Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians (Sault Tribe) objected to the district court’s entry of the 2023 Great Lakes Fishing Decree, which resulted from a three-year negotiation among seven sovereigns, including the United States, the State of Michigan, and several Indian tribes. The 2023 Decree aimed to balance the Tribes’ treaty-reserved fishing rights with the preservation of the fishery waters. The Sault Tribe argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter the decree without its consent and failed to evaluate the decree’s tribal fishing regulations based on the standard set out in People v. LeBlanc.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan overruled the Sault Tribe’s objections and entered the 2023 Decree, binding the Sault Tribe to its terms. The court concluded that it had the authority to approve the decree based on its continuing jurisdiction and equitable powers, and that the LeBlanc standard did not apply because the decree was a product of negotiation, not unilateral state regulation. The court also found that the Sault Tribe’s specific objections did not show that the decree was unreasonable or inconsistent with the treaty or the law of the case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s entry of the 2023 Decree. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in exercising its continuing jurisdiction and inherent equitable power to enter the decree over the Sault Tribe’s objections. The court found that the district court had followed the appropriate legal standards and provided the Sault Tribe with due process by allowing it to file objections, present evidence, and argue its objections in an oral hearing. The appellate court also dismissed as moot the Sault Tribe’s appeal of the district court’s order extending the 2000 Decree, as the 2000 Decree was no longer in effect. View "United States v. Michigan" on Justia Law

Kevin Obi provided a 21-year-old woman with a fatal dose of heroin, leading to her death. Obi and the victim, along with friends, returned to his home from a bar, where they snorted heroin and had sex. The victim became unconscious, and Obi later encouraged a friend to have sex with her. The friend realized she was not breathing, and Obi called 911, but the victim was pronounced dead. Obi initially lied to the police about drug use. He eventually pleaded guilty to providing the fatal heroin.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan initially sentenced Obi to 300 months, including a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice and additional criminal history points. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit remanded for resentencing due to insufficient support for the obstruction enhancement. At resentencing, the district court reaffirmed the 300-month sentence, citing additional evidence and an independent discretionary basis for the sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding any guidelines error harmless due to the district court's discretionary basis.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed Obi's appeal of his reduced sentence following a retroactive amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines. The district court recalculated Obi's guidelines range, reducing his sentence from 300 to 293 months. Obi challenged this reduction as procedurally and substantively unreasonable. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, finding no procedural error in the guidelines calculation and determining that the district court appropriately considered the seriousness of Obi's crime and the applicable sentencing factors. The court held that the 293-month sentence was reasonable and within the amended guidelines range. View "United States v. Obi" on Justia Law

George Clark and Kevin Harrington were convicted of murder based on the testimony of a single eyewitness, Bearia Stewart, who later claimed she was coerced by detectives to lie. After nearly two decades in prison, the Wayne County Prosecution Integrity Unit found that Clark and Harrington did not receive a fair trial, leading to the dismissal of charges and their release. Clark and Harrington then sued the detectives, alleging constitutional violations.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted in part and denied in part the detectives' motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The court denied qualified immunity on claims that the detectives fabricated the eyewitness statement, facilitated prosecution without probable cause, and violated the Brady rule by withholding evidence of coercion and benefits offered to key witnesses. The detectives appealed the denial of qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity, holding that there was sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the fabrication of evidence and the lack of probable cause. The court also held that the detectives' actions, if proven, violated clearly established constitutional rights. The case was remanded for trial on the merits. View "Clark v. Abdallah" on Justia Law

