Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) insures uninterrupted payment of benefits under terminated private-sector pension and health plans subject to ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1001–1461. PBGC is funded by insurance premiums paid by sponsoring companies and from assets acquired from terminated plans and recovered from underfunded plan sponsors in bankruptcy. The plan's sponsor and “trades or businesses” related to the sponsor through common ownership are jointly and severally liable for those liabilities. PBGC sued to collect $30 million in underfunded pension liabilities from Findlay Industries following its 2009 shutdown and looked to hold liable a trust started by Findlay’s founder, Philip Gardner, and to apply the federal-common-law doctrine of successor liability to hold Michael, Philip’s son, liable. Michael, a 45 percent shareholder and former CEO of Findlay, had purchased Findlay’s assets and started his own companies using the same land, hiring many of the same employees, and selling to Findlay’s largest customer. The district court ruled against PBGC. The Sixth Circuit reversed. An entity that owns land and leases it to an entity under common control should be considered, categorically, a “trade or business” under ERISA, to recognize the differences between ERISA and the tax code, satisfy the purposes of ERISA, and be consistent with other circuits. Refusing to apply successor liability here would allow Findlay to fail to uphold its promises to employees, then engage in clever financial transactions that leave PBGC to pay millions in pension liabilities. View "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. Findlay Industries, Inc." on Justia Law

McKnight, a bartender, became friends with Fewlas. McKnight rented an apartment in his duplex. For 17 years, McKnight lived in this upstairs apartment with her boyfriend, Kurt. Fewlas and McKnight did not always get along. Fewlas disliked Kurt. Fewlas died, having accumulated more than $2.2 million. McKnight went on a spending spree. She withdrew over $600,000 in 171 different transactions—all in amounts less than $10,000. This suspicious conduct got the IRS’s attention; the IRS suspected that Fewlas had not left his estate to McKnight. Kurt confessed that he had forged Fewlas’s signature on a fake will, prepared by attorney Pioch. His confession resulted in multiple convictions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, rejecting a Confrontation Clause claim based on the admission of Kurt’s videotaped deposition testimony. Kurt was 76 years old, in poor health, and unable to travel at the time of trial. The court also upheld the admission of testimony concerning handwriting analysis. The court remanded for reconsideration of a motion for a new trial because the court conflated the rules, repeatedly characterizing its task as evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, rather than weighing the evidence for itself. The court vacated the sentences: the court enhanced sentencing ranges after concluding that the defendants caused financial hardship to the putative beneficiary of Fewlas’s estate but the Guidelines did not contain that enhancement at the time of the misconduct. View "United States v. Pioch" on Justia Law

Following the 2010 census, Michigan’s Republican-controlled government enacted new legislative and congressional districting plans. Plaintiffs sued in December 2017, alleging the maps violate the Equal Protection Clause by diluting the voting power of Democratic voters and the First Amendment by marginalizing votes based on party affiliation. The state sought dismissal and asked the court to stay the case pending the Supreme Court’s decision in then-pending redistricting cases, Gill v. Whitford and Benisek v. Lamone. In February, while that motion was pending, eight Republican Michigan Congressional representatives moved to intervene, citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) (intervention by right), and permissive intervention under Rule 24(b). They argued that they stood “to be irrevocably harmed by any redrawing of congressional districts” and asserted that none of the original parties adequately represented their interests. The court denied the motion to stay and the motion to intervene. The Sixth Circuit reversed as to permissive intervention, noting that the court did not explain how the “complex issues” would delay the case or prejudice Plaintiffs, how allowing the Congressmen to intervene would frustrate an expeditious resolution, or how the shared interests of the Congressmen and the citizens of Michigan were relevant to the delay-and-prejudice calculus. The Congressmen identify several interests they seek to protect, including “the relationship between constituent and representative.” Those interests differ from those of the Secretary of State and Michigan's citizens. View "League of Women Voters of Michigan v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Every winter for about 60 years, Tawas, Michigan has been the home of the “Perchville” festival, including a polar bear swim and a fishing contest. The Chamber of Commerce organizes the event and registered the name Perchville as a trademark. While dues-paying members of the Chamber may use the Perchville mark, non-members must pay a ($750) licensing fee to use it. A local company, AuSable, wants to make Perchville-branded tee-shirts, and sued the Chamber to invalidate its mark. The district court declined. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. “Perchville” is a distinctive term eligible for protection under the Lanham Act, which protects “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof” that a person uses “to identify and distinguish his or her goods” in the marketplace, 15 U.S.C. 1127. “No matter how you slice it, the term ‘Perchville’ is inherently distinctive. The name does not refer to a place. It serves only ‘to identify a particular’ event, namely the annual winter festival in Tawas. … The word almost certainly counts as fanciful, and at the very least is sufficiently suggestive to qualify as an inherently distinctive trademark.” View "AuSable River Trading Post v. Dovetail Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

