Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Havis pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. He had a lengthy criminal record. The district court concluded that his 20-year-old state conviction for selling or delivering cocaine was a “controlled substance offense” under the Guidelines and increased his base offense level. Havis unsuccessfully argued that delivering cocaine does not qualify as a “controlled substance offense” and that it was unclear whether his state conviction was for delivery or sale. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, applying the categorical approach. On rehearing, en banc, the Sixth Circuit reversed. The lower court erred relying on the Sentencing Commission’s commentary to section 4B1.2(b), which states that a controlled substance offense “includes ‘the offenses of aiding and abetting, conspiring, and attempting to commit such offenses.’” Unlike the Guidelines themselves, commentary to the Guidelines never passes through the gauntlets of congressional review or notice and comment; commentary has no independent legal force. To make attempt crimes a part of section 4B1.2(b), the Commission did not interpret a term in the guideline itself—no term in section 4B1.2(b) would bear that construction but added an offense not listed in the guideline. The text of section 4B1.2(b) control and makes clear that attempt crimes do not qualify as controlled substance offenses. View "United States v. JHavis" on Justia Law

Doe is HIV-positive and takes Genvoya to control his condition. Doe's BlueCross health insurance covers Genvoya. After February 2017, BlueCross required Doe to fill the HIV prescription through mail order or by picking it up at certain brick-and-mortar pharmacies. If Doe used BlueCross's specialty pharmacy network, his co-pay for each monthly batch of Genvoya would be $120. If Doe continued to get the medicine at his local pharmacy, he would have to pay the full cost, thousands of dollars per batch. Doe preferred interacting with his regular pharmacists, who knew his medical history and could spot the effects of harmful drug interactions. He also worried that deliveries to his house might compromise his privacy or risk heat damage to the medicine. Doe filed a putative class action, alleging that BlueCross discriminated against HIV-positive beneficiaries in violation of the Affordable Care Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which breached their insurance contract. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Affordable Care Act prohibits discrimination against the disabled in the provision of federally supported health programs under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. BlueCross did not violate the Rehabilitation Act; it did not exclude Doe from participating in the plan or deny him benefits covered by it. Section 504 does not prohibit disparate-impact discrimination. The ADA claim failed because Doe targets BlueCross’s operation of his health care plan, not its control over his pharmacy (a public accommodation). View "Doe v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee, Inc." on Justia Law

Doutt obtained child pornography online using a video conferencing application that was being monitored by the federal government. Charge with receipt of child pornography, Doutt agreed to undergo a polygraph examination. Among other incidents, Doutt admitted that he had engaged in sexual activity with a boy, M.R., nearly 40 years earlier. Doutt stated that he was 16 and M.R. was “a year or two younger.” Doutt later changed his response and recalled that M.R. was 11 or 12. These sexual encounters continued for several years. After Doutt pleaded guilty, the court applied a sentencing enhancement for a “pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor,” U.S.S.G. 2G2.2(b)(5). “Sexual abuse” is defined by reference to various criminal statutes— including one that forbids sexual activity with a minor between the ages of 12 and 16 “if the perpetrator was at least four years older than” the minor. The Sixth Circuit vacated the sentence. The district court erred when it simply took Doutt’s age, subtracted M.R.’s age, and concluded that Doutt was four years older than M.R. “A straightforward days-and-months approach” applies to 18 U.S.C. 2243: “at least four years” older means at least 1,461 days (365 multiplied by four, plus one leap day) or 48 months older. The age difference between M.R. and Doutt could have been merely three years and one day. View "United States v. Doutt" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, battalion chiefs in Battle Creek’s fire department, were responsible for many administrative tasks. While they did not have direct authority to make hiring and firing decisions, they conducted performance evaluations and approved vacation requests. Plaintiffs’ suggestions and recommendations as to hiring, firing, advancement, or promotion of other employees were given "particular weight.” Plaintiffs were required to periodically serve on “standby” duty and be “on call” from 5:00 pm until 8:00 am the following morning for seven days. Plaintiffs received 1.5 hours of pay for each day of standby duty, plus overtime pay for hours worked if they were called back to active duty while on standby. The individual on standby duty was required to monitor a pager and a radio, answer phone calls, and help handle problems. Plaintiffs were occasionally required to respond to the scene of a fire while on standby duty. Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201, by failing to pay overtime. The district court ruled and the Sixth Circuit affirmed that Plaintiffs were exempt from the FLSA’s overtime pay requirement under the executive exemption. Ample evidence supported a finding that Plaintiffs’ primary duty was managerial in nature. View "Holt v. Battle Creek" on Justia Law

