Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellees filed a state court action, alleging that Peace caused property damage when he interfered with the water flow to the Appellees' Cleves, Ohio property. That lawsuit was stayed when Peace filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. Appellees had already hired Abercrombie to provide an expert report, which was filed in the state litigation. After Peace’s bankruptcy filing, Appellees filed an adversary proceeding under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(6), alleging that Peace owed them a non-dischargeable debt. The bankruptcy court agreed. Peace filed an untimely notice of appeal. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel dismissed. Peace filed a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment, asserting that Appellees’ expert witness, Abercrombie, committed fraud by giving false testimony and that Peace’s discovery that Abercrombie’s data sources were nonexistent was “new evidence.” The bankruptcy court denied the motion as untimely and stated that Peace failed to show that his evidence could not have been discovered with reasonable diligence and there was no clear proof that Abercrombie’s testimony was false. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. Peace made substantially similar arguments to the bankruptcy court in his initial post-trial brief. The bankruptcy court acted within its discretion in treating the motion as an attempt to relitigate issues previously decided and as an improper substitute for an appeal. View "In re Peace" on Justia Law

In 1998, Byerley was found beside the road with her throat slashed. Jordan was convicted for the murder. Prosecutors never told him that a knife found near Byerley's body might have implicated someone else. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Jordan sought post-conviction relief under Brady v. Maryland. The same court vacated Jordan’s conviction in 2011. Jordan was retried and acquitted in 2015. Less than a year later, Jordan sued a Blount County prosecutor, detective, and the county under 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking damages for the Brady violation. The statute of limitations for that claim is one year. The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of his suit As a general rule, a claim accrues “when the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.” To obtain relief, the plaintiff must be able to prove the elements of his claim. Analogizing to the tort of malicious prosecution, which requires “termination of the prior criminal proceeding in favor of the accused,” the court concluded that Brady claim under section 1983 cannot accrue until the criminal proceeding so terminates. Jordan’s criminal proceeding continued after the vacatur of his conviction, ending only upon his acquittal in 2015. His claim did not accrue until then. View "Jordan v. Blount County" on Justia Law

Morris pled guilty to the distribution of cocaine base. The plea agreement specified a Guidelines range of 30-37 months in prison. Because an amendment lowering the applicable drug sentencing guidelines was about to become effective, the government did not oppose a two-level downward variance, resulting in a range of 24-30 months. The agreement stated that Morris could withdraw his plea if the court were to impose a sentence higher than 37 months. Morris had two Michigan felony domestic violence convictions under M.C.L. 750.81(2). Under that statute, the first two domestic assault convictions are misdemeanor offenses, subsequent violations are felonies. The court utilized the “modified categorical approach,” examining the transcripts from Morris’s convictions and finding that both qualified as crimes of violence, so that he was a career offender. Morris withdrew his plea, proceeded to trial, and was convicted. The career offender designation resulted in a guidelines range of 210-262 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his sentence of 180 months of imprisonment. Domestic assault includes a risk of confrontation at least equivalent to that associated with burglary, so the conviction constitutes a crime of violence under the Guidelines’ residual clause. The conviction does not qualify under the elements clause; Michigan’s definition of battery does not include an element of “physical force” as defined by the Court in Johnson. View "United States v. Morris" on Justia Law

