Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Zillow, Inc., a for-profit corporation, requested property tax data from several Kentucky property valuation administrators (PVAs) under Kentucky’s Open Records Act (KORA). The PVAs classified Zillow’s requests as having a commercial purpose and quoted fees amounting to thousands of dollars. Zillow sued, arguing that KORA’s fee structure, which distinguishes between commercial and non-commercial purposes and includes exceptions for newspapers, radio, and television stations, violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky held that the commercial/non-commercial distinction did not violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments but found the newspaper exception unconstitutional. The court severed the newspaper exception from the statute, resulting in both Zillow and newspapers being subject to enhanced fees. The Kentucky Press Association and American City Business Journals intervened and, along with Zillow, appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the commercial-fee statute did not violate the First Amendment as applied to Zillow. It determined that the distinction between commercial and non-commercial purposes was content-neutral and did not impermissibly discriminate based on the content of Zillow’s speech. The court reversed the district court’s order declaring the newspaper exception unconstitutional, vacated the permanent injunction, and remanded with instructions to grant summary judgment to the PVAs. View "Zillow, Inc. v. Miller" on Justia Law

Shawn Lamar Peake-Wright, Jr. was a passenger in a car driven by Kimberly Manney in Kalamazoo, Michigan, when they were stopped by Sgt. Timothy Millard. Sgt. Millard recognized Peake-Wright and knew of his criminal history. During the stop, Peake-Wright exhibited strange behavior, including removing his jacket in freezing weather and repeatedly standing up despite officers' instructions to remain seated. Sgt. Millard, suspecting that Peake-Wright's jacket might contain contraband, searched it and found a loaded 9mm pistol.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan denied Peake-Wright's motion to suppress the evidence of the firearm, holding that the search was justified under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. The court found that Peake-Wright's behavior and criminal history provided probable cause to believe that his jacket contained evidence of a crime.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the duration of the traffic stop was reasonable and that the officers had probable cause to search Peake-Wright's jacket. The court emphasized that the totality of the circumstances, including Peake-Wright's erratic behavior and criminal history, justified the search under the automobile exception. The court concluded that the search was lawful and upheld the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Peake-Wright" on Justia Law

Michael Mills was convicted of being a felon in possession of ammunition after a shootout involving members of the Detroit gang, It’s Just Us (IJU). Mills, armed with a loaded pistol-grip shotgun, fired two shots during the altercation, resulting in the death of IJU member James Matthews Jr. Mills was subsequently arrested and charged. A jury found him guilty, and the district court sentenced him to the statutory maximum of 120 months, applying a sentencing enhancement based on Mills's role in Matthews's death.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan initially sentenced Mills, but the case was remanded by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for additional factual findings regarding the sentencing enhancement. On remand, the district court reaffirmed its findings, concluding that Mills caused Matthews's death, had the necessary mental state for second-degree murder, and rejected Mills's justification defense. The district court reimposed the same 120-month sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case again. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Mills committed second-degree murder with malice aforethought, based on his actions and social media messages indicating a premeditated intent. The court also found no clear error in the district court's rejection of Mills's justification defense, noting that Mills had viable alternatives to engaging in the shootout. Additionally, the appellate court determined that the district court properly considered the sentencing factors, including the need for deterrence and Mills's criminal history.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding Mills's 120-month sentence. View "United States v. Mills" on Justia Law

Mateo Alexander Mateo-Esteban and his father, Montejo, natives of Guatemala, entered the United States illegally in 2015. Mateo-Esteban applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention against Torture (CAT). The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) served both with notices to appear, and they were ordered removed in absentia after failing to attend their hearing. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) later reopened the case. At the reopened hearing, Montejo testified about gang extortion and threats in Guatemala, leading to their flight to the U.S.The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Mateo-Esteban’s application, finding that his proposed social group, “people who are afraid of gangs in Guatemala,” was not legally cognizable and that he failed to demonstrate that the Guatemalan government would acquiesce in his torture if he returned. The IJ also found Montejo’s testimony lacked credibility and noted that they could have relocated within Guatemala or that Mateo-Esteban could have lived with his mother. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision, agreeing that the proposed social group was not cognizable and that there was no likelihood of government acquiescence in torture.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Mateo-Esteban’s proposed social group was not legally cognizable, as it lacked particularity and social distinction. The court also found that the evidence did not compel the conclusion that the Guatemalan government would acquiesce in Mateo-Esteban’s torture. The court noted that the Guatemalan government had made efforts to combat gang violence and police corruption. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit denied Mateo-Esteban’s petition for review. View "Mateo-Esteban v. Garland" on Justia Law

