Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Stevenson is serving life in prison in Michigan for first-degree murder, assault with intent to commit murder, and possessing a firearm in the commission of a felony. His convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. Stevenson’s state motion for relief from judgment was denied. Stevenson filed a 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition in the Western District of Michigan, which was denied as untimely. Days before the Western District dismissed the first petition, Stevenson filed another 2254 petition in the Eastern District, which, upon learning of Stevenson’s earlier petition, dismissed the second as “duplicative.” Noting that the second petition sought to raise three grounds not mentioned in the first petition, the Sixth Circuit determined that the Eastern District abused its discretion by failing to transfer the second petition to the Western District because a subsequent 2254 petition filed while the petitioner’s initial petition is still pending should be construed as a motion to amend the initial petition under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. On remand, the Eastern District transferred the case to the Western District, which transferred the case to the Sixth Circuit for consideration as an application to file a second or successive habeas petition (28 U.S.C. 1631). The Sixth Circuit remanded, noting that it already determined that the second petition was not second or successive but should be construed as a motion to amend the first petition. View "In re Stevenson" on Justia Law

Based on allegedly deceptive pictures on pet food packaging, Wysong alleged false advertising under the Lanham Act, requiring proof that the Defendants made false or misleading statements of fact about their products, which actually deceived or had a tendency to deceive a substantial portion of the intended audience, and likely influenced the deceived consumers’ purchasing decisions, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the complaint's dismissal. If a plaintiff shows that the defendant’s advertising communicated a “literally false” message to consumers, courts presume that consumers were actually deceived. Wysong claimed the Defendants’ messaging was literally false because the photographs on their packages tell consumers their kibble is made from premium cuts of meat—when it is actually made from the trimmings. A reasonable consumer could understand the Defendants’ packaging as indicating the type of animal from which the food was made but not the precise cut used so that Wysong’s literal-falsity argument fails. A plaintiff can, alternatively, show that the defendant’s messaging was “misleading,” by proving that a “significant portion” of reasonable consumers were actually deceived by the defendant’s messaging, usually by using consumer surveys. Wysong’s complaints do not support a plausible inference that the Defendants’ packaging caused a significant number of reasonable consumers to believe their pet food was made from premium lamb chops, T-bone steaks, and the like. Reasonable consumers know that marketing involves some level of exaggeration. View "Wysong Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

Raymond, a veteran of the U.S. Air Force, was born in 1947 and was a long-term resident of Middlesboro, Kentucky. He worked in the coal-mining industry for over 20 years and developed severe respiratory issues. Raymond, a non-smoker, sought benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. 901, but died while his claim was pending. Raymond’s claim was consolidated with a claim for survivor’s benefits submitted by his widow, Joanna. The ALJ awarded benefits to Joanna, on both Raymond’s behalf, and as his surviving spouse. The Benefits Review Board affirmed. Zurich, the insurer of Straight Creek Coal, sought review. The Sixth Circuit denied Zurich’s petition, upholding the ALJ’s conclusions that Zurich failed to rebut the presumption of timeliness, that Raymond had worked for at least 15 years in qualifying employment, and that Raymond had a total respiratory disability. Raymond worked only in surface mines or coal-preparation plants during his career; the ALJ properly relied on 20 C.F.R. 718.305(b)(2) and determined whether Raymond’s mining employment was “substantially similar” to underground mining. View "Zurich American Insurance Group v. Duncan" on Justia Law

In 1994, Carruthers and Montgomery assaulted three people, robbed them, then buried them alive. The bodies were found buried in a Memphis cemetery, a week after they disappeared. Carruthers’ family retained Wharton to represent him. Wharton was allowed to withdraw because of a conflict of interest. The court appointed Nance. Carruthers repeatedly complained about Nance; the court appointed other attorneys, who ultimately withdrew. Massey was appointed and was given permission to withdraw because his family was receiving threats from Carruthers. Between January and April 1996, the court denied Carruthers’s five motions to appoint new counsel. Carruthers represented himself during the guilt and sentencing phases. A Tennessee jury convicted Carruthers of three counts of first-degree, premeditated murder and imposed a death sentence for each. State courts affirmed on direct appeal and denied Carruthers post-conviction relief. The federal district court denied his petition for habeas corpus relief, in which Carruthers argued that he was denied counsel at critical stages of the proceedings in violation of Supreme Court precedent (Cronic), that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in ordering him to proceed pro se, and that he was not competent to stand trial or to represent himself. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Carruthers procedurally defaulted his Cronic and competency claims, and the state court’s decision that Carruthers forfeited his right to counsel was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. View "Von Carruthers v. Mays" on Justia Law

NPC’s adversary proceeding against the Chapter 7 Trustee and his surety alleged that the trustee breached his fiduciary duties with respect to one of the Debtor’s assets, a former Benton Harbor manufacturing facility. NPC’s attorney (Demorest) served five non-parties with subpoenas duces tecum under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45. The ensuing discovery dispute, including several motions, hearings, and orders, resulted in an award of attorney fees and costs to the non-parties, $104,770.00 to one group and $61,417.50 to another. After a subsequent finding of civil contempt for failure to pay, payment was made and the bankruptcy court ordered payment of an additional $4,725.00 in attorney fees and costs incurred in connection with the contempt proceedings. The district court and Sixth Circuit affirmed. The bankruptcy court specifically found, after a case-specific inquiry, that the subpoenas issued to the non-parties were unduly burdensome, given the undisputedly broad scope of the requests and the temporal reach of the requests. As an experienced commercial litigator, Demorest would have known that complying with such subpoenas would involve considerable time and resources, implicate significant concerns about customer privacy, and require review for privileged communications and attorney work product. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in finding that sanctions were warranted. View "New Products Corp. v. Dickinson Wright PLLC" on Justia Law

