Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Preçetaj, a citizen of Albania, entered the U.S. without admission in 2000 and filed her first asylum application, averring that “criminal gangs constantly threaten [her] family,” and, “though [her] father is not politically involved, he is a target because he is employed by the highway department.” She attested that she was afraid of being kidnapped and placed into forced prostitution. In 2005, an IJ denied Preçetaj’s application and ordered her removal, finding Preçetaj incredible because her claim “devolved over a period of time.” The BIA affirmed; the Sixth Circuit denied review. In 2012, Preçetaj moved to reopen. The BIA denied the motion. The Sixth Circuit denied review. In 2017, Preçetaj filed another motion to reopen, arguing that “country conditions in Albania have changed . . . since a recent Socialist Party victory at the polls,” and that recently, “her family has been threatened with government persecution” and is a “distinct social group.” Preçetaj appended a psychological report about her children; an updated I-589 Statement; and an affidavit from her expert witness, detailing Albania’s political history and internal violence. The Sixth Circuit remanded the BIA’s denial. The BIA failed to demonstrate that it evaluated or analyzed Preçetaj's evidence but summarily concluded that the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate changed country conditions, without providing a sufficiently detailed analysis for its conclusion. View "Precetaj v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Havis pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). He had a lengthy criminal record. The district court concluded that his 20-year-old state conviction for selling or delivering cocaine was a “controlled substance offense” under the Guidelines and increased his base offense level. Havis objected, arguing that delivering cocaine does not qualify as a “controlled substance offense” and that it was unclear whether his state conviction was for delivery or sale. The district court rejected this argument, citing the Sixth Circuit’s prior holding that any violation of the Tennessee statute at issue is a controlled substance offense. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, applying the categorical approach: the court did not examine the facts of Havis’s actual misconduct but relied on the elements of drug delivery under Tennessee law. The court’s precedential interpretation of the Guidelines’s definition of “controlled substance offense” included attempts to commit the offense. The court acknowledged that the precedential opinion’s reliance on commentary to the Guidelines was problematic, but concluded that it was bound by precedent and rejected an argument that the Tennessee statute was overbroad. View "United States v. Havis" on Justia Law

The Sixth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for conspiring and attempting to possess, as well as possessing, cocaine with the intent to distribute it. The court held that the district court did not err by denying defendant's motion to exclude data obtained from his cell phone where the warrant's execution deadline established only the date by when the cellphone needed to be shipped to the data extraction laboratory to initiate the analysis of the phone's data, not when the extraction itself had to occur; the district court did not plainly err in overruling defendant's Batson objection to a peremptory juror challenge where there was no evidence of discriminatory intent inherent in the government's proffered explanation and defendant made no attempt to argue to the district court that the explanation was a pretext for discrimination; the testimony regarding the firearm found at the residence was admissible evidence indicative of the drug-trafficking conspiracy; and the government's comments did not constitute misconduct or rise to the level of argument that might mislead or inflame the jury concerning its duty. View "United States v. Cleveland" on Justia Law

After federal agents arrested Robert Doggart for plotting to attack an Islamic community at the foothills of the Catskill Mountains, he attempted to plead guilty to making a threat in interstate commerce, a crime carrying a sentence of no more than five years. But the district court found that he had not made a cognizable threat and rejected his plea under Criminal Rule 11. After that and after the government added some charges, a jury convicted Doggart of solicitation to damage religious property and solicitation to commit arson, leaving him with a sentence of almost 20 years. Because the district court wrongly rejected the plea agreement, the Sixth Circuit reversed its decision to reject the agreement, left in place the later convictions, and remanded for it to reconsider the agreement under the correct law. View "United States v. Doggart" on Justia Law

Ritzen Group contracted to buy a piece of property from Jackson Masonry. The sale never went through. Ritzen claimed Jackson breached by providing error-ridden documentation on the eve of the closing deadline, while Jackson claimed Ritzen breached by failing to secure funding by that deadline. After the deal failed, Ritzen sued Jackson for breach of contract in Tennessee state court. The case progressed for nearly a year-and-a-half until Jackson filed for bankruptcy. As a result of the bankruptcy, the litigation was automatically stayed. Ritzen moved to lift the stay, which the bankruptcy court denied. Ritzen did not appeal, instead, brought a claim against the bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy court found that Ritzen, not Jackson, breached the contract. Ritzen subsequently filed two appeals to the district court. The first targeted the bankruptcy court’s order denying relief from the automatic stay. The second targeted the breach-of-contract determination. The district court found that the first appeal was untimely and rejected the second on the merits. Ritzen appealed again. Finding no reversible error in the district or bankruptcy courts' judgments, the Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry" on Justia Law

