Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In an intersection, Patterson’s SUV rammed the door of Green’s sedan. According to Green, she was briefly unconscious and, after coming to, was dazed and in intense pain. Southfield Officer Maya arrived and spoke with Patterson, who did not look injured. Maya then went to Green, still on her back on the median. Because Green “didn’t respond too many times,” Maya refrained from asking many questions. Traffic Specialist Birberick arrived while paramedics were looking after Green. Patterson told him that he had entered the intersection with a green light when his car “was struck” by Green’s car. Birberick did not think that the accident was not severe enough to warrant significant investigation. Birberick determined that the physical evidence corroborated Patterson’s account. Birberick did not complete a police incident report but only completed the crash report that Michigan requires for highway-safety planning purposes. In the “Hazardous Action” box, Birberick wrote “none” for Patterson and “disregarded traffic [signal]” for Green. Crash reports cannot be used in court. Green was hospitalized for several days. When she saw the report, she insisted that Patterson ran the light and that she had a witness. Officers followed up but decided against amending the report. Green sued Patterson, then filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983; 1985 action against officers and the city, alleging that the investigation violated her equal protection rights (Green is a black woman, Patterson a white man) and her right of access to the courts. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that the officers were protected by qualified immunity, characterizing the officers’ actions as “mere laxity.” View "Green v. Southfield" on Justia Law

Petitioner robbed a restaurant of approximately $200-300. Attorney Walwyn represented petitioner. Days before trial, the state offered that petitioner plead guilty in exchange for a 20-year sentence. He allegedly rejected that offer. Convicted, he was sentenced to 28 years’ imprisonment for aggravated robbery, eight years for one conviction of aggravated assault, 10 years on the other aggravated-assault conviction, and eight years for evading arrest, all to be served consecutively. On appeal, petitioner unsuccessfully challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, jury instructions, and his sentences. Tennessee courts rejected his motion for postconviction relief, in which he raised was a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations. At a hearing, he testified that his attorney never advised him of the plea offer until years later. Throughout the post-conviction proceedings, petitioner maintained his innocence and speculated that he may have been misidentified. Walwyn testified that he “did relay the offer” but petitioner told him “he was not taking any time.” The state court also considered a claim that Walwyn conveyed the offer but did not advise petitioner of the much higher sentence he could face. The court reasoned that, despite the disparity between the offer and the possible sentence, petitioner could not show prejudice because he was uninterested in taking any plea offer. The district court dismissed a federal habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Tennessee court did not act contrary to federal law and was not unreasonable in determining that petitioner was uninterested in taking any plea. View "Johnson v. Genovese" on Justia Law

Fifth Third Bank’s “Early Access” program is a short-term lending option for certain customers who hold eligible checking accounts. Fifth Third deposited Early Access loans straight into borrowers’ accounts, then paid itself back automatically, with a 10% “transaction fee,” after a direct deposit posted or 35 days elapsed, whichever came first. The contract governing the program disclosed the annual percentage rate (APR) as 120% in all cases. Plaintiffs obtained Early Access loans, which were paid back fewer than 30 days later. They contend that the 120% figure is false and misleading. Calculated using a more conventional method, in which the APR is tied to the length of the loan, plaintiffs assert that the APR was actually as high as 3650%. The district court rejected an Ohio law breach-of-contract claim, holding that the contract unambiguously disclosed the method for calculating APR despite admitting that the result “may be misleading.” The Sixth Circuit reversed. The contract was ambiguous because it provided different descriptions of “APR” that cannot be reconciled. The first was a definition, lifted verbatim from a federal regulation, that describes the APR as being “expressed as a yearly rate”; the second was the method used to calculate it, which is not based on any time period. The ambiguity raises a question of fact that should be resolved on remand. View "Laskaris v. Fifth Third Bank" on Justia Law

