Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Velasquez was convicted of conspiracy to use interstate commerce to commit murder-for-hire, 18 U.S.C. 1958(a), and conspiracy to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841. The district court increased Velasquez’s offense level by four levels to 37 because “the offense involved the offer or the receipt of anything of pecuniary value for undertaking the murder” U.S.S.G. 2A1.5(b), determined Velasquez to be a career offender, varied downward on criminal history, reached sentencing range of 262–327 months, and ordered Velasquez to serve a 120-month sentence on the murder-for-hire conviction (the statutory maximum) concurrent with a 262-month sentence on the cocaine-distribution conviction. The Sixth Circuit rejected challenges to the convictions and upheld the four-level increase, but agreed that Velasquez should not have been considered a “career offender.”On remand, the district court denied a reduction under U.S.S.G 2X1.1(b)(2), which provides for a three-level decrease “unless the defendant or a co-conspirator completed [or was about to complete] all the acts the conspirators believed necessary on their part for the successful completion of the substantive offense” and sentenced Velasquez to 120 months for Count 1 and 240 months for Count 2, to be served concurrently. The Third Circuit held that denial of the reduction was correct; a crossreference in U.S.S.G. 2X1.1(c) provides that when the “conspiracy is expressly covered by another offense guideline section, apply that guideline section.” The guideline that covers Velasquez’s case is U.S.S.G. 2A1.5, which expressly covers conspiracy to commit murder. View "United States v. Rios-Velasquez" on Justia Law

McElhaney’s daughter, L.M., played high school softball. The school's “Parent–player Information” sheet stated: “Playing time is a non-negotiable for coaches to talk directly with parents about.” L.M.’s playing time decreased. McElhaney texted Coach Williams to express his displeasure. Williams responded, indicating McElhaney should reconsider either his tactics or his participation. McElhaney texted a conciliatory reply but Williams forwarded the messages to Principal Stepp, who banned McElhaney from a week’s worth of softball games. McElhaney unsuccessfully challenged but did not honor the suspension. Stepp spotted McElhaney and asked him to leave. Fearing arrest, McElhaney left. He filed suit (42 U.S.C. 1983), asserting that his communications with Williams constituted First Amendment-protected speech and that the school officials had impermissibly retaliated against him for exercising those speech rights and did not afford him due process before infringing on his property right to his season tickets. The district court held that the right to attend games after criticizing the coach was not clearly established, meaning any purportedly retaliatory acts did not violate McElhaney’s settled constitutional rights and that McElhaney did not experience a due process violation because any alleged injury could be remedied through a breach of contract action.The Sixth Circuit reversed. It is clearly established at a low level of generality that when a school employee interacts with a student, speech by the student’s parent about those interactions enjoys First Amendment protection. On remand, the court must resolve whether retaliation occurred. View "McElhaney v. Williams" on Justia Law

Hill and Combs kidnapped 12-year-old Fife, beat Fife, raped him in multiple ways, strangled him, bit his genitals, sodomized him, and burned him. Fife’s father found him in a field. Fife died days later. Several witnesses testified that Hill was around the crime scene. The state introduced Hill’s confession that he had watched Combs beat and rape Fife. There was physical evidence. One witness testified that Hill had raped her in the same wooded area and another testified that Hill had raped her multiple times. Hill was sentenced to death in 1986. Ohio courts rejected Hill’s appeal and state habeas petition.Hill’s 1996 federal habeas petition challenged the denial of expert assistance on bitemark evidence. While an appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided “Atkins.” On remand, the state court determined that Hill was not intellectually disabled; his death sentence stood. Following a remand by the Supreme Court and various Sixth Circuit decisions, Hill sought a new trial based on “newly discovered evidence,” a report from the American Board of Forensic Odontology that suggested using bitemarks to identify a specific individual might not be reliable. Ohio courts held that there was “no probability” that a new trial would lead to a “different outcome” because the state had proffered so much other evidence of guilt.Hill’s second federal habeas petition argued that the state trial court violated his due process rights by not properly conducting a materiality review of the bitemark evidence. The Sixth Circuit characterized Hill’s petition as “second or successive,” so Hill was required to meet the gatekeeping provisions of 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(2). Under Hill's interpretation, "Hmost convictions involving forensic evidence would never be final." View "In re: Hill" on Justia Law

