Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, who profess disbelief in God and one Jewish individual, alleged that the inscription of the Motto “In God We Trust” on U.S. currency, (31 U.S.C. 5112(d)(1) and 5114(b)), violates their rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and constitutional provisions, placing a substantial burden on their religious exercise by causing Plaintiffs to: personally bear a religious message that is the antithesis of what they consider to be truth, and “proselytize for a religious claim.” The Jewish Plaintiff alleged that it is sinful for him to participate in an activity that involves the superfluous printing of God’s name. Plaintiffs alleged that the inscription denies equal dignity to Plaintiffs’ religious views, contributing to cultural stigma. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of all claims. RFRA does not require the government to permit Plaintiffs to use their preferred means of payment. Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that the inscription substantially burdens their exercise of religion or that the currency statutes intended to discriminate against them or suppress their religion; precedent demonstrates that the statutes do not lack any valid secular purpose. The currency statutes are neutral and generally applicable and only incidentally burden religious practices. Plaintiffs alleged facts showing societal bias against Atheists and suggesting that Congress required and reaffirmed the inscription for Christian religious purposes but have not presented factual allegations plausibly demonstrating that the challenged statutes caused the societal bias that is their asserted injury. View "New Doe Child #1 v. Congress of the United States" on Justia Law

Sweeney’s parental rights over his daughter, T.R., were terminated after he was convicted of raping his niece. He had no contact with T.R. during his 10-year imprisonment. Upon his release from prison in 2013, Sweeney began contacting T.R. via Facebook and text message. By 2015, when T.R. was 14, their communications had turned sexual and included the mutual sending of explicit pictures, detailed discussion of sex acts, and plans to meet for the purpose of engaging in sexual acts. T.R. alerted her adoptive parents, who contacted DHS, which alerted Sweeney’s parole officer. During a meeting with his parole officer, Sweeney indicated that he owned a cellular telephone that he had left at a homeless shelter. A parole officer and DHS officers went to the homeless shelter and secured the phone’s media-storage card, which DHS later searched pursuant to a warrant. Sweeney was convicted of production and receipt of child pornography, attempted enticement of a minor to engage in sexual conduct, and commission of a sex offense against a minor while required to register as a sex offender, and received a sentence of 55 years. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court erred: in admitting evidence derived from the media-storage card; by applying a two-level enhancement (USSG 2G2.1(b)(5)), which applies when the defendant is the victim's “parent” because his parental rights were terminated; and in imposing a sentence that was procedurally unreasonable for failure to address mitigation arguments. View "United States v. Sweeney" on Justia Law

As a school principal, Buendia took kickbacks from Shy. Detroit Public Schools (DPS) paid Shy for supplies he never delivered. Some of the money came from the federal government. The FBI searched Shy’s home and found a ledger of kickbacks Shy owed Buendia. Buendia was convicted of federal-programs bribery, 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(B), and sentenced to 24 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting her argument that the district court violated her constitutional right to present a complete defense when it excluded evidence of her kickback expenditures and the alleged receipts of expenditures for school purposes. The right to present a complete defense yields to reasonable evidentiary restrictions. The court correctly excluded as irrelevant evidence of how Buendia spent the kickback money and correctly excluded the receipts of school expenditures as hearsay. Regardless of how Buendia eventually spent the money, she “corruptly solicit[ed]” it because, by awarding contracts to Shy in exchange for kickbacks, she subverted the normal bidding process in a manner inconsistent with her duty to obtain goods and services for her school at the best value. Nor did the government open the door" by introducing testimony that Buendia bought massages using a gift card from Shy to show that she accepted kickbacks. View "United States v. Buendia" on Justia Law

