Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Lincoln Park’s dire financial condition led Michigan officials to place the city under the purview of an Emergency Manager pursuant to the Local Financial Stability and Choice Act, Mich. Comp. Laws 141.1541. Emergency Manager Coulter, with the approval of Michigan’s Treasurer, issued 10 orders that temporarily replaced Lincoln Park retiree health-care benefits with monthly stipends that retirees could use to purchase individual health-care coverage. Retirees filed sui under 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting violations of the Contracts Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Takings Clause. The district court rejected the Treasurer’s motion to dismiss, arguing qualified immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The court held, as a matter of first impression, that an alleged Contracts Clause violation cannot give rise to a cause of action under section 1983. With respect to other constitutional claims, the claimed property right derives from contract; a state contract action would be sufficient to safeguard the retirees’ contractual property rights. Because the state contract action is available as a remedy for any uncompensated taking the challenges to the constitutionality of Coulter’s orders are not ripe for resolution. As the claims fail on the merits, there is no need to evaluate the alleged immunity defenses. View "Kaminski v. Coulter" on Justia Law

Federal Medicaid funds are not available for state medical expenditures made on behalf of “any individual who is an inmate of a public institution (except as a patient in a medical institution),” 42 U.S.C. 1396d(a)(29)(A). "Inmate of a public institution" means a person who is living in a public institution. However, an individual living in a public institution is not an “inmate of a public institution” if he resides in the public institution “for a temporary period pending other arrangements appropriate to his needs.” Ohio submitted a proposed plan amendment aimed at exploiting this distinction: it sought to classify pretrial detainees under age 19 as noninmates, living in a public institution for only “a temporary period pending other arrangements appropriate to [their] needs,” for whom the state could claim Medicaid reimbursement. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services rejected the amendment, finding that the inmate exclusion recognizes “no difference” between adults and juveniles, or convicted detainees and those awaiting trial. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review, agreeing that the involuntary nature of the stay is the determinative factor. The exception does not apply when the individual is involuntarily residing in a public institution awaiting adjudication of a criminal matter. View "Ohio Department of Medicaid v. Price" on Justia Law

Jackson, injured in an accident, taken to University Hospital, where she stated that she had health insurance coverage through United. Jackson received treatment from PRI, which uses MDB for billing services. PRI did not submit charges to United but sent Jackson a letter seeking payment of $1,066 and requesting that Jackson’s attorney sign a letter of protection against any settlement to prevent Jackson’s account from being sent to collections. Jackson did not pay. Her account was submitted to CCC, which sent Jackson a collection letter. Jackson’s attorney negotiated a $852 payment to CCC as final settlement of the charges. PRI or MDB later contacted Jackson, stating that she still owed $3.49. Jackson paid that amount. She brought a class action against CCC, PRI, and MDB for violation of Ohio Rev. Code 1751.60(A), which prohibits directly billing patients who have health insurance when the healthcare provider has a contract with the patient’s insurer to accept that insurance. The complaint also alleged breach of contract, breach of third-party beneficiary contract, violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, fraud, conversion, unjust enrichment, and punitive damages. The Sixth Circuit reversed dismissal of the claims under section 1751.60 against PRI and MDB, but affirmed as to CCC, which is not subject to the section. View "Jackson v. Professional Radiology, Inc." on Justia Law

Edwards was killed in 1991. In 1999, Defendant, incarcerated on unrelated charges, contacted Chattanooga Police, stating he had information related to the unsolved murder. Detective Mathis interviewed Defendant. Defendant was not under arrest or charged with Edwards’ murder at the time of his recorded confession. Mathis testified he did not promise anything in return for the confession; that Defendant waived his right to remain silent and to an attorney; that he talked with Defendant for some time before reading him his Miranda rights because Defendant stated that he had heard about the murder, not that he was involved; and that he told Defendant that he would tell the district attorney’s office that Defendant had come forward and cooperated. Defendant testified that he asked to speak with his attorney but that Mathis stated he did not need an attorney and that Mathis promised him that Defendant would not be charged with the murder and promised to speak with Defendant’s parole officer and the district attorney about other cases in return for cooperation. A jury convicted him of first-degree felony murder and aggravated robbery. The convictions were affirmed on direct appeal; state courts denied post-conviction relief. The district court denied petitions for federal habeas relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The state court’s ruling was objectively reasonable in finding that Defendant was not in custody for Miranda purposes. An individual who is not in Miranda custody has no constitutional right to counsel. View "Schreane v. Ebbert" on Justia Law

McNeil opened a business checking account with Defendant. A “Master Services Agreement,” stated: [W]e have available certain products designed to discover or prevent unauthorized transactions, …. You agree that if your account is eligible for those products and you choose not to avail yourself of them, then we will have no liability for any transaction that occurs on your account that those products were designed to discover or prevent. McNeil was not given a signed copy of the Agreement, nor was he advised of its details. McNeil ordered hologram checks from a third party to avoid fraudulent activity. McNeil later noticed unauthorized checks totaling $3,973.96. The checks did not contain the hologram and their numbers were duplicative of checks that Defendant had properly paid. Defendant refused to reimburse McNeil, stating that “reasonable care was not used in declining to use our ... services, which substantially contributed to the making of the forged item(s).” Government agencies indicated that they would not intervene in a private dispute involving the interpretation of a contract. Plaintiff filed a putative class action, citing Uniform Commercial Code 4-401 and 4-103(a), The district court dismissed, holding that the Agreement did not violate the UCC and shifted liability to Plaintiff. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Plaintiff stated a plausible claim that the provision unreasonably disclaims all liability under these circumstances; the UCC forbids a bank from disclaiming all of its liability to exercise ordinary care and good faith. View "Majestic Building Maintenance, Inc. v. Huntington Bancshares, Inc." on Justia Law

