Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A putative class sued Ford over an alleged design defect in their F-150 pickup trucks, model years 2013-2018, involving brake master cylinders manufactured by Hitachi, citing two alternative theories of how the failure of internal seals would occur. The court declined to certify injunction and damages classes under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) but certified five statewide issue classes under 23(c)(4) for three issues: whether the brake systems were defective; whether Ford possessed pre-sale knowledge of the defect; and whether concealed information about the defect would be material to a reasonable buyer.On interlocutory review, the Sixth Circuit reversed. Rule 23 certification requires that a class action be able to “generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.” Here, it is not clear that the certified issues can each be answered “in one stroke.” The court noted design and manufacturing changes to the units over the years and that the class alleged two distinct theories of design defect. Ford may have believed any problem was fixed when Hitachi altered its cylinder design. It is possible that those changes affected brake performance to a degree that would have made a difference to a consumer. On remand, the district court must evaluate whether each of the four Rule 23(a) factors is actually satisfied, not merely properly alleged. The inquiry might overlap with the merits of the underlying claims but is a crucial part of avoiding the procedural unfairness to which class actions are uniquely susceptible. View "In re Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

S.C., a high school freshman, was unwillingly video-recorded engaging in non-consensual sexual activity with a male student on school property. The video was shared online and other students began to harass S.C. Students then began harassing and threatening S.C. and her family. S.C. and her mother met with Detective, Carrigan, who assumed the video-recording and sexual encounter were consensual and repeatedly rejected S.C.’s statements and information about the threats, suggesting that S.C. had participated in producing child pornography. Following another meeting, Principal Kessler denied being informed that the encounter was not consensual or of any harassment, although a list of students making threats was found in Kessler’s file. Kessler suspended S.C., after which she was expected to return to school. The Assistant Principal also declined to address the threats. S.C. entered an in-patient facility and continued coursework remotely. Because the threats continued, her family moved to a different county. S.C.'s grades dropped substantially, she began abusing drugs and alcohol, and she engaged in self-harm. Before the incident, the district already had “a widespread problem of students circulating sexual pictures and videos of themselves and their peers.” The district was aware of the problem.S.C. alleged deliberate indifference to student-on-student harassment before she was assaulted; deliberate indifference during the investigation; and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims. S.C.’s Title IX “before” claim was dismissed. The court found the district liable for emotional distress and other damages on the Title IX “after” claim, but not liable under section 1983. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded the Title IX and Section 1983 “before” claims and affirmed that the district is liable on S.C.’s Title IX “after” claim. View "S.C. v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County" on Justia Law

Reynolds was convicted of selling a fentanyl-heroin mixture that killed two young men, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). Investigators connected Reynolds to these fatal drugs in part through cellphone records, including records showing the general locations of several phones; text messages, including messages between a detective pretending to be one of the victims and Reynolds; and a controlled buy arranged by that detective.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction and 328-month sentence, rejecting arguments that the government introduced insufficient evidence to convict; that a government expert identified the phones’ general locations using a software program that failed the “Daubert” reliability standards; that the district court violated the Constitution by excluding text messages that allegedly supported his innocence; and that the prosecutor improperly “vouched” for a key government witness during closing arguments. View "United States v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

In 2020, Bennett, a nursing student completing a clinical rotation at Hurley, requested that her service dog, Pistol, be permitted to accompany her. Pistol recognizes the symptoms Bennett exhibits just before a panic attack and alerts her so that she can take Ativan. Hurley agreed. Its Service Animal Policy largely tracks regulations implementing the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 12131. When Bennett brought Pistol to the hospital, one staff member and one patient reported allergic reactions. Hurley revoked Bennett’s ability to have Pistol with her at all times, stating the hospital remained “open to continued dialogue” and would provide space for a crate for Pistol on another floor and “make every effort to accommodate” unscheduled breaks. Hurley concluded that relocating staff and patients could compromise patient care. Moving nurses would be difficult; Hurley nurses are union members and the hospital was short-staffed during the pandemic. There were concerns about having a dog on a floor with immunocompromised or unconscious patients. Bennett finished her Hurley rotation without Pistol and without experiencing a panic attack. Bennett completed rotations at other hospitals with PistolThe Sixth Circuit affirmed the rejection of Bennett’s claims under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794, and Michigan law. Hurley’s concerns were with Pistol, not with Bennett’s medical condition. Hurley reasonably decided that Pistol posed a direct threat to the health and safety of patients and that the accommodations necessary to mitigate the risk were not reasonable. View "Bennett v. Hurley Medical Center" on Justia Law

