Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2012, K.H., a Guatemalan citizen, then seven years old, was kidnapped, beaten, and raped by gang members. The Guatemalan police caught K.H.’s persecutors, who were tried, convicted, and sentenced. The government provided K.H. with psychological treatment, temporarily placed her in a child refuge center, helped her with a visa application, and required that K.H. and her grandmother relocate. Shortly thereafter, while her visa application was pending, K.H. fled to the United States, where her mother was living. K.H. was apprehended by immigration authorities at the U.S.-Mexico border in 2014. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the denial of her applications for asylum and humanitarian asylum because she failed to demonstrate that the Guatemalan government was unwilling or unable to control her persecutors and protect her. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, concluding that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s determination. The court noted the government’s timely intervention and the arrests, prosecution, conviction, and sentencing of K.H.’s persecutors, as well as the steps taken by the to protect K.H. K.H. did not suffer past persecution, so her claim for humanitarian asylum must fail. View "K. H. v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Debtors filed their bankruptcy petition in 2008. Grusin provided them legal advice before the filing and at the beginning of the bankruptcy case. Fullen filed the petition and represented them in the chapter 7 case. In 2011, the bankruptcy court granted the Trustee summary judgment in an adversary proceeding seeking to deny the Debtors’ discharge and disqualified both lawyers from further representation of the Debtors in that case. The Debtors hired new counsel, who obtained relief from the summary judgment order. Following a trial, in 2015, the bankruptcy court again denied the Debtors’ discharge. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. In 2012, the bankruptcy court granted CJV derivative standing to pursue a malpractice action on behalf of the estate against Grusin and Fullen. Malpractice complaints were filed in the bankruptcy court and in Tennessee state court. In 2014, CJV filed another adversary proceeding, seeking declaratory relief that the malpractice claims constituted property of Debtors’ estate. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed the bankruptcy court in holding that the malpractice action for denial of debtors’ discharges based on errors and omissions contained in a bankruptcy petition, as well as pre and post-petition legal advice, was not property of the debtors’ bankruptcy estate. There was no pre-petition injury; the Debtors were injured by that negligence when their discharges in bankruptcy were denied. View "In re Blasingame" on Justia Law

Timberline, a timber-harvesting company that operates solely in Michigan, uses logging and harvesting equipment and trucks that were purchased in Michigan but were manufactured outside of Michigan. The Secretary of Labor sued Timberline and its director, Payne, alleging violations of the overtime and recordkeeping provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The district court awarded $439,437.42 in unpaid overtime and an equal amount in liquidated damages, reasoning that Timberline was a covered enterprise under the FLSA because it “has employees handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods or materials that have been moved in or produced for commerce by any person,” 29 U.S.C. 203(s)(1)(A)(i), i.e., the logging and harvesting equipment manufactured outside of Michigan. Part of the damages award included time employees spent commuting from home to work or for meal periods, which the district court included in the overtime calculation after finding that Timberline had an established custom or practice of compensating its employees for such time. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the liability determination but vacated the award. The district court erred in finding that ordinary commute time and bona fide meal periods qualify as compensable hours subject to the FLSA’s overtime requirements. View "Secretary of Labor v. Timberline South, LLC" on Justia Law

Cruz, a native of El Salvador, grew up in a neighborhood dominated by the 18th Street gang. A rival gang, MS-13, sought to recruit Cruz and his friends as “spies” to relay information about 18th Street activities. After they refused, MS-13 threatened and assaulted them. MS-13 members murdered Cruz’s friend. Later that week, one of them told Cruz “if [he] was just as stupid as Brian, then the same thing would happen.” Cruz fled El Salvador and was apprehended near Hidalgo, Texas. In his deportation proceeding, Cruz sought asylum based on his fear of gang violence if he returned home. While his asylum application was pending, MS-13 killed one of Cruz’s friend, while 18th Street killed another. Both gangs extorted protection money from Cruz’s mother. When she missed a payment, 18th Street members broke into her house, beat her, and threatened to rape Cruz’s sister. While the Immigration Judge found Cruz’s testimony credible, she denied Cruz’s asylum application because Cruz failed to establish that he faced this persecution “on account of” a protected ground (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42)(A)). The BIA affirmed. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review. Cruz did not establish a connection between his “well-founded fear of persecution” and his membership in a particular social group. View "Cruz-Guzman v. Barr" on Justia Law

Kentucky’s “Ultrasound Informed Consent Act,” KRS 311.727, directs a doctor, before performing an abortion, to perform an ultrasound; display the ultrasound images for the patient; and explain, in the doctor’s own words, what is being depicted. There is no requirement that the patient view the images or listen to the description. The doctor also must auscultate the fetal heartbeat but may turn off the volume if the patient requests. The Act does not penalize a doctor if the patient requested that the heartbeat sound be turned off or chose not to look at the ultrasound images or if the doctor makes any other statement, including advising a patient that she need not listen to or view the disclosures, or that the patient should have an abortion. A doctor need not make any disclosures if an abortion is medically necessary or in a medical emergency. Doctors brought a First Amendment challenge. The district court permanently enjoined enforcement of the Act. The Sixth Circuit reversed, citing the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision, National Institute of Family & Life Advocates, clarifying that no heightened First Amendment scrutiny should apply to abortion-informed-consent statutes. Even though an abortion-informed-consent law compels a doctor’s disclosure of certain information, it should be upheld so long as the disclosure is truthful, non-misleading, and relevant to abortion. View "EMW Women's Surgical Center P.S.C. v. Beshear" on Justia Law

