Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Stephens, born biologically male, worked as a funeral director for a corporation that operates Michigan funeral homes. Stephens was terminated shortly after informing the owner, Rost, that she intended to transition and would represent herself as a woman while at work. The EEOC investigated Stephens’s allegations of sex discrimination and learned that the Funeral Home provided its male public-facing employees with clothing that complied with its dress code while female public-facing employees received no such allowance. The EEOC sued, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act by terminating Stephens’s employment on the basis of her transgender or transitioning status and refusal to conform to sex-based stereotypes and administering a discriminatory clothing policy. The Sixth Circuit ruled in favor of the EEOC. The Funeral Home engaged in unlawful discrimination against Stephens on the basis of her sex and did not establish that applying Title VII’s proscriptions against sex discrimination would substantially burden Rost’s religious exercise in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Even if Rost’s religious exercise were substantially burdened, the EEOC has established that enforcing Title VII is the least restrictive means of furthering the government’s compelling interest in eradicating workplace discrimination against Stephens. The EEOC may bring the clothing claim in this case because an investigation into the clothing-allowance policy was reasonably expected to grow out of the original discrimination charge. View "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. R.G. &. G.R. Harris Funeral Homes" on Justia Law

Airports, including Lake Cumberland Regional Airport, must make “standard grant assurances” (49 U.S.C. 47101) to receive federal funds. Assurance 22 requires an airport to “make the airport available . . . without unjust discrimination to all types ... of aeronautical activities.” Assurance 23 prohibits the airport from granting exclusivity to any aeronautical-services provider. Assurance 24 requires the airport to “maintain a fee and rental structure ... which will make the airport as self-sustaining as possible.” SPA’s director, Iverson, is an aircraft maintenance technician. SPA, at the Airport since 1986, leases hangars to store Iverson’s aircraft. SPA formerly provided maintenance services but now only refurbishes and re-sells aircraft. The Airport Board notified SPA of its intent to let SPA’s lease expire. Finding that there was an unmet need for maintenance services, it solicited bids. SPA did not bid. The Board picked Somerset and agreed to pay up to $8000 toward Somerset’s public liability insurance and forgo rent. The regional FAA office determined that the contract violated Assurance 24. The Board then conditioned the incentives on Somerset’s performing at least 10 aircraft inspections annually, making the contract more economically viable for the Airport, and agreed to terminate Somerset's agreement after one year to solicit new bids. The FAA approved. SPA asked to remain at the Airport “on fair and equal terms.” The Board sent SPA proposed agreements with the same terms, including provision of maintenance services, but refused to allow Iverson to personally lease a hangar. SPA refused to vacate. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in favor of the Board. The FAA standard for unjust discrimination is whether similarly situated parties have been treated differently. SPA is not situated similarly to Somerset. View "SPA Rental, LLC v. Somerset-Pulaski County Airport Board" on Justia Law

On October 29, 2014, at 4:00 a.m., 13 police officers wearing SWAT gear and face masks blew open the door of the Greers’ West Bloomfield Township home with a shotgun. The officers did not knock or announce their presence. The parents and their daughters were ordered to their knees at gunpoint; officers handcuffed a nephew. The Greers repeatedly asked to see the search warrant, but the officers refused to show it and did not allow the mother to sit with her seven-year-old daughter. Officers stated that they were searching for a “dangerous Russian,” who had evidently resided at the house more than a year before the search. Police found neither the suspect nor any contraband. The Highland Park Police Department, which evidently conducted the search, produced the underlying search warrant in response to the Greers' complaint. The warrant described the Greers’ home and listed controlled substances and items connected to narcotics trafficking as items to be seized. In the Greers’ suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the officers’ motion for judgment on the pleadings based on qualified immunity. The complaint states a plausible claim that the officers violated the plaintiffs’ clearly established Fourth Amendment rights by executing a search warrant on their home in an unreasonable manner. View "Greer v. City of Highland Park" on Justia Law