Bhavanaben Patel, her husband Dinesh, and their two sons, natives of India, fled to the United States due to threats from loan sharks in Gujarat, India, after Dinesh accumulated significant debt. The family did not report these threats to local authorities due to a lack of "legal proof." Upon arrival in the U.S. without proper documentation, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings. Bhavanaben sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) for her family, arguing they would face harm from the loan sharks if returned to India.An immigration judge denied the family's applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. The Patels appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which dismissed their appeal, leading them to petition the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for review.The Sixth Circuit reviewed the BIA's legal determinations de novo and its factual findings for substantial evidence. The court found that the BIA's conclusion of no nexus between the Patels' risk of future persecution and their membership in a particular social group was supported by substantial evidence. The court noted that the threats from the loan sharks were motivated by a desire for financial gain rather than animus toward a protected group. Additionally, the court found that the Patels' failure to report the threats to local authorities undermined their CAT claims, as there was no evidence that Indian officials would acquiesce to the loan sharks' conduct.The Sixth Circuit denied the petition for review, upholding the BIA's decision to reject the Patels' applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. View "Patel v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Misty Coleman alleges that she fell and broke her ankle after slipping on a wet shower floor in a county jail. She pursued constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and negligence claims under Ohio law against the county, corrections officers, and medical personnel. Coleman claimed that the slippery shower violated the Due Process Clause and that a county policy or custom was behind her poor medical care. She also questioned whether the county could invoke state-law immunity from her negligence claim at the pleading stage.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dismissed all claims against all parties. The court found that Coleman failed to allege a plausible constitutional violation regarding the slippery shower and did not connect the inadequate medical care to a county policy or custom. The court also held that Ohio law granted immunity to Hamilton County on the negligence claim. The court allowed Coleman to conduct limited discovery to identify unnamed officers and nurses, but her subsequent amended complaint was dismissed as it was filed outside the statute of limitations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the district court's dismissal, holding that Coleman’s claims accrued on the date of her accident and that her amended complaint did not relate back to the original complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. The court also found that Coleman did not meet the requirements for equitable tolling, as she did not allege facts showing that she was intentionally misled or tricked into missing the deadline. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Coleman’s complaint. View "Coleman v. Hamilton County Bd. of County Commissioners" on Justia Law

In 1995, Garr Keith Hardin and Jeffrey Clark were convicted of murdering Rhonda Sue Warford based on forensic evidence and witness testimonies. Robert Thurman, a forensic serologist, testified that a hair found at the crime scene was similar to Hardin’s hair. After over two decades in prison, DNA testing revealed that the hair did not belong to Hardin, leading a state court to vacate their convictions. Hardin and Clark then sued Thurman under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he failed to disclose observation notes that suggested the hair might not have matched Hardin’s hair sample, violating his obligations under Brady v. Maryland.The United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky denied Thurman’s qualified-immunity defense for Hardin’s Brady claim but granted summary judgment on other claims. The court found that a reasonable jury could determine that Thurman should have recognized the exculpatory value of his notes and that the notes were material to Hardin’s defense. The court also held that Thurman could not invoke qualified immunity because Hardin’s Brady rights were clearly established before 1992.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision in part and dismissed in part for lack of jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review Thurman’s arguments that the notes were not exculpatory or material, as these were mixed questions of law and fact. However, the court rejected Thurman’s argument that the law in the mid-1990s did not clearly establish that Brady’s duty of disclosure applied to forensic scientists, affirming that such duties were clearly established and applicable to Thurman. View "Clark v. Louisville-Jefferson County Metro Government" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs David Moore and David Ermold sued Kim Davis, the clerk of Rowan County, Kentucky, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for refusing to issue them a marriage license, claiming it violated their constitutional right to marry. This refusal occurred after the Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, which legalized same-sex marriage nationwide. Davis, citing her religious beliefs, stopped issuing all marriage licenses until the state provided her with an accommodation. Plaintiffs sought damages for the emotional distress caused by Davis's actions.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on liability, and a jury awarded them compensatory damages. Davis appealed, arguing she was entitled to qualified immunity, had defenses under the Free Exercise Clause and the Kentucky Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and that the evidence of emotional distress was insufficient to support the jury's award.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Davis was not entitled to qualified immunity because Obergefell clearly established the right to same-sex marriage, and Davis's actions violated that right. The court also rejected Davis's Free Exercise Clause defense, stating that the First Amendment does not protect state actions that violate constitutional rights. Additionally, the court found that Kentucky's RFRA did not apply in this case because the state was not a party to the lawsuit.The court further upheld the jury's award of damages, finding that the plaintiffs provided sufficient evidence of emotional distress. The court noted that the plaintiffs' detailed testimony about their emotional harm was corroborated and not merely conclusory. Davis's request for remittitur was not considered because it was raised for the first time in her reply brief. The Sixth Circuit thus affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. View "Ermold v. Davis" on Justia Law