Police raided plaintiffs’ Lansing, Michigan homes, with search warrants for drugs. The searches were aggressive: officers knocked in doors with rams, used flashbangs and, allegedly left the homes in complete disarray. During or immediately following a search, an officer called a housing code compliance officer to the scene. At each of the four homes, the inspector found code violations such as water heaters without inspection tags, bare electrical wiring, and non-working smoke detectors and declared the home unsafe for occupancy. Some of the plaintiffs were arrested; in each case, the charges were dismissed. Plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, upholding the validity of the search warrants. Claims concerning the execution of the search warrants were properly rejected. Plaintiffs failed to show that the named officers actively participated in the use of excessive force, supervised those who used excessive force, or owed the victims a duty of protection against the use of excessive force. Although the police had no authority to admit third parties, even state actors, who had no warrant and could provide no assistance to the warranted searches, invasion-of-privacy claims failed because there was little evidence that the named officers admitted the inspectors into the homes. The court also upheld the rejection of claims concerning false arrest and malicious prosecution. The court reversed with respect to certain due-process claims and pre-deprivation claims. View "Gardner v. Evans" on Justia Law

In May 2017, Judge Benningfield issued an order offering a 30-day sentencing credit to White County, Tennessee inmates in exchange for submitting to sterilization. After public outcry, Judge Benningfield declared that inmates could no longer enroll in the program. A third order clarified which of the inmates who initially enrolled could still receive the credit. Within months, the Tennessee Legislature passed Senate Bill 2133, which made it illegal for courts to make sentencing determinations based on a defendant’s willingness to consent to sterilization. Three inmates who refused to submit to a vasectomy and were consequently denied the sentencing credit challenged Judge Benningfield’s orders under the Equal Protection Clause. The district court found that the claims were moot. The Sixth Circuit reversed, reasoning that none of those subsequent developments in the law ended the differential treatment that plaintiffs challenged. Plaintiffs alleged that awarding them the 30- day sentencing credit would affect other collateral consequences related to sentencing. Tennessee law permits non-violent offenders to petition for expungement five years after the sentence termination date so that retroactive application of the sentencing credit would allow them to pursue expungement 30 days sooner. View "Sullivan v. Benningfield" on Justia Law

In 2005, Lowe was convicted of possessing ammunition as a convicted felon. Lowe had previously been convicted of four Tennessee felonies: third-degree burglary, aggravated assault, a 1977 rape, and a 1985 rape. The two rapes were prosecuted under different statutes. The court determined that at least three of those prior felonies qualified Lowe as an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) and sentenced him to 235 months imprisonment, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Lowe then filed an unsuccessful motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255. After the Supreme Court’s 2015 “Johnson” holding that the ACCA residual clause is unconstitutionally vague, Lowe obtained an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under section 2255. The district court held that Lowe’s convictions for third-degree burglary, aggravated assault, and the 1977 rape still qualified as ACCA predicates. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The third-degree burglary conviction no longer qualifies as an ACCA predicate. The statute of conviction for the 1985 rape defines one crime, rape by force or coercion. Because rape by coercion can be committed by the use of parental authority—e.g., without any force—the statute is overbroad for purposes of ACCA. View "Lowe v. United States" on Justia Law

Armstrong sold a confidential informant about three grams of heroin during three controlled buys. He pleaded guilty to distribution, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The district court sentenced him to 37 months in prison, based, in part, on a finding that he sold around 70 grams of heroin to the informant over the course of two years. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Under the Sentencing Guidelines, district courts must consider the defendant’s entire relevant conduct beyond the scope of the conviction, U.S.S.G. 1B1.3(a)(2). The informant claimed she purchased about one gram of heroin from Armstrong 70 times over 18-24 months. The district judge made a credibility determination and found that the informant’s out-of-court statements were more reliable than Armstrong’s. View "United States v. Armstrong" on Justia Law

Over a decade ago, the Blasingames filed for bankruptcy, seeking to discharge $7.7 million in debt, claiming they made $900 per month and owned less than $6,000 worth of assets. Their creditor, Church,allegedly discovered that the Blasingames made over $300,000 per year and had at least $18 million in assets, including “a 28-acre, gated residence compound,” 1,700 acres of “prime farmland,” and hundreds of thousands of dollars in financial assets that belonged to trusts and corporations under the Blasingames’ control. The Blasingames’ bankruptcy trustee initially tried to recover the assets by authorizing Church to sue derivatively on its behalf in bankruptcy court but later decided to sell the cause of action to Church. Since the sold cause of action could no longer affect the bankruptcy estate's value, the bankruptcy court dismissed. Church filed a new lawsuit against the Blasingames and their trusts, alleging “alter-ego.” The district court dismissed, concluding that Tennessee would not recognize that theory outside of the corporate context. Church filed another adversary proceeding on behalf of the trustee, against the Blasingame Family Investment Trust, which was self-settled; the settlors, trustees, and beneficiaries were all the same. The bankruptcy court concluded that the was just a subset of the cause of action that was sold and dismissed. Church filed another adversary proceeding on behalf of the trustee, targeting the Blasingame Family Residence Trust, which granted the Blasingames a life estate. The bankruptcy court dismissed, finding that the Blasingames’ interest was equitable, not legal, and beyond their creditor’s reach. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel and the Sixth Circuit affirmed, adopting the bankruptcy court reasoning. View "In re Earl Blasingame" on Justia Law