Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1998, a jury convicted Coley of attempted murder, two counts each of kidnapping and aggravated robbery, and three counts of aggravated murder (with the felony-murder aggravating circumstance attached to each count). He was sentenced to death. After unsuccessfully pursuing state-court relief, he unsuccessfully sought federal habeas relief in 2003. In 2017, Coley filed a new federal habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit denied Coley permission to file a second or successive petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254, based on his argument that the Supreme Court’s 2016 decision, Hurst v. Florida, rendered Ohio’s death-penalty scheme unconstitutional. Even if Hurst announced “a new rule of constitutional law,” the Supreme Court has not “made [Hurst] retroactive to cases on collateral review.” While not all second-in-time petitions are “second or successive,” it “cannot be that every new legal rule, including those not made retroactive on collateral review, also constitutes a new factual predicate,” and Coley has not shown that the facts underlying his claim “would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence” that no reasonable juror would have found him guilty. View "In re: Coley" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Flint, Michigan residents, filed a purported class action against city and state officials in state court, alleging that they have been harmed since April 2014 by the toxic condition of the Flint water supply. Defendants sought removal under 28 U.S.C. 1442, the federal-officer removal statute, and 28 U.S.C. 1441, which allows removal of state-law causes of action that raise substantial federal questions. Defendants claimed that they are being sued for actions that they took while acting under the direction of the federal EPA, which delegated primary enforcement authority to the state to implement the federal Safe Drinking Water Act in Michigan, and that the EPA retains “tremendous oversight authority.” Defendants also asserted “a substantial federal question”: whether the MDEQ Defendants complied with federal law. The Sixth Circuit affirmed a remand to state court. Complete diversity of citizenship is lacking, and no federal question is presented on the face of the complaint. Simply complying with a regulation is insufficient, even if the regulatory scheme is “highly detailed” and the defendant’s “activities are highly supervised and monitored.” Despite the EPA’s authority to intervene, Michigan was governing itself when the alleged actions and inactions giving rise to the Plaintiffs’ claims occurred. View "Mays v. City of Flint, Michigan" on Justia Law

Upon receiving an anonymous tip, the Michigan Gaming Control Board (MGCB) investigated allegations of race-fixing, involving gamblers and harness-racing drivers. Plaintiffs, MGCB-licensed harness drivers, attended an administrative hearing but declined to answer questions, invoking their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The MGCB immediately suspended their licenses, based on a requirement that license applicants “cooperate in every way . . . during the conduct of an investigation, including responding correctly, to the best of his or her knowledge, to all questions pertaining to racing.” MGCB later issued exclusion orders banning the drivers from all state race tracks and denied Plaintiffs’ applications for 2011, 2012, and 2013 licenses. Plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violations of their procedural due process and Fifth Amendment rights. The Sixth Circuit held that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. The exclusion orders were issued about 30 months before a post-exclusion hearing; Plaintiffs identified a violation of a clearly established right. Under specific conditions, a public employee “may rightfully refuse to answer unless and until he is protected at least against the use of his compelled answers.” The Supreme Court has held that if a state wishes to punish an employee for invoking that right, “States must offer to the witness whatever immunity is required to supplant the privilege and may not insist that the employee ... waive such immunity.” Both rights were clearly established at the time of the violation. View "Moody v. Michigan Gaming Control Board" on Justia Law

Three of Hand’s four wives died, two as victims of violent, unsolved home invasions. The death of Hand’s fourth wife, Jill, occurred while he was at home. Hand confronted and shot the intruder, who turned out to be his friend and employee Welch. An investigation revealed a plot between the men to kill all three women in order to receive life insurance proceeds. Hand was convicted of the aggravated murders of Jill and Welch, with death-penalty specifications, conspiracy to commit the aggravated murders, and an attempt to escape police custody after he was arrested. The jury recommended and the judge imposed the death penalty. After unsuccessful state appeals and post-conviction proceedings, Hand unsuccessfully sought federal habeas relief. The Sixth Circuit rejected several claims involving the adequacy of the voir dire at his trial to screen jurors because of pretrial publicity and ineffective assistance of counsel claims related to the voir dire; ineffective assistance claims related to mitigation evidence and the reintroduction of evidence of guilt during the sentencing phase; and the adequacy of evidence supporting the death penalty specifications. View "Hand v. Houk" on Justia Law

The Zappones own OSC, an Ohio scrap-metal recycling business. In November 2012, IRS Agents executed search-and-seizure warrants on OSC’s offices and the Zappones’ home while investigating alleged tax evasion and illegal restructuring. Agents arrested the Zappones and seized their computers, cell phones, business records, and cash from the company safe, which was taken to Brink’s, the security company. Brinks issued a receipt for $1,264,000. The Zappones maintain that the safe contained $3,150,000 and that the Agents pocketed the difference. In 2013, the government brought a civil-forfeiture proceeding against the $1,264,000; the Zappones asserted claims against the currency, alleging that the amount was understated. In 2014, the Zappones submitted administrative claims to the IRS seeking $1,886,000 with power-of-attorney forms that identified their counsel as Arnold and listed counsel’s address. Six months later, the IRS mailed letters denying the claims via certified mail to Arnold, stating that the Zappones could file suit no later than six months after the date of the mailing of the notification. The Zappones had switched counsel but had not notified the IRS. More than six months later, they sued IRS employees and one IRS subcontractor, based on the execution of the search-and-seizure warrants and the purported misappropriation of their cash. The Sixth CIrcuit affirmed that the Zappones filed their state-law and constitutional claims outside the appropriate limitations periods and rejected their requests for equitable tolling. View "Zappone v. United States" on Justia Law

