Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2005, Sutton committed four armed bank robberies in quick succession in Kentucky and Ohio. He agreed to plead guilty to the Kentucky charges in the Southern District of Ohio. Sutton never formally entered a guilty plea to the Kentucky charges but was sentenced as if he had. Five years later, Sutton moved to vacate (28 U.S.C. 2255), challenging his conviction on the Kentucky charges. The Southern District of Ohio vacated the conviction and transferred the case to the Eastern District of Kentucky, where Sutton was arraigned and entered a not guilty plea, 11 years after he was indicted. He moved to dismiss, alleging that violations of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161, and the Sixth Amendment. The court denied the motion. Sutton entered a conditional plea and was sentenced to 25 years to run consecutively to the Ohio sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The speedy trial analysis is “necessarily relative. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances.” Even if all four “Barker factors” are satisfied, a court is not required to conclude that a defendant’s speedy trial right was violated. The unique facts of this case demonstrate why such flexibility is necessary. Although the Ohio court and the government were at fault, their collective behavior was consistent with Sutton’s intention to plead guilty. View "United States v. Sutton" on Justia Law

T.F., a child, was abused and killed by his stepfather. In a complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983, T.F.’s estate alleged that Arnold, the Interim Executive Director of the Mahoning County Children’s Services Board, received reports about the abuse, but did not investigate or cooperate with law enforcement, as required by statute, and that “Arnold’s inaction with regard to notification that T.F. was an abused child increased T.F.’s susceptibility to future violence and abuse.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal, noting that it had no information about the events that led to T.F.’s death other than that T.F.’s stepfather caused his death, and that T.F.’s mother and stepfather were incarcerated following a police investigation. The complaint failed to explain the duration or extent of the abuse by T.F.’s stepfather, describing only one instance, two days before T.F.’s death, when “T.F. was admitted to the hospital suffering from, among other things, frost bite and serious bruises.” T.F.’s stepfather apparently forced him to stand outside at night without proper protective clothing. The complaint did not explain when abuse allegations were brought to Arnold’s attention but stated only that Arnold “concluded that T.F.’s injuries . . . were accidental and refused to report or investigate those allegations of abuse.” View "Engler v. Arnold" on Justia Law

Eight-year-old KV accused her 17-year-old uncle, JAS, of vaginally raping her on tribal land. The FBI interviewed KV, who described the assault to an interviewer who had conducted more than 5,000 such interviews. JAS was charged with an act of juvenile delinquency: sexual abuse of a child under the age of 12, 18 U.S.C. 2241(c). The district court found beyond a reasonable doubt that JAS had sexually assaulted KV as charged. Although the Sentencing Guidelines would have recommended a life sentence had JAS been an adult, his maximum sentence as a juvenile was five years of “official detention,” 18 U.S.C. 5037(c)(2)(A); the district court sentenced him to three. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting JAS’s arguments that the court improperly admitted the video of the victim’s FBI interview and that the evidence was insufficient to support the finding that he sexually assaulted KV. The court cited Rule 801(d)(1)(B)(ii), which allows the admission of prior out-of-court statements of a trial witness (KV) if: the statements are consistent with the witness’s testimony; the statements are offered to rehabilitate the witness after an opposing party has tried to impeach her “on another ground”; and the opposing party is able to cross-examine the witness about the prior statements. View "United States v. J.A.S." on Justia Law

The Isaacs executed a mortgage to GMAC encumbering their Kentucky property. It states: “The lien ... will attach on the date this Mortgage is recorded.” The Isaacses filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in March 2004, listing the GMAC mortgage debt as secured debt. GMAC did not record the Mortgage until June 2004. GMAC did not seek relief from the automatic stay. No party sought to avoid the Mortgage. The Isaacses obtained a discharge; the case closed. Months later, the bankruptcy court reopened the case at the request of the Isaacses, avoided two judgment liens, and closed the case again. About 10 years later, GMAC’s successor obtained a default foreclosure Judgment and Order of Sale. Immediately before the scheduled sale date, wife (without husband) filed a chapter 13 petition, seeking to avoid the GMAC lien (11 U.S.C. 522(f)). In an adversary proceeding, the bankruptcy court found that GMAC was an unsecured creditor in the chapter 7 case, which discharged the debt; the foreclosure judgment was an improper modification of the discharge order, so that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply. The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reversed. The bankruptcy court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, precluding it from avoiding the state foreclosure judgment because the mortgage was enforceable against the Isaacses’ interests on the chapter 7 petition date. Since unavoided pre-petition liens pass through bankruptcy unaffected, the foreclosure judgment could not violate the chapter 7 discharge. View "In re: Isaacs" on Justia Law

