Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Columbia Gas on Landowners' state-law trespass and unjust enrichment claims involving underground storage of natural gas. In regard to the trespass claims, the court held that Landowners failed to show that Columbia Gas interfered with the possessory interest in their subsurface where each Landowner had admitted that they have not used and do not intend to use their subsurface.In regard to the unjust enrichment claims, the court held that Columbia Gas need not file a cross-appeal in order to preserve its argument to affirm the damages judgment on the ground that Columbia Gas has no underlying liability. Furthermore, Landowners' unjust enrichment claims failed because Landowners could not show, as they must, that they conferred a benefit upon the defendant. View "Baatz v. Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Safelite for breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation arising from the company's alleged mismanagement of its deferred compensation plan for executive employees. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of Safelite's motion for partial summary judgment, holding that the Safelite Plan qualifies as an employee pension benefit plan under 29 U.S.C. 1002(2)(A)(ii) and is not a bonus plan as defined in 29 C.F.R. 2510.3-2(c). Therefore, the Safelite Plan was not exempted from coverage under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. View "Wilson v. Safelite Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Pablo, born in 1985, speaks the Mam language and minimal Spanish. Pablo fled to the U.S. in 2001 after violent abuse by his stepfather. Pablo paid for legal representation but did not understand the proceedings. In 2009, Pablo was stopped for a traffic violation and deported. Pablo then lived with his grandparents, indigenous farmers. People from another town had beaten his grandparents and destroyed their crops. Pablo joined a committee of indigenous farmers and reported the abuse to the mayor. The police supported the assailants. Pablo was taken to an isolated place and beaten until he passed out. The group threatened to kill Pablo if he continued to fight for land rights. In 2010, Pablo fled to the U.S. He did not contact immigration officials or seek legal assistance. In 2012, Pablo was again deported and found work on a farm. Non-indigenous managers mistreated indigenous workers. Pablo helped form a union to protest the abuse. The owner warned that he would summon police to “show the Indians their place.” During a protest, Pablo was taken to jail and severely beaten. Police stated that Pablo would be sent to his grandparents, where local police would decide whether he lived or died. A human rights organization secured his release. Pablo spent five days in the hospital. Pablo returned to the U.S. He first met with his attorney in July 2016. Pablo did not have any records from his previous proceedings. Pablo filed complaints against his prior “attorneys” and moved to reopen. The Sixth Circuit reversed the denial of relief and remanded to the BIA to reconsider whether Pablo demonstrated changed country conditions under the correct evidentiary and legal standards. The court affirmed the denial of Pablo’s motion based on ineffective assistance because Pablo failed to demonstrate due diligence. View "Lorenzo v. Barr" on Justia Law

Ragland pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). His PSR calculated Ragland’s base offense level as 22, based in part on Ragland’s prior conviction for unarmed robbery, a "crime of violence." It applied a four-level enhancement, USSG 2K2.1(b)(4)(B), because the pistol with which Ragland was arrested had an “altered or obliterated serial number.” The gun had been reported stolen and had been used in two shootings, including one the day before Ragland was arrested. Ragland’s Guidelines range was 121-151 months of imprisonment, although the statutory maximum was 120 months. Ragland did not object to his base offense level or the enhancement but objected to a recommendation that the court not grant a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The district court gave him full acceptance-of-responsibility credit, reducing his Guidelines range to 87-108 months. The court considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and decided that an upward variance to the statutory maximum—120 months—was appropriate because the circumstances of Ragland’s arrest and his prior record indicated that Ragland was a “significant risk to the public and a significant risk to re-offend.” Ragland did not object. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the sentence. The Michigan offense of unarmed robbery constituted a “crime of violence” under USSG 2K2.1(a)(3); the court did not commit plain error in applying the enhancement for an altered or obliterated serial number on a firearm. View "United States v. Fuller-Ragland" on Justia Law

Ohio Revised Code 4123.88 addresses how workers' compensation claimant information is handled and protected by the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation and contains the solicitation ban at issue: “No person shall directly or indirectly solicit authority” (1) to “represent the claimant or employer in respect of” a worker’s compensation “claim or appeal,” or (2) “to take charge of” any such claim or appeal. The district court rejected Bevan's challenge on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed, concluding that the state has prohibited all solicitation, whether oral or written, by any person to represent a party with respect to an Ohio workers’ compensation claim or appeal and that such a prophylactic ban violates the First Amendment under the Supreme Court’s 1988 "Shapero" decision. The court rejected an argument that the constitutionally questionable language is part of a larger statutory scheme that Bevan allegedly violated by obtaining claimant information from the Bureau in an unlawful manner. Whether Bevan violated other statutory provisions governing disclosure of claimant information is not relevant to whether the solicitation ban itself is constitutional. The solicitation ban makes no distinction as to how the person doing the soliciting learned of the claimant’s information: it bans all solicitation regardless of where or how that information was obtained. The prohibition is repugnant to the First Amendment's free speech clause. View "Bevan & Associates, LPA v. Yost" on Justia Law

