Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves Jason Kechego, an inmate at a federal detention center in Michigan, who was convicted of second-degree murder for killing fellow inmate Christian Maire. Kechego appealed against several of the district court's rulings during his trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the rulings of the district court. The court held that the district court did not err in refusing to hold a Remmer hearing, a hearing to examine whether the verdict was tainted by external influences. The court also held that the district court did not err in accepting a partial verdict, where the jury unanimously convicted Kechego of second-degree murder, acquitted him of first-degree murder, assault with intent to commit murder, and assault resulting in serious bodily injury, and failed to reach unanimity on conspiracy to commit first-degree murder.The court further held that the district court did not err in refusing to give a voluntary-manslaughter instruction, as there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction on the lesser offense. The court also affirmed the district court's exclusion of Kechego's expert's testimony on retrograde extrapolation, a technique for estimating prior blood-alcohol content based on a later measurement, which was done as a discovery sanction. Finally, the court held that any error in excluding evidence of a phone call that Kechego received two weeks before the killing was harmless. View "United States v. Kechego" on Justia Law

Chinyere Ogbonna-McGruder, an African American professor, alleged that her employer, Austin Peay State University (APSU), and her supervisors engaged in racial discrimination and created a hostile work environment, and retaliated against her when she opposed their unlawful conduct. She also claimed that her supervisors violated her constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss all counts for failure to state a claim. The court ruled that Ogbonna-McGruder failed to sufficiently allege that the harassment she experienced was severe or pervasive, a necessary element of a hostile work environment claim. The court also found that she did not sufficiently allege that any adverse employment actions were motivated by discriminatory animus, and that she did not adequately assert that the conduct forming the basis of her §1983 claim violated a specific constitutional provision. View "Ogbonna-McGruder v. Austin Peay State Univ." on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied the petition for review filed by Kingsley Owusu, who was seeking asylum and withholding of removal from the United States. Owusu, originally from Ghana, claimed that he had suffered three violent incidents in his home country due to his political affiliations, leading him to fear future persecution. The immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals both found that Owusu had failed to demonstrate that the Ghanaian government was unable or unwilling to address the harm he faced from private actors, that his past incidents did not constitute persecution, that he could not establish a well-founded fear of future persecution, and that he could avoid persecution by relocating within Ghana. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit held that for Owusu to be eligible for asylum or withholding, he must show state action, either by demonstrating that his persecutor is a state actor or that the Ghanaian government was unable to protect him. The court found that Owusu failed to meet this burden, as he presented no compelling evidence that the Ghanaian police would either persecute him or fail to protect him from persecution. As such, the court denied Owusu's petition for review. View "Owusu v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

In Chattanooga, Tennessee, Al Dorsey celebrated New Year's Eve by firing a gun into the air. This action was recorded by nearby cameras, and the police were dispatched. Dorsey was detained and found in possession of a firearm. As he had prior felony convictions, he was charged with possession of a firearm as a felon. In determining his guidelines range, his base offense level was calculated as 24 due to having at least two prior convictions for a "crime of violence," specifically two prior Tennessee convictions for facilitating aggravated robbery and one for robbery. Dorsey appealed this, arguing his facilitation offenses were not "crimes of violence."The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit disagreed with Dorsey's argument. The court held that Dorsey's prior convictions for facilitating aggravated robbery were indeed "crimes of violence" under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. The court relied on its previous decision in United States v. Gloss, which interpreted the term "crime of violence" to cover the Tennessee crime of facilitating aggravated robbery. The court rejected Dorsey's argument that Gloss was in conflict with earlier or later decisions. The court concluded that facilitating aggravated robbery requires a knowing state of mind, not just a reckless one, and thus meets the definition of "crime of violence" under the sentencing guidelines. Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court's decision to treat Dorsey's facilitation offenses as "crimes of violence," leading to a higher base offense level for sentencing purposes. View "United States v. Dorsey" on Justia Law