Police arrested Bunkley for attempted murder. Although he was convicted, Bunkley was innocent. When the conviction was overturned, Bunkley sued Detroit on a Monell claim, Investigator Moses for malicious prosecution, and four officers for false arrest and failure to intervene to stop the wrongful arrest. The district court granted the city summary judgment but denied the individuals’ summary judgment motions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The officers assumed that Bunkley and his father were the shooters, even though neither fit the description (other than being African-American and Bunkley’s wearing black clothing); and they did not even question Bunkley about this shooting before arresting him—stating that he was being arrested for a parole violation, which they knew was a lie. “Viewed objectively,” a jury could find that these officers under these circumstances had no reasonable belief that they had probable cause to arrest Bunkley. Moses knowingly withheld Bunkley’s Facebook alibi; withheld from the prosecutor that the victim had rejected a photo array; and made false statements. A jury could conclude that these facts undermine a reasonable belief that Moses had established probable cause to prosecute Bunkley or that the photo-array identification was alone sufficient. The duty of law enforcement officers to intervene to prevent an arrest not supported by probable cause was stated in precedent “clear enough that every reasonable official would interpret it to establish” this rule. View "Bunkley v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

Mason, an African-American Ohio resident sued against all 88 Ohio county recorders for violating the Fair Housing Act’s prohibition against making, printing, or publishing “any . . . statement” indicating a racial preference, such as a racially restrictive covenant. Mason’s complaint included copies of land records, recorded in 1922-1957, that contain racially restrictive covenants. There is no allegation that such covenants have been enforced since the 1948 Supreme Court decision prohibiting enforcement of such covenants. Mason maintains that permitting documents with restrictive covenants in the chain of title to be recorded or maintained and making them available to the public violated the Act. Mason alleges that defendants “discouraged the Plaintiff and others from purchasing real estate ... by creating a feeling that they ... do not belong in certain neighborhoods” and that defendants’ actions “damage and cloud the title to property owned by property owners.” Mason’s counsel stated that Mason became aware of the covenants while looking to buy property, a fact not contained in the complaint. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that Mason lacked standing. A plaintiff must show that he suffered a palpable economic injury distinct to himself; any alleged injury was not caused by the county recorders, who are required by Ohio statute to furnish the documents to the public; county recorders cannot redress the alleged harm, as they have no statutory authority to edit the documents. View "Mason v. Adams County Recorder" on Justia Law