DEA agents waited along I-94, for a black Toyota Camry. The previous evening, agents had arranged for a confidential informant to purchase heroin from Soto, who agreed to drive the shipment from Chicago to Detroit. Agents obtained a warrant to track the location of Soto’s cell phone. Agents spotted Soto’s Camry, matching it to the location of Soto’s cell phone. Agents noticed a RAV4 behind Soto, driving at approximately the same speed as the Camry and changing lanes at the same time, concluded that the cars were traveling “in tandem” and asked Michigan State Police to pull over both cars. As a trooper pulled up, the RAV4 slowed to 53 miles per hour, under the minimum speed limit. The trooper effectuated a stop. The RAV4’s driver, Belakhdhar, and his passenger provided identification, explaining that they were driving to visit someone in the hospital. Belakhdhar consented to a car search. Failing to find any contraband, the trooper let them go. DEA continued surveilling the vehicle, determined that Belakhdhar lacked legal immigration status, and requested that Border Patrol stop the car. During that second stop, another agent walked a drug dog around the vehicle. The dog alerted to the back bumper. Opening the trunk, the agents discovered hidden heroin hidden and arrested Belakhdhar. The court suppressed the evidence. The Sixth Circuit reversed. As a matter of law, the district court erred to the extent it held that tandem driving with a vehicle suspected of drug activity cannot, alone, support reasonable suspicion. View "United States v. Belakhdhar" on Justia Law

Louisville police watched 2429 Elliott Avenue based on a tip that Shanklin was growing marijuana there. The tip came from a “reliable confident[i]al informant,” who stated that within the last 48 hours, he/she had seen “numerous” marijuana plants inside the residence and that he/she believed that Shanklin was the “only occupant.” McKinney and other officers observed Shanklin exit the house and enter a vehicle. McKinney followed Shanklin to a parking lot. McKinney and other officers approached Shanklin, confirmed his identity, and had a K-9 sniff Shanklin’s car. The dog alerted. A search of the car revealed a small amount of marijuana leaves in the trunk. Other officers watched the residence to ensure that no one exited or entered. An officer testified that when he approached the house, he observed marijuana plants in the backyard and noticed a “strong smell of marijuana.” McKinney obtained a search warrant. The subsequent search uncovered 51 marijuana plants, a marijuana pipe, a digital scale, letters addressed to Shanklin, and personal items associated with Shanklin, including car registrations, photographs, and a prescription. There were a few bills addressed to Shanklin’s mother and others. In the “front bedroom,” officers located a loaded pistol on the nightstand, a digital scale, and a magazine focusing on growing marijuana.Shanklin was convicted under Kentucky law for cultivating marijuana but was found not guilty of a firearm enhancement. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Shanklin’s conviction as a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1); 924(a)(2)) and 63-month sentence. The court upheld the denial of Shanklin’s motion to compel the government to disclose the identity of the confidential informant and the application of a sentencing enhancement for using or possessing a firearm “in connection with another felony offense. The government provided sufficient identification evidence to sustain Shanklin’s conviction. View "United States v. Shanklin" on Justia Law

In 2006, Williams pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. He had prior convictions under Ohio law: attempted felonious assault, domestic violence, and assault on a peace officer, which subjected him to a mandatory-minimum sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e) (ACCA). Williams twice unsuccessfully filed 28 U.S.C. 2255 petitions to vacate his sentence. In 2015, (Johnson) the Supreme Court found the ACCA's residual clause, section 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), unconstitutional and subsequently held that Johnson had announced a new substantive rule of constitutional law that applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. Williams filed a third motion, arguing that his prior convictions no longer counted as ACCA predicate offenses. The Sixth Circuit authorized the district court to consider whether Williams’ felonious assault conviction still qualifies as an ACCA violent felony, noting its 2012 holding (Anderson), that committing felonious assault in Ohio necessarily requires the use of physical force and is an ACCA predicate offense under the elements clause. The district court then held, and the Sixth Circuit agreed, that Anderson remained controlling precedent. The Sixth Circuit, en banc, subsequently overruled Anderson and held that a conviction for Ohio felonious assault no longer categorically qualifies as a violent felony predicate under the ACCA’s elements clause. The court then remanded Williams’ case. View "Williams v. United States" on Justia Law

