Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Raja, a citizen of Pakistan, first entered the U.S. in 1990 without inspection. In 1996, Raja pleaded guilty to possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance and was sentenced to three-23.5 months’ imprisonment. He served 90 days in a Pennsylvania prison. Nonetheless, in 1998, Raja was granted lawful-permanent-resident status. In 2007, Raja traveled to Pakistan to visit his family. Upon his return, he was detained after officials discovered his conviction. Raja admitted to the conviction and to providing a fraudulent Social Security number to the officers at the time of his 1995 arrest. The government initiated removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). An IJ found Raja removable for a controlled-substance offense and ineligible for a waiver of inadmissibility because he had never lawfully adjusted to lawful-permanent-resident status due to his prior conviction. The BIA dismissed Raja’s appeal. The Sixth Circuit denied relief, finding the Pennsylvania statute under which Raja was convicted divisible; the portion of the statute under which he was charged is a categorical match to 21 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) and is a controlled substance offense under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) under the “modified categorical approach.” View "Raja v. Sessions" on Justia Law

In 2006, English was convicted of third-degree criminal sexual conduct based on sexual intercourse with a 17-year-old acquaintance while she was asleep. The court sentenced English to 21-180 months’ imprisonment. English has been released. After the trial,“Juror A” revealed that her father had sexually abused her at age eight. English was granted a new trial. The Court of Appeals reversed, reinstating English’s conviction. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. A state court denied post-judgment relief. The Court of Appeals and Michigan Supreme Court denied discretionary review, using routine language. English's federal habeas petition was dismissed. The Sixth Circuit concluded that deference to the state courts was improper because the district court failed to make the requisite determination that English’s federal claim had been adjudicated on the merits and applied de novo review. The court found that reasonable jurists could disagree on whether English was denied a fair trial. English made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Juror A’s failure to disclose; the evidence that Juror A would have known that her past abuse was relevant at voir dire; and inconsistencies in her account at the evidentiary hearing, all indicate deliberate concealment, permitting an inference of bias. View "English v. Berghuis" on Justia Law

L.H. has Down Syndrome. Through second grade, L.H. was “mainstreamed,” i.e., educated in the standard Normal Park School setting, integrated with non-disabled grade-level peers, and taught the standard curriculum, with special supports and services. An “IEP team” comprising his parents, teachers, and staff, prepared an annual “individualized education program” (IEP). L.H. made progress academically but did not keep pace with his peers. Staff members suggested moving L.H. to a Comprehensive Development Classroom (CDC) at a different school. L.H.’s parents resisted. L.H. remained at Normal Park. Teachers reported that L.H.’s behavior became disruptive; they changed his curriculum and attempted to minimize distractions by isolating L.H. L.H.’s behavior improved but progress toward his goals did not. Over his parents’ objections, L.H.’s 2013-2014 (third grade) IEP unilaterally ordered L.H. transferred to the CDC, where the curriculum uses an online special-education program (ULS) to teach reading and math. ULS follows Common CORE standards but is not peer-reviewed nor is it tied to Tennessee’s general-education standards. The CDC had two teachers and nine students. There would be little interaction between disabled and non-disabled students. L.H.’s parents rejected the IEP and enrolled L.H. at a private school, where he has remained.They sued under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400. The district court held that placement of L.H. in the segregated classroom was more restrictive than necessary and violated the IDEA, but that the parents’ alternative placement did not satisfy the IDEA. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that the CDC placement violated the IDEA, but concluded that the private placement did satisfy the IDEA, and remanded for a determination of reimbursement. The Normal Park teachers were openly unwilling to properly mainstream L.H., rather than removing him when it became challenging. View "L. H. v. Hamilton County Department of Education" on Justia Law