Westine completed a 235-month sentence for securities fraud, and, within months, began offering investments in oil wells. Prospective investors were promised their “[f]irst monthly check within 90 days.” Investors never received royalties; they complained to the Kentucky Department of Financial Institutions, which concluded that the companies were selling unlawful securities and obtained a restraining order. Westine and Ramer, his partner, began winding down the companies and transitioning to new companies that collected over $2 million from 138 investors, who never received checks. Ramer oversaw call centers, developed a promotional video that boasted a fictional production capacity of 75 barrels per day, and organized a trip, during which investors were introduced to another co-conspirator, Cornell, who provided a tour of his oil facility, to create an appearance of legitimacy. Defendants began to shift operations to a new company, and, in less than two months, collected $242,233 from 12 investors. Defendants were charged with 29 counts of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341; conspiracy to commit money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1956(h); and securities fraud, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b). A jury found each Defendant guilty. The court sentenced Westine to 480 months’ and Ramer to 156 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the admission of “prior acts” evidence and rejecting various hearsay challenges. Given the evidence against the Defendants, later-discovered evidence that Cornell was running a side deal is insufficient to warrant remand. View "United States v. Ramer" on Justia Law

In 2008, the National Park Service proposed a trailway through the Sleeping Bear Dunes National Lakeshore in Leelanau County, Michigan. One alternative route ran along Traverse Lake Road. Residents opposed sending visitors down their residential street and submitted objections during the public comment period. In 2009, the Park Service issued a revised proposal, with significant changes to the Traverse Lake Road portion of the trail. No one submitted objections. The Park Service approved the Traverse Lake Road route, making a finding of no significant impact. Six years later, the residents sued, citing the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321. Plaintiffs sought to supplement the administrative record with pictures, maps, and other documents. The court dismissed most of their claims as forfeited because Plaintiffs failed to participate in the planning process in a manner that would alert the Park Service to their objections to the 2009 plan and held that Plaintiffs failed to show exceptional circumstances requiring supplementation of the record. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Many of Plaintiffs’ objections during the 2008 comment period were sufficient to alert the Park Service to deficiencies in the 2008 Plan, but those comments did not preserve any challenge to the 2009 Plan. The record contains evidence addressing the issues Plaintiffs sought to prove with their supplemental material; the Park Service was not negligent in compiling the 3,005-page administrative record. View "Little Traverse Lake Property Owners Association v. National Park Service" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs worked for Oleson’s in Michigan. The collective bargaining agreement between Oleson’s and the Union allowed Oleson’s to deduct union dues from employees’ paychecks if the employee signed an authorization form. That form provided that the authorization would be irrevocable for one year or until the termination of the agreement, and thereafter for yearly periods unless revoked by certified mail during a 15- day window. Plaintiffs joined the union and signed the authorization forms. Three years later, they resigned their membership but sent their permission revocations by regular, not certified, mail, outside of the 15-day window. The union refused to accept the revocations. The company continued to deduct dues. Plaintiffs filed a class action, claiming violation of the Labor Management Relations Act by imposing conditions on their ability to revoke their authorizations and by violation of its duty of fair representation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the complaint, noting that one plaintiff had quit and the other had successfully revoked his membership. The Act makes it a crime for an employer to willfully give money to a labor union, 29 U.S.C. 186(a,b), and for a union to willfully accept money from an employer, except money deducted from the wages for dues if the employer has received a written assignment. This criminal provision creates no civil cause of action; the union did not act arbitrarily or in bad faith. View "Ohlendorf v. United Food & Commerical Workers International Union, Local 876" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs worked for Oleson’s in Michigan. The collective bargaining agreement between Oleson’s and the Union allowed Oleson’s to deduct union dues from employees’ paychecks if the employee signed an authorization form. That form provided that the authorization would be irrevocable for one year or until the termination of the agreement, and thereafter for yearly periods unless revoked by certified mail during a 15- day window. Plaintiffs joined the union and signed the authorization forms. Three years later, they resigned their membership but sent their permission revocations by regular, not certified, mail, outside of the 15-day window. The union refused to accept the revocations. The company continued to deduct dues. Plaintiffs filed a class action, claiming violation of the Labor Management Relations Act by imposing conditions on their ability to revoke their authorizations and by violation of its duty of fair representation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the complaint, noting that one plaintiff had quit and the other had successfully revoked his membership. The Act makes it a crime for an employer to willfully give money to a labor union, 29 U.S.C. 186(a,b), and for a union to willfully accept money from an employer, except money deducted from the wages for dues if the employer has received a written assignment. This criminal provision creates no civil cause of action; the union did not act arbitrarily or in bad faith. View "Ohlendorf v. United Food & Commerical Workers International Union, Local 876" on Justia Law