In August 2020, a joint federal task force between the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) and the Cincinnati Police Department (CPD) attempted to arrest Mason Meyer. While fleeing from CPD officers, Meyer crashed into a restaurant, killing Gayle and Raymond Laible and severely injuring Steven and Maribeth Klein. The Laibles’ estate and the Kleins filed a lawsuit alleging that three CPD officers were negligent in their execution of the high-speed car chase. The officers claimed they were federal employees and therefore immune from common-law tort actions due to their participation in the federal task force. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that CPD Sergeant Donald Scalf was a federal employee acting within the scope of his employment during the chase and therefore immune under the Westfall Act. However, it affirmed the district court's denial of immunity for Sergeant Timothy Lanter and Officer Brett Thomas, as they were not federal employees at the time of the incident. View "Laible v. Lanter" on Justia Law

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed a district court decision in a medical malpractice case where the plaintiff's mother died in a nursing home. The plaintiff, Chappelle Gales, alleged that her mother died due to inadequate care provided by the nursing home, and she sought to support her claim with expert testimony. However, the district court excluded the testimony of the plaintiff's expert witness, Dr. Edwin Polverino, due to his unfamiliarity with local medical standards in Memphis, Tennessee where the nursing home is located. The district court subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of the nursing home, Allenbrooke Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, on the basis that without expert testimony, the plaintiff could not establish the essential elements of a state law medical malpractice claim.The Court of Appeals held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the expert's testimony. According to Tennessee's Healthcare Liability Act, for a medical malpractice action, the plaintiff must establish the "recognized standard of acceptable professional practice" in the community where the defendant practices or in a similar community. However, the plaintiff's expert witness, who practiced in Virginia, admitted that he had not looked into the standard of care in Memphis. The court held that a national standard of care could not be substituted for a local standard of care under Tennessee law. The court further held that the plaintiff had failed to establish that the expert was familiar with the standard of care in a community similar to Memphis. As a result, without admissible medical expert testimony regarding the recognized standard of professional care in Memphis or a similar community, the nursing home was entitled to summary judgment. View "Gales v. Allenbrooke Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, LLC" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals affirmed a district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Adroit Medical Systems, Inc., Grazyna Gammons, Kelley Patten, and Gene Gammons. The plaintiff, Scott Gammons, alleged that his father and stepfamily, who controlled the family business, Adroit, were diverting company funds for personal use without accounting for tax consequences. He claimed that after he reported their financial misdeeds to the IRS, they fired him. Scott brought an action under federal and state whistleblower statutes and state common law.The court found that while Scott’s reporting of alleged financial malfeasance to the IRS was protected conduct and may have contributed to his termination, the defendants had clear and convincing evidence that they would have fired Scott due to his attempted hostile takeover of the company, irrespective of his whistleblowing. Scott had obtained an emergency conservatorship over his father, Gene, which he used to control the family business. When the conservatorship was dissolved, the defendants regained control and promptly fired Scott.Scott also brought claims under the Tennessee Public Protection Act (TPPA) and state common law. The court found that Scott failed to show that the defendants’ legitimate reason for terminating him was pretextual. The court also rejected Scott’s state common law claims, holding that the individual defendants were immune from tortious interference claims as they were acting within their corporate capacities and did not personally benefit from Scott’s termination. View "Gammons v. Adroit Medical Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Leslie Fisher sued officers Randall Jordan, Matthew Rice, and John Trefelet of the Michigan State Police for violating federal and state law by arresting her without probable cause. Fisher and her husband were arrested after the officers executed a search warrant and found marijuana growing in their garage. All charges against Fisher were eventually dismissed in state court. She then filed a federal lawsuit against the arresting officers.The officers moved for summary judgment, invoking qualified immunity in response to Fisher's federal claims of arrest and prosecution without probable cause under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and governmental immunity for her state claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. The district court granted summary judgment to the officers, concluding that they had probable cause to arrest Fisher.On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the officers had probable cause to believe that Fisher had committed the crime of possession of at least 5,000 grams of marijuana with the intent to distribute, based on various pieces of evidence. This included the fact that Fisher lived at and owned the site of the marijuana cultivation operation, and that she admitted to using marijuana grown by her husband. The court also found that the large quantity of marijuana in the Fishers' garage supported probable cause to infer intent to distribute.The court further concluded that the officers were entitled to governmental immunity from Fisher's state law claims, as the probable cause analysis for federal Fourth Amendment claims is the same under Michigan law. Since the officers had probable cause to suspect that Fisher possessed an illegal quantity of marijuana with the intent to distribute, they were entitled to governmental immunity from Fisher's state law claims. View "Fisher v. Jordan" on Justia Law