In 1981, at 18 months old, Carter was removed from his mother, who suffered from schizophrenia. After several foster homes, Carter was adopted when he was 10 years old. In 1997, Carter went to live with his adoptive grandmother, Prince. He was subsequently incarcerated. Carter was released from jail, let himself into Prince’s home, and killed her. He took extensive measures to cover the crime, took money, and left, stopping to steal a license plate. Prince had been stabbed 18 times, had suffered blunt-force head trauma, and had been anally raped. Semen was identified as Carter’s. Carter was detained and, after his Miranda warnings, confessed. At a pre-trial competency hearing, Carter was shackled because he had attempted to commit suicide several times. The court concluded that Carter was competent based upon the testimony of a court-appointed licensed psychologist. Carter entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. The defense expert, Dr. King. noted “several subtle signs of a psychotic disorder, ”including inappropriate laughter, auditory and visual hallucinations, and Carter’s musing about killing his lawyer. The judge again found Carter competent, noting that even King acknowledged that the issue was borderline. Carter interrupted opening statements to express his desire to plead guilty and insist that he did not want to attend the trial. After asking whether he would be removed if he “acted up,” he lunged at the judge. Defense counsel stipulated that Carter would monitor the proceedings via television. In 1998, Carter was convicted of aggravated murder and was sentenced to death. Carter unsuccessfully sought federal habeas relief, alleging that he was incompetent at trial and that his attorneys were constitutionally ineffective. The Supreme Court of Ohio explicitly recognized Carter’s suicide attempts, his “disagreements with counsel[,]” his desire to “enter a plea and get it over[,]” and his “lung[ing] at the judge.” While Carter’s evidence of incompetence may be “enough,” the question is whether such evidence compels a determination of incompetence. Carter failed to carry his burden under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2). View "Carter v. Bogan" on Justia Law

In 2010, the defendants formed PremierTox, a urinalysis testing company: Doctors Peavler and Wood owned a substance abuse treatment company, SelfRefind; Doctor Bertram previously worked for SelfRefind. Bottom and Walters owned a drug testing service and laboratory. Physicians at clinics ordered urinalysis tests to check if their patients used illicit drugs and to monitor their medications. PremierTox was to receive those urine samples, perform the testing, and report back. In October 2010, SelfRefind began to send frozen urine samples to PremierTox for testing, but PremierTox did not have the correct equipment. In 2011, after PremierTox bought the necessary, expensive machines, they broke down. Urine samples from SelfRefind piled up. PremierTox started testing them between February and April 2011 and finished testing them in October. Over the same period, it tested and billed for fresh samples as they came in, aiming for a 48-hour turnaround. PremierTox billed insurers, saying nothing about the delays. The defendants were charged with 99 counts of health care fraud and with conspiracy. A jury acquitted them of conspiracy and 82 of the health care fraud charges and convicted them of 17 health care fraud charges. The trial judge imposed sentences of 13-21 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions. A reasonable jury could find that the defendants violated 18 U.S.C. 1347 by requesting reimbursement for tests that were not medically necessary. View "United States v. Walters" on Justia Law

DEA ordered Miami-Luken, a registered controlled substances pharmaceutical wholesaler, to show cause why its registration should not be revoked, for failing to maintain effective controls against the diversion of oxycodone and hydrocodone and failing to disclose suspicious orders. At the company’s request, an ALJ issued a subpoena requiring DEA to produce various investigative records. DEA filed a notice declaring that it would not comply. Miami-Luken filed an emergency motion and the district court adopted a magistrate’s recommendation to enforce the subpoena in part, eliminating one category of subpoenaed documents, narrowing another, and permitting DEA to provide “reasonably redacted versions.” DEA's Acting Administrator determined that the enforcement order, permitting the DEA to make reasonable redactions, also permitted DEA to review the validity of the subpoena itself, and found that the requested categories of documents were not “necessary to conduct” the hearing as would be required for disclosure under 21 C.F.R. 1316.52(d) and ordered the subpoena quashed. DEA obtained a stay of the order enforcing the subpoena pending further judicial review and moved for relief from judgment. Miami-Luken then petitioned the Sixth Circuit to review directly DEA’s order quashing the subpoena. Meanwhile, the district court denied DEA’s motion for relief from judgment, stating: Nothing in this Court’s Order permitted the DEA Administrator to set aside the subpoena. The Sixth Circuit denied Miami-Luken’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. The Administrator’s order was not a “final decision” under 21 U.S.C. 877. View "Miami-Luken, Inc. v. United States Drug Enforcement Administration" on Justia Law

