Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

ODPS offers private security and traffic control services. Most ODPS workers are sworn officers for some law-enforcement entity. Non-sworn workers may have no background in law enforcement. ODPS offers assignments to workers who meet the qualifications specified by the customer. Workers can choose to reject a job but might not receive future assignments if they decline. ODPS sometimes provides workers with equipment. Workers pay for other equipment. All workers must own police-style vehicles. The cost of the non-sworn workers’ investments is roughly $3,000-$5,000. On the job, workers follow the customer’s instructions, comply with ODPS’s standard policies, and occasionally submit to the supervision of other ODPS workers. Sworn police officers wear their official police uniforms; non-sworn workers wear uniforms with ODPS-branded patches. Workers send ODPS an invoice to be paid an hourly wage. All workers sign “independent contractor agreements,” including non-compete clauses. ODPS has never paid overtime wages. The Department of Labor sued under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 207(a)(1). The district court held that ODPS’s non-sworn workers were employees entitled to overtime wages but that sworn officers were independent contractors because they “simply were not economically dependent on ODPS” and some of ODPS’s records “faulty.” The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. All of the workers were employees. The court noted the length and consistency of the relationship between ODPS and its workers, that ODPS’s workers earned set wages to perform low-skilled jobs for fixed periods, and that the officers were an integral part of ODPS’s business. View "Acosta v. Off Duty Police Services, Inc." on Justia Law

A woman outside the prison provided an anonymous tip that Parrish, a federal prisoner, was texting her. Officers began a search; found Parrish in a prison bathroom; and saw him pull a cellphone from his pocket, break the phone, and toss it away. They recovered the phone. Parrish pleaded guilty to possession of contraband in prison, a misdemeanor, 18 U.S.C. 1791(a)(2). The government asked for a sentence within the Guidelines range of four-10 months. Defense counsel argued that the court should vary downward because the Bureau of Prisons had already disciplined Parrish; that a one-day sentence was commensurate with sentences given to others charged with the same crime; and Parrish had not seen his family in three years and had used the phone to contact friends and family on the outside. The judge stated “he’s contacting somebody that didn’t want him to contact them,” and sentenced Parrish to five months’ imprisonment, consecutive to his 250-month sentence for controlled substance distribution. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Parrish’s claim that the judge engaged in unreasonable speculation that he used the phone to harass the woman. Parrish offered no evidence, other than his own statement, to support his claim that he was using the cellphone only to contact his family. The record supported the district court’s reasonable inferences. The court also rejected Parrish’s arguments regarding deterrence and disparities. View "United States v. Parrish" on Justia Law

Officers searched for a fugitive in a house in which Jacobs rented a basement apartment. The house belonged to the fugitive’s brother. They did not find the fugitive. Following the search, plaintiff returned home from work and entered his basement apartment through a backdoor without noticing the officers. He claims that his living area had been ransacked. He ran up the backstairs shouting. According to the officers, Jacobs pointed a gun and shot at them. The officers returned fire and arrested him. Jacob admits he had a holstered pistol but denies that he touched it at all. Contemporaneous with turning to flee and reaching for his holster, Jacobs fell down the steps and was shot in the stomach, shoulder, and leg. Forensic evidence later confirmed that Jacobs did not fire his gun; witness accounts conflicted on whether he pointed the gun at an officer. .After a jury acquitted Jacobs of state criminal charges, he filed “Bivens” action against the officers, alleging excessive force, false arrest, malicious prosecution, fabrication of evidence, and civil conspiracy. The district court denied defendants qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, finding plaintiff’s “garden-variety Bivens” claims viable in light of the Supreme Court’s holdings in “Ziglar” and “Hernandez” as “run-of-the-mill challenges” to “standard law enforcement operations.” The court dismissed some of the specific challenges for lack of jurisdiction in an interlocutory appeal. View "Jacobs v. Alam" on Justia Law

Tramble worked for various Kentucky coal companies from at least May 1963 until June 1985. Tramble’s 1987 claim for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA), 30 U.S.C. 901–944, indicated that he had stopped working due to a job-related back injury. That claim was denied although the parties stipulated to 17 years of qualifying coal mine employment. The ALJ found that medical evidence established that Tramble suffered from coal workers’ pneumoconiosis but was not totally disabled. After his 2008 death, Tramble’s widow sought survivor’s benefits. Reversing an award by an ALJ, the Department of Labor Benefits Review Board found that the ALJ failed to explain adequately how he calculated the 15.25-years of underground coal mine employment that justified application of the 15-year statutory presumption of entitlement to benefits. On remand, the ALJ again awarded benefits. The Board again reversed. The Sixth Circuit remanded. Further fact-finding is required to ensure that all relevant evidence has been considered. The court rejected Incoal’s argument that, in order to be credited with one year of coal mine employment, a miner must be on the payroll of a mining company for 365 consecutive days and have worked 125 of those days in or around a coal mine . View "Shepherd v. Incoal, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2010, Ewing was tried as the shooter in a gang-related shooting. Ewing claimed that he was attending a funeral when the shooting happened and that the shooter was Washington. Ewing put on alibi witnesses and a jailhouse informant who testified that Washington had bragged about the shooting. On the second day of deliberations, the jury asked the court to declare that it was deadlocked. The court refused. On the fourth day of deliberations the jury returned a verdict against Ewing on all counts, including first-degree murder. About two months later, Juror Byrnes filed an affidavit stating that two fellow jurors had brought up information that was not part of the trial evidence, coming from Facebook postings and “googling” information about gangs. Ewing sought a new trial, alternatively requesting an evidentiary hearing to further develop the facts surrounding the allegedly tainted jury deliberations. The state did not object to an evidentiary hearing. The court denied the motion outright, finding that the internet information was duplicative of what the jury had learned from the trial evidence. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Ewing sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court held that the state court’s determination was contrary to clearly established law and that “the internet information may have tainted the jury,” and ordered a new trial. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The appropriate remedy was a hearing to consider whether a new trial is warranted. View "Ewing v. Horton" on Justia Law

King pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of ammunition and received a sentence of 46 months’ imprisonment. His three years of supervised release began in 2015. Two years, later the Probation Department filed a notice detailing multiple violations, including unauthorized use of drugs and failure to comply with substance abuse treatment. King was also suspected of moving to a new residence without informing his probation officer, possessing a firearm, and selling cocaine from his new residence. In searching King’s residence, officers discovered airsoft pistols, marijuana, scales, and a cell phone. King was hiding in a closet with his hands down the back of his shorts. Officers arrested and transported him to the Akron Federal Courthouse. During a strip search of King, officers discovered a baggie containing cocaine and cocaine base. King pleaded guilty to violating 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) and 18 U.S.C. 1791(a)(2). King’s probation officer filed an updated violation report. The court noted that the Sentencing Guidelines recommended a 30-37-month prison sentence for the drug convictions and 24-30 months for the supervised release violations. The statutory maximum term for the supervised release violations was 24 months. The court sentenced King to 36 months in prison: 30 months for King’s drug convictions and six months for supervised release violations. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The judge sufficiently explained why he ordered that the sentence for the supervised release violations run consecutively to the sentence for the drug convictions. View "United States v. King" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought medical malpractice claims in Ohio state court against a doctor who operated on them and against several hospitals where he worked. The plaintiffs allege that the judge presiding over their case, Judge Schweikert, and Chief Justice O’Connor of the Ohio Supreme Court were biased against their claims. In accordance with Ohio law, they filed affidavits of disqualification against Judge Schweikert, and requested that Chief Justice O’Connor recuse herself from deciding Judge Schweikert’s disqualification. They then requested that a federal court enjoin Chief Justice O’Connor from ruling on the affidavit of disqualification pertaining to Judge Schweikert and enjoin Judge Schweikert from taking any action in their cases before the affidavit of disqualification was ruled upon. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claims. The Younger abstention doctrine applies. The ability of Ohio courts to determine when recusal of a judge or justice is appropriate and to administer the recusal decision process in accordance with state law operates “uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.” View "Aaron v. O'Connor" on Justia Law

The named plaintiffs in a suit under 29 U.S.C. 1132(a) represent several thousand current and former insurance agents for American Family Insurance and claim that American Family misclassified them as independent contractors, while treating them as employees, in order to avoid paying them benefits in compliance with the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Reversing the district court, the Sixth Circuit held American Family properly classified its agents as independent contractors. The court applied factors relating to the skill required of an agent and the hiring and paying of assistants; the district court correctly recognized that the agreement favored independent-contractor status but did not weigh this important component when reaching its conclusion. View "Jammal v. American Family Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Dimond was hired by a Chinese manufacturer to “rig, dismantle, wash, and pack,” and ship used automotive assembly-line equipment to China. Dimond, which lacked experience in international shipment, hired BDP. Dimond asserted that BDP did not disclose that it was not a licensed Ocean Transport Intermediary by the Federal Maritime Commission. In May 2011, BDP informed Dimond that it had obtained a ship and sent a booking note to Dimond. Between May and October 2011, Dimond dismantled and weighed the equipment and prepared a “preliminary" packing list. BDP allegedly provided the preliminary packing list when it obtained quotes from third-party contractors to load the Equipment. In October 2011, BDP notified Dimond that the ship was no longer available. Dimond asserted that BDP “without Dimond’s knowledge, consent or approval” hired Logitrans to perform BDP’s freight forwarding duties. BDP and Logitrans hired a ship. As a result of many ensuing difficulties, Dimond became involved in multiple lawsuits, including suits with its Chinese customer and the stevedores. Dimond sued BDP in July 2013 but never served BDP with the complaint. When the summons expired, the district court dismissed without prejudice. In August 2017, Dimond filed a Motion to Amend and Praecipe for Issuance of Amended Summons for its 2013 suit. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. The suit was not timely filed within the one-year statute of limitations set forth in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. View "Dimond Rigging Co. v. BDP International, Inc." on Justia Law

In an act of road rage, Bedford fired two shots at a truck driver while they both headed westbound on Interstate 40 in Tennessee. The truck driver, P.D., was employed by P&R, a private trucking company that had a contract with the United States Postal Service (USPS) to transport mail, and was carrying U.S. mail. Bedford was charged with forcibly assaulting, resisting, opposing, impeding, intimidating, or interfering with a person assisting officers and employees of the United States, while that person was engaged in the performance of official duties, and in doing so, using a dangerous weapon, 18 U.S.C. 111(a)(1), (b). Bedford moved to dismiss the indictment for lack of jurisdiction, contending that P.D. was not an officer or employee of the United States within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 1114. The district court denied the motion, finding that the driver was a person assisting a federal officer or employee and fell within the statute’s reach. Bedford now appeals that denial. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. When a private mail carrier, pursuant to formal contract, carries U.S. mail on behalf of the USPS, he assists an officer or employee of the United States in the performance of official duties. View "United States v. Bedford" on Justia Law