The Tennessee Alcoholic Beverage Commission issues separate classes of licenses to manufacturers and distillers, wholesalers, and liquor retailers, Tenn. Code 57-3-201. To obtain a license, an individual must have “been a bona fide resident of [Tennessee] during the two-year period immediately preceding the date upon which application is made.” The statute imposes a 10-year residency requirement to renew the license. A corporation cannot receive a license “if any officer, director or stockholder owning any capital stock in the corporation, would be ineligible to receive a retailer’s license for any reason specified” and all capital stock must be owned by individuals who meet the same residency requirements. Anticipating litigation, the state sought a declaratory judgment construing the constitutionality of the durational-residency requirements. The district court found the requirements facially discriminatory; held that state regulations of the retailer and wholesaler tiers are not immune from Commerce Clause scrutiny just because they do not discriminate against out-of-state liquor; concluded that nondiscriminatory alternatives could achieve the durational-residency requirements’ purposes—citizen health and alcohol regulation; and found that the requirements violate the dormant Commerce Clause. The Sixth Circuit affirmed and found the unconstitutional provisions severable. View "Byrd v. Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers Association" on Justia Law

The Tennessee Alcoholic Beverage Commission issues separate classes of licenses to manufacturers and distillers, wholesalers, and liquor retailers, Tenn. Code 57-3-201. To obtain a license, an individual must have “been a bona fide resident of [Tennessee] during the two-year period immediately preceding the date upon which application is made.” The statute imposes a 10-year residency requirement to renew the license. A corporation cannot receive a license “if any officer, director or stockholder owning any capital stock in the corporation, would be ineligible to receive a retailer’s license for any reason specified” and all capital stock must be owned by individuals who meet the same residency requirements. Anticipating litigation, the state sought a declaratory judgment construing the constitutionality of the durational-residency requirements. The district court found the requirements facially discriminatory; held that state regulations of the retailer and wholesaler tiers are not immune from Commerce Clause scrutiny just because they do not discriminate against out-of-state liquor; concluded that nondiscriminatory alternatives could achieve the durational-residency requirements’ purposes—citizen health and alcohol regulation; and found that the requirements violate the dormant Commerce Clause. The Sixth Circuit affirmed and found the unconstitutional provisions severable. View "Byrd v. Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers Association" on Justia Law

Mosby-Meachem, an in-house attorney for Memphis Light, Gas & Water, was denied a request to work from home for 10 weeks while she was on bedrest due to complications from pregnancy. MLG&W unsuccessfully argued that precedent precluded any reasonable jury from determining that Mosby-Meachem was a qualified individual while on bedrest because in-person attendance was an essential function of her job. A jury found in favor of Mosby-Meachem on her claim for disability discrimination under the Americans With Disabilities Act and awarded her compensatory damages. The district court also granted Mosby-Meachem’s motion for equitable relief and awarded her backpay for the period in which MLG&W did not permit her to telework. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Mosby-Meachem produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that in-person attendance was not an essential function of her job for the 10-week period in which she requested to telework. View "Mosby-Meachem v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division" on Justia Law