Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs are homeowners in centrally-planned neighborhoods in Thompson’s Station, Tennessee. The developers established and controlled owners’ associations for the neighborhoods but have transferred that control to third-party entities not controlled by either the developers or homeowners. While under the developers’ control, the associations each entered into agreements granting Crystal the right to provide telecommunications services to the neighborhoods for 25 years, with an option for Crystal to unilaterally renew for an additional 25 years. The Agreements make Crystal the exclusive agent for homeowners in procuring services from outside providers. Homeowners must pay the associations a monthly assessment fee, which the associations use to pay Crystal, regardless of whether the homeowner uses Crystal's service, and must pay Crystal $1,500 for the cost of constructing telecommunications infrastructure. Crystal uses service easements within the neighborhoods. Crystal had no prior experience in telecommunications-services and contracts with another provider, DirecTV, and charges homeowners a premium above the rate negotiated with DirecTV. Crystal does not provide services outside of the neighborhoods. The plaintiffs claimed that the Agreements constituted self-dealing, unjust enrichment, unconscionability, unlawful tying, and unlawful exclusivity. The Sixth Circuit reversed dismissal, in part, finding plaintiffs’ allegations plausible on their face with respect to the tying claim, but affirmed dismissal of the exclusivity claim. View "Cates v. Crystal Clear Technologies, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). At the time of sentencing, Defendant had a pending incest charge in Tennessee relating to inappropriate sexual contact with his minor half-sister. After his federal sentencing, Defendant was convicted on the incest charge. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction for a Miranda violation and remanded. While Defendant’s new state case was pending, the Probation Office sought modifications to Defendant’s special conditions of supervised release: that Defendant have no contact with his sex offense victim(s) and submit to a psychosexual assessment at his own expense. Defendant pleaded guilty in state court to the reduced charge of aggravated assault. The federal court held a hearing and considered multiple reports relating to his state conviction that described numerous incidents of inappropriate sexual conduct between Defendant and his half-sister, only some of which formed the basis for his state court convictions. Defendant argued that a psychosexual evaluation was intrusive, unrelated to his federal offense, and not the “least restrictive means” to achieve the sentencing purposes of 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). The Sixth Circuit affirmed imposition of the conditions, agreeing that Defendant’s “history and characteristics” justified a psychosexual evaluation. The government conceded that it would not conduct a penile plethysmography test without seeking an additional order. View "United States v. Childress" on Justia Law

Perreault was alone with his four-month-old daughter when he called 911 to report that Jenna had been injured. Police and paramedics arrived and found that Jenna had suffered a blunt-force trauma to the head. She died from her injuries. Perreault was indicted for first-degree felony murder and felony child abuse. He claimed that he had dropped Jenna, had fallen on top of her, and that she may have hit her head on an object as they fell. The state produced the testimony of the emergency room doctor that Jenna’s injuries could have been caused only by a narrow range of high-impact events, such as a high-speed car accident, a fall from several stories, or “a baseball bat to the head.” Convicted, Perreault was sentenced to life in prison. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed. He filed an unsuccessful state post-conviction petition, arguing ineffective assistance. The Sixth Circuit affirmed a denial of federal habeas relief. The state court did not unreasonably apply clearly established Supreme Court precedent in rejecting claims that Perreault’s statement during his interrogation, “let’s call the lawyer then ‘cause I gave what I could,” constituted an unambiguous invocation of the right to counsel that required the police to stop questioning him and that Perreault’s trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to challenge the state expert’s testimony about the cause of Jenna’s injuries. View "Perreault v. Smith" on Justia Law