In 2012, after attempting to sell a sawed-off shotgun, Richardson pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Based on Richardson’s three prior Georgia burglary convictions, each of which qualified as a predicate “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), the court sentenced him to 180 months’ imprisonment. Richardson did not appeal but subsequently brought a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to set aside his sentence, alleging that in light of the Supreme Court’s 2015 "Johnson" decision, his burglary convictions no longer qualified as predicate "violent felonies" under the ACCA. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. ACCA defines “violent felony” to include “generic burglary,” “an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.” While the Georgia burglary statute criminalizes more conduct than the generic definition because it includes vehicles, railcars, watercraft, and aircraft in its list of covered locations covered, the court employed the modified categorical approach and concluded that the law is divisible. Richardson’s state court indictments make clear that his convictions involved three elements: an unlawful entry into a dwelling house or building with intent to commit a crime therein. View "Richardson v. United States" on Justia Law

Comey was the administrator of her brother, Warehime's, estate. Martin and Simons fraudulently took ownership of Warehime’s property. Martin, a nurse, accessed Warehime’s medical records without authorization so that Simons could fabricate a story about a relationship with Warehime that would make the putative property transfer look legitimate. Martin recruited a patient to “take [Comey] out.” The patient contacted the police. Before the government brought criminal charges, the probate court entered judgment against Martin and Simons. Martin pled guilty to using interstate commerce facilities with the intent to commit murder-for-hire, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and obtaining individually identifiable health information. The government agreed to move for a three-level reduction in the Guidelines “[i]f the defendant continues to demonstrate that he has accepted responsibility.” Before sentencing, Martin filed a Rule 60(b) motion to vacate the probate court judgment, asserting facts that contradicted the guilty plea. The government brought Martin’s motion to the sentencing hearing. Had Martin received the reduction, his guidelines range would have been 87–108 months. The court imposed a sentence of 144 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Martin then filed a section 2255 motion to vacate, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorneys advised him to file the Rule 60(b) motion. The government submitted documents contradicting that position but containing some inconsistencies. The court denied Martin’s motion without a hearing. Martin then filed a Rule 59(e) motion to alter the judgment. The court denied the motion, stating that “[a]lthough [Martin] asserts that there are facts in dispute, [he] offers no proof beyond mere self-serving allegations.” The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court abused its discretion by declining to hold an evidentiary hearing. Martin presents more than mere assertions of innocence; his motion contains factual allegations about the deficiencies of his attorneys’ advice. View "Martin v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2013, Jackson filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. The bankruptcy court lifted the automatic stay on Jackson’s residence. The bank foreclosed on Jackson’s residence in May 2014. Jackson’s right to redeem the property expired six months later. In October 2014, the Chapter 7 Trustee filed a no-asset report; in February 2015, Jackson obtained a discharge. Jackson submitted letters to the bankruptcy court in December 2016, stating that the account number for a creditor had changed; requesting “reconsideration of House being exempt in the bankruptcy case”; requesting a “sign[ed] court Order stating that the amended Scheduled have been listed, dismissed and entered”; and requesting reconsideration of an order denying her request to transfer the case. After a hearing, the bankruptcy court denied all of Jackson’s request and directed the Clerk to “prepare and enter a final decree discharging the trustee and closing the case promptly but not earlier than twenty-eight days after the entry” of that January 26, 2017 order. Jackson filed her Notice of Appeal 28 days later on February 23. On February 24, the Clerk docketed a “Text Order of Final Decree” which referenced the discharge and closed the case. The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, sua sponte, raised the issue and found that the appeal was filed late under 28 U.S.C. 158(c)(2), Supreme Court precedent indicates that the statutory time requirements are jurisdictional in nature. View "In re Jackson" on Justia Law