Davis and Allen pleaded guilty to using a facility of interstate commerce (their cellphones) in a murder-for-hire scheme, 18 U.S.C. 1958(a).The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the government could not constitutionally apply the federal murder-for-hire statute to their conduct. Although the statute rests on Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce, the defendants never left Michigan or even made calls outside the state when committing the murder. At most, some of their intrastate calls required the telephone company to use out-of-state switches. The Supreme Court has held that Congress may regulate the “instrumentalities of interstate commerce” even when used only within a state, and the Sixth Circuit treats an ordinary telephone as one such “instrumentality” within Congress’s control. The court also rejected speedy-trial claims. Before they pleaded guilty, the district court had postponed their trial for nearly four years. But the delay arose in part from their own repeated requests for more time and in part from the COVID-19 pandemic. Both reasons justified the delay. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

In April 2015, federal agent Quinn shot and killed Kellom while trying to arrest him. Kellom’s estate sued Quinn under the Federal Tort Claims Act with a “Bivens” excessive-force claim. The government replaced Quinn as the defendant in the tort claims. The estate then filed an unsuccessful claim with Quinn’s employer, DHS. The FTCA requires plaintiffs to seek relief “first” from the federal agency within two years: the government notified the estate that it needed to bring a new lawsuit for its FTCA claims. Instead, in May 2018, the estate amended its complaint, asserting the same claims. The district court treated the FTCA exhaustion requirement as jurisdictional and dismissed the FTCA claims. The Bivens claim proceeded. A jury ruled in Quinn’s favor. Meanwhile, Kellom’s family members brought FTCA claims by joining the estate’s amended complaint, which was filed in May 2018. The family had not sought relief from DHS, so the district court dismissed those claims. In October 2018, the family filed a claim with DHS. DHS denied the claim. Rather than rejoin the estate’s lawsuit, the family filed a new one. The district court dismissed the family’s claims as untimely.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The government did not waive or forfeit its exhaustion defense in the estate’s case by failing to oppose a motion to amend. The estate did not cure its failure to exhaust by filing an amended complaint. The family’s claims were untimely. View "Kellom v. Quinn" on Justia Law

In 1970, Michigan voters approved Proposal C, amending Article VIII, section 2 of Michigan’s constitution: “No public monies or property shall be appropriated or paid or any public credit utilized, by the legislature or any other political subdivision or agency of the state directly or indirectly to aid or maintain any private, denominational or other nonpublic, pre-elementary, elementary, or secondary schools.” The plaintiffs allege that Proposal C was spurred by the legislature’s passage of 1970 PA 100, which “allowed the Department of Education to purchase educational services from nonpublic schools in secular subjects,” and authorized $22 million in spending during the 1970-71 school year. Plaintiffs allege that “nonpublic schools” meant “religious schools”; opposition to 1970 PA 100 resulted in Proposal C. In 2000, Michigan voters rejected a ballot initiative that would have amended the section to authorize “indirect” support of non-public school students and create a voucher program for students in underperforming public school districts to attend nonpublic schools.Plaintiffs brought unsuccessful free exercise claims, alleging they have funded Michigan Education Savings Program plans and wish to use those plans to pay for their children’s religious school tuition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of their equal protection claim that section 2, while facially neutral, creates a political structure that unconstitutionally discriminates against religion because religious persons and schools cannot lobby their state representatives for governmental aid or tuition help without first amending the state constitution. View "Hile v. State of Michigan" on Justia Law