Fulson was the indirect equity owner of the Chapter 7 Debtor, based on his ownership of Nicole Gas, the Debtor’s sole owner. While Debtor’s bankruptcy was pending Fulson filed a state court complaint against the Columbia Gas entities under the Ohio Corrupt Practices Act (OCPA), alleging that the companies caused him indirect injury by harming Debtor; the only damages Fulson pled were those Debtor suffered—he did not claim any unique individual damages. Ransier, as Bankruptcy Trustee, eventually settled those claims on behalf of Debtor’s estate. Appellants, representing Fulson's probate estate, unsuccessfully objected. Ransier moved for contempt against Appellants, arguing that Fulson had merely a derivative claim based on Debtor’s injury, for damages that duplicated Debtor’s damages, that the claim became the property of Debtor’s bankruptcy estate, and that Appellants violated Debtor’s automatic stay. The Bankruptcy Court agreed, rejecting an argument that the claim was for “indirect” injury that fell within OCPA’s “directly or indirectly injured” language. The Bankruptcy Court held Appellants in contempt for violating 11 U.S.C. 362(a)(3) and awarded Ransier $91,068.00. The Ohio Supreme Court declined to answer the certified question: Whether a shareholder of a corporation has standing to bring a claim individually (as opposed to merely derivatively) under OCPA. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Judge then affirmed the contempt order and sanction award. OCPA did not provide Fulson an individual claim against the Columbia Gas entities. View "In re: Nicole Gas Production, Ltd." on Justia Law

Perkins has actively operated a 200-acre Kentucky farm since 1970. Her operation expanded to cultivate approximately 9,500 acres in various partnerships. Perkins encountered financial trouble in 2014. The partnerships filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases. Perkins retired from teaching. The Chapter 11 bankruptcies were dismissed after liquidating substantially all of the partnerships’ assets and making over four million dollars of payments to BB&T. In 2016 Perkins sought Chapter 12 bankruptcy protection. Creditors' proofs of claim totaled $4,012,908.79. In the preceding year, Perkins received $279,000 of gross income from her farm, $764,472 from her partnerships, $161,571 of capital gains from equipment sales, and $132,360 from wages, pension, and social security. BB&T objected to her plan, which projected that $18,950 could be paid annually to unsecured creditors over the plan’s five-year life and that a Chapter 7 liquidation would produce no payments to unsecured creditors. The plan proposed to pay BB&T annual installments over 20 years at 4.5% interest. The bankruptcy court rejected BB&T’s objection and confirmed the plan. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. Chapter 12 relief, 11 U.S.C. 109(f), is available to family fishermen and family farmers, defined as an “individual . . . engaged in a farming operation whose aggregate debts do not exceed $4,153,150,” and who receives more than half of her gross income from “such farming operation.” The bankruptcy court properly found Perkins to be a family farmer and confirmed the plan as feasible, providing proper treatment to secured claims, and meeting the best interests of creditors test. View "In re: Perkins" on Justia Law

School superintendent Groening had surgery that required six weeks of Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2612(a), leave. She returned to work part-time. Her mother then fell ill. Groening took intermittent leave to care for her throughout the rest of that year. A school board member told Groening that the district spent "too much time” working around Groening’s schedule. The board president told a colleague that Groening’s time away would be reflected in her annual evaluation. The board asked Groening for a breakdown of her leave. Groening created a spreadsheet. Between her leave, vacation, and business trips, Groening had been away for 12 weeks. The board indicated that it was hesitant to approve an upcoming conference. Groening submitted her notice of retirement, effective at the end of the following school year. The board then audited the business office, directing the auditors to review the method for tracking administrators’ time off. Groening was to be paid for unpaid leave when she retired, so any discrepancies had to be addressed before her retirement. Groening resigned the day before the auditors submitted their report. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the rejection of her FMLA claims. Groening's claims fell far short of showing constructive discharge. Groening failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether her working conditions were objectively intolerable. The audit was not an adverse employment action. View "Groening v. Glen Lake Community Schools" on Justia Law

School superintendent Groening had surgery that required six weeks of Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2612(a), leave. She returned to work part-time. Her mother then fell ill. Groening took intermittent leave to care for her throughout the rest of that year. A school board member told Groening that the district spent "too much time” working around Groening’s schedule. The board president told a colleague that Groening’s time away would be reflected in her annual evaluation. The board asked Groening for a breakdown of her leave. Groening created a spreadsheet. Between her leave, vacation, and business trips, Groening had been away for 12 weeks. The board indicated that it was hesitant to approve an upcoming conference. Groening submitted her notice of retirement, effective at the end of the following school year. The board then audited the business office, directing the auditors to review the method for tracking administrators’ time off. Groening was to be paid for unpaid leave when she retired, so any discrepancies had to be addressed before her retirement. Groening resigned the day before the auditors submitted their report. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the rejection of her FMLA claims. Groening's claims fell far short of showing constructive discharge. Groening failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether her working conditions were objectively intolerable. The audit was not an adverse employment action. View "Groening v. Glen Lake Community Schools" on Justia Law

