Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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The case involves the family of Todd Kerchen, who died from a lethal dose of fentanyl. The family filed a complaint against the University of Michigan and Dr. James Woods, alleging violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Michigan state law. The family claimed that the fentanyl that killed Todd originated from a University of Michigan pharmacology lab where Christian Raphalides, the person who allegedly provided the drug to Todd, worked. The lab was overseen by Dr. Woods. The family argued that the lab's lax policies surrounding the use of controlled substances led to Todd's death.The district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss and ordered limited discovery on whether the action was barred by the statutes of limitations applicable to the plaintiffs' claims. The defendants appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The court found that the University of Michigan and Dr. Woods in his official capacity were entitled to sovereign immunity, barring all claims against them. The court also found that Dr. Woods in his individual capacity was entitled to qualified immunity, barring the § 1983 claim against him. Furthermore, the court found that the wrongful death claim against Dr. Woods in his individual capacity should be dismissed as it was barred by governmental immunity. The court dismissed the remainder of the defendants' appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Kerchen v. University of Michigan" on Justia Law

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Thabet Mahdi Saleh, an Iraqi refugee, was granted asylum in the United States in 2010. However, after being convicted of crimes under Michigan law, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him. Saleh sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), fearing torture if he returned to Iraq due to his work with the U.S. Army and his mixed marriage. The immigration judge denied all forms of relief and ordered Saleh's removal. Saleh did not appeal this decision.In 2018, Saleh moved to reopen his proceedings, seeking deferral of removal under the CAT. He alleged changed country conditions and an increased risk of torture due to his past experiences and criminal convictions in the U.S. The immigration judge granted the motion to reopen but later denied Saleh’s application for relief. Saleh appealed this decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which assumed Saleh’s credibility but found no error in the other decisions, thus denying Saleh’s petition.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Saleh challenged the BIA's decision, arguing that the immigration judge erred by treating a key witness as a fact witness rather than an expert. However, the court found that Saleh's counsel had agreed to this treatment of the witness, and Saleh had not shown that the agency erred by treating the witness as a fact witness only. The court also found that the BIA had properly analyzed Saleh’s probability of torture in the aggregate, considering all the factors together. Therefore, the court denied Saleh's petition for review. View "Mahdi Saleh v. Garland" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
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The case involves a group of bettors who sued Churchill Downs, Inc., and trainers Robert Baffert and Bob Baffert Racing, Inc., after the horse they bet on, Medina Spirit, was disqualified from the 2021 Kentucky Derby due to a failed post-race drug test. The bettors claimed that they would have won their bets under the new order of finish after Medina Spirit's disqualification. However, under Kentucky law, only the first order of finish marked "official" counts for wagering purposes. The plaintiffs brought claims for negligence, breach of contract, violation of the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act, and unjust enrichment.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, which granted the defendants' motions to dismiss and denied the plaintiffs leave to amend the complaint. The court found that the plaintiffs' claims were based on the theory that they had "unpaid winning wagers," but under Kentucky law, the first official order of finish is final. Therefore, the plaintiffs' wagers were lost, and the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.The case was then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision, agreeing that the plaintiffs' claims were based on the theory that they had "unpaid winning wagers." However, under Kentucky law, the first official order of finish is final for wagering purposes. Therefore, the plaintiffs' wagers were lost, and the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court also found that the proposed amendment to the complaint did not cure this flaw, so the lower court properly denied leave to amend. View "Mattera v. Baffert" on Justia Law

