Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Cathedral Buffet, an Ohio for-profit corporation, does not generate a profit. Its sole shareholder is Grace Cathedral, a 501(c)(3) non-profit religious organization, which subsidizes the restaurant. The restaurant separated its workers into “employees” and “volunteers.” Volunteers performed many of the same tasks as employees, who received an hourly wage. Reverend Angley recruited volunteers from the pulpit on Sundays, suggesting that members who repeatedly refused to volunteer were at risk an unforgivable sin. The Department of Labor (DOL) filed suit; the district court held that Buffet’s religious affiliation did not exempt it from Fair Labor Standards Act. The Sixth Circuit reversed. To be considered an employee under the FLSA, a worker must first expect to receive compensation; Buffet volunteers had no such expectation. Buffet then sought “prevailing party” costs and attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. 2412, arguing that the DOL’s position throughout the litigation was not substantially justified. The Sixth Circuit declined to address the issue: “in the usual case in which fees are sought for the entire litigation, the determination of whether the government was ‘substantially justified’ . . . is for the district court” because that court “may have insights not conveyed by the record.” Buffet did not wish to argue before the district court, which adopted the DOL’s position, but that is not a legitimate reason to forgo judicial economy. The district court is better-equipped to determine the fees, if any, that should be awarded for work at that level. View "Acosta v. Cathedral Buffet, Inc." on Justia Law

Shabo immigrated to the U.S. in 1985. In 1992, at the age of 25, he was convicted of an aggravated felony: possession with the intent to deliver 50-225 grams of cocaine. He served 60 months of imprisonment. An immigration judge ordered his removal to Iraq based on his conviction for an aggravated felony and a crime relating to a controlled substance. The BIA denied his appeal. Because the Iraqi government was not issuing travel papers, Shabo remained in the U.S. Iraq began issuing travel papers last year. Shabo moved to reopen his 1998 BIA proceedings to seek protection under the Convention Against Torture, claiming that, as a Chaldean Christian, he faces likely torture in Iraq. He concedes that he is deportable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) and (B)(i). He argued that the circumstances in Iraq have changed considerably since 1997 when the IJ ordered his removal. The BIA found his petition untimely; that the changed-country-conditions exception does not apply to Convention Against Torture applications; and that Shabo had not presented sufficient evidence that he was “more likely than not” to be subject to torture. The Sixth Circuit dismissed his appeal, citing 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(C): “no court shall have jurisdiction to review any final order of removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed a criminal offense covered in section 1182(a)(2) or 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D)” unless the matter involves constitutional claims or questions of law. View "Shabo v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Brookdale employed Prather to review Medicare claims before their submission for payment. Many of these claims were missing required certifications from physicians attesting to the need for the medical services provided. Certifications must “be obtained at the time the plan of care is established or as soon thereafter as possible.” 42 C.F.R. 424.22(a)(2).Prather filed a complaint under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729, alleging an implied false certification theory. The district court dismissed her complaint. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, holding that Prather had pleaded two claims with the required particularity and that the claims submitted were false. On remand, the district court dismissed Prather's Third Amended Complaint in light of the Supreme Court’s 2016 clarification of the materiality element of an FCA claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Prather sufficiently alleged the required materiality element; the timing requirement in section 424.22(a)(2) is an express condition of payment and Prather alleges that the government paid the claims submitted by the defendants without knowledge of the non-compliance, making those payments irrelevant to the question of materiality. Section 424.22(a)(2) is a mechanism of fraud prevention, which the government has consistently emphasized in guidance regarding physician certifications and Prather adequately alleged “reckless disregard” of compliance and whether this requirement was material. View "Prather v. Brookdale Senior Living Community" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, retirees who worked at Honeywell’s Greenville, Ohio plant, were members of a bargaining unit. The final collective bargaining agreement (CBA) did not expire until May 2014. Honeywell sold the plant in 2011 but continued to provide healthcare benefits for retirees after the CBA expired. The 2011 CBA stated that “[u]pon the death of a retiree, the Company will continue coverage for the spouse and dependent children for their lifetime.” In December 2015, Honeywell sent a letter stating that it intended to terminate the retiree medical and prescription drug coverage on December 31, 2016. Plaintiffs filed suit on behalf of themselves and similarly situated retirees and eligible dependents under the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. 185, and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1132, claiming that Honeywell was obligated to provide retirees with lifetime healthcare benefits. Honeywell argued that the CBA’s general durational clause, which stated that the agreement remained in effect until May 22, 2014, governed its duty to provide those benefits. The Sixth Circuit held that the CBAs were unambiguous and do not vest retiree healthcare benefits for life. A CBA’s general durational clause applies to healthcare benefits unless it contains clear, affirmative language indicating the contrary. Retirees are not entitled to lifetime benefits; only the dependents of retirees who died while the CBA was in effect are entitled to lifetime benefits. View "Fletcher v. Honeywell International, Inc." on Justia Law

