Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Zheng and Wu owned and operated the Tokyo Dragon restaurant, where they employed noncitizens who were working in the U.S. illegally. In 2017, Homeland Security received a tip from a nurse who suspected that they were human trafficking. Agents executed a warrant at Tokyo Dragon and discovered that the business had not filed any government paperwork with respect to the noncitizens’ employment. Four Hispanic men lived in the basement of Zheng and Wu’s home. The owners transported the men to and from work every day and to the grocery store weekly, paying them in cash. Other employees were paid by check. A Mexican citizen testified he began working as a Tokyo Dragon cook in 2015, generally working six or seven days a week for 11-12 hours per day; he did not interact with customers. Zheng instructed the noncitizens that they “should not go outside” the house and should not make noise, to avoid being deported.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions of Zheng and Wu on four counts of harboring illegal noncitizens for commercial gain, 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii). The court rejected arguments that the district court erred in instructing the jury on the meaning of “harboring” by not including a requirement that the defendants acted intentionally and knowingly in shielding the illegal noncitizens from law enforcement and invaded the province of the jury by giving examples of “harboring.” View "United States v. Zheng" on Justia Law

Hardwick alleged that his bloodstream contains trace quantities of five chemicals (PFAS)—which are part of a family of thousands of chemicals used in medical devices, automotive interiors, waterproof clothing, food packaging, firefighting foam, non-stick cookware, ski and car waxes, batteries, semiconductors, aviation and aerospace construction, paints and varnishes, and building materials. Hardwick, who was exposed to firefighting foam, does not know what companies manufactured the particular chemicals in his bloodstream; nor does he know whether those chemicals might someday make him sick. Of the thousands of companies that have manufactured PFAS since the 1950s, Hardwick sued 10 defendants and sought to represent a class comprising nearly every person “residing in the United States.” The district court certified a class comprising every person residing in Ohio with trace amounts of certain PFAS in their blood.The Sixth Circuit remanded with instructions to dismiss the case. Even at the pleadings stage, the factual allegations, taken as true, “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” The element of traceability requires a showing that the plaintiff’s “injury was likely caused by the defendant.” The district court treated the defendants as a collective, but “standing is not dispensed in gross.” Even if Hardwick met the actual-injury requirement he must tie his injury to each defendant.” Hardwick’s conclusory allegations do not support a plausible inference that any of the defendants bear responsibility for the PFAS in Hardwick’s blood. View "Hardwick v. 3M Co." on Justia Law

In 2011, the automaker FCA transferred the work that plaintiffs (engineers) had previously performed at FCA’s company headquarters to a new location. The plaintiffs filed a grievance with their union, UAW, in 2016. UAW failed to pursue it. In 2017, plaintiffs filed essentially the same grievance, but UAW again did not pursue it. By this time, plaintiffs had learned of a massive bribery scheme involving FCA and UAW; they believed that those bribes had affected the 2011 job-relocation process and UAW’s treatment of their grievances. In 2018, plaintiffs filed the same grievance again. Nearly two years later, UAW found the grievance meritorious.Plaintiffs sued FCA, UAW, and individual defendants in 2020, raising claims under the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. 185(a), and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claims as untimely under the LMRA’s six-month limitations period. Plaintiffs pursuing a hybrid LMRA claim must sue once they “reasonably should know that the union has abandoned” their claim. Plaintiffs learned of their RICO injuries as early as 2011 and learned of the bribery allegations in 2017 but waited until 2020 to file their complaint, with no explanation for the delay. View "Baltrusaitis v. United Auto Workers" on Justia Law

Brown created a driver’s license with his photo and someone else’s identity and made credit cards using that identity, pulling account numbers from the dark web. Brown used those fraudulent documents to purchase 25 firearms, which he sold. Brown subsequently walked into a gun store, picked out a firearm, and presented a fraudulent license and credit card. The store employee recognized Brown and called the police. As police arrived, Brown drove away in a rented U-Haul. During the ensuing traffic stop, officers found Brown’s fraudulent license and false credit cards in a wallet on the passenger seat; a gun that had been reported stolen was between the front seats. After being arrested, Brown recruited a friend to continue his scheme. The friend used fraudulent cards to purchase 39 firearms. The two fraudulently purchased $56,000 in guns over three months.Brown pled guilty to aggravated identity theft, using a false ID during the purchase of a firearm, and conspiracy to commit wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(6), 1028A(a)(1), 1343, 1349. The court enhanced Brown’s sentencing range based on the stolen firearm in the U-Haul, U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(4)(A), and imposed a 120-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that the enhancement would apply even without the stolen firearm in the U-Haul. Fraudulently purchased firearms are “stolen” for purposes of the enhancement. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