A class of 28,177 exotic dancers alleged that dance clubs violated the Fair Labor Standards Act and state wage-and-hour laws by “intentionally misclassif[ying] class members as independent contractors, refus[ing] to pay minimum wage, unlawfully requir[ing] employees to split gratuities, and unlawfully deduct[ing] employee wages through rents, fines, and penalties.” The Agreement required that every club provide its dancers with an assessment to determine whether they should be classified as employees or an Independent Professional Entertainers and limited the control that the clubs may exercise over the Independent Entertainers. The Agreement also addresses tip-pooling, commissions, reimbursement for license and permit fees required to perform at the club, and provision of logo costumes; it divides a total award of $6.55 million into a Net Cash Payment Settlement Fund, Secondary Pool Remuneration, and attorneys’ fees. The district court approved a settlement over the objections of four class members. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, considering: the “high risk of continued litigation and the uncertain likelihood of success on the merits” and that the Agreement “offers value to the class in the form of cash, rent-credit or dance-fee payments, and long-term structural changes to Defendants’ business practices, all of which directly benefit class members.” The court rejected an argument that the settlement violated the procedural requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 because the class release was impermissibly broad and the class notice failed to adequately apprise the class members of their rights. View "Doe v. Deja Vu Consulting, Inc." on Justia Law

Myers entered Sullivan’s home without permission, pointed a gun, and demanded drugs. The two went outside to Sullivan's car, where Sullivan saw her neighbor, Baker, and attempted to whisper to call the police. Myers grabbed Sullivan and threatened Baker. Baker ran away and called the police, who arrived and arrested Myers. Myers pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The PSR recommended that Myers be sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), based on his prior Tennessee convictions for aggravated assault and two separate initiations of a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine. Myers argued that initiating a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine is not an ACCA “serious drug” offense. The district court disagreed and sentenced him to the statutory mandatory minimum term of 180 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A state conviction qualifies as “a serious drug offense” if it involves "manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance,” for which a maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years or more is prescribed. Initiation of the methamphetamine manufacture process carries a maximum term of 10 years or more. The Tennessee legislature’s intent to criminalize steps in the methamphetamine manufacturing process, including actions short of the actual manufacture, does not remove the offenses from the ambit of the ACCA. View "United States v. Myers" on Justia Law

Based on a five-page-long search-warrant affidavit—which included evidence from a confidential informant and other sources, a controlled buy, direct police-officer surveillance, and Christian’s history of drug trafficking arrests—a magistrate determined that there was probable cause to search 618 Grandville Avenue, Christian’s home, for evidence of drug trafficking. That search uncovered a large amount of heroin, some cocaine and marijuana, and two loaded guns. Christian was convicted of various drug and firearm crimes. The Sixth Circuit initially reversed the district court's denial of Christian's motion to suppress evidence. On rehearing, the en banc court affirmed the denial of the motion, rejecting Christian's "attempt to isolate and explain away each piece of evidence," and contradict the factual assertions of the officers who watched the house. Viewing the “totality of the circumstances,” through the “lens of common sense,” as the Supreme Court has instructed, the conclusion is inescapable: there was probable cause to believe that a search of 618 Grandville would uncover evidence of drug trafficking. “Most readers of the affidavit would have been surprised if it did not.” View "United States v. Christian" on Justia Law

