Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves Brian Dewayne Darden-Mosby, who was convicted of two federal drug-dealing offenses. During the investigation, Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents executed a search warrant for Darden-Mosby’s house and car, discovering an unregistered firearm, a money counter, drug ledgers, marijuana, and a backpack containing cocaine. They also seized $112,690 in cash found in various locations in his bedroom. After the search, police pulled over one of Darden-Mosby’s cocaine suppliers and found Darden-Mosby in the passenger seat with a bank envelope containing $2,500 in cash and two cashier’s checks totaling nearly $150,000.The United States prosecuted Darden-Mosby for various crimes based on the drugs and guns found in his house. As part of the prosecution, the government initiated criminal-forfeiture proceedings against the cash from Darden-Mosby’s bedroom, the two cashier’s checks, and the $2,500 found in Darden-Mosby’s pocket. Darden-Mosby sought to suppress the cashier’s checks and $2,500, arguing the detective’s search violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied the motion. The government ultimately opted not to introduce that evidence at trial, and it dismissed the criminal forfeiture claims against the two checks.A jury convicted Darden-Mosby of two drug-dealing offenses. The government declined to prosecute the forfeiture of the $2,500 in cash from the traffic stop any further but continued to pursue criminal forfeiture of the $112,690 from Darden-Mosby’s house. After a hearing and additional briefing, the court concluded the cash was connected to Darden-Mosby’s drug dealing and ordered the criminal forfeiture of the money.Separate from the government’s criminal-forfeiture actions, the DEA commenced administrative-forfeiture proceedings against the two cashier’s checks and the $2,500. These proceedings resulted in the administrative forfeiture of all three assets.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court affirmed the district court’s criminal-forfeiture order with respect to the $92,470 found in the safe and shoebox at Darden-Mosby’s house but reversed with respect to the $20,220 found in and on the dresser. The court found that Darden-Mosby offered credible evidence that the $20,220 found on and in the dresser had legal sources and purposes. However, the court found that Darden-Mosby’s evidence was considerably weaker when it came to the $92,470 in the safe and shoebox. View "United States v. Darden-Mosby" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between Diamond Transportation Logistics (Diamond) and The Kroger Company (Kroger). In 2010, the two companies entered into a transportation agreement, which was renewed in 2016, for Diamond to transport Kroger's goods. The agreement included an indemnity provision, which allowed Kroger to withhold payments from Diamond for claims against Diamond under certain conditions. In December 2015, a subcontractor of Diamond was involved in a fatal accident while transporting Kroger's goods. The family of the deceased sued both Diamond and Kroger for wrongful death, alleging negligence in Kroger's selection, hiring, and retention of Diamond as a shipper. Kroger demanded Diamond to cover its legal expenses based on the indemnity provision in their agreement. However, Diamond failed to reimburse Kroger, leading Kroger to withhold nearly $1.8 million in shipping payments from Diamond.The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, where Kroger filed a counterclaim for breach of the transportation agreement's indemnity provision. The district court ruled in favor of Kroger, awarding it $612,429.45 plus interest. Diamond appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. The main issue was whether the indemnity provision's exception for "liability...caused by the sole negligence or willful misconduct of Kroger" relieved Diamond of its obligation. The court held that the exception did not apply in this case because Kroger's liability for the family's negligent selection, hiring, and retention claim was not caused by its "sole negligence." The court reasoned that Diamond's negligence also played a part in Kroger's liability, and therefore, Diamond was required to cover Kroger's costs in settling the family's claim. View "Diamond Transp. Logistics, Inc. v. Kroger Co." on Justia Law

The case involves Tommy Kirtdoll, who was under investigation by a multijurisdictional task force in southwest Michigan for leading a drug-trafficking organization. After several undercover drug deals, the task force obtained a search warrant for Kirtdoll's house, which was described in detail in the warrant application. Upon executing the warrant, officers found drugs and distribution equipment, leading to Kirtdoll's indictment on multiple drug offenses.Kirtdoll challenged the validity of the search warrant, citing three errors: the address listed was not his, the tax identification number was incorrect, and the property owner's name was not his. He argued that these mistakes rendered the warrant unconstitutional due to lack of particularity, as required by the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied Kirtdoll's motion, ruling that the warrant's other accurate descriptors were particular enough to satisfy the Fourth Amendment. Kirtdoll pleaded guilty but reserved the right to appeal the district court's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the warrant's particularity de novo. The court held that the Fourth Amendment does not require perfection in search warrants, but rather enough detail for the executing officer to identify the intended place with reasonable effort. The court found that despite the errors, the warrant contained three descriptors that indisputably applied only to Kirtdoll's house and clearly identified it as the premises to be searched. These included the house's geographic location, a detailed description of the house, and a unique identifier - a red star affixed to its west side. The court concluded that the warrant for Kirtdoll's house was specific enough to meet the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement, and thus, the district court properly denied Kirtdoll's motion to suppress. The court affirmed the district court's decision. View "United States v. Kirtdoll" on Justia Law