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The case involves Terrence Jordan and Damara Sanders, who were pulled over by a state trooper for speeding. During the stop, the trooper noticed inconsistencies in their travel plans and observed Jordan's heavy breathing, which raised his suspicion. He called for a canine unit, which detected the presence of drugs. A subsequent search of the vehicle and the defendants revealed marijuana, pill presses, digital scales, plastic baggies, firearms, and a significant quantity of pills containing a fluorofentanyl-fentanyl mixture.The defendants were charged with possessing a firearm as a felon, possessing a controlled substance with the intent to distribute, and possessing firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking. They sought to suppress the evidence obtained from the traffic stop, arguing that the trooper lacked reasonable suspicion to extend the stop. The District Judge denied the motion. The defendants also proposed a lesser-included-offense instruction for simple possession of a controlled substance, which the court rejected, citing the quantity of drugs and distribution paraphernalia as evidence of intent to distribute.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that the trooper had reasonable suspicion to extend the stop, based on the defendants' suspicious travel plans, Sanders's implausible explanations, and Jordan's heavy breathing. The court also agreed with the district court's decision not to give a lesser-included-offense instruction, given the substantial evidence of the defendants' intent to distribute drugs. However, the court vacated the defendants' convictions for possessing firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking due to an error in the jury instructions. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court's opinion. View "United States v. Jordan" on Justia Law

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The case involves Carlos Brown, a defendant who was indicted on fraud and identity theft charges related to a credit card scheme. Brown argued that his right to a speedy trial, as stipulated by the Speedy Trial Act, was violated twice during the 1,176 days between his arraignment and his guilty plea. The first violation involved a 36-day delay in transporting Brown from Ohio to the Federal Medical Center in Lexington for his competency evaluation. The second violation involved a 21-day period after the denial of Brown’s first motion to dismiss.The district court denied both of Brown's motions to dismiss. It ruled that the 36-day delay was excludable and entered a 21-day retroactive ends-of-justice continuance after denying Brown's first motion to dismiss.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that the district court erred in denying both motions. The court held that the 36-day delay in transporting Brown was not excludable and that the district court abused its discretion by not properly placing its reasoning for the 21-day retroactive ends-of-justice continuance on the record. As a result, the court vacated Brown's conviction and remanded the case to the district court to determine whether his indictment should be dismissed with or without prejudice. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The case involves Jose Yanel Sanchez-Perez, a native and citizen of El Salvador, who entered the United States in 1998. In 2009, Sanchez-Perez pleaded guilty to committing misdemeanor domestic assault under Tennessee law. The following day, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him. In 2015, an immigration judge found Sanchez-Perez ineligible for cancellation of removal because he failed to establish that he had been continuously present in the United States for ten years prior to receiving the notice to appear. However, the judge also found that Sanchez-Perez was not statutorily barred from seeking cancellation of removal due to his 2009 domestic-violence conviction.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Sanchez-Perez’s appeal and agreed with the immigration judge’s findings that Sanchez-Perez lacked the requisite continuous physical presence and thus was not eligible for cancellation of removal. In 2018, the immigration judge found that Sanchez-Perez’s 2009 conviction is categorically a crime of violence, and thus Sanchez-Perez was statutorily barred from obtaining cancellation of removal. The BIA dismissed Sanchez-Perez’s appeal from this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the BIA erred in determining that Sanchez-Perez’s 2009 conviction was categorically a crime of violence, and thus Sanchez-Perez was statutorily barred from obtaining cancellation of removal. The court noted that the Tennessee statute at issue criminalizes conduct that does not require the use or threatened use of violent physical force. Therefore, the court granted Sanchez-Perez’s petition for review, vacated the BIA’s order, and remanded the case to the BIA for proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Sanchez-Perez v. Garland" on Justia Law

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The case involves a technology company, Root Inc., which sought to disrupt the traditional car insurance market. The plaintiff, Plumber’s Local 290 Pension Trust Fund, invested in Root around the time of its initial public offering (IPO). The plaintiff alleged that Root made misleading statements about its customer acquisition cost (CAC), a key performance metric. Root's CAC was lower than traditional car insurance companies, giving it a competitive advantage. However, the plaintiff claimed that Root's CAC increased after its IPO, ending its competitive advantage. The plaintiff argued that Root had a duty to update investors about its CAC because it was higher than its historical average at the time of the IPO.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, which dismissed all of the plaintiff's claims for failure to state a claim for relief. The court found that the statements made by Root were not actionable because they were based on past performance or historical data, and were not false or misleading.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the plaintiff's claims sounded in fraud and thus were subject to the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b). The court also found that Root's statements about its CAC were not misleading. Two of the statements were protected as statements of past or historical performance, and the third was protected by the "Bespeaks Caution" doctrine, which shields companies from liability when they make forward-looking statements accompanied by meaningful cautionary language. The court concluded that Root had no duty to update its CAC because the statements were about past performance and did not predict the future. View "Kolominsky v. Root, Inc." on Justia Law

