Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants in an action alleging that jail personnel and members of Healthcare's medical staff violated federal and state law tort claims after her son died of a perforated duodenal ulcer in a detention center. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that the record would not support a jury finding that defendants were deliberately indifferent to the deceased's serious medical needs. In this case, the facts supported a case of misdiagnosis rather than one of deliberate indifference. View "Winkler v. Madison County" on Justia Law

The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained via a search warrant. The court held that the district court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress where the evidence failed to establish a fair probability that drug activity was occurring at the residence at the time the search warrant was executed. Furthermore, the good faith exception did not apply because no reasonable officer would believe that the affidavit established probable cause to search the residence at the time the affidavit was executed. The court also held that the district court erred in admitting a recorded telephone call because it constituted inadmissible hearsay. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Christian" on Justia Law

Dr. Paulus, a cardiologist at Ashland, Kentucky’s KDMC, was first in the nation in billing Medicare for angiograms. His annual salary was around $2.5 million, under KDMC’s per-procedure compensation package. In 2008, HHS received an anonymous complaint that Paulus was defrauding Medicare and Medicaid by performing medically unnecessary procedures, 42 U.S.C. 1320c-5(a)(1), 1395y(a)(1), placing stents into arteries that were not blocked, with the encouragement of KDMC. An anti-fraud contractor selected 19 angiograms for an audit and concluded that in seven cases, the blockage was insufficient to warrant a stent. Medicare denied reimbursement for those procedures and continued investigating. A private insurer did its own review and concluded that at least half the stents ordered by Paulus were not medically necessary. The Kentucky Board of Medical Licensure subpoenaed records and concluded that Paulus had diagnosed patients with severe stenosis where none was apparent from the angiograms. Paulus had retired; he voluntarily surrendered his medical license. A jury convicted Paulus on 10 false-statement counts and on the healthcare fraud count. It acquitted him on five false-statement counts. The court set aside the guilty verdicts and granted Paulus a new trial. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The degree of stenosis is a fact capable of proof. A doctor who deliberately inflates the blockage he sees on an angiogram has told a lie; if he does so to bill a more expensive procedure, then he has also committed fraud. View "United States v. Paulus" on Justia Law

In Ohio, judges in all courts of record are selected by election. Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 4, governs the fundraising and political conduct of judicial candidates. Platt, an Ohio attorney, formed the Platt for Judge Campaign Committee in 2013. Platt believes that parts of Canon 4 violate his rights to free speech, due process, and equal protection: Rule 4.1(A)(2), which prohibits a candidate from making speeches on behalf of a political party or another candidate for office; Rule 4.1(A)(3), which prohibits a candidate from publicly endorsing or opposing a candidate for another public office; Rule 4.4(A), which, save for three exceptions, prohibits a judicial candidate from personally soliciting campaign contributions; Rule 4.4(E), which creates a permissible window for soliciting and receiving campaign contributions; Rule 4.4(F), which limits the solicitation and receipt of contributions for candidates defeated before the general election; and Rule 4.4(G), which regulates the solicitation and receipt of contributions for candidates who die or withdraw from the election. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rejection of all of Platt’s claims. Ohio’s rules strike the delicate balance between the Constitution’s commands and the state’s desire to protect judicial integrity. View "Platt v. Board of Commissioners on Grievances & Discipline of the Ohio Supreme Court" on Justia Law

Following Columbus, Ohio robberies, the government obtained an arrest warrant against Satterwhite for interstate robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951; felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g); and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). Satterwhite was arrested. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3161 (Speedy Trial Act), “[a]ny information or indictment charging an individual with the commission of an offense shall be filed within thirty days from the date on which such individual was arrested or served with a summons.” The deadline in Satterwhite’s case was February 22, 2016. The parties filed six joint motions for waiver and to extend the period while the parties discussed a plea agreement. The court granted these motions, extending the time until August 21. On October 7, the government filed an information and an executed plea agreement, including a binding recommended sentence of 240 months. On November 29, Satterwhite was arraigned. The court accepted Satterwhite’s plea and sentenced Satterwhite to 240 months of imprisonment, noting that Satterwhite’s advisory sentencing range was 471 months. Satterwhite did not challenge the untimely filing of the information. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the time limits for the government to file an information or indictment after arresting a defendant are jurisdictional. A defendant who fails to timely move for dismissal on the basis of an untimely indictment waives his right to move for dismissal under the speedy indictment provision. View "United States v. Satterwhite" on Justia Law

Leone’s employer used a degasser, a large vat lined with brick, to extract gas impurities from molten steel. The degasser’s components include an alloy chute near the top of the vat. The employer hired BMI to “tearout” the degasser’s deteriorated face brick. Although the contract did not include any work on the alloy chute, a BMI employee testified that his team would dislodge loose material from the chute to ensure that nothing could fall. He did not notice any loose slag on the chute. After BMI finished, his employer assigned Leone to reline the degasser. Leone and his crew frequently climbed ladders near the alloy chute. They never spotted any loose slag on the chute but, 21 days after BMI completed its one-day job, a 40-pound piece of slag fell and struck Leone. Leone sued, claiming that the slag detached from the alloy chute. Because no molten metal could have created new slag, the court concluded that the slag must have existed when BMI finished but that BMI owed Leone no duty of care under Michigan law. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court interpreted Michigan law too narrowly. Although a contractor’s creation of a new hazard can trigger a duty to third parties, that is not the only way that such a duty might arise. A contractor can be liable to a third party if “any legal duty independent of the contract existed,” including by voluntary assumption of a duty. View "Leone v. BMI Refractory Services., Inc." on Justia Law

