Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendants service student loans. Parchman, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, filed suit, alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227, which prohibits a party from making a call “using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice,” absent an emergency or consent. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants “negligently, knowingly and/or willfully contact[ed] Plaintiffs on Plaintiffs’ cellular telephones without their prior express consent and repeatedly contacted plaintiff Parchman, even though he never gave them his cell phone number, never owed any debt to any Defendant, and told them to stop calling. Plaintiffs alleged that, although plaintiff Carlin took out a student loan in 2012, Defendants repeatedly contacted her, even after she demanded in writing that they stop calling her, in October 2014. Defendant NSI successfully moved to sever and dismiss Carlin’s claims because the calls involved different companies and their respective calling practices. Plaintiffs unsuccessfully moved to amend the complaint after Parchman died to substitute Parchman’s daughter. Defendants argued that the requisite elements of adequacy of class counsel and adequacy of class representatives were not met. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, holding that a TCPA claim does survive death, but affirmed with respect to Carlin’s claims. View "Parchman v. SLM Corp." on Justia Law

Zank, a U.S. citizen, and Moreno, an Ecuadorian citizen, divorced and had joint custody of BLZ, born in Michigan in 2006. The decree prohibited Moreno from taking BLZ to Ecuador without prior notice to Zank. In 2009, Moreno took BLZ to Ecuador. Zank obtained a Michigan state court temporary sole custody order, contacted the State Department, and filled out a Hague Convention petition with the Embassy in Ecuador. Zank did not complete the process by filing the petition with the Ecuadorian courts. The State Department labeled Ecuador as noncompliant with its Hague Convention obligations. In Ecuador, Moreno enrolled BLZ in school. BLZ flourished, participating in extracurricular activities and making many friends. In 2010, Moreno permitted Zank to visit BLZ in Ecuador. Zank did not take BLZ to the Embassy or pursue a Hague Convention petition. Moreno obtained an ex parte order from an Ecuadorian court prohibiting BLZ from leaving the country. The parents eventually filed an agreement in Ecuador: Moreno received full legal custody and an increase in child support; Zank waived issues concerning BLZ's arrival in Ecuador. The "no travel" order was lifted. BLZ visited Zank in 2014. Moreno and Zank reiterated their agreement, for filing in the U.S.; it was filed in the wrong court. In 2016, BLZ visited Zank. Zank claims that BLZ told him that Moreno had physically abused her and that she did not wish to return to Ecuador. BLZ voiced a preference for living permanently with Zank. The Michigan court granted Zank custody. Moreno filed this Hague Convention petition in federal court, which held that the original abduction meant that Ecuador could not be the child’s habitual residence. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The proper remedy for the initial kidnapping was a Hague Convention petition in Ecuador, subject to applicable defenses, not self-help. View "Moreno v. Zank" on Justia Law

Woodside, a Florida resident, participated in a 24-person conspiracy to distribute pain pills in Middle Tennessee. He pled guilty under 21 U.S.C. 841 and 846. The Sixth Circuit vacated his 170-month so that the district court might better explain the quantity of drugs attributable to him. On remand, the district court, without further hearing, imposed the same sentence and explained its reasoning—including the drug quantity on which it based Woodside’s sentence—in a written amended judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Woodside’s argument that the district court erred by not affording him a new sentencing hearing and violated 18 U.S.C. 3553(c) by not stating the new explanation for his sentence “in open court.” The limited remand did not entitle Woodside to a new sentencing hearing or new procedures. Even if the district court erroneously attributed to Woodside drugs sold by others, Woodside would still have been sentenced according to the same base-offense level; any error was therefore harmless. View "United States v. Woodside" on Justia Law