Price pleaded guilty to bank robbery and was sentenced to 60 months of imprisonment plus three years of supervised release. Price began his first term of supervised release on July 21, 2017. Two urine samples collected the next week tested positive for cocaine. Price admitted the violation. At the recommendation of the probation officer, the court took no action. When Price tested positive for cocaine use on July 28 and August 7, the probation officer recommended revocation. Price admitted using cocaine, pleaded guilty to violating two conditions of his supervised release, and asked that he be allowed to participate in inpatient substance abuse treatment in lieu of incarceration. Ultimately, the district court revoked Price’s supervised release and sentenced him to 24 months of imprisonment plus 12 months of supervised release. Price argued that it was substantively unreasonable to have imposed a term of incarceration rather than ordering residential inpatient substance abuse treatment and that the new term of supervised release was procedurally unreasonable because it exceeded the maximum length permitted by 18 U.S.C. 3583(h). The Sixth Circuit affirmed Price’s custodial sentence but agreed that section 3583(h) must be interpreted to require that the maximum term of supervised release be reduced by the aggregate of all post-revocation terms of imprisonment related to the same underlying offense; under this interpretation, 10 months was the maximum term of supervised release that could follow the 24-month term of imprisonment imposed in this case. View "United States v. Price" on Justia Law

In 2001, Davis pled guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). He was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1) based on three prior Tennessee aggravated assault convictions. Davis’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. In 2016, Davis filed a petition for habeas corpus, citing the Supreme Court’s 2015 “Johnson” holding, which invalidated ACCA’s residual clause and arguing that his aggravated assault convictions were no longer ACCA predicate crimes. The district court agreed, noting that the Sixth Circuit had already concluded in 2011 (McMurray) that reckless aggravated assault did not qualify as a violent felony under the ACCA’s use-of-force clause The court determined that Davis could have been sentenced only under ACCA’s residual clause and was entitled to “Johnson” relief. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Tennessee reckless aggravated assault, section 39-13-102(a)(1), under which Davis was convicted is a crime of violence under ACCA’s use-of-force clause. The court noted that in 2016 the Supreme Court (Voisine) overruled McMurray by holding that the ACCA’s use-of-force clause encompassed reckless conduct. View "Davis v. United States" on Justia Law

Seven Counties, a nonprofit provider of mental health services, attempted to file for Bankruptcy Code Chapter 11 reorganization. For decades, Seven Counties has participated in Kentucky’s public pension plan (KERS). Because the rate set for employer contributions has drastically increased in recent years, Seven Counties sought to reject its relationship with KERS in bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court and the district court both held that Seven Counties is eligible to file under Chapter 11 and that the relationship between Seven Counties and KERS is based on an executory contract that can be rejected. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part. Seven Counties is only eligible to be a Chapter 11 debtor if it is a “person” under 11 U.S.C. 109(a); a “governmental unit” is generally excluded from the category of “person.” Because the Commonwealth does not exercise the necessary forms of control over Seven Counties for it to be considered an instrumentality of the Commonwealth, Seven Counties is eligible to file. Seven Counties characterized its relationship with KERS as contractual, such that, to the extent it is executory, it may be rejected in bankruptcy, 11 U.S.C. 365. KERS argued the relationship is purely statutory, similar to an assessment, such that it cannot be rejected. The Sixth Circuit certified the question of the nature of the relationship to the Kentucky Supreme Court. View "Kentucky Employees. Retirement System v. Seven Counties.Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Robinson and two cohorts sold the victim a large amount of crack cocaine on credit, beat the victim when he was unable to pay, and, extorted from the victim’s parents for roughly $1,000. A Michigan jury convicted Robinson of extortion, delivery of a controlled substance, unlawful imprisonment, and aggravated assault. Based on his Presentence Investigation Report, the sentencing court scored multiple variables that went beyond the elements of the offenses for which Robinson was convicted, including the number of victims and exploitation of a vulnerable victim, resulting in higher minimum-sentence ranges than would have been warranted without those judge-found facts. The judge imposed concurrent sentences, the longest being 38-480 months for the delivery-of-a-controlled-substance conviction. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed. The Sixth Circuit conditionally granted habeas relief, limited to Robinson’s sentence. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Sixth Amendment’s jury guarantee to mean that “[a]ny fact that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime . . . must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt,” Alleyne v. United States (2013). The Michigan court violated Robinson’s Sixth Amendment right by using judge-found facts to score sentencing variables that increased his mandatory minimum sentence,“ which “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.” View "Robinson v. Woods" on Justia Law