Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Michigan National Guard terminated two “dual-status” technicians, who are military employees that must be members of the National Guard, hold a military grade, and wear an appropriate military uniform while performing military duties, 32 U.S.C. 709(b), but are also “Federal civilian employee[s]” who are “assigned to a civilian position,” 10 U.S.C. 10216(a). Dual-status technicians are “afforded the benefits and rights generally provided for federal employees in the civil service,” including rights under the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS), 5 U.S.C. 7101–7135. The technicians appealed through the Guard’s internal administrative process, represented by their union. The Guard sent a letter to the union that could be read as temporarily forbidding all private communication between union representatives and Guard employees. The Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) found that this letter violated the FSLMRS. The Sixth Circuit enforced the order as modified. “Accepting the FLRA’s arguable but somewhat implausible interpretation of the letter under deferential substantial-evidence review, the letter did violate the FSLMRS and was within the purview of the FLRA." View "Federal Labor Relations Authority v. Michigan Army National Guard" on Justia Law

Insane Clown Posse, a Michigan music group, performs songs with “harsh language and themes.” Its fans, “Juggalos,” wear distinctive tattoos, clothing, and insignia, including clown face paint and the “hatchetman” logo. The Attorney General’s National Gang Intelligence Center's (34 U.S.C. 41507) 2011 gang-activity report, described Juggalos as “a loosely-organized hybrid gang.” “Juggalo[] subsets exhibit gang-like behavior and engage in criminal activity and violence.” Although “Most crimes ... are sporadic, disorganized, individualistic,” and minor, “a small number of Juggalos are forming more organized subsets and engaging in more gang-like criminal activity, such as felony assaults, thefts, robberies, and drug sales.” Four states recognize Juggalos as a gang. Juggalos who allege that they do not knowingly affiliate with any criminal gang, but have suffered violations of their Fifth Amendment due-process rights and a chill in the exercise of their First Amendment expression and association rights due to the designation, sued under the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 701(b). Some alleged that they had been detained; an Army Corporal with Juggalo tattoos alleges that he is “in imminent danger of suffering discipline or an involuntary discharge.” Local law enforcement caused a musical event to be canceled. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal; the designation was not reviewable because it was not a final agency action and was committed to agency discretion by law. View "Parsons v. United States Department of Justice" on Justia Law

Bruce and Bridget married in 1993. Their only child, Sierra, was born in 1995. In 2003, Bruce signed up for a life insurance plan sponsored by his employer and governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Bruce listed his uncle as the sole beneficiary. Bruce and Bridget divorced in 2006. Bruce died in 2013, insured for $48,000 in basic life insurance and $191,000 in optional life insurance. In their 2006 divorce decree, Bruce and Bridget agreed to maintain any employer-related life insurance policies for the benefit of Sierra until she turned 18 or graduated from high school. Bruce had not changed his beneficiary. The district court ordered payment to Sierra. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The divorce decree suffices as a qualified domestic relations order that, incorporating the Jacksons’ separation agreement and their shared parenting plan, “clearly specifies” Sierra as the beneficiary under 29 U.S.C. 1056(d)(3)(C). Her parents’ (alleged) non-compliance with the decree does not limit Sierra’s rights under ERISA. View "Sun Life Assurance Co. v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act, part of ERISA, a construction industry employer who withdraws from a multiemployer pension plan owes liability to that plan if the employer conducts work “in the jurisdiction of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) of the type for which contributions were previously required,” 29 U.S.C. 1383(b)(2)(B)(i). The Iron Workers Local 17 Pension Fund assessed pension liability against Stevens Engineers claiming that Stevens’s activities on a certain construction project involved such work within the jurisdiction of their previous CBA. An arbitrator, the district court, and the Sixth Circuit found that Stevens did not owe pension liability to the Fund because the work identified by Local 17 did not fall within the jurisdiction of the relevant CBA, and did not otherwise require contributions by Stevens. The CBA instead allowed Stevens to assign jobs like the ones at issue to other trade unions, and a job did not trigger pension liability to the Fund if, as here, it was properly assigned to a different union. View "Stevens Engineers & Constructors, Inc. v. Local 17 Iron Workers Pension Fund" on Justia Law

The United States charged Hall with unlawful gambling and money laundering and obtained a preliminary criminal forfeiture order for 18 parcels in Knox County. The County determined that Hall owed substantial delinquent real property taxes, giving it a first lien under Tennessee law. Under 21 U.S.C. 853(n)(2), a party asserting an interest in property that is subject to criminal forfeiture may seek a hearing on his alleged interest within 30 days. Knox County filed an untimely claim. The court amended the preliminary forfeiture order to cover three more Knox County properties. Knox County filed a timely second claim and requested an interlocutory sale and delay of forfeiture. The United States stated that accrued taxes and interest would be paid, regardless of whether the taxing authority filed a claim, but argued that Knox County would have no legal interest in accruing taxes once title passes, citing the Supremacy Clause, and objected to delaying a final forfeiture order. The Sixth Circuit vacated the forfeiture order. Knox County has a legal interest in the property (tax lien), so the district court erred in dismissing its claim for lack of standing but it is not necessarily entitled to a hearing. The court may ascertain the scope of Knox County’s interest on summary judgment but must account for that interest before entering a final forfeiture order. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying Knox County’s motion for an interlocutory sale. View "United States v. Hall" on Justia Law