The Isaacs took out a home-equity loan, secured by a mortgage on their home. GMAC did not immediately record the mortgage. While the mortgage remained unrecorded, the Isaacs filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. GMAC recorded the mortgage after the automatic bankruptcy stay was in effect, without obtaining an order modifying or lifting the stay. The mortgage was listed as a secured claim. In 2004, the bankruptcy court entered a discharge order; the case closed. A decade later, the mortgage's new owner (DBI’s predecessor) obtained a Kentucky state court foreclosure order. Before the sale, Linda Isaacs filed a voluntary Chapter 13 petition, with an adversary complaint seeking to avoid the mortgage through the “strong-arm” power (11 U.S.C. 544(a)), which permits the trustee to “avoid transfers of property that would be avoidable by certain hypothetical parties,” arguing that it was never properly perfected and would lose under state priority law to the hypothetical parties. Isaacs alternatively argued that the lien had never attached because it contained conflicting language: one clause indicated that the lien attached once the Isaacs signed the mortgage another section stated the lien would attach upon recording. DBI contended that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because Isaacs was effectively asking it to sit as an appellate court over the state court’s foreclosure judgment. The bankruptcy court granted Isaacs summary judgment. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reversed, holding that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Sixth Circuit agreed but remanded. The primary claim, seeking avoidance under the strong-arm provision, was independent of the validity of the state-court judgment. View "Isaacs v. DBI-ASG Coinvestor Fund, III, LLC" on Justia Law

The DEA bars hospitals from hiring, as an employee with “access to controlled substances,” any doctor who “for cause” has surrendered his registration to handle those substances. The DEA enforced this regulation against Doctors McDonald and Woods, who had voluntarily surrendered their registrations while in addiction treatment. They later regained full registrations. The doctors sued to enjoin the DEA from enforcing the regulation against them in the future, arguing that it no longer applied to them once their registrations were restored. The parties settled. Their agreement provides that “[t]he DEA no longer interprets 21 C.F.R. 1301.76(a) as requiring . . . potential employers of doctors with unrestricted DEA registrations to seek waivers.” The Sixth Circuit denied the government’s motion to keep the agreement under seal, noting “a strong presumption in favor of openness as to court records.” The government did not identify information too sensitive to remain public. Public interest is particularly strong where the information pertains to an agency’s interpretation of a regulation. Other doctors would no doubt be interested. View "Woods v. United States Drug Enforcement Administration" on Justia Law

Nakhleh entered a post office with an open package. An employee stated that he would have to tape his box closed and that she could not give him free tape. Nakhleh left to buy tape, returned, and sealed his package but had lost his shipping label. Nakhleh accused the workers of hiding it but eventually looked inside the box and found the label. Nakhleh refused to touch the label because “it’s got pollutant on it.” Another customer eventually affixed the label and taped the box. The post office then processed Nakhleh’s package. Nakhleh left but returned and asked for his package. When an employee stated that she could not return his package because it had been processed, Nakhleh became loud and irate. He paced, taking photos and asking employees for their names. Employees were unable to serve other customers and called the police. Officers arrived and asked Nakhleh what he needed from his package. Nakhleh replied (twice), “What if it’s a bomb?” The post office was closed for two hours while a Postal Inspector examined the package. Nakhleh was found guilty of causing a disturbance in a post office, 18 U.S.C. 3061(c)(4)(B), sentenced to six months’ probation with anger management treatment and fined $1,000. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. There was sufficient evidence that Nakhleh engaged in “conduct which create[d] loud and unusual noise” in the post office and that interfered with postal operations. View "United States v. Nakhleh" on Justia Law

In 2006, Gilmore pleaded guilty to federal offenses and began serving a 188-month sentence. South Carolina, planning to charge Gilmore with assault and battery and failure to pay child support, filed a detainer, requesting that the Federal Bureau of Prisons notify it before releasing him. The Bureau notified Gilmore under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act. If he asked South Carolina to resolve the charges, the state would need to try him within 180 days. The Bureau notified the Solicitor of Richland County, South Carolina that Gilmore requested final disposition. Months later, that office replied that it “ha[d] no charges pending” and speculated that any charges originated in the Sheriff’s Department. The Bureau forwarded Gilmore’s request to the Magistrate Court. No one responded. Four years later, South Carolina sent another detainer request for failure to pay child support. Gilmore wrote the South Carolina judge that he had tried to resolve the matter for years; the detainers made it difficult for him to complete rehabilitative programs. No one responded. Gilmore filed federal habeas petitions. The South Carolina district court transferred both petitions to the Eastern District of Kentucky, which dismissed them. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. In naming the federal warden, Gilmore sued the wrong official--South Carolina was responsible for the alleged harm. The court noted that Gilmore should determine whether a violation of the Act states a cognizable federal habeas claim; whether exhaustion applies; and whether any limitation on a criminal charge applies. View "Gilmore v. Ebbert" on Justia Law