The Laniers were involved in a scheme fraudulently to obtain government contracts reserved for businesses owned by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals or by service-disabled veterans. During deliberations at their trial, a juror contacted assistant district attorney Nelson—a social acquaintance and a state prosecutor not involved with the Laniers's federal case. Nelson called the district court and told the judge that Juror 11 called her and said that there was a “problem” with the deliberations. According to the district judge’s account, Nelson told Juror 11 that they could not discuss deliberations and that Juror 11 should alert the judge. No juror alerted court personnel to problems with the deliberations. The court officer reported that the jury was “clearly divided ... and they’re angry with each other.” The jury convicted the Laniers of conspiracy to commit wire fraud; wire fraud; and major fraud against the U.S. Defendants unsuccessfully requested to interview the jurors and moved for a mistrial, stating that the jury had been at an impasse but then returned a verdict after a juror contacted a third party. No one ever interviewed Juror 11 about the telephone call nor interviewed any other juror about whether Juror 11 discussed the call with other jurors. Although the district court talked by phone with Nelson and counsel interviewed her after the trial, no one questioned Nelson in open court or under oath. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for a Remmer hearing. View "United States v. Lanier" on Justia Law

The Jackson County Michigan Board of Commissioners begins its monthly meetings with a Christian prayer. Bormuth, a non-Christian resident, attended meetings because he was concerned about environmental issues. During the prayer, Bormuth was the only one in attendance who did not rise and bow his head. Bormuth felt isolated and worried that the Commissioners would hold his action against him. He raised the First Amendment issue during a public comment period. The Commissioners reacted with “disgust.” Bormuth filed suit asserting that this prayer practice violated the Establishment Clause. The Commissioners declined Bormuth’s application to serve on an environmental committee. The district court granted the County summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit initially reversed, but on rehearing, en banc, affirmed. “Since the founding of our Republic, Congress, state legislatures, and many municipal bodies have commenced legislative sessions with a prayer.” Jackson County’s invocation practice is consistent with the Supreme Court’s legislative prayer decisions and does not violate the Establishment Clause. View "Bormuth v. County of Jackson" on Justia Law

Roell suffered from schizoaffective disorder and paranoid delusions. Roell’s symptoms could be controlled by medication but he stopped taking his medication in June 2013 and began exhibiting signs of mental decompensation. On the night of August 12-13, Roell entered a state of excited delirium. His wife was out of town. Roell damaged their condominium, then went to the condominium of his neighbor, Agarwal, and threw a flower pot through her window. Agarwal called 911, stating that her neighbor was “acting crazy.” Agarwal testified that Roell appeared angry, his face red and his eyes bulging, as he muttered unintelligible things, while pacing in front of Agarwal’s broken window, peering into her condominium. Deputies arrived and saw Roell holding a garden hose with a metal nozzle in one hand and a garden basket in the other, wearing a t-shirt, but otherwise naked., Roell was screaming “no” and something about water. While attempting to subdue Roell, the deputies physically struggled with him and unsuccessfully tased him multiple times. Roell stopped breathing during the encounter and was pronounced dead shortly thereafter. His death was documented by the coroner as natural, resulting from his excited delirium. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the deputies on Mrs. Roell’s claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and in favor of Hamilton County on her claims under section 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act. View "Roell v. Hamilton County Board of Commissioners" on Justia Law

In 2005, Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute cocaine hydrochloride, 21 U.S.C. 846 and 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A). The Probation Office determined that Defendant was to be held accountable for conspiring to distribute at least 12 kilograms of cocaine hydrochloride; under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1(a), Defendant was classified as a career offender with an enhanced offense level based on his prior felony convictions for controlled substances. Defendant’s offense level was reduced three levels for his acceptance of responsibility. His guideline range for imprisonment according to the 2004 Sentencing Guidelines was 262-327 months but section 841(b)(1)(A) required imposition of a minimum term of life due to Defendant’s prior felony controlled substance convictions, U.S.S.G. 5G1.1(b). The government moved for a downward departure based on Defendant’s substantial assistance. The court granted that motion and imposed a sentence of 211 months. In 2015, Defendant moved for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) and Guidelines Amendments 780, 782, and 788, arguing that the court departed downward from a guideline range of life and that this guideline range of life was lowered by Amendment 780. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion Defendant’s sentence was based on Defendant’s status as a career offender, not on a drug quantity; Defendant is ineligible for the reduction. View "United States v. Cook" on Justia Law

The collective bargaining agreement (CBA) signed by the Jefferson County Board of Education (JCBE) and Jefferson County Teachers Association (JCTA) provided that if an employee believed that they were discriminated against, that employee could file a grievance with JCBE; if the employee subsequently filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the grievance proceedings would be held in abeyance. Watford filed a grievance on the day she was terminated (October 13, 2010) and those proceedings are still in abeyance. Watford sued, alleging that JCBE and JCTA retaliated against her for filing an EEOC charge. The district court awarded the defendants summary judgment, The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding the judgment inconsistent with prior holdings that “an adverse action against [an] employee because the employee had pursued the statutorily protected activity of filing a charge with the EEOC” is “clearly” retaliation. The CBA is retaliatory on its face. View "Watford v. Jefferson County Public Schools" on Justia Law