Community, the nation’s largest for-profit hospital system, obtained about 30 percent of its revenue from Medicare reimbursement. Instead of using one of the systems commonly in use for determining whether Medicare patients need in-patient care, Community used its own system, Blue Book, which directed doctors to provide inpatient services for many conditions that other hospitals would treat as outpatient cases. Community paid higher bonuses to doctors who admitted more inpatients and fired doctors who did not meet quotas. Community’s internal audits found that its hospitals were improperly classifying many patients; its Medicare consultant told management that the Blue Book put the company at risk of a fraud suit. Community attempted a hostile takeover of a competitor, Tenet. Tenet publicly disclosed to the SEC, expert analyses and other information suggesting that Community’s profits depended largely on Medicare fraud. Community issued press releases, denying Tenet’s allegations, but ultimately corroborated many of Tenet’s claims. Community’s shareholders sued Community and its CFO and CEO, alleging that the disclosure caused a decline in stock prices. The district court rejected the claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The Tenet complaint at least plausibly presents an exception to the general rule that a disclosure in the form of a complaint would be regarded, by the market, as comprising mere allegations rather than truth. The plaintiffs plausibly alleged that the value of Community’s shares fell because of revelations about practices that Community had previously concealed. View "Norfolk County Retirement System v. Community Health Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court affirming the bankruptcy court concluding that Mountain Glacier properly reserved its arbitration claim in its dispute with Nestle Waters after Mountain Glacier filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The bankruptcy automatically stayed the companies’ arbitration. After the bankruptcy proceedings ended, Mountain Glacier attempted to resume arbitration, but Nestle Waters objected, arguing that Mountain Glacier failed properly to reserve the arbitration in its reorganization plan. The lower courts disagreed, as did the Sixth Circuit, holding (1) Mountain Glacier’s reservation enabled creditors to identify its claim and evaluate whether additional assets might be available for distribution; and (2) neither Browning v. Levy, 283 F.3d 761, 772 (6th Cir. 2002) nor 11 U.S.C. 1123(b)(3) required Mountain Glacier to provide more information than it did. View "Nestlé Waters North America. Inc. v. Mountain Glacier LLC" on Justia Law

Individuals reprogrammed ATMs to dispense $20 bills for each $1 they were supposed to dispense. Requesting $40 at a compromised ATM would deliver 40 $20 bills instead of two. More than $600,000 was taken from ATMs owned by SafeCash Systems. SafeCash investigated and found evidence that a former employee who serviced the machines, Folad, and his friend, Fattah, engineered the scheme. They turned the information over to the government, resulting in several criminal convictions, one-year sentences for Folad and Fattah, and a restitution order. After the scheme ended and after SafeCash determined what had happened, SafeCash replaced 17 of the relevant 18 ATMs in response to a federal regulation requiring that they be accessible to individuals with sight impairments. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences, rejecting an argument that destruction of the ATMs amounted to the destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence and violated the defendants’ due process rights. SafeCash, not the government, made the decision to replace the machines. Even if the government had been involved in the destruction of the machines, there was no indication that they contained potentially exculpatory evidence. View "United States v. Folad" on Justia Law

An undercover agent drove a confidential informant to purchase heroin. After Jackson sold the CI a gram of heroin, the CI asked Jackson if he knew where to get a pistol. They negotiated a price. While the CI went to the car for the money, Jackson walked to his residence to get the gun. Days later, Jackson told the CI that he had another gun. The agent drove the CI to meet Jackson. After the CI purchased a second gun. the CI asked whether Jackson wanted another drug customer, indicating the undercover agent. The CI then left the property with the pistol, returning to the car. Jackson subsequently walked to the vehicle and sold the agent heroin. Days later, officers executed a search warrant on the properties involved in these sales. At one, they discovered $3,050 and a spoon with heroin residue. At the other, they encountered Jackson's relative who admitted to flushing marijuana and cocaine base down the toilet when he heard officers entering. No guns were recovered. Jackson pled guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm and two counts of distribution of heroin. The court applied a four-level enhancement (U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)) for “us[ing] or possess[ing] a firearm in connection with another felony offense,” imposing a 100-month sentence. Without the enhancement, the range would have been 77-96 months. The Sixth Circuit vacated. Jackson made separate sales, without bringing both a gun and drugs to either or having reason to anticipate that the first sale would beget the second. Jackson did not use or possess either gun in connection with either drug sale. View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law

In 2009, Clardy pled guilty to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon and to possessing over 50 grams of crack cocaine with the intent to distribute it. He signed a “Waiver of Appellate Rights,” stating that Clardy “knowingly waives the right to challenge the sentence imposed in any collateral attack, including, but not limited to, a motion brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255 and/or 2241, and/or 18 U.S.C. 3582(c).” After ensuring that Clardy understood and had signed the agreement voluntarily, the court accepted his plea and sentenced him to 144 months' imprisonment. The Sentencing Commission later amended the Guidelines to reduce the offense levels for drug crimes. Clardy filed a motion under section 3582(c)(2), which allows a court to reduce a sentence that was based on a Guidelines range that has been lowered. The Seventh Circuit affirmed rejection of his motion. A defendant can waive “any right, even a constitutional right,” in a plea agreement. Clardy signed his agreement knowingly and voluntarily. By its plain terms, Clardy waived his right to file a 3582(c) motion. The specific terms within the agreement, not its general title, control its reach. References to specific statutes more clearly explain an agreement’s scope than do terms like “collateral attack.” View "United States v. Clardy" on Justia Law