Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1992-2006, Snider committed various crimes, including four convictions under Tennessee’s aggravated burglary statute. In 2007, he was convicted of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 846; manufacturing and attempting to manufacture over 50 grams of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846; possessing equipment, chemicals, products, and materials that may be used to manufacture methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 843(a)(6); possessing a firearm after being convicted of a felony, 18 U.S.C 922(g); possessing a stolen firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(j); and possessing a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). Snider was sentenced as a career criminal offender based on three Tennessee aggravated burglary convictions deemed crimes of violence (USSG 4B1.1(b)(B)), which was defined to include “burglary of a dwelling.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Snider’s motion (28 U.S.C. 2255) to vacate his sentence, rejecting his argument that its 2017 "Stitt" ruling that a conviction for Tennessee aggravated burglary is not a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e) required that it vacate his sentence as a career offender under the sentencing guidelines. Snider’s challenge to his advisory guidelines range is not cognizable under section 2255, which authorizes post-conviction relief only when a sentence “was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or . . . the court was without jurisdiction ... or . . . the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” View "Snider v. United States" on Justia Law

Mother contends that Utica Schools (UCS) violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 because the Individualized Educational Plan (IEP) for her son, Dylan did provide him with a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE). Dylan suffers from Autism, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, Tourette’s Disorder, and symptoms of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder. During the 2012–2013 school year, Dylan was 18 years old and in his fifth year of high school. Dylan's IEP provided that Dylan’s IEP team would implement and document a trial of “assistive technology” and that his curriculum would be evenly split between special education and general education classes. The “Post-Secondary Vision and Transition Activities” section listed several activities in which Dylan was interested that could lead to employment but did not list any next steps or resources. UCS placed Dylan in Community Based Inclusion (CBI) for two periods of his school day. CBI covers “daily living skills, employability training, recreation[,] leisure, [and] personal social skills.” Dylan was enrolled in three special education classes and one general education class, so the CBI placement was inconsistent with his IEP. After mother objected, UCS provided Dylan with instruction in the office, apart from other students. By June 2013, the school had reevaluated Dylan and developed a new IEP, which was amended several times. Mother voluntarily withdrew Dylan from UCS and enrolled him in private school. She filed an administrative complaint with the Michigan Department of Education. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment, noting that the district acknowledged denying Dylan a FAPE. UCS was ordered to pay for 1,200 hours of tutoring and one year of transition planning as compensatory education and to pay $210,654.65 in attorney fees and costs. View "Somberg v. Utica Community Schools" on Justia Law

Fulton’s Linden, Michigan dental practice filed a purported class action, alleging that it received a fax from Defendants that was an unsolicited advertisement under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227, that failed to include the requisite opt-out provision. The district court dismissed, finding that the fax was not an advertisement under the TCPA. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Fulton plausibly alleged that the fax was an unsolicited advertisement by alleging that the fax served as a pretext to send Fulton additional marketing materials. The fax stated that it was a Fax Verification Request to update contact information for sending clinical summaries, prescription renewals, and other sensitive communications. The fax provided space for recipients either to validate or update contact information. It had a signature line and room for comments and included a phone number and a URL for a website of Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs). Fulton’s allegation that providing verified contact information paves the way for Defendants’ customers to “send additional marketing faxes to recipients” finds some support in the FAQs, which confirm that Defendants’ customers use the system to “invite [providers] to become part of a provider network” and “send[] important notifications,” among “other uses.” View "Fulton v. Enclarity, Inc." on Justia Law

In October 2014, Kentucky Educational Television (KET) hosted a debate between the candidates for one of Kentucky’s seats in the U.S. Senate. KET limited the debate to candidates who qualified for the ballot, had collected at least $100,000 in campaign contributions, and had an independent poll indicating that at least one in 10 Kentuckians planned to vote for them. The criteria excluded Patterson, the Libertarian Party candidate. The district court rejected a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 by Patterson and the Party, noting that, with relatively few limits, KET could invite to its debates whomever it wanted. KET was not required to create—let alone publish—any criteria at all. KET restricted who could appear in a televised debate, not on the ballot. The debate criteria had nothing to do with a candidate’s views; rather, they measured whether voters had shown an objective interest in hearing the candidate. View "Libertarian National Committee, Inc. v. Holiday" on Justia Law

Williams filed a purported class action against Cleveland, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that intake procedures at its House of Corrections (HOC), consisting of strip searches and mandatory delousing, violated the Fourth Amendment. On remand, after extensive discovery, the court granted Williams summary judgment in part and permanently enjoined the city from reinstituting its previous delousing method and from conducting group strip searches without installation of privacy partitions to obstruct the view of other inmates. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Williams did not have standing to seek declaratory or injunctive relief; she was not in custody when she filed suit and it must be assumed that she will not return to the HOC. The fact that Williams returned to the HOC three times after filing the complaint does not confer standing because the relevant inquiry is whether she had a live, actionable claim for relief at the time she filed suit. Cleveland had discontinued its delousing policy by 2011, when Williams returned to the HOC. Allowing strip searches to be conducted in groups of two or three during busy periods, such as Williams’s time of intake, was reasonably related to Cleveland's legitimate penological interest of expediting the intake procedure; delousing detainees with a fine mist was reasonably related to its interest in maintaining the HOC's cleanliness and habitability. The need for delousing outweighed the admittedly substantial invasion of personal rights. View "Williams v. City of Cleveland" on Justia Law

