Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Integrity provides thousands of hourly workers, like Plaintiffs, to fill orders, track merchandise, and process returns at Amazon facilities. Other Plaintiffs were directly employed by Amazon. Plaintiffs claim “Amazon.com exercises direct control over the hours and other working conditions,” and sued, concerning a policy that is enforced at all Amazon locations. Plaintiffs and other hourly employees must undergo a security clearance check at the end of each shift and before taking lunch breaks, to deter theft and reduce inventory shrinkage. Plaintiffs allege that the policy "was solely for the benefit of the employers and their customers” and that this process took approximately 25 minutes each day. Because employees were required to “clock out” before the screening, they were not compensated for time spent waiting in line and undergoing the screenings. Plaintiffs alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201 (FLSA) and state labor laws. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. While time spent undergoing mandatory security checks is not compensable under federal law, neither Nevada nor Arizona incorporates the federal Portal-to-Portal Act; the time is compensable under the states' laws, but the Arizona Plaintiffs failed to satisfy Arizona’s “workweek requirement,” by identifying a particular workweek in which, taking the average rate, they received less than the minimum wage per hour. View "Busk v. Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

Upper Arlington's Master Plan guides its zoning decisions, emphasizing the need to increase the city’s revenue by attracting business development in the small portion of the city’s land that is devoted to commercial use. To further the Plan’s goals, the Unified Development Ordinance restricts the use of areas zoned "office district" to specific uses that are primarily commercial. The operation of schools, both secular and religious, is prohibited within the office district. Nonetheless, Tree of Life decided to purchase a large office building on a 16-acre tract within the office district for the operation of a pre-K through 12th-grade school. After failing to secure authorization to operate the school, Tree filed suit, citing the “equal terms” provision of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc(b)(1). After two prior appeals, the district court granted Upper Arlington judgment, holding that the Ordinance is no more onerous to Tree than to non-religious entities that generate comparably small amounts of revenue for the city. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Revenue maximization is a legitimate regulatory purpose. Upper Arlington’s assertion of revenue maximization as the purpose of the Ordinance is not pretextual. Daycares are the only potentially valid comparator put forward by Tree, which presented no evidence suggesting that nonprofit daycares are similarly situated to its proposed school in terms of their capacity to generate revenue. View "Tree of Life Christian Scool. v. City of Upper Arlington" on Justia Law

A Lebanese citizen, Al-Saka married Hashem, a U.S. citizen, in Beirut in 1999. He entered the U.S. in 2001 as a conditional permanent resident based on his marriage to Hashem continuing for at least two years. Just weeks later, the couple signed a religious divorce. In August 2001, the Lebanese government granted a legal divorce. Two months later, Michigan annulled the marriage at Hashem’s request after finding that “there had been no marital cohabitation.” In 2003, Al-Saka married another woman in Lebanon and took steps to remove the permanent-residence condition. Because he had divorced Hashem, he could not file a joint petition with her, as the law requires, 8 U.S.C. 1186a(c)–(d). He instead claimed that deportation would cause hardship and that he married Hashem in good faith. An UJ found that Al-Saka and Hashem did not marry in good faith, and refused to waive the joint-petition requirement. She rejected his hardship claim on the ground that his family remained in Lebanon. The BIA affirmed. The Sixth Circuit denied Al-Saka’s petition for relief, noting substantial evidence that his first marriage was not in good faith and rejecting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. View "Al-Saka v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Whitis brothers and Pyles drove to Louisville to pick up drugs for distribution. On the way home, Kentucky State Trooper Ramsey noticed their car traveling over the speed limit. Ramsey learned that the car’s owner had an outstanding arrest warrant. Ramsey approached and noticed Pyles stuffing something under a pile of clothes in the back seat. An occupant rolled down the window. Ramsey smelled marijuana and called for backup. Officers searched the car and found a loaded handgun, marijuana, and over 200 grams of methamphetamine. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress and Whitis’s 200-month sentence. Once an officer discovers that a car’s owner has an outstanding arrest warrant, he needs only reasonable suspicion that the owner is in the vehicle; Ramsey had reasonable suspicion to stop this car. Ramsey consistently stated that, before he stopped and approached the car, he could not determine the gender of the back-seat passenger and could not tell whether there were more passengers in the vehicle. Ramsey’s testimony was not so internally inconsistent or implausible that a reasonable factfinder would not credit it. The district court did not explicitly discuss Whitis’s health but showed familiarity with the arguments in Whitis’s sentencing memorandum. It looked at the section 3553(a) factors and explained that it was imposing a sentence above the guidelines range because the range understated Whitis’s criminal history. View "United States v. Pyles" on Justia Law

