Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2004, Jackson was convicted of armed bank robbery, carrying and brandishing a firearm during the bank robbery, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Based on two prior convictions for Ohio aggravated robbery and one for Ohio attempted robbery, the court designated Jackson an armed career criminal, 18 U.S.C. 924(e), and sentenced him to 360 months. In 2015, the Supreme Court invalidated the Armed Career Criminal Act’s residual clause (Johnson). Jackson moved to vacate his sentence. In 2016, the Seventh Circuit held that Johnson’s logic applied to the Sentencing Guidelines’ residual clause. Nevertheless, at Jackson’s subsequent resentencing, the court found that his prior convictions were crimes of violence under the Guidelines and resentenced Jackson to 346 months. In 2017, the Supreme Court (Beckles) upheld the Guidelines’ residual clause, abrogating the Seventh Circuit decision. Sentencing Guidelines Amendment 798, deleting the Guidelines residual clause, was not in effect at Jackson’s 2016 resentencing. The Seventh Circuit then held that Jackson’s earlier convictions amounted to crimes of violence under the residual clause but that the court committed procedural error by failing to explain the sentence. On remand, Jackson argued that he should be subject to the 2016 guidelines, without the residual clause. The court disagreed and resentenced Jackson to 244 months.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. When a court of appeals reverses a sentence imposed “in violation of law,” it must remand for resentencing under the guidelines in effect at the time of the previous sentencing. The Commission did not make the amendment retroactive and characterized the deletion not as “clarifying” but as a “matter of policy.” While deleting the residual clause resolved an ambiguity, it did not clarify existing law but eliminated that law and made new law. View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Convicted on drug and weapons charges in 1996, Charles received a sentence of 35 years. Charles obtained a sentence reduction, to 24 years plus four months) under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) following the Sentencing Commission’s change to the crack cocaine guideline. The Sixth Circuit reversed. As a career offender, Charles was ineligible for the reduction. On remand, the district court reimposed Charles’ original 35-year sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that its previous decision gave the district court “the opening to correct an illegality” through a new sentencing. The order stated clearly that the remand was “for purposes of entering an order that rejects Charles’ section 3582(c)(2) motion.” A district court must respect the scope of the remand. Section 3582(c)(2) limits who is eligible for relief. As a career offender, Charles was ineligible, Charles’ sentence is not “illegal” in a way that permits relief by the courts from this final sentence. Although the Supreme Court has held that facts elevating a crime’s penalty, such as drug quantities, must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, those decisions do not apply to final sentences like this one. The court recognized that Charles has achieved “[a]n extraordinary record,” of rehabilitation and of “good works.”Executive clemency provides Charles another avenue for relief. View "United States v. Charles" on Justia Law

In January 2010, 15-year-old Robert arrived at a Detroit Police station wearing no shirt, no shoes, and a pair of shorts. Employees of Wayne County Department of Health Services (DHS) opened an investigation into his parents, the Brents, visited the Brents’ home, and allegedly took photographs without their consent. A petition to remove the five Brent children from their home detailed the poor conditions, concerns about lead-based paint on the walls, and that the Brents’ youngest child, age 10, appeared to have a severe speech impediment. The Brents claim that the petition contained falsehoods, that the judge did not actually sign the order, that officers used abusive tactics in removing the children, and that Robert became ill because he was given cough medicine that had expired while in a residential facility. Brents claim that officials threatened to and did interfere with their visitation with the children. The children were released to the Brents in June 2010 but remained under DHS supervision until September 2010. The Brents sued “seemingly every person or agency involved in the removal, custody, and care” of the children. The Sixth Circuit reinstated gross negligence claims against the state defendants but affirmed the rejection of those claims as to city defendants; affirmed summary judgment for city defendants on intentional infliction of emotional distress claims; rejected failure-to-train and failure-to-supervise claims against the city; and rejected 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against police officers. View "Brent v. Wayne County Department of Human Services." on Justia Law

