Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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The case involves a dispute between Wendell Shane Mackey, a local resident, and Jeff Rising, a real-estate agent who served one term as a part-time City Commissioner for Adrian, Michigan. Mackey posted information about Rising on Facebook that Rising believed to be false. Rising responded by calling Mackey’s mother and allegedly threatened to “hurt” Mackey if he did not delete the post. Mackey sued, arguing that Rising’s threat of physical violence violated the First Amendment because Rising made it in his capacity as a Commissioner to stifle Mackey’s speech.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment to Rising, concluding that he had acted as a private citizen when he made the alleged threats. Mackey appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that Rising, as a legislator, did not have any “authority” to use (or threaten) physical force on behalf of the City of Adrian. His alleged “misuse” of the power, therefore, could not qualify as state action. The court also found that Rising’s acceptance of the City’s insurance for his defense did not conflict with his state-action defense on the merits, and thus, neither waiver nor judicial estoppel applied. View "Mackey v. Rising" on Justia Law

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The case revolves around Corey Neal, who was charged with federal gun possession after Shelby County officers, armed with a warrant, discovered three firearms at his residence. Neal challenged the validity of the search under the Fourth Amendment, but his plea was rejected, leading him to plead guilty to the charges. The case was then brought to appeal, where Neal reiterated his Fourth Amendment claim.The District Court for the Western District of Tennessee had previously denied Neal's motion to suppress the evidence found at his residence. The court agreed that the warrant lacked probable cause but invoked the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule from United States v. Leon, which allows evidence obtained in good faith reliance on a search warrant later found to be deficient. Neal pleaded guilty to the second count in the indictment, reserving his right to appeal the ruling, and was sentenced to 92 months' imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the affidavit supporting the search warrant established a "minimally sufficient nexus" between the items sought and the place to be searched. The court reasoned that the affidavit provided more than a naked guess that contraband might be found at Neal's residence. It established recent drug trafficking by Neal and evidence of Neal's residency. The court concluded that the affidavit was not so bare bones as to necessitate the application of the exclusionary rule, thereby upholding the lower court's application of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. View "United States v. Neal" on Justia Law

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In 1987, Michael Kitchen, a seventeen-year-old, was sentenced to forty-two to sixty years in prison by a Michigan state court for his involvement in a home invasion. Under Michigan law, Kitchen is not eligible for parole until he completes his minimum sentence, which means he will not be considered for parole until he is nearly sixty. Kitchen filed a pro se § 1983 suit challenging the statute against Michigan’s governor, the Department of Corrections Director, and the chair of the Parole Board. He alleges that Michigan’s parole statute violates his Eighth Amendment rights because it effectively keeps him in prison for life without parole. The district court sided with Kitchen.The district court agreed with Kitchen and ruled against Defendants in an opinion and order on August 16, 2019. The court concluded that, despite the “legal and factual support” for Defendants’ position, “Kitchen is not required to bring his federal constitutional claims via a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,” and he could pursue them under § 1983. The district court thus rejected Defendants’ Heck argument. The Heck issue was not litigated any further.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit disagreed with the district court's decision. The court held that Kitchen's claim, if successful, would necessarily imply the invalidity of his sentence. Therefore, his claim must be brought through habeas corpus, not § 1983. The court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Kitchen v. Whitmer" on Justia Law

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This case involves a catastrophic wildfire that occurred in 2016 in the Great Smoky Mountains National Park in Eastern Tennessee. The fire spread into Gatlinburg and Sevier County, resulting in the destruction of over 2,500 structures and the death of 14 people. The appellant insurance companies paid claims to policy holders and then filed claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) against the National Park Service (NPS), alleging negligence for failure to follow multiple mandatory fire-management protocols and for the failure to issue mandatory warnings to the public.The government moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that it was immune from suit under the discretionary-function exception to the FTCA. The district court granted the motion on all three claims relating to fire-management protocols, but denied the motion on claims relating to the duty to warn. The insurance companies appealed, and the government cross-appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's order granting the government's motion to dismiss the insurance companies' incident-command claim. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the fire-monitoring claim and the Wildland Fire Decision Support System (WFDSS) claim as part of the discretionary fire-suppression decision-making process. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of the government's facial challenge to the insurance companies' duty-to-warn claims, and remanded these claims for further proceedings. View "American Reliable Insurance Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

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The case involves the Tennessee Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) challenging a state policy that requires some convicted felons to submit additional documentation to confirm their eligibility to vote. The NAACP argued that this policy violated the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA). A district court agreed with the NAACP and permanently enjoined the policy in the middle of the 2024 election cycle. Tennessee's Secretary of State and Coordinator of Elections appealed this decision and sought a stay of the injunction pending appeal.The district court's decision was based on the finding that the NAACP had standing to challenge the policy and that the policy violated the NVRA. The court held that the policy was unnecessary for determining the eligibility of those with felony convictions as the state had other information at its disposal to make that decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted the stay for two reasons. First, the injunction triggered the Supreme Court’s “Purcell principle,” which instructs federal courts not to disrupt state election rules close to an election. Second, the court found that the NAACP likely did not present enough evidence to prove its standing to challenge the Documentation Policy. The court concluded that the NAACP's claim that the policy forced it to divert its resources to help those convicted of felonies track down the records they need to register was not supported by specific facts. View "Tennessee Conference of the NAACP v. Lee" on Justia Law