Tony Gunter injured his shoulder on the job. After Gunter had surgery to repair the injury, his doctor imposed work restrictions. Thinking the restrictions prevented him from performing his job, his employer, Bemis Company, fired Gunter. Gunter sued, alleging Bemis violated the Americans with Disabilities Act. A jury ruled in favor of Gunter and awarded him damages, some of which the district court reduced. The parties cross-appealed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The Sixth Circuit determined the district court erred in giving the jury the option of awarding front pay rather than reinstating Gunter, and vacated the front-pay award. The Court affirmed the district court's judgment in all other respects. View "Gunter v. Bemis Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Officer Joseph Danzy responded to a call about two suspicious men in an Akron neighborhood. He found Rauphael Thomas and Jesse Gray standing on the sidewalk. One thing (a Terry frisk) led to another (a tussle on the ground), which led to another (the discharge of Thomas’s concealed pistol). Thomas sprinted away, and Danzy shot him. Thomas died. His mother and estate administrator, Sherry Wilkerson, filed constitutional and state-tort claims against the officers, the City of Akron, and its police department. The district court denied Danzy summary judgment on one claim, which Danzy appealed. Wilkerson cross-appealed the grant of summary judgment on the other claims. The Sixth Circuit agreed Danzy was not entitled to summary judgment on the Terry stop-and-frisk; the Court agreed Wilkerson was not entitled to judgment in her favor on the other claims raised. View "Wilkerson v. City of Akron" on Justia Law

In 2006, a federal jury convicted Victor Castano of drug and firearms crimes. At a subsequent trial in 2015, Castano was convicted of suborning perjury and obstructing justice regarding the 2006 trial, among other crimes. His sentence could be enhanced due to his 2006 felony convictions. Fearing such enhancement, Castano petitioned the district court for a writ of coram nobis to challenge his 2006 firearms conviction. The district court denied his petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding Castano’s petition ultimately failed because he did not show fundamental error that would justify this extraordinary remedy, and he lacked sound reasons for failing to seek earlier appropriate relief. View "United States v. Castano" on Justia Law

Losantiville Country Club hosted unprofitable nonmember events for many years, consistently using those losses to avoid paying tax on its investment income. Because the Internal Revenue Service determined that Losantiville did not hold nonmember events for the primary purpose of making a profit, the club could not offset its income from investments with losses from those nonmember activities. Invalidating those deductions resulted in Losantiville having underpaid tax on its unrelated business income between 2010 and 2012. Plus, the IRS imposed accuracy-related penalties. On appeal, the Tax Court upheld this determination, reasoning that Losantiville did not intend to profit from its nonmember events. Finding no reversible error in that decision, the Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Losantiville Country Club v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

In 2016, commercial air pilot Sean Fitzgerald showed up for work "rip-roaring drunk." He was set to fly in the morning, so he readied the jet for take-off: he conducted a walk-around safety check before entering the cockpit, where he calibrated the altimeter, programmed the flight-management system, turned on the auxiliary power unit, and requested flight clearance from air- traffic control. Before passengers boarded, Fitzgerald’s co-pilot recognized his inebriation and alerted airline executives, who in turn notified local law enforcement. Fitzgerald was arrested and charged under 18 U.S.C. 342, which makes it a crime to operate a common carrier while intoxicated. A jury convicted Fitzgerald, and the district court sentenced him to one year and one day in prison and to three years of supervised release. On appeal, Fitzgerald contended that the actions he performed were not enough to operate the aircraft within the meaning of section 342, that the jury was wrongly instructed, and that the district court erred at his sentencing. Finding no reversible error, the Sixth Circuit affirmed Fitzgerald's conviction. View "United States v. Fitzgerald" on Justia Law