In a dispute between Ultra Bond, Inc., and its owner, Richard Campfield (collectively "Ultra Bond"), and Safelite Group, Inc. and its affiliates (collectively "Safelite"), both parties operate in the vehicle glass repair and replacement industry. Ultra Bond alleges that Safelite violated the Lanham Act by falsely advertising that windshield cracks longer than six inches could not be safely repaired and instead required replacement of the entire windshield. Safelite counterclaims that Ultra Bond stole trade secrets from Safelite in violation of state and federal law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled that the district court was incorrect to grant summary judgment to Safelite on Ultra Bond’s Lanham Act claim. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to suggest that Safelite's allegedly false statements may have caused economic injury to Ultra Bond, and this issue should go to a jury.The court also affirmed the district court's decision that Safelite's claims for conversion, civil conspiracy, and tortious interference with contract were preempted by the Ohio Uniform Trade Secrets Act (OUTSA). However, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Ultra Bond on Safelite’s claim under OUTSA, ruling that Safelite's claim was not time-barred and should be evaluated further in the lower court.Finally, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Ultra Bond on Safelite's unfair competition claim, finding that Safelite hadn't provided enough evidence to support its claim that Ultra Bond's statements were false or that they had led to a diversion of customers from Safelite to Ultra Bond. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Campfield v. Safelite Group, Inc." on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Brandenburg Telephone Company and Sprint Communications were in disagreement over the interest rate on an award that Sprint Communications conceded it owed to Brandenburg Telephone Company. The $2.2 million award was for unpaid fees that Sprint Communications owed for connecting local telephone calls. The dispute centered on Brandenburg's filed utility tariff which set the interest rate. Sprint argued that the tariff set the rate at 8%, and thus owed $4.3 million in interest, while Brandenburg claimed the tariff imposed a rate of 10.66%, which would result in $7.1 million in interest. The district court ruled in favor of Sprint, and the appeals court affirmed this decision.The court reasoned that the 8% rate set by the Kentucky usury statute was applicable. The court noted that while Brandenburg's tariff offered two alternatives for late payment penalty: (1) the highest interest rate (in decimal value) which may be levied by law for commercial transactions, or (2) a rate of .000292 per day (which works out to an annualized rate of 10.66%); the court interpreted the phrase "levied by law for commercial transactions" to refer to the default rate that Kentucky permits to be collected by law, which is 8%.The court rejected Brandenburg's argument that the 10.66% rate was applicable because the tariff could be viewed as an agreement between the parties and Kentucky law allows for parties to agree on higher interest rates. The court pointed out that tariffs are not freely negotiated contracts, but represent the judgment of regulators about what rates and conditions will prove reasonable and uniform for utility customers. Once regulators approve a tariff, the filed-rate doctrine prevents utilities and their customers from contracting around its terms. In this context, the court determined that the tariff's reference to the maximum rate levied by the General Assembly for general commercial transactions aligned with the filed-rate doctrine, and thus, the 8% default rule of interest applied. View "Brandenburg Telephone Co. v. Sprint Comm'ns Co." on Justia Law