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The case involves the United States of America, et al. ex rel. Michael Angelo and MSP WB, LLC (Relators-Appellants) against Allstate Insurance Company, et al. (Defendants-Appellees). The relators alleged that Allstate Insurance violated the False Claims Act by avoiding its obligations under the Medicare Secondary Payer Act. They claimed that Allstate failed to report or inaccurately reported to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) information regarding its beneficiaries, which led to Allstate failing to reimburse Medicare for auto-accident-related medical costs incurred by beneficiaries insured by Allstate.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan dismissed the case with prejudice, deeming the relators' second amended complaint deficient in numerous respects. The relators then moved for reconsideration, which the district court denied. They also filed a motion to amend or correct under Rule 59(e), asking the district court to amend its judgment to dismiss the case without prejudice to allow them to file another amended complaint. The district court denied the motion on all grounds.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the relators failed to state a claim for a violation of the False Claims Act. The court noted that the relators did not provide sufficient facts demonstrating that Allstate had an "established duty" to pay money or property owed to the government. The court also found that the relators did not demonstrate Allstate's understanding that its conduct violated its obligations under federal law. Furthermore, the court found that the relators' claim for conspiracy also failed as they did not provide any specific details regarding the alleged plan or an agreement to execute the plan. The court also affirmed the district court's decision to deny the relators leave to amend their complaint again. View "United States ex rel. Angelo v. Allstate Insurance Co." on Justia Law

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The case involves Shannon Blick, a former principal of an elementary school in the Ann Arbor Public School District. In 2019, Blick was placed on paid leave while the school district investigated her role in a custodian's over-billing scheme. The leave lasted two years, and the school district eventually terminated Blick's contract. Blick filed a lawsuit while still on leave, alleging that various officials violated her freedoms of speech and association under the First Amendment. She also brought race-discrimination, due-process, and conspiracy claims against these officials. The district court rejected Blick's First Amendment claims at the summary-judgment stage and dismissed the other claims on the pleadings.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that Blick failed to show a reversible error. She argued that the school district violated the First Amendment by imposing a prior restraint that barred her from speaking during her leave and by taking harmful actions against her in retaliation for her speech. However, the court found that Blick's lawyers did not provide sufficient information about what she wanted to say or what she did say. The court also found that Blick's opening brief did not preserve her challenges to much of the district court's motion-to-dismiss decision. As a result, the court affirmed the district court's decision. View "Blick v. Ann Arbor Public School District" on Justia Law

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Brent Adkins, a crew member on one of Marathon Petroleum Company’s inland river barges, claimed that his service on the barge caused his lung function to deteriorate. He brought claims against Marathon under the Jones Act and general maritime law. Adkins worked on the barge from 2008 to 2012. During this time, he underwent several medical examinations which showed a decline in his Forced Vital Capacity (FVC), a measure of lung function. Despite this, Marathon cleared Adkins to work without restriction. In March 2012, Adkins fell ill and was diagnosed with an irregular heartbeat and heat intolerance. He never returned to work for Marathon and subsequently sued the company.The case was initially filed in Louisiana state court but was dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds. Adkins then sued Marathon in the Southern District of Ohio. He claimed that repeated exposure to hydrogen sulfide and other hydrocarbon fumes while working on the barge caused his pulmonary function to deteriorate. He also claimed that Marathon failed to pay maintenance and cure for the injuries and illnesses he sustained while working on the barge. Marathon moved for summary judgment on all of Adkins’s claims. The district court granted Marathon’s motion for summary judgment and denied Adkins’s.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the district court. The court held that Adkins needed expert medical proof to show causation on his Jones Act negligence claims. However, the court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Marathon on Adkins’s maintenance-and-cure claim, finding that Adkins presented evidence that created a genuine dispute of material fact about whether his lung problems manifested while he was in Marathon’s service. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Adkins v. Marathon Petroleum Co., LP" on Justia Law

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The case involves Benjamin Stanley, who was employed by Western Michigan University (WMU) for about a month before his employment was terminated. Stanley, who has severe ADHD, claimed that WMU and certain supervisors discriminated and retaliated against him in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). He also brought a claim under Michigan’s Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (PWDCRA), as well as a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court dismissed Stanley’s federal claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on Eleventh Amendment immunity and dismissed his state-law claims for failure to comply with the Michigan Court of Claims Act’s notification statute.The district court's dismissal of Stanley's claims was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Stanley’s federal claims and the denial of Stanley’s motion for leave to amend his complaint. However, the court vacated the judgment in part and remanded to the district court to dismiss Stanley’s federal and state-law claims without prejudice. The court found that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Stanley’s ADA claims because the defendants were entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, and Stanley lacked standing to request injunctive relief from the individual defendants. The court also found that the district court lacked jurisdiction to decide Stanley’s state-law claims because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over any federal issues. View "Stanley v. Western Michigan University" on Justia Law

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The case involves eight landowners who sued Midland and Gladwin Counties in Michigan, alleging a taking under the federal and state constitutions following the failure of the Edenville Dam, which resulted in flooding of several cities downstream. The dam, built in 1924, had a history of flood control issues. In 2018, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission revoked the existing owner's license and transferred regulatory authority over the dam to the Michigan Department of Environment, Great Lakes, and Energy. In compliance with Michigan law, the counties assembled a task force to manage the lake above the dam and filed a petition in 2019 to maintain the lake levels. In May 2020, several days of historic rainfall raised the water level three feet above its previous maximum, triggering the dam's failure and causing extensive damage to properties downstream.The district court granted summary judgment to the counties, concluding that their efforts to maintain the water levels did not show that they intended to flood the downstream properties and "take" their land. The landowners appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the counties' petition to maintain the lake depth at the same level that had existed for roughly a century did not show that they intended to flood the downstream properties. The court also noted that the counties played no part in regulating or controlling the dam's infrastructure. Furthermore, the court pointed out that the dam's failure was caused by soil vulnerabilities, not inadequate spillways, as determined by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's independent forensic team. Therefore, the court concluded that no taking occurred as a matter of federal or state law. View "Bruneau v. Michigan Department of Environment, Great Lakes, and Energy" on Justia Law