Wilden, age 19, and her infant son were involved in a traffic accident with an 18-wheel tractor-trailer. Wilden suffered severe brain damage when her sedan was pulled beneath the side of the trailer in a “side-underride” crash. The remaining defendant is Great Dane, the trailer’s manufacturer. The district court excluded plaintiffs’ expert-witness testimony about an alternative design that allegedly would have prevented, or at least mitigated, Wilden’s injuries. That alternative design is a “telescoping side guard.” An ordinary, fixed-position side guard would block the space underneath the side of the trailer so that, in a crash, automobiles would not go underneath. A telescoping side guard would also slide and expand to protect the space opened up when a truck’s sliding rear-axle— which trucks use to meet weight-per-axle regulations—is moved toward the rear of the truck. Although elements of the telescoping design have existed for some time, and computer simulations suggest that the design could work, nobody has ever built or tested one in the real world. The court held that the testimony of the two experts was unreliable and inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Great Dane. Given the total absence of real-world, physical-prototype testing and that neither expert had designed a telescoping side guard, the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence. View "Wilden v. Laury Transportation, LLC" on Justia Law

Pittman's mortgage note requires that Pittman pay $1,980.42 monthly. iServe initially serviced the loan. Pittman failed to make two payments in 2011. iServe granted Pittman a Trial Modification Plan (TPP) under the Home Affordable Mortgage Program. Pittman was to make three $1,357.80 payments in 2012; “[a]fter all trial period payments are timely made ... your mortgage will be permanently modified.” Pittman made the payments but the TPP was never made permanent in writing. Pittman continued to make reduced payments. Servicing of the loan was assigned to BSI, which sent Pittman a notice of default. Pittman’s attorney, Borman discovered that iServe did not report the modification to the Treasury Department. In January 2013, iServe emailed BSI that“[t]he borrower … made all payments on time, contractually entitling him to a permanent mod [sic] in April 2012.” BSI told Pittman to continue the trial payment amount. In 2014, Pittman obtained a credit report, which showed that both servicers had reported his payments as past due. Pittman sent letters to credit reporting agencies disputing the information. The loan servicers concluded that the payments were untimely as reported. In addition, BSI had not made property tax payments from Pittman's escrow account. Pittman sued, alleging negligent and willful violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681n, 1681o. The court granted the servicers summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. The reasonableness of the investigations is a question for the trier of fact to resolve. Pittman’s missed payments did not constitute a substantial breach, so Michigan’s first substantial breach rule does not prevent Pittman from bringing a breach of contract claim against BSI. View "Pittman v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

Ayers, an experienced Kentucky criminal-defense attorney, was indicted in 2008 on five counts of failing to file state tax returns. Ayers represented himself throughout the 21 months between his indictment and trial, but never formally elected to do so. He never waived his right to counsel on the record, filed a notice of appearance, or moved to be allowed to proceed pro se. The court allegedly failed to inform him at his arraignment that he had a right to counsel and never subsequently sought to determine whether Ayers’s self-representation was a voluntary, intelligent, and knowing waiver of his right to counsel. When Ayers asked for a continuance a day before trial was scheduled to begin so that he could hire an attorney with whom he attested he was already in negotiations, the court denied his request and forced him to proceed pro se. Ayers was convicted. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of habeas relief. The Kentucky Supreme Court acted contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent when it held that trial courts need not “obtain a waiver of counsel” before allowing “experienced criminal trial attorneys” to represent themselves. Applying de novo review, the court concluded that Ayers did not validly waive his right to counsel. View "Ayers v. Hall" on Justia Law