Davis’s co-defendant, Young, contacted 16-year-old S.S. on Facebook to ask if S.S. and her sister were trading sex for drugs. S.S. and her sister drove to meet Young, who said he had friends who would pay for sex. Davis and another man got in their car. S.S.’s sister stated, “she’s 17.” Young directed S.S.’s sister to drive to Fort Wayne, Indiana. S.S. engaged in prostitution that night, splitting the proceeds with Young. S.S.’s sister drove S.S. back to Ohio. That evening, S.S.’s sister returned S.S. to Fort Wayne, where she engaged in sex acts for money and had sex with Davis. Davis and Young prostituted S.S. again, days later. Davis was convicted of conspiracy to engage in sex trafficking of a minor, two counts of transportation of a minor with intent to engage in prostitution, and three counts of sex trafficking of a minor. The court noted a 16-year age gap between S.S. and Davis and applied an enhancement for exerting "undue influence" over S.S., split Davis’s offense conduct into three groups (for each day of prostitution), calculated Davis’s Guidelines range as life imprisonment, and orally pronounced a sentence of life imprisonment. The next day, the court convened “a continued hearing” and sentenced Davis to 360 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed as to the grouping of Davis’s offense conduct but vacated the sentence and remanded for factual findings relating to the undue-influence enhancement. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 authorized the IRS to gather information about tax shelters, 26 U.S.C. 6707A. The IRS requires taxpayers and certain third parties to submit records pertaining to “reportable transaction[s]” as defined by IRS regulations, subject to significant penalties. A “material advisor” who provides material aid to a taxpayer in carrying out reportable transactions and who derives a threshold amount of gross income from that aid, faces similar penalties. A material advisor who fails to maintain a list of taxpayers that he aided in carrying out reportable transactions faces a $10,000 per day penalty. Notice 2016-66 identified “micro-captive transactions” as “transactions of interest,” a subset of reportable transactions that have “a potential for tax avoidance or evasion,” but stated that the IRS “lack[s] sufficient information” to distinguish between those that are lawful and those that are unlawful. Plaintiff, a material advisor to taxpayers engaging in micro-captive transactions, challenged the Notice under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 500, and the Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 801, arguing that it was a legislative rule that required notice-and-comment rulemaking, was arbitrary, and required submission for congressional review. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint as barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. 7421(a) and the tax exception to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. 2201, which divest federal district courts of jurisdiction over suits “for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax.” The court noted that the IRS does “not have a great history of complying with APA procedures.” View "CIC Services., LLC v. Internal Revenue Service" on Justia Law

Schier represented Capital in a state court suit filed by Longhorn. Capital was hit with a $5-million judgment and landed in bankruptcy. Its Chapter 7 proceedings stayed the Longhorn litigation with post-trial motions pending. Longhorn filed a bankruptcy claim. When Schier filed a claim for Capital’s unpaid legal fees, the bankruptcy trustee countered with a malpractice suit against Schier, which eventually settled. Schier agreed to pay the estate $600,000 and to withdraw its attorney’s fees claim. The bankruptcy court approved this settlement. Schier withdrew its claim. When the trustee filed a final report, Schier alleged that Capital’s right to appeal Longhorn’s state-court judgment qualified as an “asset” that the trustee should have administered or abandoned. The bankruptcy court overruled Schier’s objection, reasoning that Schier should have raised this issue while Schier had a pending fees request and was a “creditor” with “standing.” The district court dismissed an appeal, stating that “[i]n order to have standing to appeal a bankruptcy court order, an appellant must have been directly and adversely affected pecuniarily by the order,” a more demanding standard than Article III standing. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting the Supreme Court’s 2014 “Lexmark” decision, which jettisoned the label “prudential standing.” Citing “the post-Lexmark uncertainty about various standing concepts,” the court held that Schier lacked the type of standing that Lexmark did not affect: Article III standing. View "In re Capital Contracting Co." on Justia Law

Wandahsega was convicted of abusive sexual contact, 18 U.S.C. 2244(a)(5), after Wandahsega’s then-six-year-old son, H.D.W., told his grandmother and others that Wandahsega had touched him inappropriately. Wandahsega and H.D.W. are Native Americans and lived on the Hannahville Reservation. After his mother’s death, H.D.W. split his time between his maternal grandparents and Wandahsega’s apartment. Wandahsega denied touching his son but said that he sometimes blacks out from drinking and did not know what, if anything, he might have done to H.D.W. The Michigan State Police Forensic Laboratory found saliva on the inside rear portion of a pair of H.D.W.’s underwear, and testing established that the saliva contained a mixture of both H.D.W.’s and Wandahsega’s DNA. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Wandahsega’s conviction and 288-month sentence, rejecting an argument that the district court erred in allowing H.D.W. to testify by closed-circuit television and upholding the district court’s evidentiary rulings concerning the testimony of medical professionals and others about what H.D.W. told them. The court upheld the district court’s decision to deny Wandahsega the opportunity to present to the jury a video of a supervised visit between H.D.W. and Wandahsega. The evidence was sufficient to support the conviction and the sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Wandahsega" on Justia Law