Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

n 1975, Jackson, Ajamu, and Bridgeman were convicted of murder, based largely on the purported eyewitness testimony of Vernon, who then was 13 years old. In 2014, Vernon recanted, disclosing that police officers had coerced him into testifying falsely. Vernon’s recantation led to the overturning of their convictions. The exonerated men filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, along with state law claims for indemnification against Cleveland. The district court granted the defendants judgment on the pleadings. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment as to the section 1983 claims based on conspiracy, but reversed judgment on the pleadings as to the indemnification claims; denial of motions to amend the complaints to substitute the administrator of the estates of the deceased officers as a party in their place; summary judgment as to section 1983 claims arising from violations of Brady v. Maryland, fabrication of evidence, and malicious prosecution; and summary judgment as to “Monell” claims against Cleveland. The court noted evidence that officers may have been unaware of their “Brady” obligations, that Brady violations were common, and that officers intimidated Vernon. View "Jackson v. Cleveland" on Justia Law

Roberts and seven co-conspirators stole millions of dollars’ worth of sensitive military equipment from an army base and sold it on eBay. Although Roberts testified that he did not knowingly traffick stolen goods, he was convicted of conspiracy to steal government property valued at over $1,000 (18 U.S.C. 371); 10 counts of wire fraud (18 U.S.C. 1343); and two counts of unauthorized export of prohibited military equipment (22 U.S.C. 2778(b)(2)). The court applied sentencing enhancements: 18 offense levels for stealing more than $3.5 million of military equipment (USSG 2B1.1(b)(1)(J)), two levels for mass-marketing (USSG 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(ii)), two levels as a “person in the business of receiving and selling stolen property” (USSG 2B1.1(b)(4)), two levels for committing a crime involving sophisticated means (USSG 2B1.1(b)(10)(C)), four levels for organizing or otherwise leading the criminal conspiracy (USSG 3B1.1(a)), and two levels for willfully obstructing justice (USSG 3C1.1). The court sentenced Roberts to 180 months’ imprisonment, varying downward from the 210-262-month Guidelines range. The Sixth Circuit vacated the loss enhancement (USSG 2B1.1(b)(1)(J)) and the obstruction enhancement (USSG 3C1.1) and remanded for resentencing. The court otherwise affirmed, rejecting challenges to other sentencing enhancements; the exclusion of evidence of current e-Bay listings, to show that Roberts did not intend to commit a crime; the denial of Criminal Justice Act funds to allow Roberts to retain a forensic accountant; and the substantive reasonableness of Roberts’s sentence. View "United States v. Roberts" on Justia Law

In February 2002, Daniel, his brother, Peter, McGlown, and Neal, traveling in a van, pulled up alongside a car and shot Newsom. They mistook Newsom for Bradley (the intended target). Newsom was in an automobile owned by Newsom’s sister, Bradley’s girlfriend. Newsom died from gunshot wounds. Based on eyewitness testimony, officers stopped Daniel's vehicle. Retracing the route from the shooting, investigators recovered firearms and gloves that had been discarded on the roadway. Bullets from those firearms matched bullets found in Newsom’s body and in his sister’s vehicle. Daniel, Peter, and McGlown were tried together. Before trial, the Michigan judge ordered them to wear a Band-It electronic restraint concealed underneath clothing. Daniel’s counsel unsuccessfully objected, stating that the Band-It was “pretrial punishment” and Daniel had no history of acting out in the courtroom. They were convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, and felon in possession of a firearm. Officers never activated or threatened to activate Daniel’s Band-It. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed; the Michigan Supreme Court denied an appeal. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Daniel’s 28 U.S.C.2254 habeas petition, in which he alleged that he was denied due process, a fair trial, and access to counsel. Noting that Daniel had made threats, the court held that use of the restraint was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law; there is no evidence that the Band-It hindered his communications with his attorney. View "Daniel v. Burton" on Justia Law