At the age of 19, Barcus had sex with a 12-year-old girl. He pleaded guilty to attempted aggravated sexual battery against a victim less than 13 years old in Tennessee, spent three years in prison, is subject to “community supervision for life” under Tennessee law, and is required to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). After his release from prison, Barcus cut off his ankle monitoring bracelet and fled to Texas. He went to Kentucky but failed to register as required. Arrested, Barcus pleaded guilty to failing to register as a sex offender under SORNA, 18 U.S.C. 2250(a). The PSR classified Barcus as a Tier III sex offender, which corresponds to a base level of 16, and recommended special conditions of supervised release, including mental health and drug treatment, participation in a sex offender treatment program, psychosexual assessment, and complete polygraph testing. The district court adopted the PSR calculations and sentenced Barcus to a within-guidelines term of 30 months in prison with a five-year term of supervised release with the special sex offender conditions. The Sixth Circuit vacated the sentence. The district court incorrectly classified him as a Tier III sex offender because his qualifying Tennessee conviction is broader than the comparable offense under SORNA. The comparable federal offense requires Barcus to have acted with intent; the Tennessee offense does not. View "United States v. Barcus" on Justia Law

Officers obtained a search warrant for Robinson’s Ohio apartment after observing him sell drugs outside and making controlled buys from him. When the officers arrived to execute the warrant, Robinson fled and was chased, tackled, and subdued. Police then seized fentanyl, marijuana, and methamphetamine, plus three scales, a blender, packaging materials, three cell phones, and a bag of needles, from the apartment. Two women and a young child were present during the search. Robinson pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). His pre-sentence report calculated a total offense level of 19. Because Robinson’s criminal history spanned 19 years and yielded a total score of 26, he was assigned to Criminal History Category VI. Robinson faced a statutory maximum of 20 years in prison, but his advisory Guidelines range was 63-78 months. The district court sentenced Robinson to 118 months, invoking its discretion to increase a sentence based on the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors rather than a specific Guidelines provision. Robinson argued that the court gave excessive weight to certain factors including his continued drug use and recidivism, and to the community-wide harm caused by the opioid epidemic. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the sentence. The district court was not indifferent to the sympathetic aspects of Robinson's personal history. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Trustee and Creditor filed an adversary complaint against Debtors and NonDebtor Defendants, including BIT, seeking a declaration that Debtors were not entitled to a discharge, and to recover assets from the Non-Debtors. Creditor and Trustee later entered into an agreement; Creditor purchased the bankruptcy estate’s claims, except Trustee’s objection to discharge, for $100,000 and a reduction to Creditor’s proof of claim. The court authorized the sale and dismissed the purchased claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Trustee no longer owned and lacked standing to assert them but did not dismiss the 2009 Complaint. Creditor then filed the dismissed claims in the Western District of Tennessee, alleging that the BIT was an alter ego of Debtors, such that its assets should be made available to satisfy claims. The district court dismissed the claims because Tennessee law does not recognize reverse-veil-piercing outside of parent-subsidiary corporate relationships. In 2017, Creditor filed a new bankruptcy court complaint, invoking derivative standing and seeking a declaration that the BIT is a self-settled trust so that its assets are not excluded from bankruptcy estate by 11 U.S.C. 541(c)(2). The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed dismissal. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in interpreting the Sale Order to include the claims asserted in the 2017 Complaint or in concluding that Creditor could not pursue the claims asserted in the 2017 Complaint derivatively on Trustee’s behalf. View "In re Blasingame" on Justia Law