Farrad was released from custody. Months later, informants reported observing Farrad in possession of firearms. Officer Garrison, using an undercover account, became Farrad's Facebook friend. Farrad’s Facebook photos included one showing what appeared to be three handguns on a closed toilet lid, uploaded on October 7, 2013. Execution of a warrant to search Facebook’s records yielded photos showing a person who looks like Farrad holding what appears to be a gun; others show a close-up hand holding what appears to be a gun. None show a date or unique distinguishing feature. The person in the photos has distinctive tattoos. Facebook records revealed that the photos were uploaded on October 11. Farrad was charged with having, “on or about October 11, 2013, . . . knowingly possess[ed] . . . a firearm.” The government argued that the photos were self-authenticating business records under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6). Defense counsel argued that the photos did not authenticate who took the pictures or when they were taken. The court admitted the photos. Garrison testified that criminals are likely to upload photos of criminal deeds soon after committing those deeds. Hinkle testified about the similarities between the photos and a real gun. No witness claimed to have seen Farrad with a gun. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Farrad’s conviction. The district court’s error in deeming the photographs self-authenticating business records was harmless because admission was proper under Rule 901(a). Hinkle was qualified, his testimony was relevant and reliable. Admitting Garrison’s testimony was harmless error because defense counsel did not argue a “date theory.” View "United States v. Farrad" on Justia Law

Wooster hired Hostettler in 2013; she was pregnant. Wooster allowed new employees 12 weeks unpaid maternity leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601–2654, even if they did not otherwise qualify. Hostettler took 12 weeks of leave but as her return to work approached, she experienced severe postpartum depression. Hostettler’s OB/GYN, Dr. Seals, prescribed an antidepressant and indicated that a reduced schedule “was medically necessary” for the “foreseeable future.” Hostettler met with her supervisor, Beasley, and did not return to work as scheduled. Wooster indicated that it would accommodate a part-time schedule until June 30. Hostettler returned to work but her symptoms continue. Hostettler contends that she was able to do everything required of her position, doing some work from home, a common practice in the department. There were no complaints about her work. Beasley stated that Hostettler never failed to perform any responsibility or timely finish any assignment. June 30 passed. The parties disagree about whether Wooster insisted that she return full-time. In mid-July, Seals submitted an updated medical certification, stating that Hostettler might return full-time in September. Beasley fired Hostettler. Hostettler sued, citing the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, the FMLA, and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The court granted Wooster summary judgment, concluding that full-time work was an essential function of the position of HR Generalist. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Genuine disputes of material fact remain; Wooster may have preferred that Hostettler be in the office 40 hours a week but an employer cannot deny a modified work schedule without showing why the employee is needed on a full-time schedule. View "Hostettler v. College of Wooster" on Justia Law

In 2008, plaintiffs filed a class action concerning 540 properties in Dayton’s McCook Field neighborhood, alleging that the groundwater is contaminated with carcinogenic volatile organic compounds, released by defendants’ automotive and dry cleaning facilities. The EPA designated the area as a Superfund site. Plaintiffs have access to municipal drinking water but the contaminated groundwater creates the risk of VOC vapor intrusion into buildings so that Plaintiffs may inhale carcinogenic and hazardous substances. A school was closed and demolished when vapor mitigation systems were unable to adequately contain the levels of harmful substances. After the suit was removed to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(2) and consolidated with related actions, Plaintiffs sought Rule 23(b)(3) liability-only class certification for five of their 11 causes of action—private nuisance, negligence, negligence per se, strict liability, and unjust enrichment. Alternatively, they requested Rule 23(c)(4) certification of seven common issues. The court determined that although the proposed classes satisfied Rule 23(a)’s prerequisites, Ohio law regarding injury-in-fact and causation meant that plaintiffs could not meet Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement and denied certification of the proposed liability-only classes. The court then employed the “broad view” and certified seven issues for class treatment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The certified classes satisfy requirements of predominance and superiority. Each issue may be resolved with common proof and individualized inquiries do not outweigh common questions. Class treatment of the certified issues will not resolve liability entirely, but will materially advance the litigation. View "Martin v. Behr Dayton Thermal Products, LLC" on Justia Law