An informant contacted the FBI and explained that, during an internet chat, Oliver had requested contact information for someone who could facilitate a meeting between Oliver and a minor for the purposes of sexual activity. An FBI agent instructed the informant to provide Oliver with the agent's contact information. Oliver sent the agent images and videos of child pornography and a picture of his penis. For several weeks, the two exchanged messages focusing on Oliver’s interest in having sexual intercourse with the agent’s purported minor daughter. Oliver pleaded guilty to distributing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2). Oliver’s PSR called for a five-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2G2.2(b)(3)(B), which applies when a defendant distributes child pornography “in exchange for any valuable consideration, but not for pecuniary gain,” stating that the defendant distributed images of child pornography to gain access to a minor to engage in sexual intercourse. The court concluded that there was an “implicit agreement” then calculated a guideline range of 210-262 months. The Sixth Circuit vacated Oliver's 210-month sentence. The district court did not fully consider the essential elements for applying the enhancement under the 2016 version of 2G2.2(b)(3)(B): whether the defendant agreed, explicitly or implicitly, to an exchange with another person and then knowingly distributed child pornography to that person for the specific purpose of obtaining something of valuable consideration from that person. View "United States v. Oliver" on Justia Law

Steele and 11 other suspected members of the Detroit Rollin 60s Crips street gang were charged with racketeering conspiracy (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1962(d). All but one of the co-conspirators pleaded guilty. Although Steele denied any gang affiliation, during his trial the government presented seven current and former Crips members who testified that Steele was a member of the gang during the relevant time period. The jury saw photographs of Steele’s tattoos which demonstrated participation in the gang and a photograph of Steele with other gang members, with one member holding a sawed-off shotgun, and were read his social media messages that demonstrated his fluency in the gang’s jargon. Crips members testified to seeing Steele store guns to protect his drug and weapon stash and seeing Steele sell marijuana while armed with a weapon. The jury also heard from multiple officers. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Steele’s convictions under RICO and for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c), rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence; an argument that the district court should have provided a specific jury instruction requiring unanimity on section 924(c); and a challenge to the denial of his motion to change counsel mid-trial. View "United States v. Steele" on Justia Law

Eason pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm. The statutory range for such a violation is zero to 10 years’ imprisonment but under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), a defendant convicted under 18 U.S.C. 922(g) who has three prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses is subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 180 months. Eason had five prior felony convictions for the promotion of methamphetamine manufacture. Eason argued that an ACCA “serious drug offense” is defined as “an offense under State law, involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance,” and that, under the Tennessee statute, his prior offenses could have been based on no more than the purchase of an ingredient that can be used to produce methamphetamine with reckless disregard of its intended use. The district court agreed with Eason. Without the ACCA enhancement, Eason was sentenced to 46 months’ imprisonment, the top of the guideline range. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Purchasing ingredients needed to make methamphetamine, and consciously disregarding an unjustifiable risk regarding how those products will be used, “indirectly,” if not “directly,” connects with methamphetamine’s “production, preparation, propagation, compounding or processing” and is a serious drug offense under ACCA. View "United States v. Eason" on Justia Law

Trucking, owned by Bourdow, his wife, and their sons, sold and transported dirt, stone, and sand throughout lower Michigan and engaged in construction site preparation and excavation. Trucking employed other members of the Bourdow family. Trucking executed collective bargaining agreements (CBAs), under which it made fringe benefit payments to the Union’s pension fund (Fund). Experiencing financial difficulties, Trucking terminated its CBA. In 2012, the Fund informed Trucking that it had incurred withdrawal liability ($1,163,279) under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C 1381(a). Trucking missed its first withdrawal liability payment. The Fund filed suit, which was stayed when Trucking filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The Fund filed a proof of claim. Trucking did not object; the claim was allowed, 11 U.S.C. 502(a). The Fund received $52,034. Contracting was incorporated the day after Trucking missed its first withdrawal payment; it bid on its first project two days before Trucking's bankruptcy filing. Contracting engages in construction site preparation and excavation in lower Michigan. Contracting is owned by the Bourdow sons; it employs other family members and retains the services of other professionals formerly retained by Trucking. The Fund sought to recover the outstanding withdrawal liability, alleging that Contracting was created to avoid withdrawal liability, and is responsible for that liability under 29 U.S.C 1392(c), and that Contracting is the alter ego of Trucking. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the Fund, applying the National Labor Relations Act’s alter-ego test and citing the factors of business purpose, operations, customers, supervision, ownership, and intent to evade labor obligations. View "Trustees of Operating Engineers Local 324 v. Bourdow Contracting, Inc." on Justia Law