Home Depot, Inc. and Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. (collectively, "Home Depot") experienced a data breach where hackers accessed their computer system and stole payment card information from customers. Home Depot settled claims with financial institutions for approximately $170 million, which included costs for reissuing payment cards and losses from reduced card usage. Home Depot's cyber insurers covered up to $100 million, and Home Depot sought additional coverage from Steadfast Insurance Company and Great American Assurance Company under their commercial general liability policies. The insurers denied coverage, arguing that the policies did not cover electronic data losses.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted summary judgment in favor of the insurers, finding that the policies did not cover the claims related to the data breach. Home Depot appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the electronic data exclusion in the insurance policies unambiguously barred coverage for both the reissuance and reduced usage claims. The court found that the payment card data qualified as "electronic data" under the policies, and the damages arose from the loss of use of this electronic data. Additionally, the court determined that the insurers had no duty to defend Home Depot in the lawsuits filed by the financial institutions, as the claims were not covered by the policies. The court concluded that the plain language of the policies excluded coverage for the damages arising from the data breach. View "Home Depot, Inc. v. Steadfast Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Clarence Fry was convicted by a jury of the aggravated felony murder of his girlfriend, Tamela Hardison, and was sentenced to death by an Ohio trial court. The conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Ohio courts on direct appeal, and Fry's request for collateral relief was denied. Fry then petitioned for a writ of federal habeas corpus, which the district court denied.The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed Fry's conviction and sentence. The Ohio Court of Appeals denied state collateral relief, and the Ohio Supreme Court declined additional review. Fry filed a habeas petition in federal court, raising 24 grounds for relief. The district court denied his petition and granted a certificate of appealability on five claims: ineffective assistance of trial counsel, trial-court error, and ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Fry's trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance during plea bargaining, as the state court reasonably found no prejudice. The court also held that Fry's counsel did not prevent him from testifying, as the state court's finding that Fry knowingly waived his right to testify was reasonable. Additionally, the court found that Fry's waiver of mitigation evidence was knowing and voluntary, and thus, there was no prejudice from counsel's performance.The court also addressed Fry's claims of trial court error. It held that the trial court did not violate Fry's right to testify by failing to independently inquire about his decision, as there was no Supreme Court precedent requiring such an inquiry. Lastly, the court found that the trial court did not err in accepting Fry's mitigation waiver, as the extensive colloquy showed that Fry's waiver was knowing and voluntary.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Fry's habeas petition. View "Fry v. Shoop" on Justia Law

Defendant Shefiu A. Hanson, serving a 46-month sentence for wire fraud, appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to reduce his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Hanson had pled guilty to wire fraud and conspiracy for creating fraudulent bank and email accounts to induce businesses to wire money to his accounts. The total loss to 30 victims was $1,122,805.74. Hanson, with no prior convictions, had a Criminal History Category of I and an Offense Level of 22, resulting in a Guidelines Range of 41 to 51 months. He was sentenced to 46 months in May 2023.Hanson moved for a sentence reduction under the newly created U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1, which applies retroactively. The government opposed, arguing Hanson was ineligible because he caused substantial financial hardship to his victims. The district court agreed, finding Hanson caused substantial financial harm to multiple victims, making him ineligible under U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1(a)(6). The court also concluded that a sentence reduction would not adequately reflect the seriousness of the offense or provide just punishment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not err in determining Hanson was ineligible for a sentence reduction. The court noted that the financial hardship caused by Hanson did not need to fall perfectly within the factors listed in U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 n.4F, as the list is non-exhaustive. The district court reasonably concluded that the financial hardship to at least one victim was substantial, citing specific examples of individual victims' hardships. The court affirmed the district court’s order denying Hanson’s motion for a sentence reduction. View "United States v. Hanson" on Justia Law