Sene, a citizen of both Mauritania and Senegal, was charged in removal proceedings, alleging that she was admitted to the U.S. in 2000, without a valid entry or travel document. She sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), testifying that she was subjected to female genital mutilation (FGM) and that, when she was 10 years old, Mauritanian military personnel took her family to military barracks, where she was questioned, beaten, forced to work, and raped. She escaped to a refugee camp, eventually moving to Dakar, where she lived for 11 years without problems. She came to the U.S. for a job opportunity, married in 2004, and had a daughter in 2005. She feared that her husband’s family might subject her daughter to FGM. An IJ denied Sene’s applications. The BIA took notice of a State Department Country Report about a 2008 military coup in Mauritania, followed by a deterioration in the human rights situation and remanded. The IJ again denied Sene’s applications and ordered her removal to Senegal; the BIA affirmed. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review. Sene failed to show that it is more likely than not that she would be subject to persecution in Senegal, “where the country reports indicate that FGM is a criminal offense that is not commonly committed against adult women and the record likewise does not support her fear of any other form of harm.” View "Sene v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Parrino worked as a pharmacist for NRS. He was responsible for preparing medications, mainly inhalers. After leaving NRS, Parrino was contacted by the FDA and FBI, which were investigating reports that NRS was filling prescription medications for Pulmicort, a steroid used for the treatment of asthma, with a sub-potent amount of the active ingredient. Parrino cooperated and pleaded guilty to introducing misbranded drugs into interstate commerce, 21 U.S.C. 331(a), 352(a), and 18 U.S.C. 2, a strict liability misdemeanor. Parrino was sentenced to one year of probation and ordered to pay $14,098.24 in restitution for Medicaid and Medicare payments. The Department of Health and Human Services notified Parrino that it was required to exclude him from participation in any capacity in the Medicare, Medicaid, and all federal healthcare programs for at least five years, under 42 U.S.C. 1320a-7(a). Rejecting Parrino’s argument that he lacked any mens rea to commit a crime and was convicted of a strict liability misdemeanor, an ALJ and the Appeals Board upheld HHS’s decision. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of Parrino’s suit, finding that HHS’s action affected no substantive due process right because “health care providers are not the intended beneficiaries of the federal health care programs” and that the decision to exclude Parrino was “not so shocking as to shake the foundations of this country.” View "Parrino v. Price" on Justia Law

From 2011-2014, House ran a drug-trafficking operation that specialized in distributing oxycodone pills. The operation obtained the pills from a Michigan pain clinic’s patients and employed runners to transport the oxycodone to House’s network of dealers in Ohio. In 2014, DEA agents penetrated House’s organization and staged a series of controlled deliveries and pick-ups. After obtaining information from members of House’s network, DEA agents arrested House. He pleaded guilty under 21 U.S.C. 846 and 841(a)(1), but maintained during the plea colloquy that the conspiracy spanned from November 2013 to September or October 2014, not the entire 2011-to-2014 time period alleged in the indictment. House challenged the PSR finding that he was “an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants,” U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(a). The district court denied House’s objection to the leadership enhancement and rejected House’s claim that the PSR should have calculated the quantity of drugs attributable to him using the conspiracy duration he admitted. The court ultimately decreased the quantity of oxycodone attributed to House on other grounds, but did not shorten the conspiracy’s length, and sentenced House to 180 months’ imprisonment—below the Guidelines range of 235 to 240 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding House’s designation as a career offender. View "United States v. House" on Justia Law

Ohio’s execution protocol allows for lethal injection using a three-drug combination of midazolam; either vecuronium bromide, pancuronium bromide, or rocuronium bromide, which are paralytics; and potassium chloride, which stops the heart. The midazolam is intended to ensure that the person being executed is insensate to the pain that the other drugs cause. If midazolam does not “render the prisoner unconscious,” then “there is a substantial, constitutionally unacceptable risk of suffocation . . . and pain” from the second two drugs. The district court granted a preliminary injunction to allow for further litigation regarding midazolam’s efficacy before Ohio executes three men. The Sixth Circuit initially affirmed, but following rehearing en banc, reversed. The court noted that about two decades have passed since the commission of the crimes, which included the rape-murder of a three-year-old. The court stated that “In a sense the claim is unprecedented: the Supreme Court ‘has never invalidated a State’s chosen procedure for carrying out a sentence of death as the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment.’” The State’s chosen procedure here is the same procedure (so far as the combination of drugs is concerned) that the Supreme Court has upheld. Every other court of appeals to consider that procedure has likewise upheld it. View "In re: Ohio Execution Protocol Litigation" on Justia Law

In 2011, Stitt tried to shove a loaded handgun into his girlfriend’s mouth while threatening to kill her. When a neighbor called the police, Stitt fled, then surrendered to authorities after a brief foot chase. Detectives recovered the gun lying on the ground within his reach. A jury found Stitt guilty of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). Due to his nine prior “violent felony” convictions—including six for Tennessee aggravated burglary—the court sentenced Stitt under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), to 290 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, the government conceded that the 2015 Supreme Court decision, Johnson v. United States, invalidated the violent-felony status of three of his prior offenses, leaving only his six aggravated-burglary convictions at issue. Bound by its precedent, (United States v. Nance), which held that Tennessee aggravated burglary fit the Supreme Court’s definition of “generic burglary,” the Sixth Circuit initially affirmed his sentence. On rehearing en banc, the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that Tennessee’s aggravated-burglary statute is broader than the definition of generic burglary. The court applied the categorical analysis; Tennessee’s aggravated-burglary statute is indivisible, thereby foreclosing application of the modified categorical approach. View "United States v. Stitt" on Justia Law

Great Lakes Brewing sought to end its relationship with one of its distributors, Glazer’s., after it executed a corporate merger without seeking Great Lakes’ consent, as required by their contract. Glazer’s successor corporation sought to preliminarily enjoin the impending termination, arguing that the contract’s consent requirement was invalid under the Ohio Alcoholic Beverages Franchise Act, Ohio Rev. Code 1333.82–87. The district court agreed and found that the remaining equities weighed in favor of granting the preliminary injunction. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Because the parties’ consent provision is valid under state law, the distributor had no likelihood of success on the merits. Far from prohibiting such provisions section 1333.84(F) actually anticipates that parties will include such provisions in their written franchise agreements; the fact that it requires manufacturers to “act in good faith in accordance with reasonable standards for fair dealing” regarding the sale of a distributor’s business necessarily implies that manufacturers can have a say over the transaction. View "Southern Glazer's Distributors of Ohio, LLC v. Great Lakes Brewing Co." on Justia Law