During a campaign rally at Louisville’s Kentucky International Convention Center, then-candidate Trump spoke for 35 minutes. Plaintiffs attended the rally with the intention of peacefully protesting. Protesters’ actions during Trump’s video-recorded address precipitated directions from Trump on five different occasions to “get ’em out of here.” Members of the audience assaulted, pushed and shoved plaintiffs. Plaintiff Brousseau was punched in the stomach. Defendants Heimbach and Bamberger participated in the assaults. Plaintiffs sued Trump, the campaign, Heimbach, Bamberger, and an unknown woman who punched Brousseau, for battery, assault, incitement to riot, negligence, gross negligence and recklessness. The district court dismissed claims against the Trump defendants alleging they were vicariously liable for the actions of Heimbach, Bamberger and the unknown woman, and dismissed a negligent-speech theory as “incompatible with the First Amendment” but refused to dismiss the incitement-to-riot claims. On interlocutory appeal, the Sixth Circuit found that the claim should be dismissed. Plaintiffs have not stated a valid claim under Kentucky law, given the elements of “incitement to riot.” Trump’s speech enjoys First Amendment protection because he did not specifically advocate imminent lawless action. Trump’s “get ’em out of here” statement, closely followed by, “Don’t hurt ’em,” cannot be interpreted as advocating a riot or the use of any violence. View "Nwanguma v. Trump" on Justia Law

In 2015, Camp robbed a store at gunpoint. He pled guilty to Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a); using a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C 924(c); and being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(C)(i), Camp faced a 25-year mandatory minimum prison sentence on the 924(c) count because he had a prior conviction for the same offense. The district court also determined that Camp was a career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines, finding that Camp’s instant Hobbs Act robbery conviction was a crime of violence and that his 2003 federal bank robbery conviction and 1990 Michigan armed robbery conviction were both crimes of violence. Camp received a 372-month prison sentence—the 25-year mandatory minimum on the 924(c) count and 72 months on the robbery and felon in possession counts, to run consecutively. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions but vacated the sentence. Although Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence under section 924(c)’s use-of-force clause, Hobbs Act robbery, which includes threats against property, is not a categorical match with Guidelines extortion. Hobbs Act robbery criminalizes conduct that extends beyond both generic robbery and Guidelines extortion and is not a crime of violence under the enumerated offense clause. View "United States v. Camp" on Justia Law