The Commissioner of Social Security imposed an assessment of $51,410 and a civil monetary penalty of $75,000 on Valent after the Social Security Administration found that Valent failed to disclose that she had engaged in paid work activity while receiving Social Security disability benefits. Valent argued that 42 U.S.C. 421(m)(1)(B) prohibits the Administration from considering her work activity in determining whether she continues to be eligible as a disability-benefits recipient and that her failure to disclose her paid work activity was, therefore, not a material omission, and that even if her failure to disclose her paid work activity was a material omission, she did not have actual or constructive knowledge that her omission was material. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Valent’s argument that the Administration can consider “substantial gainful activity” but not “work” or “work activity.” The Administration’s interpretation is a permissible construction of the statute and Valent’s construction “would be impossible to implement.” The Administration would be unable to examine a beneficiary’s substantial gainful activity without considering the beneficiary’s work activity that generates profit or pay. Valent had constructive notice that her failure to report her work activity that generated profit or pay was a material omission that misled the Administration. View "Valent v. Commissioner of Social Security" on Justia Law

Asgari came to the U.S. for education, earning a doctorate in 1997. He returned to Iran and became a professor at Sharif University. His work involves transmission electron microscopy. Asgari traveled to the U.S. in 2011, stating on his visa application that he planned to visit New York, Florida, Pennsylvania, and Los Angeles. He traveled to Cleveland to see an Iranian-American friend at Case Western’s Swagelok Center. They began collaborating. Asgari returned to Iran and obtained another visa for “temp[orary] business[/]pleasure,” identifying his destination as his son’s New York address. He applied for a job at Swagelok. The FBI investigated. The Center’s director stated that Asgari was on a sabbatical from Sharif University; that the Center conducted Navy-funded research; and that an opening had emerged on the project. Agent Boggs obtained a warrant to search Asgari’s personal email account for evidence that Asgari made materially false statements in his visa application and that Asgari violated the prohibition on exporting “any goods, technology, or services to Iran.” Based on information uncovered from that 2013 search, the government obtained another warrant to search Asgari’s subsequent emails. Indicted on 13 counts of stealing trade secrets, wire fraud, and visa fraud, Asgari successfully moved to suppress the evidence. The Sixth Circuit reversed, applying the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The affidavit was not “so skimpy, so conclusory, that anyone ... would necessarily have known it failed to demonstrate probable cause.” The sanctions on Iran are broad; probable cause is a lenient standard. View "United States v. Asgari" on Justia Law

Employees at Seoul Garden, an Ann Arbor, Michigan restaurant, customarily work lunch and dinner shifts six days a week. Before August 2016, when the restaurant got a time clock, employees did not record their hours. The owners marked employees as present or absent for each shift without recording whether employees left early or stayed late. Employees work an average of 52 hours a week. The owners negotiate a “guaranteed wage” day rate with each employee, then derive an hourly rate (for 40 hours) and overtime rate. Although the rate is generous compared to minimum wage, some employees’ rates are too low to reach the guaranteed wage even working a full week, so the owners add a “bonus” to reach the agreed-upon weekly wage. In rare instances, employees exceed their guaranteed wage; the owners apply a “negative bonus” to reduce the pay to the guaranteed wage. The Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division investigated and alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 207(a). The district court held that the owners owe back pay of $112,212 to 28 employees and enjoined them from continuing violations, but excused them from paying liquidated damages. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting the owners’ insufficient record-keeping but stating that they acted in good faith and had reasonable grounds for believing they were in compliance with the Act. View "Acosta v. Min & Kim, Inc." on Justia Law