In 2017, officers discovered Rogers sitting in a motel room with methamphetamine. Rogers was taken into custody but released. Rogers was indicted in February 2018 for trafficking in two grams or more of methamphetamine. A month later, Rogers was riding in a vehicle that was stopped for a minor traffic violation. Officers realized that Rogers had an active warrant for his arrest for failing to appear following the indictment. A search of the car unearthed a bag of methamphetamine under Rogers’s seat. Rogers pleaded guilty to two state felony drug trafficking offenses (2017 motel incident; 2018 traffic stop) and received concurrent prison terms. He was released in 2020.In 2021, officers again found Rogers in possession of methamphetamine. Rogers pleaded guilty to possessing with the intent to distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a). The probation office recommended that Rogers’s 2017 and 2018 offenses triggered the career offender enhancement for certain defendants with “at least two prior felony convictions” of a controlled substance offense, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1(a), resulting in a Guidelines range of 262-327 months. Rogers unsuccessfully argued that the two offenses did not count as distinct prior felony convictions because they were not “separated by an intervening arrest,” as required by the Guidelines. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his 240-month sentence. Rogers was arrested (as the term is used in the Guidelines) after the motel incident but before the traffic stop. View "United States v. Rogers" on Justia Law

In 1993, Fields, having spent the day drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana, fought with Burton, who lived in a duplex owned by Horton. That night, Burton was locked outside. Fields appeared, with a knife, and broke a window in the duplex. Fields and Burton fled before police arrived, having been called by a neighbor. Officers found Fields in Horton’s residence, a block away, in possession of Horton’s jewelry, saying that he had killed Horton, who was dead in her bedroom. At his second trial, the prosecution argued that Fields broke into Horton’s residence through a storm window, murdered her, and started burglarizing the residence before police arrived. To test that theory, the jury conducted an experiment using a flat-tipped knife submitted into evidence to remove a cabinet door in the jury room (in place of the storm window). Satisfied with the outcome, the jurors convicted Fields of intentional murder and sentenced him to death.In 2022, the Sixth Circuit granted Fields conditional habeas corpus relief. On rehearing, en banc, the court affirmed the denial of relief. The Supreme Court has not addressed when jury experiments of this type violate state or federal law. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act habeas relief is unavailable unless a state court has unreasonably applied “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court,” 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1). View "Fields v. Jordan" on Justia Law

Adams, born in 1960, smoked about a pack a day starting at age 18 and worked in coal mines at times between 1979-1995, mostly underground using a “cutting machine” in the “dustiest” areas. Adams struggled to breathe after his retirement. Adams’s 1998 application under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. 901(b), was denied because he failed to prove that he had pneumoconiosis. In 2008, Adams sought benefits from Wilgar. His treating physician, Dr. Alam, identified the causes of his 2013 death as cardiopulmonary arrest, emphysema, coal worker’s pneumoconiosis, throat cancer, and aspiration pneumonia.A 2019 notice in the case stated “the Court may look to the preamble to the revised” regulations in weighing conflicting medical opinions. Wilgar unsuccessfully requested discovery concerning the preamble and the scientific studies that supported its conclusions. The ALJ awarded benefits, finding that Adams had “legal pneumoconiosis” and giving Dr. Alam’s opinion that Adam’s coal mine work had substantially aggravated his disease “controlling weight.” All things being equal, a treating physician’s opinion is “entitled to more weight,” 30 C.F.R. 718.104(d)(1). Wilgar's three experts had opined that Adams’s smoking exclusively caused his disease The ALJ gave “little weight” to these opinions, believing that they conflicted with the preamble to the 2001 regulation.The Benefits Review Board and Sixth Circuit affirmed. The preamble interpreted the then-existing scientific studies to establish that coal mine work can cause obstructive diseases, either alone or in combination with smoking. The ALJ simply found the preamble more persuasive than the experts. View "Wilgar Land Co. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs" on Justia Law