During her freshman and his junior year at the University of Michigan, John and Jane met at a fraternity party, drank, danced, and eventually had sex. Two days later, Roe filed a sexual misconduct complaint, claiming that she was too drunk to consent. For three months, the school’s investigator collected evidence and interviewed John, Jane, and 23 others. John stated that Jane did not appear drunk, that she was an active participant in their sexual encounter, and that he had no reason to believe that his sexual advances were unwelcome. Jane claimed that she was drunk and told Doe “no sex” before she “flopped” onto his bed. Almost all of the male witnesses corroborated John’s story; all of the female witnesses corroborated Jane’s. The investigator concluded that the evidence supporting a finding of sexual misconduct was not more convincing than the evidence offered in opposition and recommended closing the case. The Appeals Board held closed sessions (without considering new evidence or interviewing any students), and reversed, finding Jane’s narrative “more credible” and her witnesses more persuasive. Facing possible expulsion, John agreed to withdraw from the university, 13.5 credits short of graduating. The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of John’s suit against the University. If a public university has to choose between competing narratives to resolve a case, it must give the accused student an opportunity to cross-examine the accuser and adverse witnesses in the presence of a neutral fact-finder. View "Doe v. Baum" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs' home, on a one-acre lot, displayed no-trespassing signs and was not readily visible to neighbors. The back has a second-story balcony, accessible only from inside the house, and not visible from the front; a fence and trees block the views from neighboring houses. The county’s Street Crime Reduction and Apprehension Program (SCRAP) unit received anonymous tips that Plaintiffs were growing marijuana and cooking methamphetamine. SCRAP had conducted a ‘knock and talk’ a year earlier and given Plaintiffs a warning. SCRAP went to the house and, following standard practice, surrounded it before knocking. Officers stood five-to-seven feet from the house and could see inside. Deputy Campbell knocked and spoke with Plaintiff Graf, who shut the door, remaining inside. Meanwhile, an officer in the back noticed marijuana plants growing on the balcony. Campbell opened the door, entered, and brought Plaintiffs outside to wait for a search warrant. Officers found weapons, drugs, and drug paraphernalia. On appeal, the denial of their suppression motion was overturned and their convictions vacated.After dismissal of the charges, Plaintiffs filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action. The Sixth Circuit reversed its dismissal as to the county and officials but affirmed that individual officers were entitled to qualified immunity. It is well-established that a warrantless entry of the area immediately surrounding the home is presumed unreasonable unless it meets an exception. SCRAP, following official policy, entered that constitutionally-protected area without a warrant and without satisfying any of the narrow exceptions, violating the Fourth Amendment. Because of then-existing Sixth Circuit Fourth Amendment law, however, it was not clearly established that SCRAP could not do what it did. County policy required officers to ignore Constitutional protection of the curtilage. View "Morgan v. Fairfield County" on Justia Law

Brittany, age 17, her mother, father, and sister, driving home from dinner, were stopped by Erlanger police because of an obstructed license plate. Mother, the driver, was arrested for obstructing a license plate, driving with no registration plates, driving with a suspended license, and possession of a forged instrument. Officers noticed that father's “tools, like screwdrivers and wrenches,” some of which were “sitting out” and others “in containers” and suspected that mother was engaged in drug activity. They sent for a drug dog, which found no drugs. The wait took about an hour. A female officer, Klare, escorted Brittany to the restroom with permission from father. Klare told Brittany that she “may have to search” her, then asked, “would you step over here.” Brittany answered “yes” and walked to the requested location. The snap securing Klare’s gun was unfastened; she placed her hand on the gun five times while talking to Brittany. Klare secured Brittany’s hands behind her back. Brittany claims that Klare placed her hands under Harris’s brassiere and pinched her breasts, causing bruising, stating a previous suspect had “stuffed needles in her bra” and that “[y]ou have the look of a junkie whore.” Klare found no drugs, paraphernalia, weapon, or other contraband. Brittany sued Klare under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment. A reasonable jury could find that Klare’s search of Brittany was unconstitutional and that Klare is not entitled to qualified immunity. View "Harris v. Klare" on Justia Law

Wogenstahl was convicted of aggravated murder, kidnapping, and aggravated burglary, and was sentenced to death. Following an unsuccessful direct appeal, in 1996, Wogenstahl sought post-conviction relief, asserting ineffective assistance of trial counsel and the suppression of evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland and seeking to conduct DNA testing. Ohio courts denied relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Wogenstahl's 1999 petition for federal habeas relief. In 2014, Wogenstahl again sought a new trial, citing a 2013 Justice Department letter, stating that testimony by an FBI examiner, included “inappropriate” statements that “‘exceed[ed] the limits of the science’ of microscopic-hair-comparison analysis.” State courts denied relief. Wogenstahl sought to file another habeas petition in the district court, arguing that his petition, although second-in-time, was not second or successive.The Sixth Circuit granted permission to file a second or successive habeas corpus petition. Wogenstahl is attacking the same state court judgment of conviction and his claims were not unripe at the time of his initial petition. Wogenstahl’s claims fall under 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(2)(B); he is raising new claims, relying on facts that he only recently discovered. That Wogenstahl did not previously obtain that evidence is not attributable to a lack of reasonable diligence. Wogenstahl has made prima facie showings that the evidence is impeaching; the state suppressed the material in the original police file and made inaccurate statements misrepresenting the hair analysis; and that he can establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable fact-finder would have found him guilty. View "In re Wogenstahl" on Justia Law