Abilify is approved to treat schizophrenia, Bipolar Disorder, major depressive disorder and irritability associated with autism. There are no disapproved treatments for elderly patients, but the FDA has included a warning since 2007 that Abilify is associated with increased mortality in elderly patients with dementia-related psychosis. Relators, former BMS employees, alleged in a qui tam suit that BMS and Otsuka engaged in a scheme to encourage providers to prescribe Abilify for unapproved (off-label) uses and improperly induced providers to prescribe Abilify in violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute. Nearly identical allegations were leveled against the companies years earlier. In 2007-2008, the companies each entered into an Agreement as part of a settlement of qui tam actions concerning improper promotion of Abilify. Relators allege that, despite those agreements, the companies continued to promote Abilify off-label and offer kickbacks, causing claims for reimbursement for the drug to be submitted to the government, in violation of the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729. The district court dismissed in part. The Sixth Circuit affirmed; the complaint did not satisfy Rule 9(b)’s requirement that relators adequately allege the entire chain to fairly show defendants caused false claims to be filed. As sales representatives, relators did not have personal knowledge of provider’s billing practices.The alleged plan was to increase Abilify prescriptions through improper promotion, which does not amount to conspiracy to violate the FCA. View "Ibanez v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co." on Justia Law

Narcotics investigator Williams received information from a confidential source that White was selling marijuana from a Covington, Tennessee location. Williams enlisted the confidential source to execute a “controlled buy” from White. After reviewing the recorded audio-video footage of the transaction, which occurred in the driveway, and conducting additional investigation, Williams prepared an affidavit and obtaining a search warrant for the address, stating: A sudden and forceful entry is clearly necessary ... due to ... White’s extensive criminal history … Albert is also known to have dogs believed to [be] pit bulls. The ensuing search uncovered over a pound of marijuana, a firearm, ammunition, and $32,000 in cash, some of which was traced to the controlled buy. The district court agreed with White that the affidavit failed to establish probable cause, but denied a motion to suppress, noting defendant’s failure to object to the magistrate’s good-faith ruling. Convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm and of ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), White was sentenced to 33 months in prison, concurrent with an on-going state sentence for his probation violation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court erred in denying the motion to suppress and committed plain error in failing to specify the “start date” for his federal sentence or adjusting it under USSG. 5G1.3(b). View "United States v. White" on Justia Law

Rucker finished an approximately 15-year term of imprisonment and began a five-year term of supervised release. Rucker violated the terms of his supervised release on four occasions when he tested positive for methamphetamine, which required the court to revoke Rucker’s supervised release and to sentence him to a term of imprisonment not to exceed five years, 18 U.S.C. 3583. Before determining the length of Rucker’s new term of imprisonment, the district court permitted him to enter an inpatient addiction treatment program. Presumably if Rucker had successfully completed the program the court would have imposed a short sentence. About a month after Rucker entered the program, he was ejected. The district court held a revocation hearing. Rucker’s Guidelines range was 21-27 months’ imprisonment. The court imposed a sentence of 24 months, stating that Rucker could qualify for the Bureau of Prisons’ residential drug-abuse program only if his sentence was at least 22 months in length. The Sixth Circuit vacated. A sentence is substantively unreasonable if the district court bases it on an impermissible factor. The Supreme Court has held that “[s]ection 3582(a) precludes sentencing courts from imposing or lengthening a prison term to promote an offender’s rehabilitation.” View "United States v. Rucker" on Justia Law

Navarre, a confidential informant for the Toledo Vice Narcotics Unit (TPD), was found unresponsive and bleeding from the head on December 1, 1993. A bloody, 110-pound boulder was found near her body. Navarre died days later. TPD misclassified the offense as a felonious assault and destroyed the relevant evidence once the statute of limitation for felonious assault expired. The case remained unsolved until 2005, when Wilson’s wife, told TPD of Wilson’s possible involvement in Navarre’s murder. Mrs. Wilson testified against Wilson, but owing to Wilson’s assertion of spousal privilege, her testimony was limited to acts and communications by Wilson in the presence of a third party. Mrs. Wilson’s son also testified that on the night of the murder, Wilson made comments that “snitch bitches die,” and “he had to kill the snitch bitch,” and finally, that he“dropped a brick on her head.” Wilson was convicted of murder and sentenced to 15 years to life. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the physical evidence, including the bloody boulder, was not “materially exculpatory.” The trial court rejected, as untimely, Wilson’s “motion to vacate” in which he argued that the state failed to adhere to discovery obligations, depriving him of a fair trial. The Ohio Court of Appeals denied his application to reopen his appeal, in which he claimed ineffective assistance. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition. View "Wilson v. Sheldon" on Justia Law