In the spring of 2021, the Lexington Police Department investigated a large-scale methamphetamine distribution scheme involving Lamonte Brown. Surveillance and a cooperating source led to the discovery of significant quantities of drugs and firearms at an office building used by Brown and his associate, William Hargis. Brown was later arrested for drug trafficking, and additional firearms were found in his car. Brown, a felon, was charged with conspiring to distribute methamphetamine and being a felon in possession of a firearm.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky consolidated the two cases for sentencing, and Brown pled guilty to both charges. He received a 310-month sentence. Brown appealed several aspects of his sentence, including the application of a two-level sentencing enhancement for possessing a dangerous weapon, which was based on firearms found in the office used for drug operations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The court upheld the two-level enhancement, finding that it was reasonably foreseeable for Brown to know that his co-conspirator possessed firearms given the large quantities of drugs involved. The court also found no procedural error in the late filing of the third addendum to the presentence investigation report, as the district court had postponed the sentencing hearing, giving Brown sufficient time to respond.Additionally, the court determined that Brown's felon-in-possession charge was not relevant conduct to the drug conspiracy and thus could be counted as part of his criminal history. The court also found that the district court adequately explained its decision to run Brown's sentences consecutively, providing sufficient justification based on the § 3553(a) factors. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's sentencing decisions. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Kirstyn Paige Bashaw was employed as the Director of Social Services at Majestic Care of Whitehall, a skilled nursing home and residential facility in Ohio, from November 2021 until her termination in March 2022. Her role involved managing the Social Service department and attending daily meetings. During her tenure, Bashaw was frequently late or absent without authorization, and she raised concerns about resident care and alleged inappropriate behavior by her manager, Edward Beatrice. Bashaw also secretly recorded work meetings and discussed her intention to leave the job with a Human Resources representative.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted summary judgment in favor of Majestic Care, finding that the company had provided three non-pretextual reasons for Bashaw’s termination: her surreptitious recording of work meetings, her attendance issues, and her expressed desire to leave the job. The court did not find it necessary to resolve whether a fourth reason, related to a resident's readmission, was pretextual.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that Majestic Care had legitimate, non-pretextual reasons for terminating Bashaw. Specifically, the court found that Bashaw’s secret recordings undermined trust and posed legal risks, her attendance issues were valid grounds for termination, and Majestic Care reasonably believed she no longer wished to work there. The court concluded that these reasons were sufficient to defeat Bashaw’s retaliation claim under Title VII and Ohio law. View "Bashaw v. Majestic Care of Whitehall" on Justia Law

Shenisa Mohammed, a citizen of Trinidad and Tobago, became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 2010. In 2020, she pleaded guilty to arson under Virginia Code § 18.2-77. The Department of Homeland Security charged her as removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), alleging her arson conviction qualified as an aggravated felony. Mohammed sought cancellation of removal, but the immigration judge (IJ) concluded that her arson conviction was an aggravated felony, making her removable and ineligible for discretionary relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, and Mohammed petitioned for review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court confirmed its jurisdiction to review the BIA’s final order of removal, limited to constitutional claims or questions of law. The court reviewed de novo whether Mohammed’s state conviction for arson qualified as an aggravated felony under the INA.The court applied the categorical approach to determine if the Virginia arson statute matched the federal arson statute under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). The Virginia statute criminalizes maliciously burning or aiding and abetting the burning of certain properties. The federal statute criminalizes maliciously damaging or destroying property used in interstate commerce by fire or explosives. The court found that both statutes prohibit malicious burning, and the federal statute implicitly includes aiding and abetting liability through 18 U.S.C. § 2.The court concluded that the Virginia arson statute is not broader than the federal arson statute, as aiding and abetting is considered an alternative theory of liability under federal law. Therefore, Mohammed’s state arson conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony. The Sixth Circuit denied Mohammed’s petition for review. View "Mohammed v. Bondi" on Justia Law