Calvin Caver was sentenced to life imprisonment for conspiring to distribute more than 50 grams of crack cocaine, having committed three prior felony drug offenses. The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 later increased the amount of crack cocaine required to trigger a life sentence to 280 grams. The First Step Act of 2018 allowed defendants like Caver to seek retroactive relief as if they had committed their crimes after the Fair Sentencing Act. Caver sought a reduced sentence under the First Step Act, but the district court held that the Act gave it no discretion to grant him relief. The court reasoned that Caver's jury had found that his drug crime involved at least 500 grams of crack cocaine, an amount that still exceeded the 280 grams required to trigger a mandatory life sentence after the Fair Sentencing Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court clarified that if the Fair Sentencing Act's changes would still trigger the same mandatory-minimum sentence that a district court originally imposed, a district court lacks discretion to reduce the defendant’s sentence below that minimum under the First Step Act. The court also noted that the First Step Act allows a court to impose a reduced sentence as if the Fair Sentencing Act were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed. The court concluded that no plausible reading of the First Step Act or the caselaw interpreting it permitted the district court to sentence Caver below the mandatory-minimum term that he faced under the Fair Sentencing Act. View "United States v. Caver" on Justia Law

The case involves StarLink Logistics, Inc. ("StarLink") and ACC, LLC ("ACC"). StarLink owns land adjacent to and downstream from ACC's land, where ACC used to operate a landfill for byproducts of aluminum recycling. StarLink alleged that ACC's improperly closed landfill was polluting StarLink’s land. After StarLink initiated its suit, ACC and the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (“Department”) finalized a consent order requiring ACC to abate the landfill’s pollution. The district court dismissed StarLink’s claims for lack of jurisdiction and granted summary judgment to ACC as to its remaining claims.The district court dismissed StarLink’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief as moot and granted summary judgment to ACC as to StarLink’s claims for civil penalties. The court also dismissed StarLink’s claims for failure to meet the Clean Water Act’s and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act’s jurisdictional notice requirements.The United States Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s judgment. The court held that StarLink can proceed with Count 2 and to seek remediation of its property for Count 5 of its complaint. As to Counts 1, 3, and 4, the court agreed with the district court’s claim preclusion and notice rulings. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "StarLink Logistics, Inc. v. ACC, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves the family of Todd Kerchen, who died from a lethal dose of fentanyl. The family filed a complaint against the University of Michigan and Dr. James Woods, alleging violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Michigan state law. The family claimed that the fentanyl that killed Todd originated from a University of Michigan pharmacology lab where Christian Raphalides, the person who allegedly provided the drug to Todd, worked. The lab was overseen by Dr. Woods. The family argued that the lab's lax policies surrounding the use of controlled substances led to Todd's death.The district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss and ordered limited discovery on whether the action was barred by the statutes of limitations applicable to the plaintiffs' claims. The defendants appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The court found that the University of Michigan and Dr. Woods in his official capacity were entitled to sovereign immunity, barring all claims against them. The court also found that Dr. Woods in his individual capacity was entitled to qualified immunity, barring the § 1983 claim against him. Furthermore, the court found that the wrongful death claim against Dr. Woods in his individual capacity should be dismissed as it was barred by governmental immunity. The court dismissed the remainder of the defendants' appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Kerchen v. University of Michigan" on Justia Law