Born in Pakistan, Haroon came to the U.S. on a visitor’s visa in 2002. Six months later, Haroon returned to Pakistan, married Bano, and the couple had a son. One week after the birth, they divorced. The next day, Haroon returned to the U.S. on another six-month visa. Within two months, Haroon married McVey, an American citizen. They filed a relative petition which permitted Haroon to apply for permanent residence. After a two-year probationary period, Haroon applied to have the conditions on his permanent residence removed. While that application was pending, Haroon and McVey divorced. Haroon became an American citizen. At each stage of this process, Haroon lied. The forms (G-325, I- 485, I-751, and N-400) asked whether Haroon had any children or former wives. On each form and in interviews, Haroon denied marrying Bano and denied the existence of children, even after returning to Bano in Pakistan during the probationary period and after Bano gave birth to another son nine months later. One month after becoming a citizen, Haroon returned to Pakistan, where he remarried Bano. He flew back to the U.S and filed relative petitions for Bano, two sons, and seven other family members. The government charged Haroon with “knowingly procur[ing]” his citizenship “contrary to law,” 18 U.S.C. 1425(a). The Sixth CIrcuit affirmed his conviction, sentence of two years’ probation, and revocation of his citizenship. View "United States v. Haroon" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Campbell of four counts of aggravated murder, four counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of attempted kidnapping, and one count each of kidnapping, felonious assault, escape, and having a weapon under a disability. The court adopted the jury's recommendation and sentenced him to death. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed Campbell’s convictions but remanded for resentencing due to a procedural error. On remand, the court resentenced Campbell to death. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed. In 2005, Campbell filed a 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition, alleging 12 grounds for relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the petition. In 2015, Campbell filed a second section 2254 petition, challenging Ohio’s lethal injection protocol. The magistrate ordered and the district court affirmed its transfer to the Sixth Circuit for initial review as a “successive” habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit denied the motion. Under Supreme Court precedent, an Eighth Amendment habeas corpus challenge to the death penalty cannot succeed unless it can identify a constitutional means of execution. The court rejected arguments based on Ohio’s changed execution protocol and on Campbell’s physical and mental health. The court noted that Campbell’s alternative, 42 U.S.C. 1983, empowers a court to enjoin the"deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution." A hearing on Campbell’s section 1983 motion is scheduled. View "In re: Campbell" on Justia Law

Tawas, Michigan hosts an annual festival called “Perchville.” Its Chamber of Commerce obtained federal trademark registration for the term “Perchville,” in 2003. Trading Post allegedly was selling merchandise depicting the term “Perchville.” The Chamber filed suit against Agnello, a Trading Post employee, and obtained an ex parte injunctive order prohibiting sales of t-shirts with the mark, which stated: “this order shall be binding upon the parties to this action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys and on those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of this order by personal service [or] otherwise.” Agnello appeared at a hearing without an attorney, indicated that he had spoken to Trading Post's partial owner about the lawsuit, but repeatedly stated that he was confused. Agnello consented to a permanent injunction. The judge stated that the order would be binding on anyone acting in concert with Agnello. Trading Post filed suit, challenging the Chamber’s trademark of “Perchville.” The district court found the challenge barred by res judicata because a final determination on the merits occurred in the state court. The Sixth Circuit reversed. There may be circumstances when an employee’s interests are so aligned with his employer as to be in privity for purposes of res judicata, that was not true here. Agnello was an hourly employee given a few days’ notice of an injunction. View "AuSable River Trading Post, LLC v. Dovetail Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law