Wesley was an elementary school counselor in Covington, Kentucky. Seven-year-old J.S., who suffered from psychological problems, told his mother that Wesley had sexually assaulted him. Campbell, a social worker, talked to J.S. and contacted Detective Rigney, Rigney and Campbell interviewed 32 other students who had contact with Wesley; none disclosed any inappropriate behavior. A medical exam of J.S. did not reveal any evidence of abuse. Rigney obtained a warrant for Wesley’s arrest. Rigney did not interview employees who worked near Wesley’s office, although the sexual abuse allegedly occurred in Wesley’s office, with the door ajar and others able to see inside. The charges were dismissed. In Wesley’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the jury found that Rigney lacked probable cause to secure an arrest warrant; facts misrepresented in or omitted from Rigney’s affidavit and warrant application were material; and the misrepresentations or omissions were done intentionally, deliberately, or with reckless disregard for the truth. The jury awarded Wesley $589,000 in compensatory and $500,000 in punitive damages. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Rigney’s arguments concerning failure to instruct the jury adequately about qualified immunity; the court’s reference to J.S.’s psychological history during the probable-cause jury instruction; the denial of a motion regarding the availability of punitive damages; and the court’s refusal to remit the damage awards. View "Wesley v. Campbell" on Justia Law

The Alger County, Michigan dispatch center received a report that Mitchell had assaulted “Kevin,” had been drinking, and was “swerving all over the road.” Officer Schlabach identified Mitchell’s car, followed it into a parking lot, and stopped alongside. Mitchell sped back onto the highway. Schlabach pursued Mitchell through residential neighborhoods, around cars, and through stop signs, often in excess of 100 miles per hour in pouring rain. Minutes later, Mitchell ran his car into a ditch in a national forest. Schlabach parked 63.6 feet from Mitchell’s car. Mitchell exited the car, looked toward Schlabach, then turned away and crouched toward the ground. Mitchell appeared to be unarmed. Schlabach drew his handgun and slowly approached Mitchell. Mitchell walked toward Schlabach with “[c]lenched fists, wide eyes, coming directly ... towards me, ... refusing to listen to any of my direct commands.” The dash-cam video did not clearly show Mitchell’s facial expressions but left “little room to doubt the hostility of Mitchell’s approach” even after Schlabach began backing away in fear. Mitchell pressed Schlabach all the way across the road. Schlabach fired a shot. Mitchell hunched over slightly but continued moving purposefully toward Schlabach. Schlabach fired again. Mitchell collapsed and died. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment of qualified immunity in favor of Schlabach, noting that the confrontation took less than 20 seconds. Courts must make an “allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments.” View "Mitchell v. Schlabach" on Justia Law

Perry conditionally pled guilty to conspiring to possess narcotics with intent to distribute. On appeal, Perry argued that the activities indicating drug sales that were observed over the seven weeks before the issuance of the search warrant were stale evidence because the activities were not individually dated. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of his motion to suppress. Even without specific dates, the amount of suspicious activity observed within the seven weeks in connection with Perry’s apartment was enough to support probable cause. The court noted several complaints from concerned residents about drug sales being conducted in the apartment complex and in a black Chevrolet Impala and naming Perry and his girlfriend as the sellers; Perry had several prior drug charges; an officer observed Perry exchange money and packages, which appeared to contain marijuana, at a fence; the officer observed multiple additional transactions involving Perry and his girlfriend that appeared to be drug transactions. The officer stated that his observations occurred between October 15 and December 3—two to 51 days before the probable-cause determination; his observations of heavy car and foot traffic, repeated transactions, and one particular transaction, all suggested that apartment four was home to a sizeable ongoing drug business. View "United States v. Perry" on Justia Law

Crosby, a tenured professor at the University of Kentucky’s College of Public Health, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law, claiming that his removal as Department Chair amounted to a deprivation of his protected property and liberty interests without due process of law. He claimed that the defendants were not protected by qualified immunity and were liable under contract law for monetary damages. Before his removal, Crosby had been investigated for being “[v]olatile,” “explosive,” “disrespectful,” “very condescending,” and “out of control.” The report included an allegation that Crosby stated that the Associate Dean for Research had been appointed “because she is a woman, genitalia” and contained claims that the Department’s performance was suffering as a result of Crosby’s temper and hostility toward other departments. The University declined Crosby’s request to handle his appeal under a proposed Governing Regulation and stated that existing regulations would apply. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of his claims.Crosby identified no statute, formal contract, or contract implied from the circumstances that supports his claim to a protected property interest in his position as Chair; “the unlawfulness” of the defendants’ actions was not apparent “in the light of pre-existing law,” so they were entitled to qualified immunity. View "Crosby v. University of Kentucky" on Justia Law

Ataya pleaded guilty to conspiring to commit health care fraud and wire fraud. In his plea agreement, he relinquished any right to appeal his conviction or sentence “on any grounds.” Atatya nonetheless appealed. The Sixth Circuit directed the parties to brief the question of whether Ataya entered into the plea agreement as a whole knowingly and voluntarily. Ataya understood and accepted the appellate waiver’s consequences, but if he misunderstood the conviction’s key consequences, that undermines the knowingness of the appellate waiver. The district court did not inform Ataya, as Rule 11 requires, that the plea agreement required him to pay restitution and a special assessment and to forfeit the proceeds of his fraud; neither the plea agreement nor the district court mentioned that Ataya, who became a naturalized citizen after the alleged frauds, might face denaturalization as a result of his conviction. Invalidation of the agreement will require him to demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered the plea.” View "United States v. Ataya" on Justia Law