Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Novak created a “farcical Facebook account” that looked like the Parma Police Department’s official page. The page was up for 12 hours and published posts including a recruitment advertisement that “strongly encourag[ed] minorities to not apply.” and an advertisement for a “Pedophile Reform" event. Some of its about 100 followers thought it was funny. Others were angry or confused and called the police station. The Department posted a warning on its official Facebook page. Novak reposted that warning on his page, to “deepen his satire.” Novak deleted “pedantic comments” on his page explaining that the page was fake, The Department contacted Facebook requesting that the page be shut down and informed local news outlets. Novak deleted his creation. Based on a search warrant and subpoena, Facebook disclosed that Novak was behind the fake. The police obtained warrants to search Novak’s apartment and to arrest him, stating that Novak unlawfully impaired the department’s functions. Novak responded that, other than 12 minutes of phone calls, the police department suffered no disruption. Novak was acquitted, then sued, alleging violations of his constitutional and statutory rights. The district court dismissed in part, with 26 claims remaining. The Sixth Circuit granted the officers qualified immunity on claims related to anonymous speech, censorship in a public forum, and the right to receive speech were dismissed. View "Novak v. City of Parma" on Justia Law

Elyria Police officers, dispatched to the house, observed blood on the frame of an open window. Wiseman appeared near a vehicle parked in the driveway and stated that there was a handgun on the driveway. The officers entered the home and observed a teenaged male in a pool of blood close to the bloody window; he appeared to have been shot multiple times. Police collected the loaded gun from the driveway, a package with white powder containing cocaine from the kitchen, and surveillance videos; they collected $4,949.00 in cash from Wiseman’s person. In a recorded video interview. Wiseman stated that he had been awoken by a voice and, on his surveillance monitor, saw Whitaker, that he had knocked Whitaker’s gun out of his hand and then shot Whitaker with a gun that Wiseman already had in the house. Wiseman subsequently placed that gun in a safe in the vehicle. Officers obtained a search warrant; the safe contained the handgun with a defaced serial number, 11 bags of a white powder containing cocaine, cutting material, a digital scale, and documents bearing Wiseman’s name. Wiseman was charged under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) & 924. The government identified the previous felony drug offense convictions that it intended to rely upon in enhancing his sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his convictions and 262-month sentence, rejecting arguments that the First Step Act of 2018 rendered his sentencing improper, that he was entitled to a jury instruction on the justification defense, and that testimony about his parolee status was improperly admitted. The Act does not apply retroactively and did not alter the definition of “felony drug offense[s]” that serve as qualifying convictions for sentencing enhancement under 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(C). View "United States v. Wiseman" on Justia Law

Clayton, the father of Bailey’s child, was charged with sexual exploitation of a minor. Bailey was present at Clayton’s trial when a victim, K.P., testified. K.P. and her mother reported that Bailey later threatened to assault K.P. in retaliation for her testimony. Bailey was also heard making threats to another testifying victim. Days after the guilty verdict, Bailey used Facebook Messenger to send K.P.’s sister messages stating: “I’m beating your ass cuz of your sister and your fat ass momma can get it too.” In later messages, Bailey again threatened to assault K.P’s sister. Bailey was indicted for witness retaliation, 18 U.S.C. 1513(b)(1)(c); 1591(a)(1)(b)(2), and pleaded guilty. The Presentence Report recommended a cross-reference (U.S.S.G. 2J1.2(c)(1)), for obstructing the prosecution of Clayton’s criminal case, which provides that the offense level shall be 6 levels lower than that of the offense that was obstructed as long as the resulting level is not less than 4 nor greater than 30. Clayton's offense level (underlying Bailey’s obstruction) was 40. Bailey’s offense level under the cross-reference became 30. The PSR alternatively recommended U.S.S.G. 2J1.2(b)(1)(B), which dictates an 8-level enhancement for “threatening to cause physical injury to a person ... to obstruct the administration of justice.” With that enhancement, Bailey’s offense level would have become 22 but when the cross-reference results in a greater offense level than that enhancement, the cross-reference controls. Applying the cross-reference, the district court found that Bailey’s Guidelines range was 78-97 months and sentenced her to 78 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding the sentence substantively and procedurally reasonable. View "United States v. Bailey" on Justia Law