The IRS may penalize taxpayers who fail to report a “listed transaction” that the agency determines is similar to one already identified as a tax-avoidance scheme, 26 U.S.C. 6707A(a), (c)(2). IRS Notice 2007-83 listed employee-benefit plans with cash-value life insurance policies. In 2013, Mann created trusts for its co-owners that paid the premiums on their cash-value life insurance policies. Mann deducted the expenses on its tax forms, and the owners counted the death benefits as income. None of them reported the trusts as a listed transaction.In 2019, the IRS determined that the trusts failed to comply with Notice 2007-83 and imposed penalties, which were paid. After the IRS refused requests for refunds, the taxpayers filed suit. The district court granted the IRS summary judgment on a claim that the Notice violated the Administrative Procedures Act’s notice-and-comment requirements. The Sixth Circuit reversed, concluding that Notice 2007- 83 was a legislative rule that lacked exemption from the requirements; “we must set [Notice 2007-83] aside” and “need not address the taxpayers’ remaining claims.”Before the district court ruled on remand, the IRS refunded the past penalties with interest and agreed not to apply the Notice to anyone within the Sixth Circuit. The district court concluded that it retained jurisdiction to set aside and vacate the Notice nationwide. The Sixth Circuit vacated. The taxpayers sought a refund of past tax penalties and prospective relief against Notice 2007-83; the IRS’s actions mooted their claim and left nothing more for the court to do. View "Mann Construction, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Ohio requires that political parties elect a central committee composed of various party members throughout the state. Ohio Rev. Code 3517.01 and establishes rules for the gender composition and the term length of the central committee members, requiring two members, “one a man and one a woman, representing either each congressional district in the state or each senatorial district in the state. Ames, a member of the Ohio Republican Party, was the male representative of the 32nd District on the ORP Central Committee. Although he no longer serves on the ORP Central Committee, Ames alleges that he intends to run in the future and that both the gender and term-length provisions violate his associational rights by interfering with party members’ ability to self-govern and freely choose their leadership.The district court concluded that Ames lacked standing and dismissed his claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that independent of the statute, the ORP’s internal rules contain an identical gender provision and a compatible two-year term-length provision. Ames did not challenge the ORP’s ability to maintain those internal rules, nor did he present any allegation or evidence that the ORP would change its internal practices in the absence of 3517.03, so Ames failed to allege a redressable injury. View "Ames v. LaRose" on Justia Law

During a traffic stop, Tellez agreed to a car search. After the search, the officer asked, “Do you have your wallet?” Tellez handed it over. Inside, the officer discovered three Visa gift cards, each with numbers written on the back, which the officer believed was indicative of fraud. The officer asked whether he could swipe the cards. Tellez agreed but then said, “I don’t give permission.” The officer nevertheless swiped the cards. The numbers did not match the cards, indicating they had been altered. Tellez was indicted for conspiracy to defraud the U.S., bank fraud, and aggravated identity theft. He moved to suppress all evidence derived from the wallet search but did not challenge the officer’s decision to swipe the cards.After reviewing a video recording of the traffic stop and the officer’s testimony, the court denied Tellez’s motion, concluding that Tellez’s gesture of handing over his wallet reflected his nonverbal, voluntary consent. Tellez entered a conditional guilty plea. Tellez objected to the intended loss calculations used to derive his Guidelines offense level. The three cards had been used to spend or withdraw an average of $1,400 per card. The probation office calculated the intended loss by multiplying the number of accounts associated with Tellez—303, including 300 other accounts found on a thumb drive in Tellez’s possession—by $1,400. The court agreed with the government. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress and Tellez’s 70-month sentence. View "United States v. Crespo" on Justia Law

A putative class sued Ford over an alleged design defect in their F-150 pickup trucks, model years 2013-2018, involving brake master cylinders manufactured by Hitachi, citing two alternative theories of how the failure of internal seals would occur. The court declined to certify injunction and damages classes under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) but certified five statewide issue classes under 23(c)(4) for three issues: whether the brake systems were defective; whether Ford possessed pre-sale knowledge of the defect; and whether concealed information about the defect would be material to a reasonable buyer.On interlocutory review, the Sixth Circuit reversed. Rule 23 certification requires that a class action be able to “generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.” Here, it is not clear that the certified issues can each be answered “in one stroke.” The court noted design and manufacturing changes to the units over the years and that the class alleged two distinct theories of design defect. Ford may have believed any problem was fixed when Hitachi altered its cylinder design. It is possible that those changes affected brake performance to a degree that would have made a difference to a consumer. On remand, the district court must evaluate whether each of the four Rule 23(a) factors is actually satisfied, not merely properly alleged. The inquiry might overlap with the merits of the underlying claims but is a crucial part of avoiding the procedural unfairness to which class actions are uniquely susceptible. View "In re Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

S.C., a high school freshman, was unwillingly video-recorded engaging in non-consensual sexual activity with a male student on school property. The video was shared online and other students began to harass S.C. Students then began harassing and threatening S.C. and her family. S.C. and her mother met with Detective, Carrigan, who assumed the video-recording and sexual encounter were consensual and repeatedly rejected S.C.’s statements and information about the threats, suggesting that S.C. had participated in producing child pornography. Following another meeting, Principal Kessler denied being informed that the encounter was not consensual or of any harassment, although a list of students making threats was found in Kessler’s file. Kessler suspended S.C., after which she was expected to return to school. The Assistant Principal also declined to address the threats. S.C. entered an in-patient facility and continued coursework remotely. Because the threats continued, her family moved to a different county. S.C.'s grades dropped substantially, she began abusing drugs and alcohol, and she engaged in self-harm. Before the incident, the district already had “a widespread problem of students circulating sexual pictures and videos of themselves and their peers.” The district was aware of the problem.S.C. alleged deliberate indifference to student-on-student harassment before she was assaulted; deliberate indifference during the investigation; and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims. S.C.’s Title IX “before” claim was dismissed. The court found the district liable for emotional distress and other damages on the Title IX “after” claim, but not liable under section 1983. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded the Title IX and Section 1983 “before” claims and affirmed that the district is liable on S.C.’s Title IX “after” claim. View "S.C. v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County" on Justia Law

Reynolds was convicted of selling a fentanyl-heroin mixture that killed two young men, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). Investigators connected Reynolds to these fatal drugs in part through cellphone records, including records showing the general locations of several phones; text messages, including messages between a detective pretending to be one of the victims and Reynolds; and a controlled buy arranged by that detective.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction and 328-month sentence, rejecting arguments that the government introduced insufficient evidence to convict; that a government expert identified the phones’ general locations using a software program that failed the “Daubert” reliability standards; that the district court violated the Constitution by excluding text messages that allegedly supported his innocence; and that the prosecutor improperly “vouched” for a key government witness during closing arguments. View "United States v. Reynolds" on Justia Law