Thabet Mahdi Saleh, an Iraqi refugee, was granted asylum in the United States in 2010. However, after being convicted of crimes under Michigan law, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him. Saleh sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), fearing torture if he returned to Iraq due to his work with the U.S. Army and his mixed marriage. The immigration judge denied all forms of relief and ordered Saleh's removal. Saleh did not appeal this decision.In 2018, Saleh moved to reopen his proceedings, seeking deferral of removal under the CAT. He alleged changed country conditions and an increased risk of torture due to his past experiences and criminal convictions in the U.S. The immigration judge granted the motion to reopen but later denied Saleh’s application for relief. Saleh appealed this decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which assumed Saleh’s credibility but found no error in the other decisions, thus denying Saleh’s petition.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Saleh challenged the BIA's decision, arguing that the immigration judge erred by treating a key witness as a fact witness rather than an expert. However, the court found that Saleh's counsel had agreed to this treatment of the witness, and Saleh had not shown that the agency erred by treating the witness as a fact witness only. The court also found that the BIA had properly analyzed Saleh’s probability of torture in the aggregate, considering all the factors together. Therefore, the court denied Saleh's petition for review. View "Mahdi Saleh v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of bettors who sued Churchill Downs, Inc., and trainers Robert Baffert and Bob Baffert Racing, Inc., after the horse they bet on, Medina Spirit, was disqualified from the 2021 Kentucky Derby due to a failed post-race drug test. The bettors claimed that they would have won their bets under the new order of finish after Medina Spirit's disqualification. However, under Kentucky law, only the first order of finish marked "official" counts for wagering purposes. The plaintiffs brought claims for negligence, breach of contract, violation of the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act, and unjust enrichment.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, which granted the defendants' motions to dismiss and denied the plaintiffs leave to amend the complaint. The court found that the plaintiffs' claims were based on the theory that they had "unpaid winning wagers," but under Kentucky law, the first official order of finish is final. Therefore, the plaintiffs' wagers were lost, and the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.The case was then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision, agreeing that the plaintiffs' claims were based on the theory that they had "unpaid winning wagers." However, under Kentucky law, the first official order of finish is final for wagering purposes. Therefore, the plaintiffs' wagers were lost, and the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court also found that the proposed amendment to the complaint did not cure this flaw, so the lower court properly denied leave to amend. View "Mattera v. Baffert" on Justia Law

The case involves Terrence Jordan and Damara Sanders, who were pulled over by a state trooper for speeding. During the stop, the trooper noticed inconsistencies in their travel plans and observed Jordan's heavy breathing, which raised his suspicion. He called for a canine unit, which detected the presence of drugs. A subsequent search of the vehicle and the defendants revealed marijuana, pill presses, digital scales, plastic baggies, firearms, and a significant quantity of pills containing a fluorofentanyl-fentanyl mixture.The defendants were charged with possessing a firearm as a felon, possessing a controlled substance with the intent to distribute, and possessing firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking. They sought to suppress the evidence obtained from the traffic stop, arguing that the trooper lacked reasonable suspicion to extend the stop. The District Judge denied the motion. The defendants also proposed a lesser-included-offense instruction for simple possession of a controlled substance, which the court rejected, citing the quantity of drugs and distribution paraphernalia as evidence of intent to distribute.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that the trooper had reasonable suspicion to extend the stop, based on the defendants' suspicious travel plans, Sanders's implausible explanations, and Jordan's heavy breathing. The court also agreed with the district court's decision not to give a lesser-included-offense instruction, given the substantial evidence of the defendants' intent to distribute drugs. However, the court vacated the defendants' convictions for possessing firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking due to an error in the jury instructions. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court's opinion. View "United States v. Jordan" on Justia Law

The case involves Carlos Brown, a defendant who was indicted on fraud and identity theft charges related to a credit card scheme. Brown argued that his right to a speedy trial, as stipulated by the Speedy Trial Act, was violated twice during the 1,176 days between his arraignment and his guilty plea. The first violation involved a 36-day delay in transporting Brown from Ohio to the Federal Medical Center in Lexington for his competency evaluation. The second violation involved a 21-day period after the denial of Brown’s first motion to dismiss.The district court denied both of Brown's motions to dismiss. It ruled that the 36-day delay was excludable and entered a 21-day retroactive ends-of-justice continuance after denying Brown's first motion to dismiss.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that the district court erred in denying both motions. The court held that the 36-day delay in transporting Brown was not excludable and that the district court abused its discretion by not properly placing its reasoning for the 21-day retroactive ends-of-justice continuance on the record. As a result, the court vacated Brown's conviction and remanded the case to the district court to determine whether his indictment should be dismissed with or without prejudice. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law