Thomas-Mathews pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute controlled substances, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and to two counts of possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(i). Thomas-Mathews objected to the PSR’s “weight attribution to cocaine base versus cocaine as an unwarranted disparity” and requested the use of a 1:1 ratio. Thomas-Mathews also alleged he experienced a challenging childhood, including food insecurity and physical and sexual abuse by his uncle. His juvenile convictions include criminal sexual conduct, larceny, and drug possession. His adult convictions include drug offenses, domestic violence, and perjury in connection with a murder investigation. While serving his sentences for these crimes, Thomas-Mathews appeared to have turned his life around when he got out of prison in 2017, becoming involved with his children and “getting a barbershop.” The pandemic hurt Thomas-Mathews’ career as a barber and he “got back into [his] old style of living.”The Sixth Circuit vacated his sentence of 60 months for the drug count, and two 60-month consecutive sentences for each of the gun counts as procedurally unreasonable. The court did not acknowledge the scope of its discretion concerning the crack-to-powder ratio and did not address specifically that failing to use the 1:1 ratio would result in an excessive sentence for Thomas-Mathews. The court’s discussion of section 3553(a)'s factors was limited to Thomas-Mathews’ criminal history without addressing Thomas-Mathews’ personal history and characteristics. View "United States v. Thomas-Mathews" on Justia Law

In 2019-2020, Cedrid, Smith, and Hoskins defrauded 20 different banks and their customers by purchasing identification information that hackers stole from financial institutions, then accessing the victim’s bank online. A conspirator would call the victim, “spoofing” the bank's phone number, and pretend to be concerned about suspicious activity, then tell the victim they would send an identification code to verify the victim’s identity. The co-conspirator would then trigger the “forgot my password” function to send a code to the victim. When the victim provided that code to the conspirator, the conspirator could change the password and gain full access to the victim’s account.to withdraw funds. The three were charged with bank fraud conspiracy and aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1349 and 18 U.S.C. 1028A.The PSRs determined an actual loss of $1,171,673.97 and an Intended loss of $2,158,297.80. The district court overruled Smith’s objection to some of the conduct included in her offense level because she was not directly involved with several of the banks. The court sentenced Smith to 36 months for the conspiracy charge and to a consecutive 24 months for aggravated identity theft. Hoskins was sentenced to 48 months for the conspiracy charge. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court erred by attributing to each defendant the conduct of others involved in the conspiracy, by including intended-loss amounts in Hoskins’s offense level, and in ordering Smith to pay all the restitution in full. View "United States v. Hoskins" on Justia Law

Allstates, a full-service industrial general contractor, employs people throughout the country, subject to the Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Act. Allstates must comply with Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) workplace safety standards. It has been the subject of enforcement actions, including a $10,000 fine for a 2019 catwalk injury. In a facial challenge to the OSH Act, Allstates argued that, because the only textual constraint on setting workplace-safety standards is that they be “reasonably necessary or appropriate,” 29 U.S.C. 652(8), OSHA does not have the constitutional authority to set those standards and employers do not have a duty to comply with OSHA’s standards. Allstates sought a permanent nationwide injunction. The district court granted the government summary judgment, reasoning that the “reasonably necessary or appropriate” standard provided an “intelligible principle” to satisfy the nondelegation doctrine because the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld similar delegations.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding OSHA’s delegation constitutional. The Act provides an overarching framework to guide OSHA’s discretion, and the Act’s standards comfortably fall within limits previously upheld by the Supreme Court. “To require more would be to insist on a degree of exactitude which not only lacks legal necessity but which does not comport with the requirements of the administrative process.” View "Allstates Refractory Contractors, LLC v. Su" on Justia Law