In 1996, at Madison Correctional Institution, Stojetz and other inmates stormed a unit housing juvenile offenders. After overpowering the guard, they proceeded to the cell of 17-year-old Watkins and attacked him. Watkins initially escaped but was cornered and stabbed to death by Stojetz and another inmate. Trial evidence indicated that Stojetz and his accomplices (members of the Aryan Brotherhood) killed Watkins, who was black, due in part to his race. Stojetz was charged with aggravated murder with prior calculation with a death-penalty specification--committing aggravated murder while a prisoner in a detention facility. The court accepted the jury's death-sentence recommendation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas corpus relief, rejecting Stojetz’s claims that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to: question prospective jurors about their views on race; life qualify the jury; accurately describe the nature of mitigating evidence during voir dire; investigate and present evidence; request voir dire of jurors concerning publicity during the trial; object to allegedly improper jury instructions and to incidents of prosecutorial misconduct; and object to opinion evidence regarding, Stojetz’s intent. The court also rejected claims of prosecutorial misconduct by failing to disclose Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction medical records to show that Stojetz’s throat was cut by another inmate; that the district court abused its discretion in denying a request for access to the grand-jury transcripts; that Stojetz was actually innocent of aggravated murder; and that his death sentence was arbitrary. View "Stojetz v. Ishee" on Justia Law

In 2008, a jury convicted Cradler of violating 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), which prohibits convicted felons from possessing a firearm. This offense typically carries a maximum imprisonment penalty of 10 years. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), a defendant who violates section 922(g)(1) after being convicted of at least three violent felonies or serious drug offenses becomes subject to a mandatory minimum imprisonment penalty of 15 years, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). The court sentenced Cradler under the ACCA, to a term of 222 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in 2011. In 2014, Cradler moved, under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate his sentence in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2013 Descamps decision. He argued that his convictions for sexual battery and third-degree burglary no longer qualified as violent felonies. The government conceded that it lacked the requisite information to support the argument that Cradler’s sexual battery conviction qualifies as a violent felony. The Sixth Circuit granted relief, first declining to address whether Cradler’s motion was timely or procedurally defaulted. FInding the Tennessee third-degree burglary statute divisible, the court applied a modified categorical approach, examined documents pertaining to Cradler’s conviction, and concluded the statute criminalizes more conduct than generic burglary and does not qualify as the enumerated offense of “burglary.” In so holding, the court abrogated a 2006 Sixth Circuit decision. View "Cradler v. United States" on Justia Law

Sunrise, an Ohio agricultural cooperative, owns one-third of Lund, which sells crop insurance. Sunrise pays “patronage,” a rebate, to its Ohio and Michigan members based on how much Lund insurance they buy. The Risk Management Agency (RMA) within the USDA, administers Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) programs. Patronage payments were prohibited until 2000, when Congress authorized some rebating if permitted under state law. Congress changed course in 2008, prohibiting patronage payments with a grandfather clause, 7 U.S.C. 1508(a)(9)(B)(iii) stating that the prohibition does not apply to a patronage dividend paid: “by an entity that was approved by the [FCIC] to make such payments for the 2005, 2006, or 2007 reinsurance year.” From 2008-2016, Sunrise was approved to pay patronage as a “grandfathered” entity. In 2016, another farming cooperative, Trupointe, merged into Sunrise. Trupointe had 4100 members, did not sell crop insurance, and was not eligible to pay patronage. Sunrise argued to the RMA that under Ohio law and federal tax law, when one company merges into another, the surviving company is the same entity that existed before the merger. The RMA disagreed, concluding that the merger would make Sunrise ineligible to pay patronage and defining “entity” to mean the same entity that it approved for any of the 2005-2007 reinsurance years, with the same structure and relative size; any mergers would be considered a different entity, regardless of name or how taxed. The Sixth Circuit held that the agency was not permitted to impose additional eligibility requirements on approved entities that are unmoored from the statute. View "Sunrise Cooperative v. United States Department of Agriculture" on Justia Law