An incumbent Kentucky state senator and an unsuccessful state candidate sued, alleging that Kentucky statutes violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. One (now defunct) campaign finance provision restricted the amount a candidate could loan to his campaign. The challenged ethics provisions prohibit a legislator, candidate for the legislature, or his campaign committee from accepting a campaign contribution from a lobbyist; prohibit a legislator, candidate, or his campaign committee from accepting a campaign contribution from an employer of a lobbyist or a political committee (PAC) during a regular session of the General Assembly; prohibit a legislator or his spouse from accepting “anything of value” from a lobbyist or his employer; and prohibit a lobbyist from serving as a campaign treasurer, and directly soliciting, controlling, or delivering a campaign contribution to a legislator or candidate. The district court dismissed the campaign finance claim as moot but found that the ethics laws burdened “core political speech” and curtailed freedom of association, requiring strict scrutiny. The court upheld the regular session contribution ban but found the other challenged ethics provisions unconstitutional. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to the “regular session” ban but otherwise vacated and reversed. Kentucky’s legislature acted to protect itself and its citizens from corruption; these laws are closely drawn to further Kentucky’s anti-corruption interest and pass constitutional muster. View "Schickel v. Dilger" on Justia Law

Medicare pays for doctors’ home visits if a patient is homebound. Mobile Doctors offered physician services to homebound Medicare beneficiaries, hiring doctors who assigned their Medicare billing rights to the company. Upon receipt of payment, Mobile would pay the physician-employee a percentage of what Mobile received from billing Medicare. Many of Mobile’s patients did not actually qualify as homebound. Some doctors signed certifications for additional unneeded treatment from companies that provided at-home nursing or physical therapy services—companies that had referred the patients to Mobile. Mobile submitted Medicare codes for more serious and more expensive diagnoses or procedures than the provider actually diagnosed or performed. Mobile instructed physicians to list at least three diagnoses in the patient file; if the doctors did not list enough, a staff member added more. Mobile only paid the physicians if they checked at least one of the top two billing codes. Doctors who billed for the higher of the top two codes were paid more. Mobile also paid for “standing orders” for testing, although Medicare prohibits testing done under standing orders. Daneshvar joined Mobile as a physician in 2012. After following Mobile’s policies Daneshvar was convicted of conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud but found not guilty of healthcare fraud; he was sentenced to 24 months' imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Daneshvar’s trial was fair; none of the district court’s rulings during that proceeding should be reversed. There was no reversible error with his sentencing. View "United States v. Daneshvar" on Justia Law

In 2005-2006, Thompson was sued by employees and one business he hired to assist in locating a long-sunken ship and recovering its treasures. The district court entered a preliminary injunction instructing Thompson not to sell, encumber, transfer or diminish in value any gold coins he had in his possession. If the coins were not in Thompson’s possession, Thompson was to submit a declaration under oath describing the parties to whom the coins were transferred and any consideration. Thompson transferred the coins to a third-party trust and failed to provide the required information. The court scheduled a “show cause” hearing. When Thompson failed to appear, having absconded to Florida, an arrest warrant issued. Thompson, charged under 18 U.S.C. 401(3), entered into plea agreement, agreeing to assist in identifying and recovering assets. The court ordered Thompson to “submit to a debtor’s examination,” consistent with that agreement. Thompson appeared for the examination; the civil parties and receiver contended that Thompson refused to provide sufficient answers, then invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege. At a second court-ordered examination, Thompson appeared but refused to answer any questions. After a civil show-cause hearing combined with criminal-contempt sentencing, the court sentenced Thompson to two years of imprisonment for criminal contempt, held Thompson in civil contempt and ordered Thompson to “be incarcerated indefinitely until you comply.” After 18 months of incarceration for civil contempt, Thompson sought to terminate his civil-contempt sanctions, citing the recalcitrant-witness statute, 28 U.S.C. 1826(a), which limits confinement to 18 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Thompson’s motion. Because Thompson was required both to testify and to help recover assets by taking non-testimonial actions, section 1826 did not apply. View "United States v. Thompson" on Justia Law