In 1996, Montgomery was sexually assaulted and murdered in her Kalkaska, Michigan home. Months later, 22-year-old Peterson was in jail on an unrelated charge. Another inmate informed officers that Peterson had made an incriminating statement about the Montgomery crime. Peterson claims that he suffered from brain damage, mental illness, and severe depression, was on suicide watch, and that the defendants knew of Peterson’s disabilities. Peterson initially denied involvement, but after nine interrogations and several polygraph examinations, Peterson confessed. A week later, DNA results showed that Peterson’s DNA was not a match for a vaginal semen sample. Peterson was convicted. In 2013, Peterson’s attorneys obtained new DNA test results that excluded Peterson as a contributor to a previously-inconclusive sample from the victim’s shirt. Peterson’s conviction was vacated in 2014. Peterson filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The officers each raised qualified immunity, arguing Peterson was collaterally estopped from relitigating the voluntariness of his confession, which the Michigan trial court had determined was admissible. The district court rejected that argument and denied the defendants qualified immunity, absolute witness immunity, and governmental immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to two officers but reversed with respect to one officer, who was not alleged to have participated in the interrogations. The court reversed the decision to deny governmental immunity to the county. The state court ruling regarding the confession was vacated with the conviction. View "Peterson v. Heymes" on Justia Law

A 2004 Ohio statute regulated the "off-label" prescription of mifepristone (RU-486), which is commonly used in conjunction with misoprostol, to induce first-trimester abortions without surgery. Planned Parenthood challenged the statute under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction “insofar as it prohibits unconstitutional applications of the [statute].” In 2006, the district court entered a permanent injunction. After the Ohio Supreme Court answered certified questions, the Sixth Circuit remanded for a determination regarding the injunction’s scope. In 2011, the district court clarified that the statute was enjoined only as it applied to instances where the health of the patient was at risk and denied broader relief, leaving one remaining claim. In 2016, the FDA amended its approval and label for mifepristone, authorizing the off-label uses at issue. The statute remains in force, requiring physicians to prescribe medication abortion according to the FDA’s updated approval. Planned Parenthood sought $10,365.35 to cover costs for litigation on the merits and attorneys’ fees at 2016 rates to offset lost interest. Using this rate, the requested fees for the preliminary injunction litigation totaled $372,164.63. The district court granted that request, finding the requested hours and rates reasonable. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that Planned Parenthood does not properly qualify as a “prevailing party” because its relief was narrow and preliminary; that the court erred in refusing to apply a blanket fee reduction based on the degree of success; and that the court erred in applying 2016 rates rather than 2006 rates The court properly engaged in a contextual, case-specific review, considered the aims of section 1988, and adequately explained its rationale. View "Planned Parenthood Southwest Ohio Region v. DeWine" on Justia Law

The Tennessee General Assembly alleged that the federal government violated the Spending Clause and the Tenth Amendment by enacting and implementing statutes that require states to provide Medicaid coverage to eligible refugees. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the General Assembly’s complaint. The General Assembly did not allege an injury that gives it standing and did not establish that it has the authority to bring suit on behalf of Tennessee. Merely alleging an institutional injury is not enough. In this case, one of the claimed injuries is an alleged injury to the state, not the General Assembly. The General Assembly argued that the State Department was “infringing on the State’s sovereignty and nullifying its powers” and that its votes to appropriate state funds have been “completely nullif[ied].” The allegation amounts to claiming an abstract “loss of political power.” The General Assembly has not identified an injury that it has suffered, such as disruption of the legislative process, a usurpation of its authority, or nullification of anything it has done. Tennessee has selected the Attorney General, not the General Assembly, as the exclusive representative of its interests in federal court View "Tennessee v. United States Department of State" on Justia Law

A Colombian father brought his one-year-old son, TCG, to the United States, planning that TCG would stay with TCG’s Colombian mother, who was attempting to immigrate to the U.S. Mother was detained by INS in Texas, so father left TCG with mother’s sister in Tennessee and returned home to Colombia. Mother was released on bond and joined TCG in Tennessee. About five months later, father visited the two in the U.S., then returned to Colombia, leaving TCG in the U.S. The relationship between mother and father, who were not married, soon deteriorated. Almost a year later, father filed a petition under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 22 U.S.C. 9001(a)(2), claiming that TCG had been vacationing in the U.S. and that mother had wrongfully retained him there, beyond the expiration of his tourist visa. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the petition, finding that the U.S. was TCG’s habitual residence so that mother’s retention of the child was not wrongful. The acclimatization standard was “of limited utility” in TCG’s case, because of TCG’s age, but the court noted that TCG was “comfortable and settled” in his aunt’s home. The parental-intent standard was more appropriate in TCG’s case. Although father testified that he had always intended to return TCG to Colombia, the court found no evidence of any such plan. View "Vasquez v. Acevedo" on Justia Law