Susany conspired with Courtney and Quinn to obtain explosives to crack safes at jewelry and coin shops. They planned to finance their purchase of explosives by breaking into shops. Susany and Quinn met with an FBI confidential informant to discuss procuring explosives, then met again to talk about the informant participating the in break-ins. Susany, Courtney, and the informant planned the details of a break-in. In the early hours of April 19, 2013, Susany, Courtney, and the informant arrived at the store. Courtney served as a lookout. Susany cut the phone line and activated a jamming device to block the alarm system's cellular backup. Officers arrived and arrested them shortly after the alarm was cut. Susany pled guilty to conspiracy to knowingly receive and transport explosive materials, 18 U.S.C. 371, 842(a)(3)(A), and 844(a). The district court imposed a sentence of 21 months of imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. While the district court erred in failed to reduce Susany’s base offense level by three points under USSG 2X1.1(b)(2), the error was harmless. That Guideline applies when the defendant and the co-conspirators have not completed all the acts necessary for the substantive offense. The court instead granted a three-level downward variance based on the nature and circumstances of the offense and reduced Susany’s base offense level to 10, yielding a Guidelines range of 21-27 months; the error resulted in a lower range than would have resulted under the correct calculation. View "United States v. Susany" on Justia Law

On March 31, 2014, the government obtained a single 30-day electronic surveillance order authorizing the wiretapping of cell phones used by Williams (TT1), and TT2 used by Cooper. The government intercepted Cooper’s TT2 calls for two weeks, including a call on April 12. Cooper made no more calls on TT2; the government confirmed this through a confidential informant on April 14 and ended its TT2 surveillance. On April 16, the government provided the TT2 wiretap recordings to the district court to be sealed. The government did not intercept any conversations from TT1 because Williams had stopped using it. When the government charged Cooper with drug trafficking, he twice unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence gathered directly or derivatively from the TT2 wiretap, citing the Fourth Amendment and 18 U.S.C. 2518(1)(c), claiming that the TT2 application did not establish the necessity for the wiretap and that the government did not seal the TT2 recording “immediately” and requesting a “Franks” hearing on his claim that the TT2 application’s supporting affidavit had material misrepresentations and omissions. Cooper entered a guilty plea and was sentenced to 396 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that the application included a 52-page affidavit, prepared by a knowledgeable officer, stating that the government had been investigating Cooper and his drug-trafficking organization for six months, during which traditional investigative methods had been attempted. Statements cited by Cooper were not misleading; the government complied with section 2518. View "United States v. Jamal Cooper" on Justia Law

In 2008, facing insolvency, Chrysler offered certain employees incentives to take early retirement, in addition to benefits they had earned under its Pension Plan. Pearce, then 60 years old, had worked for Chrysler for 33 years, and was eligible for the buyout plus the Plan’s 30-and-Out benefits--a monthly pension supplement “to help early retirees make ends meet until eligible for Social Security.” Chrysler provided Pearce with Pension Statements that repeatedly advised him to consult the Summary Plan Document (SPD). The SPD cautioned that “[i]f there is a conflict ... the Plan document and trust agreement will govern.” With respect to the 30-and-Out benefits, the SPD stated: “You do not need to be actively employed at retirement to be eligible ... you must retire and begin receiving pension benefits within five years of your last day of work for the Company.” Pearce believed that he could not lose his 30-and-Out benefits if he lost his job and declined the buyout offer. Chrysler terminated him that same day. Pearce was told that, because he had been terminated before retirement, he was ineligible for the 30-and-Out benefits; the SPD omitted a clause contained in the Plan, which said that an employee who was terminated was ineligible. Pearce sued under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the Plan on Pearce’s request for reformation, affirmed summary judgment rejecting Pearce’s request for equitable estoppel, and remanded. Analyzing Pearce’s request for reformation under contract law principles, the court should consider information asymmetry--Chrysler had access to the Plan while Pearce did not but repeatedly referred Pearce to the SPD--and other factors. View "Pearce v. Chrysler Group LLC Pension Plan" on Justia Law

More than 95% of the world’s bourbon comes from Kentucky. One distiller, Colonel Edmund Haynes Taylor, Jr., was called “the most remarkable man to enter the whiskey industry during the post-Civil War years.” Taylor built the Old Taylor Distillery in 1887 in Woodford County, to resemble a medieval limestone castle. The distillery fell into financial ruin and changed hands several times after the Colonel’s death. Production ceased in 1972. In 2014, Peristyle purchased the Old Taylor distillery, planning to renovate and resume bourbon production there. Peristyle renamed the property “Castle & Key” and intends to do business under that name, including marketing its bourbons and whiskeys. During the renovation period, the company regularly referred to its location at “the Former Old Taylor Distillery” or simply “Old Taylor.” Sazerac, which owns the trademark rights to “Old Taylor” and “Colonel E.H. Taylor” and produces bourbons under both names, sued Peristyle, alleging trademark infringement, unfair competition, and false advertising under the Lanham Act as well as common law trademark infringement, unfair competition, and passing-off violations. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Peristyle, which used the Old Taylor name descriptively and in good faith, qualifying for shelter under the Lanham Act’s fair use defense, 15 U.S.C. 1115(b)(4). View "Sazerac Brands, LLC v. Peristyle, LLC" on Justia Law