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The case involves Karen Frohn, who applied for and received a life insurance policy from Globe Life and Accident Insurance Company on behalf of her husband, Greg Frohn. After Greg's death, Karen submitted a claim for death benefits, which Globe denied. Karen then sued Globe, both individually and on behalf of a putative class of beneficiaries, challenging the denial of her claim.Globe moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was entitled to rescind the life insurance policy because Karen was not truthful in her application for insurance. The district court granted Globe’s motion, barring Karen from recovery on her claims against Globe. Karen also asked the court to redact certain portions of that order, but the district court published it without any redactions. Karen appealed these decisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that Karen had voluntarily waived her husband's physician-patient privilege by signing an Authorization for Release, allowing Globe to access Greg's medical records. The court also found that Globe was entitled to rescind the policy under Ohio law because Karen had made material misrepresentations in the insurance application. The court concluded that Globe's defense barred Karen's breach-of-contract and bad-faith claims. View "Frohn v. Globe Life and Accident Ins Co" on Justia Law

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This case involves a lawsuit filed by the family of Bill Heeter against Officer Kenneth Bowers and the Columbus Police Department. The family alleges that Officer Bowers used excessive force and violated Mr. Heeter's constitutional rights when he shot and killed Mr. Heeter during a police response to a suicide threat. The family also alleges that Officer Bowers violated Mr. Heeter's right to adequate medical care by failing to administer first aid after the shooting.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, where the defendants claimed immunity from the lawsuit. The district court granted the defendants immunity from some claims but denied others. The two constitutional claims against Officer Bowers that survived qualified immunity in the district court are the central focus of this appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of state-law immunity and qualified immunity as to Officer Bowers in his individual capacity, allowing the Heeters’ constitutional and state-law claims against him to proceed to trial. However, the court held that the City was entitled to summary judgment on the state-law claims because of an Ohio municipal immunity statute. The court reversed solely on the issue of municipal immunity for the City, and otherwise affirmed the district court's decision. View "Heeter v. Bowers" on Justia Law

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Tyren Cervenak pleaded guilty to two counts of distributing crack cocaine and one count of possessing a firearm and ammunition as a convicted felon. Prior to this, Cervenak had been convicted of numerous crimes in Ohio state court, including two felony convictions: one in 2016 for two counts of robbery while using a firearm and another in 2020 for trafficking heroin. Prior to sentencing in the federal case, pretrial services recommended that the district court consider Cervenak a career offender under section 4B1.1 of the sentencing guidelines. Cervenak objected to his career-offender designation, arguing that a conviction under Ohio’s robbery statute does not qualify as a crime of violence under the sentencing guidelines.The district court overruled Cervenak’s objection and accepted the guidelines calculations recommended by pretrial services. The court agreed with the government and imposed a total sentence at the high end of the guidelines range: 188 months. After the hearing, the court issued an order explaining its reasoning for applying the career-offender enhancement to Cervenak’s guidelines calculations. The district court concluded that a conviction under Ohio Revised Code § 2911.02(A)(2) (“Ohio robbery”) falls within the definition of “robbery” included among the enumerated offenses in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2), meaning that Ohio robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under the guidelines. Cervenak timely appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that under its recent decision in United States v. Carter, a conviction for Ohio robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under the guidelines. The court found that Ohio robbery categorically matched generic “extortion,” which is also an enumerated offense under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). The court rejected Cervenak's arguments that the Carter panel erred by failing to conduct the double-divisibility analysis mandated by Butts and Wilson and by assuming that “theft offense” under the Ohio statute categorically matches the “obtaining” element of generic extortion. The court concluded that Cervenak’s conviction for Ohio robbery qualifies as a crime of violence. View "United States v. Cervenak" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law