The Short North Posse gang of Columbus, Ohio (an affiliate of the national Crips gang) conducted brutal home-invasion style robberies and planned and executed the murder of rivals, high-value targets, and cooperating witnesses to support its drug operation. After two months of trial, Ledbetter, Ussury, Liston, and Harris were convicted of RICO conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) for their membership in the Posse enterprise. Those four, plus Robinson, were convicted of various murders in aid of racketeering, 18 U.S.C. 1959, and other similar crimes; all received at least one life sentence. The Sixth Circuit vacated Ussury’s conviction for the murder of Hill in aid of racketeering, finding insufficient evidence that Ussury acted with the necessary statutory purpose The court vacated Harris’s and Robinson’s convictions for murder by firearm during a crime of violence in light of the Supreme Court’s 2019 “Davis” decision, that 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)(B)’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague. The court rejected other claims, including insufficiency of the evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel, improper jury instructions, and improper testimony. View "United States v. Liston" on Justia Law

Sulik pleaded guilty to cyberstalking, 18 U.S.C. 2261A(2), after he sent threatening emails to a member of Congress. The threats followed the representative calling General John Kelly, then White House Chief of Staff, a “disgrace to the uniform he used to wear” and included statements: “You put your family at risk,” “Marines are loyal to their Generals, not low life parasite politicians like you,” and “What are you going to do before I erase you?” The district court concluded that his crime was motivated by the victim’s status as a government officer, triggering a six-level enhancement under USSG 3A1.2. Sulik was sentenced to 48 months in prison. Without the enhancement, Sulik’s range would have been 24-30 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The “official victim” enhancement applies if the victim is a current or former “government officer or employee,” or an immediate family member, and “the offense of conviction was motivated by such status.” A defendant’s knowledge of the victim’s official status alone cannot trigger the enhancement. The comment that triggered Sulik’s threats was a public response to the debate about a matter of great political significance: immigration policy. In at least one email, Sulik referenced the Representative’s official status; the threats were sent “to a campaign email, not a personal address.” While the evidence was “barely sufficient” to support the application of the enhancement, there was no clear error. View "United States v. Sulik" on Justia Law

The union accused the employer, which operates coal-fired power generation facilities in Ohio and Pennsylvania, of implementing terms and conditions of employment that were inconsistent with the employer’s final impasse offer during collective bargaining negotiations and of unilaterally subcontracting out periodic maintenance work historically performed by union employees. The National Labor Relations Board affirmed an administrative law judge’s findings in favor of the union on both charges. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that the employer violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158 (a)(5), (a)(1), when, after impasse, it selectively implemented certain pre-impasse bargaining proposals that were inextricably linked to other proposals not imposed. The court reversed with respect to subcontracting the turbine/generator outage work without first bargaining with the union. The decision to subcontract a planned project involving the shutdown and maintenance of one of its turbine-generator units is properly characterized as a business management decision, driven by the employer's responsibility to keep its generating units in working order, while continuously offering full service, or face penalties. The court reversed the Board’s order requiring the employer to supply requested information regarding subcontracting. View "FirstEnergy Generation, LLC v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

Berkshire has a long history of mental health issues. Berkshire was incarcerated, 2001-2014, for second-degree home invasion. He began to improve while he was in the Macomb Correctional Facility's Residential Treatment Program (RTP). Berkshire was a Housing Unit Representative on a “Warden’s Forum.” After Berkshire brought complaints, Dr. Dahl unilaterally raised Berkshire’s Global Assessment Functioning score so that Berkshire was ineligible for RTP. Berkshire claims the move was retaliation. Once discharged from RTP, Berkshire deteriorated. Berkshire’s care was overseen by Beauvais, the unit chief of the outpatient mental-health program; Sermo, a psychologist with that program; and Dr. Pozios, a private doctor working for the government. Berkshire had homicidal thoughts and engaged in self-injury. Eventually, Berkshire attempted suicide; Beauvais and Sermo transferred Berkshire to a Crisis Stabilization Program, stating that they “could not transfer [Berkshire] to Mars.” Berkshire claims that the three exhibited deliberate indifference to Berkshire’s serious medical needs. After Berkshire attempted suicide, he was restrained. When Berkshire requested a bathroom break. Sergeant Nelson told Berkshire to “hold it” and that he was going to “stay just like that until [his] mental illness goes away.” Sergeant Nelson never returned, leaving Berkshire to lie in his own urine and feces for several hours. In Berkshire’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity to all the defendants. Berkshire produced sufficient evidence to show violations of clearly established constitutional rights. View "Berkshire v. Dahl" on Justia Law

Louisiana-Pacific produces “engineered-wood” building siding—wood treated with zinc borate, a preservative that poisons termites; Hardie sells fiber-cement siding. To demonstrate the superiority of its fiber cement, Hardie initiated an advertising campaign called “No Wood Is Good,” proclaiming that customers ought to realize that all wood siding—however “engineered”—is vulnerable to damage by pests. Its marketing materials included digitally-altered images and video of a woodpecker perched in a hole in Louisiana-Pacific’s siding with nearby text boasting both that “Pests Love It,” and that engineered wood is “[s]ubject to damage caused by woodpeckers, termites, and other pests.” Louisiana-Pacific sued Hardie, alleging false advertising, and moved for a preliminary injunction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. Louisiana-Pacific failed to show that it would likely succeed in proving the advertisement unambiguously false under the Lanham Act and the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. View "Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. James Hardie Building Products, Inc." on Justia Law