Some of KVG’s commercial tenants got caught growing marijuana in their rental units and caused substantial damage to the premises before the police caught them. KVG speedily evicted the tenants and sought coverage from its insurers for nearly $500,000 in related losses. Westfield denied the claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Westfield, reasoning that the damage was excluded by the policy, which is the Building and Personal Property Coverage Form. Under this Form, Westfield agreed to pay for “direct physical loss of or damage to Covered Property . . . caused by or resulting from any Covered Cause of Loss.” A “Covered Cause of Loss” is any “Risk[] Of Direct Physical Loss,” with several exclusions, including that Westfield “will not pay for loss or damage caused by or resulting from” any “[d]ishonest or criminal act by you, any of your partners, members, officers, managers, employees (including leased employees), directors, trustees, authorized representatives or anyone to whom you entrust the property for any purpose.” While cultivating marijuana is a crime under federal law, it is protected by Michigan law under certain conditions but no reasonable jury could find that KVG’s tenants complied with Michigan law. View "K.V.G. Properties, Inc. v. Westfield Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Lobbins was detained at the Davidson County Criminal Justice Center, awaiting trial on federal charges related to his gang membership. Another gang member, Churchwell, was awaiting trial on state charges of murdering a Vanderbilt professor. Churchwell boasted about committing the murder. Inmate Boyd relayed that information to a state prosecutor. Churchwell heard about Boyd’s cooperation and said that he was “going to have Maurice f***ed up.” Lobbins entered Boyd’s cell with a shank and repeatedly stabbed him. The government added a federal charge for witness tampering, 18 U.S.C. 1512(a)(2)(A) and 1512(a)(2)(C). The Sixth Circuit affirmed Lobbins’s convictions. Lobbins then unsuccessfully moved to vacate his witness tampering sentence.The Sixth Circuit reversed. The “reasonable likelihood” standard applies to section 1512(a)(2)(C) but the district court instructed the jury to apply a lower standard: whether, absent the attack, Boyd “might” have spoken to a federal officer. The Vanderbilt murders were investigated and prosecuted by the state. Boyd spoke to a state prosecutor, not a federal one; there was no evidence that Boyd was reasonably likely to talk to a federal official. The statute requires the likelihood of “communication” to a federal official about “the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense.” That Lobbins and Boyd were federal detainees does not support any inference that Boyd was likely to talk to a federal official about Churchwell. Had the jury been properly instructed, it would have probably voted to acquit. A defense lawyer’s failure to object to an erroneous jury instruction that materially lightens the government’s burden of proof is typically deficient performance. View "Lobbins v. United States" on Justia Law

Raja, a citizen of Pakistan, first entered the U.S. in 1990 without inspection. In 1996, Raja pleaded guilty to possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance and was sentenced to three-23.5 months’ imprisonment. He served 90 days in a Pennsylvania prison. Nonetheless, in 1998, Raja was granted lawful-permanent-resident status. In 2007, Raja traveled to Pakistan to visit his family. Upon his return, he was detained after officials discovered his conviction. Raja admitted to the conviction and to providing a fraudulent Social Security number to the officers at the time of his 1995 arrest. The government initiated removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). An IJ found Raja removable for a controlled-substance offense and ineligible for a waiver of inadmissibility because he had never lawfully adjusted to lawful-permanent-resident status due to his prior conviction. The BIA dismissed Raja’s appeal. The Sixth Circuit denied relief, finding the Pennsylvania statute under which Raja was convicted divisible; the portion of the statute under which he was charged is a categorical match to 21 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) and is a controlled substance offense under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) under the “modified categorical approach.” View "Raja v. Sessions" on Justia Law

In 2006, English was convicted of third-degree criminal sexual conduct based on sexual intercourse with a 17-year-old acquaintance while she was asleep. The court sentenced English to 21-180 months’ imprisonment. English has been released. After the trial,“Juror A” revealed that her father had sexually abused her at age eight. English was granted a new trial. The Court of Appeals reversed, reinstating English’s conviction. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. A state court denied post-judgment relief. The Court of Appeals and Michigan Supreme Court denied discretionary review, using routine language. English's federal habeas petition was dismissed. The Sixth Circuit concluded that deference to the state courts was improper because the district court failed to make the requisite determination that English’s federal claim had been adjudicated on the merits and applied de novo review. The court found that reasonable jurists could disagree on whether English was denied a fair trial. English made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Juror A’s failure to disclose; the evidence that Juror A would have known that her past abuse was relevant at voir dire; and inconsistencies in her account at the evidentiary hearing, all indicate deliberate concealment, permitting an inference of bias. View "English v. Berghuis" on Justia Law