In 2006, Lang shot and killed Cheek and Burditte during a botched drug deal. Lang was indicted on two counts of aggravated murder and for aggravated robbery with firearm specifications. After two witnesses had testified, the prosecutor notified the court that Cheek’s father recognized Juror 386 as the daughter of the woman married to Cheek’s brother. After two more witnesses testified, the judge and counsel questioned Juror 386; she acknowledged she met Cheek once and had attended her funeral. She learned of Cheek’s death from her grandfather and from newspapers. She denied talking to others about the case and was excused by agreement. The court confirmed that Juror 386 had not spoken with and would have no contact with other jurors, then told the jurors that she was excused because “she may have had a relationship with ... somebody.” The court asked the jurors as a group whether Juror 386 had talked about knowing someone involved in the case and stated: “I take it by your silence that she did not.” Neither attorney asked to question them individually. The jury returned a guilty verdict. After taking mitigation evidence, the judge imposed a death sentence. Lang unsuccessfully sought federal habeas corpus relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Ohio Supreme Court reasonably concluded that counsel’s approach to mitigation did not result in ineffective assistance; Lang suffered no prejudice from his attorney’s failure to request individual voir dire of the jurors. View "Lang v. Bobby" on Justia Law

In 1991, Norton merged predecessor retirement plans into one Plan governed by ERISA. As of 1997, the Plan included a traditional defined-benefit formula applicable to members of the predecessor plans and a cash-balance formula applicable to all other plans. In 2004, the Plan was amended to end accruals under the defined-benefit formulas and allow further accruals only under the cash-balance benefit formula. The Plan allows disability retirement, “normal” age 65 retirement, late retirement, and early retirement, for participants at least 55 years old with at least 10 years of service. The Plan allows retirees to take benefits in the “Basic Form” or in one of six alternative forms, including a lump-sum payment on the date of retirement. In 2008, the Retirees brought a putative class action, alleging Norton underpaid retirees who took a lump-sum payment. The court certified a class in 2011 and eventually granted the Retirees summary judgment. Damages were not reduced to a sum certain, but the court adopted the Retirees’ calculation formula, awarded fixed-rate pre-judgment interest, and entered final judgment. The Sixth Circuit vacated, finding the Plan ambiguous, with respect to calculation of benefits, and possibly noncompliant with ERISA, with respect to actuarial calculations. The court vacated class certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) and (b)(2). The court held that if the Plan clearly gives the administrator “Firestone” deference, interpretation against the draftsman has no place in reviewing the administrator’s decisions. The arbitrary-and-capricious standard stays intact. View "Clemons v. Norton Healthcare Inc. Retirement Plan" on Justia Law

Mohawk, a seller of prescription drugs sent junk faxes to medical providers, advertising the seller’s prices on Bristol-Myers and Pfizer drugs. A recipient filed a putative class-action lawsuit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, which makes it unlawful “to send . . . an unsolicited advertisement” to a fax machine, 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(C). Plaintiff first asserted claims only against Mohawk, which never answered the complaint. The district court entered a default judgment. Plaintiff then amended its complaint to assert claims against Bristol and Pfizer, arguing that they had “sent” the unsolicited faxes simply because the faxes mentioned their drugs. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. To be liable, a defendant must “use” a fax machine or other device “to send . . . an unsolicited advertisement” to another fax machine. Bristol and Pfizer neither caused the subject faxes to be conveyed nor dispatched them in any way; only Mohawk did those things. Bristol and Pfizer, therefore, did not “send” the faxes and thus have no liability for them. View "Health One Medical Center v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co." on Justia Law

Knoxville police stopped Malone for driving with unlit tail lights. A handgun was found under Malone’s seat and he was charged as a felon-in-possession, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). A witness-intimidation charge was added after Malone asked his sister lie to officers about who bought the gun, section 1512(b)(1). He pleaded guilty. The Presentence Report classified Malone as an armed career criminal under the ACCA, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1),(e)(2)(B)(ii), based on three prior convictions for Tennessee aggravated assault, federal drug trafficking, and Kentucky second-degree burglary. He contested the classification, arguing that his Kentucky conviction was incorrectly considered an ACCA predicate offense because the crime’s elements are broader than generic burglary’s. The district court sentenced him to the ACCA-minimum 15 years’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Kentucky second-degree burglary categorically qualifies as generic burglary under the ACCA. Generic burglary “contains at least the following elements: an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.” In Kentucky, “[a] person is guilty of burglary in the second degree when, with the intent to commit a crime, he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling.” View "United States v. Malone" on Justia Law