Fairness Campaign e-mailed a press release, stating that it would protest at the KFB-sponsored annual Ham Breakfast at the Kentucky State Fair, describing KFB’s policies as “anti-LGBT, anti-teacher, anti-union, anti-choice, and pro-death penalty.” Kentucky Administrative Regulations (KAR) require 72 hours’ notice to the Fairgrounds, after which protestors “have to receive a permit … with the specifics of . . . where, [and] the number of people.” Although Campaign did not abide by the KAR, Fairgrounds officials decided to “allow the protest … but to keep it in an area that did not disrupt any services,” choosing an area of the parking lot based on handicap-accessible parking. The next morning, 24 Campaign members arrived and were told that, inside the protest zone, they could use signs, megaphones, “the whole nine yards” but could not disrupt the Breakfast when they went inside. Campaign members presented their tickets and entered the Breakfast without restriction. They were seated at tables farthest from the speakers. After the opening invocation, they simultaneously rose and stood at their tables silently. This action led to their arrest. Some were handcuffed, some had to be forced to leave. All the charges against the protestors were dismissed. Protestors filed suit under 42 U.S.C.1983, alleging Fourth Amendment false arrest and malicious prosecution and First Amendment free speech and retaliatory arrest claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The protest zone, inside the Fairgrounds' ticketed area, was a limited public forum; Fairgrounds had a legitimate, viewpoint-neutral reason for designating a protest zone and the restrictions were reasonable. Plaintiffs knew that the Breakfast was a private event and were unequivocal that their intention to cause disruptions, Defendants had probable cause to make the arrests. View "Hartman v. Thompson" on Justia Law

The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) creates a cause of action for “borrower[s],” 12 U.S.C. 2605(f). Tara and Nathan Keen got a loan and took out a mortgage when they bought their house. Both of them signed the mortgage; only Nathan signed the loan. The pair later divorced. Nathan gave Keen full title to the house. He died shortly afterward. Although Tara was not legally obligated to make payments on the loan after Nathan died, she made payments anyway so she could keep the house. She later ran into financial trouble, fell behind on those payments, and contacted the loan servicer, Ocwen. After unsuccessful negotiations, Ocwen proceeded with foreclosure. The house was sold to a third-party buyer, Helson. Soon after foreclosure, Tara sued both Ocwen and Helson, alleging that Ocwen violated the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2601, which requires that loan servicers take certain steps when a borrower asks for options to avoid foreclosure. Tara alleged that Ocwen failed to properly review her requests before it foreclosed on her house. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Keen’s RESPA claims. RESPA’s cause of action extends only to “borrower[s].” Keen was not a “borrower” because she was never personally obligated under the loan agreement. View "Keen v. Helson" on Justia Law

Croce, the Chair of Human Cancer Genetics at Ohio State University (OSU), has published over 650 papers during his 45-year career; 12 were subject to corrections and two more were withdrawn with Croce’s consent. New York Times reporter Glanz emailed Croce, asking to discuss “promising anti-cancer” research. After a meeting, Glanz emailed Dr. Croce, stating that the scope of the story had broadened and that Glanz had made records requests at OSU and other institutions. Glanz later sent a letter on Times letterhead to OSU and to Croce with pointed questions, many of which followed allegations made by others against Croce. Croce retained counsel and responded, denying the allegations as “false and defamatory.” Glanz sent another email that contained additional allegations. Croce’s counsel again responded, denying each allegation. Ultimately, the Times published an article on its website (and social media) with the title, “Years of Ethics Charges, but Star Cancer Researcher Gets a Pass”; and text, “Dr. Carlo Croce was repeatedly cleared by Ohio State University, which reaped millions from his grants. Now, he faces new whistle-blower accusations.” The article appeared on the front page and above the fold in the printed edition and detailed various allegations against and criticisms of Croce. Croce brought defamation, false light, and intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claims. The article is a standard piece of investigative journalism that presents newsworthy allegations made by others, with appropriate qualifying language. View "Croce v. New York Times Co." on Justia Law