Davis is incarcerated for the assault and murder of Marsha Blakely. His conviction was based on the testimony of an eye-witness, Avery, who changed his story several times before trial. Corroborating evidence permitted the jury to credit Avery’s trial testimony that implicated Davis. Years later, Avery recanted his testimony, claiming that he did not witness Blakely’s murder and that he admitted this to the prosecutor before testifying against Davis. Davis filed a successive petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254, based on the prosecution’s alleged knowing presentation of Avery’s perjured testimony at trial. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Davis’s petition, which was filed outside the one-year statute of limitations. Davis’s petition was untimely and he cannot show a credible claim of actual innocence to overcome the statute of limitations. For a petitioner to establish entitlement to the actual-innocence exception, he must support his allegations of constitutional error with new, reliable evidence, such as exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence, that was not presented at trial. Davis has not undermined the evidence that corroborates Avery’s trial testimony, and his only proof of innocence, Avery’s recantation affidavit, is unreliable and, in the circumstances, insufficient to establish innocence. View "Davis v. Bradshaw" on Justia Law

In 2008, Midwest hired Plaintiff. In 2015, Plaintiff informed Midwest that she was pregnant. Plaintiff claims her supervisor made negative comments and was annoyed by Plaintiff’s absences for pre-natal appointments. About three months later, Plaintiff was terminated “[d]espite … no record of discipline.” Plaintiff testified that Midwest’s president presented Plaintiff with an agreement and said that she “needed to sign then if [she] wanted any severance,” that she felt bullied and signed the agreement, which provided that Plaintiff would waive “any and all past, current and future claims” against Midwest. Plaintiff later stated that she assumed that "claims" referred to unpaid wages or benefits. Midwest paid and Plaintiff accepted $4,000.Plaintiff filed a charge with the EEOC, then filed suit, alleging that Midwest terminated her because of her pregnancy, that Midwest has a sex-segregated workforce, and discrimination in compensation, citing Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e; the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k); 42 U.S.C. 1981a; Michigan's Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act; and the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. 206(d). After filing, Plaintiff returned the $4,00, saying that she was “rescinding the severance agreement.” The Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment entered in favor of the Defendant. Under the tender-back doctrine, contracts tainted by mistake, duress, or even fraud are voidable at the option of the innocent party if the innocent party first tenders back any benefits received; if she fails to do so within a reasonable time after learning of her rights, she ratifies the contract. The doctrine does not apply to claims under Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. View "McClellan v. Midwest Machining, Inc." on Justia Law

Gaffers is a former employee of Kelly, which provides outsourcing and consulting services to firms around the world, including “virtual” call center support, where employees like Gaffers work from home. Gaffers alleged that Kelly underpaid virtual employees, based on time spent logging in to Kelly’s network, logging out, and fixing technical problems. Gaffers sued on behalf of himself and his co-workers (over 1,600 have joined) seeking back pay and liquidated damages under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 216(b). About half of the employees that Gaffers sought to represent signed an arbitration agreement with Kelly (Gaffers did not sign one) stating that individual arbitration is the “only forum” for employment claims, including unpaid-wage claims. Kelly moved to compel individual arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 4. Gaffers contended that the National Labor Relations Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act rendered the arbitration agreements unenforceable. The district court agreed with Gaffers. The Sixth Circuit reversed. In 2018, the Supreme Court held, in Epic Systems, that the National Labor Relations Act does not invalidate individual arbitration agreements. The court rejected arguments that FLSA displaced the Arbitration Act by providing a right to “concerted activities” or “collective action” or rendered the employees’ arbitration agreements illegal and unenforceable. View "Gaffers v. Kelly Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged Michigan’s statutory scheme for resentencing individuals who were convicted of first-degree murder and received mandatory sentences of life without parole for acts they committed as children. Plaintiff’s 2016 amended complaint (SAC) addressed the Supreme Court’s decisions in Miller v. Alabama (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, (2016), and Michigan’s 2014 amendments to its juvenile sentencing scheme. The SAC included allegations that Michigan’s policies and procedures governing parole deny Plaintiffs a meaningful opportunity for release in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments (Count IV); that deprivation of Plaintiffs’ good time and disciplinary credits in Section 769.25a(6) violates the Ex Post Facto Clause (Count V); and Defendants have failed to provide the Plaintiffs with access to programming, education, training, and rehabilitation opportunities in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments (Count VI). The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of Counts IV, V, and VI. On remand, the district court granted Plaintiffs summary judgment on Count V and class certification, and ordered permanent injunctive relief that prohibited Defendants from enforcing or applying the credit elimination. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that Mich. Comp. Laws 769.25a(4)(c), which was enacted in 2014 and eliminates credits for individuals who were sentenced to mandatory life without parole for juvenile first-degree murder convictions, unconstitutional. View "Hill v. Snyder" on Justia Law