Over 20 years ago, taxpayers sued Kentucky and Sunrise, a religiously affiliated organization, for alleged violations of the Establishment Clause by paying for religious services that Sunrise allegedly imposed on children in state custody. The Sixth Circuit remanded the approval of a 2013 settlement. In 2015, the parties replaced monitoring provisions that mentioned Sunrise with general language about “any Agency.” The Third Circuit held, for the third time, that the plaintiffs had standing to bring their Establishment Clause claim but that the 2015 Amendment required new regulations or modifications to existing regulations for implementation, which meant the Amendment violated Kentucky law. In 2021 Kentucky and the plaintiffs jointly moved to dismiss the case with prejudice. Kentucky agreed to pursue new regulations in good faith; certain provisions of the Agreement would not take effect unless those regulations were adopted. The Settling Parties did “not” seek to have the court retain jurisdiction for enforcement, nor to incorporate the Agreement in the order of dismissal.Noting that the motion was filed by “the parties to the sole remaining claim,” the Establishment Clause claim against Kentucky, the district court dismissed the case. The court refused to address the terms of the 2021 Agreement, which was not properly before it. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. “Sunrise no doubt is frustrated to find itself unable to vindicate the legality of its program” but federal courts do not decide constitutional issues in the abstract. View "Pedreira v. Sunrise Children's Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Doe, a University of Michigan student, was accused of sexual assault in 2018. Before the University’s investigation had concluded, he sued. alleging that the University’s disciplinary procedures for cases involving sexual assault violated his due process rights. The district court granted him a preliminary injunction preventing the disciplinary process from proceeding. The Sixth Circuit remanded for reconsideration in light of “Baum,” in which it held that the University’s disciplinary procedures violated due process and in light of the University’s new disciplinary policy implemented in response to that decision.The district court granted in part and denied in part the University’s motion to dismiss and granted in part Doe’s motion for partial summary judgment. The University appealed again, renewing its jurisdictional arguments. Before the appeal was heard, the complainant decided she no longer wished to participate. The Sixth Circuit determined that the appeal had become moot and vacated the summary judgment order. Doe then sought attorney fees, which the district court granted.The University appealed again. The Sixth Circuit vacated, noting that issues of ripeness, standing, and mootness have gone unaddressed through more than five years of litigation. Doe had standing to sue to seek the release of his transcript but that the district court lacked jurisdiction over his remaining claims. Doe was the prevailing party only as to his due process claim seeking the release of his transcript. View "Doe v. University of Michigan" on Justia Law

In 2006, Soto’s wife reported the death of their two-year-old son. Soto admitted that the child’s death was his fault but described it as an accident: he said he had been driving an ATV around his property and had run over the toddler by mistake. Soto agreed to plead guilty to child endangerment in exchange for the dismissal of a manslaughter charge. Soto served his five-year sentence and left prison in 2011. In 2016, Soto went to the Putnam County Sheriff’s Office and confessed that he had actually beaten his son to death and had staged the ATV accident to cover up his crime. Soto was charged with aggravated murder, murder, felonious assault, kidnapping, and tampering with evidence.Soto claimed double jeopardy in a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Jeopardy attaches to an “offence” under the Double Jeopardy Clause, only when a court or jury has the power to determine the defendant’s guilt or innocence as to that “offence.” During Soto’s 2006 plea hearing, jeopardy attached to the child-endangerment charge once the court accepted Soto’s guilty plea for that charge; the court lacked power to determine Soto’s guilt or innocence of the manslaughter charge. Jeopardy never attached to that charge. View "Soto v. Siefker" on Justia Law

Pembrook, Johnson, and two others robbed two stores at gunpoint. Each was convicted of Hobbs Act robbery and conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), possession of a firearm by a felon, 922(g), and two counts of brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 924(c). The 924(c) counts carried a combined 32-year additional mandatory-minimum sentence: seven years for the first count and an additional 25 years for the second.The court granted a downward variance and sentenced each defendant to 33 years: one year each for the first three counts, to run concurrently, plus the mandatory 32 years. The Supreme Court remanded in light of “Davis” (2019), which found 924(c)(3)(B) unconstitutionally vague. The parties stipulated that new PSRs would exclude the 25-year additional sentence for the second 924(c) count, and revise the defendants’ personal information, including their conduct during incarceration. The court added a five-level enhancement for brandishing a firearm, which applied only after the second 924(c) charge was excluded, U.S.S.G. 2B3.1(b)(2)(C), and a two-level enhancement for physical restraint of the victims, 2B3.1(b)(4)(b), then resentenced Pembrook to 156 months in prison and Johnson to 168 months.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. This case involved a general remand for a de novo resentencing; the parties were entitled to raise new issues at resentencing, even issues previously waived or forfeited. The district court properly determined that the facts of the robbery satisfy that enhancement. View "United States v. Pembrook" on Justia Law