The case involves the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) 2024 Safeguarding and Securing the Open Internet Order, which reclassified Broadband Internet Service Providers (ISPs) as offering a "telecommunications service" under Title II of the Communications Act, thereby subjecting them to net-neutrality regulations. The FCC's order also classified mobile broadband as a "commercial mobile service" under Title III, imposing similar regulations.Previously, the FCC had fluctuated in its classification of broadband services. In 2015, the FCC classified broadband as a telecommunications service, which the D.C. Circuit upheld under the Chevron doctrine. In 2018, the FCC reversed this classification, treating broadband as an information service, a decision also upheld by the D.C. Circuit. The 2024 order reversed the 2018 decision, reinstating the 2015 classification.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the 2024 order. The court held that Broadband ISPs offer an "information service" under 47 U.S.C. § 153(24), not a telecommunications service. The court reasoned that ISPs provide the capability to retrieve and utilize information via telecommunications, which fits the definition of an information service. The court also found that the FCC's interpretation of the statute was inconsistent with its plain language and historical context.Regarding mobile broadband, the court held that it does not qualify as a "commercial mobile service" under 47 U.S.C. § 332(d)(1) because it is not interconnected with the public switched network, which refers to the traditional telephone network using the North American Numbering Plan. Consequently, mobile broadband is classified as a "private mobile service" and is not subject to common-carrier regulation.The Sixth Circuit granted the petitions for review and set aside the FCC's 2024 Safeguarding Order. View "Ohio Telecom Ass'n v. FCC" on Justia Law

Employees of Mercedes-Benz Research and Development North America, Inc. accidentally set fire to a property leased from Airport Boulevard Associates, LLC (ABA) while transferring gasoline between vehicles. ABA's insurer, Pioneer State Mutual Insurance Company, paid ABA for the damages and sought reimbursement from Mercedes and its insurer, Allianz Global Risks US Insurance Company. Unable to resolve the matter, Pioneer filed a lawsuit in federal court.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied Pioneer's motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment to Mercedes and Allianz. Pioneer appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision regarding Allianz, holding that the No-Fault Act did not apply because the vehicle was exempt from registration and the Allianz policy did not provide property protection insurance. The court also rejected Pioneer's argument for apportionment of recovery between the insurers, as the policies insured different parties and risks.However, the court reversed the district court's decision regarding Mercedes. The court found that Mercedes potentially breached the lease by handling hazardous materials, specifically gasoline, on the property. This breach could allow Pioneer to recover damages despite the lease's waiver-of-subrogation clause. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the claims against Mercedes. View "Pioneer State Mut. Ins. v. HDI Global" on Justia Law

Mario Adams, a defendant with a history of mental health issues, was sentenced to 24 months’ imprisonment for violating the terms of his supervised release. Adams argued that the district court improperly considered his mental health as an aggravating factor in its sentencing determination.In 2014, Adams was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. He was initially found incompetent to stand trial due to mental health issues but was later deemed competent and pleaded guilty. He was sentenced to 87 months in prison followed by 36 months of supervised release. After his release in 2020, Adams violated the terms of his supervised release multiple times, including missing drug tests, failing to allow home visits, and committing new state crimes.The district court for the Northern District of Ohio revoked Adams’s supervised release based on these violations and sentenced him to 24 months in prison, an upward variance from the Guidelines range of 8 to 14 months. The court emphasized Adams’s conduct, including his absconding from a halfway house and committing violent crimes, as the basis for the sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the district court did not improperly rely on Adams’s mental health status as an aggravating factor but rather based its decision on Adams’s conduct and the failure of previous interventions to prevent further offenses. The court concluded that the district court’s sentence was procedurally reasonable and based on permissible factors. View "United States v. Adams" on Justia Law