Burchett and Jude suffered from serious mental illnesses. Each hired attorney Conn to represent them in applying for Social Security disability benefits, 42 U.S.C. 405(a), which were granted in 2009 and 2010. Conn was perpetrating a fraudulent scheme. Conn paid doctors to submit fraudulent letters concerning his clients' ailments and bribed an ALJ to assign Conn’s cases to his own docket and to decide nearly all of those cases in favor of Conn. Plaintiffs allege that the SSA had reason to suspect Conn's fraud in 2007 due to the reports of internal whistle-blowers. In 2011, the Wall Street Journal published a story about Conn’s exploits. Conn was indicted and pleaded guilty. The Huntington, West Virginia SSA office's former Chief ALJ, pleaded guilty to retaliation against a whistle-blower. The SSA’s Appeals Council informed Jude and Burchett that it was legally required to redetermine their eligibility for benefits (42 U.S.C. 1320a-8(l). Their benefits were suspended pending redeterminations. Each requested additional time to gather evidence. About two weeks after the SSA notices, before the SSA granted those requests, Jude and Burchett each committed suicide. Their estates filed Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) claims for wrongful death with the SSA, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b) and 2671, and a Bivens claim alleging procedural due process violations. The Federal Circuit affirmed dismissal of the claims, concluding that the FTCA’s discretionary function exception applied to preclude that claim and that the Bivens claim was improperly formulated. View "Jude v. Commissioner of Social Security" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged the validity of Ohio’s confirmation notices under the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), 52 U.S.C 20507(b)(2). The district court denied plaintiffs a permanent injunction, except as regards a requirement that Ohio continue to use a confirmation notice with information for voters moving out of state on how to remain eligible to vote. Plaintiffs moved to enjoin Ohio, pending appeal, to implement the APRI Exception in the November 2018 election and not to remove any voter by the Supplemental Process if the voter was sent a confirmation notice before 2016. The APRI Exception requires Boards to count provisional ballots cast by voters purged under the Supplemental Process in 2011-2015 if the voter: cast the ballot at their early voting location or at the correct polling location on Election Day; continues to reside in the county where they were previously registered; and did not become ineligible by reason of felony conviction, mental incapacity, or death after the date on which their name was removed. The Sixth Circuit granted an emergency injunction pending appeal, requiring the implementation of the APRI Exception. Plaintiffs have a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of their claim that the confirmation notice did not adequately advise registrants of the consequences of failure to respond, as the NVRA requires. The court denied an injunction that Ohio not delete any voters from the rolls under the Supplemental Process if the confirmation notice was sent before 2016. View "A. Philip Randolph Institute v. Husted" on Justia Law

In 2014, Lane sold her residence to the Deans. They subsequently discovered mold and sued her. The state court submitted the dispute to binding arbitration. The arbitrator awarded the Deans $126,895.57. A Kentucky court entered judgment on the award. The Deans filed their judgment lien against Lane’s current residence in May 2017. Lane filed a voluntary chapter 13 petition in July, proposing to avoid the Deans’ judgment lien as impairing her exemption rights. The Deans filed an Objection, asserting that the judgment lien was not avoidable under 11 U.S.C. 522(f) and that, under section 1322(b), Lane was not entitled to “modify” their rights as holders of a claim secured by her residence. The Bankruptcy Court overruled the Objection and confirmed the Debtor’s Plan. The Deans did not appeal. In November, the Deans, as pro se creditors, filed a dismissal motion, which the court denied. The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel dismissed an appeal. The order denying the Deans’ motion to dismiss is not a final order and the record presents no grounds for granting leave to appeal under well-settled Sixth Circuit case law, even treating the pro se notice of appeal as a motion for leave to appeal under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8004(d). View "In re: Lane" on Justia Law

In 1984, a Tennessee jury convicted Zagorski of two first-degree murders and sentenced him to death. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentence; state courts denied post-conviction relief. Zagorski sought federal habeas corpus relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate an alternative suspect, that the court erred by improperly instructing the jury on the meaning of mitigating circumstances, and that the jury could not constitutionally impose the death penalty because prosecutors originally offered a plea deal for two life sentences. Finding all three arguments procedurally defaulted, the district court denied relief, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. The Supreme Court subsequently decided "Martinez," permitting ineffective assistance of counsel at initial-review collateral proceedings to establish cause for a prisoner’s procedural default of an ineffective assistance claim at trial. Zagorski sought post-judgment relief under FRCP 60(b)(6), which grants courts equitable power to vacate judgments “to achieve substantial justice” in the most “unusual and extreme situations.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief, “giving due deference to the district court’s discretion in balancing the equities” and noting that, given the overwhelming evidence, a more thorough investigation of another suspect would not have reasonably been likely to affect the outcome. View "Zagorski v. Mays" on Justia Law

In September 2005, the government assessed Chicorel $140,903.52 in income tax for the 2002 tax year. Chicorel died in 2006 having not paid the assessed taxes. On May 4, 2007, Behar, the estate’s personal representative, published a notice to creditors of the four-month deadline for presenting claims, but he did not mail the notice to the government despite it being a known creditor of the estate. In January 2009, the government filed a proof of claim in the probate proceeding concerning the tax assessment. Behar has not responded to the proof of claim; probate is ongoing. The government filed this collections proceeding in March 2016, seeking judgment on the 2005 tax assessment, which is the subject of the proof of claim. The district court granted the government summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the government’s 2009 proof of claim filing tolled the statute of limitations, 26 U.S.C. 6502(a), which provides that, after the government assesses a tax, “such tax may be collected by levy or by a proceeding in court, but only if the levy is made or the proceeding begun—(1) within 10 years after the assessment of the tax.” View "United States v. Estate of Chicorel" on Justia Law