In 2010, Dr. Menendez treated 15-year-old Garber for a fever, constipation, and back pain. Garber became a paraplegic. The state court dismissed Garber’s initial lawsuit because he failed to file an affidavit from an expert witness in support of his claim. In his second lawsuit, Garber tried to serve Menendez at his Ohio office, but (unbeknownst to him) Menendez had retired to Florida. Garber voluntarily dismissed the lawsuit. Garber sued Menendez a third time in May 2017 and properly served him. Ohio provides a one-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims, Ohio Rev. Code 2305.113, which began running on August 5, 2013, when Garber turned 18. Garber argued that Ohio tolls the statute of limitations when the defendant “departs from the state.” The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the suit. The court rejected an argument that the statute’s differential treatment of residents and non-residents violates the dormant Commerce Clause by disincentivizing individuals from leaving Ohio and offering their services (or retirement spending) in other states. The Ohio tolling provision does not discriminate against out-of-state commerce any more than many other policy benefits reserved for residents of a given state, including the existence of an estate tax for Ohioans but not for Floridians. View "Garber v. Menendez" on Justia Law

Sexton entered a bank and presented a note, stating that he was robbing the bank. The teller retrieved $1,610 from a drawer and gave it to Sexton, who took the money and the note and left the bank. Sexton was arrested later that day and charged with bank robbery by intimidation, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a). Sexton pleaded guilty; the government agreed to recommend a sentence at the low end of the guideline range. The PSR concluded that the guideline range was 63-78 months of imprisonment, but recommended a five-level upward departure to reflect the inadequacy of Sexton’s criminal history category, pursuant to USSG 4A1.3,1 resulting in a guideline range of 100-125 months. The PSR recommended a sentence of 120 months. Sexton emphasized that the robbery was nonviolent and fueled by his need to obtain money to satisfy his drug addiction and argued that the PSR failed to explain why it recommended a five-level upward departure. The district judge, agreeing that Sexton’s extensive criminal history merited an upward departure, imposed a sentence of 96 months of imprisonment, noting that a two-, three-, or four-level upward departure all would permit the 96-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the departure was not substantively unreasonable and that the sentence was adequately explained. View "United States v. Sexton" on Justia Law

Sexton entered a bank and presented a note, stating that he was robbing the bank. The teller retrieved $1,610 from a drawer and gave it to Sexton, who took the money and the note and left the bank. Sexton was arrested later that day and charged with bank robbery by intimidation, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a). Sexton pleaded guilty; the government agreed to recommend a sentence at the low end of the guideline range. The PSR concluded that the guideline range was 63-78 months of imprisonment, but recommended a five-level upward departure to reflect the inadequacy of Sexton’s criminal history category, pursuant to USSG 4A1.3,1 resulting in a guideline range of 100-125 months. The PSR recommended a sentence of 120 months. Sexton emphasized that the robbery was nonviolent and fueled by his need to obtain money to satisfy his drug addiction and argued that the PSR failed to explain why it recommended a five-level upward departure. The district judge, agreeing that Sexton’s extensive criminal history merited an upward departure, imposed a sentence of 96 months of imprisonment, noting that a two-, three-, or four-level upward departure all would permit the 96-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the departure was not substantively unreasonable and that the sentence was adequately explained. View "United States v. Sexton" on Justia Law

Grimsby invited Nancy to take a boat trip on Lake Erie. The boat hit a wave, jarring the passengers and injuring Nancy. In her suit, invoking the court’s diversity and admiralty jurisdiction, Nancy pleaded that “this action is not to be deemed an ‘admiralty and maritime claim’ within the meaning of” Rule 9 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In 2015, the district court held that the incident fell within the court’s admiralty jurisdiction, meaning that federal maritime law controlled the duty of care. In 2016, the court held that a boat hitting a wave did not count as a “collision” under the Coast Guard Navigation Rules. A jury subsequently found that Grimsby was not negligent. The court granted Nancy’s motion for a new trial, finding that the evidence did not support the verdict. Grimsby filed an interlocutory appeal, and Nancy cross-appealed, citing the interlocutory exception to the final judgment rule that applies to admiralty cases. The Sixth Circuit dismissed. The exception does not apply because Nancy chose to pursue claims under ordinary civil procedures. View "Buccina v. Grimsby" on Justia Law

Kimberly and defendant argued on the phone. Defendant went to the home of Kimberly’s aunt (Taylor), where Kimberly was staying and told her that if she did not come out, he was going to “set it off.” After hanging up the phone and declining to leave the house, Kimberly heard gunshots, glass breaking, and the security alarm. A gun was found between a storm door and an inner door. The glass on the door was broken. At trial, Taylor testified she was awakened by the gunshots, that she heard defendant’s voice outside, and that she received a phone call from her alarm company. On that call, which was admitted into evidence, Taylor and Kimberly identify defendant as the shooter. Kimberly stated defendant was “dangerous” and had a history of domestic violence. The court also admitted two 9-1-1 calls made by Kimberly, one during the incident and one a few hours later, when she was concerned that defendant had returned. Those calls also referenced defendant’s history of domestic violence. The Memphis Police Department arrived and recovered the gun, which belonged to Kimberly. She testified that she reported it stolen a year earlier. Defendant was arrested, convicted as a felon in possession of a handgun, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), and sentenced to 109 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and upholding the admission of evidence containing references to prior domestic abuse. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law