The Union sued Genesis Mechanical, Genesis Services, and Genesis Corporation, claiming that all three had violated the union’s collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) by failing to forward certain funds. The Union alleged that Mechanical was a signatory to the CBA and that Services and Genesis Corporation were bound by the CBA as alter egos of Mechanical. On summary judgment, the district court held that Mechanical and Services were bound by the CBA but that Genesis Corporation was not. The Union filed a notice of appeal but the district court had not determined the amount of damages to which it was entitled. The parties, “for the sole purpose of proceeding with the appeal,” and without waiving any rights, agreed to the entry of a “Stipulated Judgment Order” by which Mechanical and Services would pay the Union about $45,000 in damages. The Seventh Circuit dismissed, holding that the orders were not final for purposes of appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291, despite the stipulated order. That order leaves open the possibility of “piecemeal appeals” and would “let the parties pause the litigation, appeal, then resume the litigation” on whatever issues they like. View "Board of Trustees of the Plumbers, Pipe Fitters & Mechanical Equipment Service, Local Union v. Humbert" on Justia Law

Counts 1-4 and 6 alleged Bacon sold firearms to prohibited persons, 18 U.S.C. 922(d)(1). Counts 5 and 7 charged Bacon with possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number, 18 U.S.C. 922(k). Bacon entered guilty pleas to Counts 1 and 5. The prosecution agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. Bacon testified that he purchased the Count 1 firearm and sold it from his Grand Rapids home "with reasonable cause to know that [the purchaser was] a felon.” The government proffered that the Count 1 purchaser had been convicted of a felony and that the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce. Bacon confirmed that he sold the Count 5 firearm, a semiautomatic pistol with an obliterated serial number, to a prohibited person at the same house, and had removed the serial number. The government proffered that the Count 5 firearm was manufactured in Ohio. Defense counsel stipulated to all facts proffered by the government and confirmed that Bacon was “satisfied” with the record. The court sentenced Bacon to 60 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Bacon’s arguments that the sections under which he was convicted exceeded Congressional authority under the Commerce Clause. The interstate commerce element, which Bacon admitted when entering his plea, ensures that the firearms affected interstate commerce and saves the statute from any jurisdictional defects. View "United States v. Bacon" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, former employees at Honeywell’s Boyne City, Michigan auto parts plant, were represented by the UAW while working. The collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between that union and Honeywell that became effective in 2011 and expired in 2016 stated: Retirees under age 65 who are covered under the BC/BS Preferred Medical Plan will continue to be covered under the Plan, until age 65, by payment of 16% of the retiree monthly premium costs ... as adjusted year to year,” Article 19.7.4. The plaintiffs took early retirement under the 2011 CBA and received Honeywell-sponsored healthcare, consistent with Article 19.7.4. Other Boyne City employees had retired before the 2011 CBA took effect, but were still eligible for benefits under Article 19.7.4. In 2015, Honeywell notified the UAW and the Boyne City retirees that it planned to terminate retiree medical benefits upon the 2011 CBA’s expiration. The plaintiffs, citing the Labor Management Relations Act, the Employment Retirement Income Security Act, and Michigan common law estoppel, obtained a preliminary injunction. The Sixth Circuit reversed, reasoning that the CBA did not clearly provide an alternative end date to the CBA’s general durational clause, so the plaintiffs have not shown a likelihood of success on the merits. View "Cooper v. Honeywell International, Inc." on Justia Law