Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

During a routine traffic stop of Moore and Saunders, the Ohio State Highway Patrol seized four vacuum-sealed packages, containing 431 grams of heroin. The couriers stated they had planned to deliver their load to Minter in West Virginia. The FBI Drug Task Force learned Minter had paid them in either cash or drugs, or both, to deliver money to Wright in Detroit and return with drugs for distribution by Minter. They had made similar journeys between Wright and Minter in the past. Moore explained that Wright was “in charge.” The FBI executed a search warrant for Minter’s residence and recovered traces of heroin, scales, and $18,000 in cash. A day later, the FBI executed a second warrant, based on information from a confidential informant, to search under the shared porch at Minter’s apartment building,.Officers recovered a charcoal bag containing 529 grams of heroin and 37 grams of crack cocaine. Underneath the steps, about eight feet away, officers recovered a stolen .357 Magnum.Minter pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute heroin; after remands, the district court applied a two-level enhancement for his role as a manager or supervisor and a two-level firearm-possession enhancement. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding the enhancements proper. View "United States v. Minter" on Justia Law

Three individuals filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Wayne County has a policy or practice of seizing vehicles and their contents without probable cause, simply because of the vehicle’s location in an area generally associated with crime. Wayne County impounds the vehicles and their contents until the owner pays a redemption fee: $900 for the first seizure, $1,800 for the second, and $2,700 for the third, plus towing and storage fees. The owner's only alternatives are to abandon the vehicle or to wait for prosecutors to decide whether to initiate civil forfeiture proceedings. Before a forfeiture action is brought, there are multiple pretrial conferences involving the owner and prosecutors, without a judge; prosecutors attempt to persuade the owner to pay the fee by pointing out that storage fees accrue daily. Missing just one conference results in automatic forfeiture. It takes at least four months, beyond any previous delays to arrive before a neutral decisionmaker. The seizure proceedings are conducted under Michigan’s Nuisance Abatement statute, the Controlled Substances Act, and the Omnibus Forfeiture Act, which do not protect plaintiffs from the pre-hearing deprivation of their properties.The Sixth Circuit held that Wayne County violated the Constitution when it seized plaintiffs’ personal vehicles—which were vital to their transportation and livelihoods— with no timely process to contest the seizure. Wayne County was required to provide an interim hearing within two weeks to test the probable validity of the deprivation. View "Ingram v. Wayne County, Michigan" on Justia Law

A 911 call, reported that “the people that live behind me” were “yelling and what sounds like him hitting something.” Officers Curtis and Gray responded to the address, wearing activated body cameras. Not seeing or hearing anything amiss outside, they knocked. Reed answered the door. Gray asked, “Do you mind stepping out here and talking to me for a second?” Reed asked, “you got a warrant?” Gray replied, “nope,” explaining that “somebody called and said that somebody was fighting.” Reed said, “Wasn’t here.” After additional discussion, Gray stated they needed to talk to other adults in the house; “if not, then we can come in … exigent circumstances.” Reed closed his door. The officers kicked the door down. Curtis stepped inside, drew his firearm, pointed it at Reed’s head. then put the gun away, and pulled Reed outside. Gray pushed Reed against the car and patted him down. Other officers arrived and spoke with Reed’s family. Satisfied that everyone in Reed’s house was safe, the officers documented the damage to Reed’s door and left.The district court dismissed 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against Campbell County and against the officers in their official capacities; dismissed a Terry claim as “duplicative” of a false arrest claim; dismissed claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress; and declined to award the officers qualified immunity on the individual capacity unlawful-entry, excessive-force, and false-arrest claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A reasonable jury could find that the officers violated clearly established constitutional rights. View "Reed v. Campbell County, Kentucky" on Justia Law

Jones, who was on supervised release, was arrested after he fired shots outside his house and fled inside. He pled guilty to possessing a stolen firearm. The district court imposed the agreed-upon 10-year sentence, which was above the 77-96 month Guidelines range but below the 15-year mandatory minimum that would have applied if he had been classified as an armed career criminal. The court rejected arguments that he should not receive a sentence enhancement for reckless endangerment during flight and challenging the use of his prior controlled substance offense under Michigan state law to increase his base offense level–claiming Michigan’s controlled-substance statute is broader than the federal definition of the relevant substances. Separately, Jones faced resentencing on his supervised release; the firearm offense violated his supervised release conditions. A different district court imposed a 24-month sentence—half to run concurrently with his firearm conviction and half to run consecutively.The Third Circuit affirmed. The district courts properly calculated Jones’s Guidelines range for the firearm offense and imposed a reasonable sentence for the supervised-release violation. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

From 2009-2015, Hofstetter managed pain clinics in Florida and Tennessee. Hofstetter also co-owned and managed an additional clinic in Tennessee. Clemons, Newman, and Womack were employed as nurse practitioners at these clinics. All four defendants were convicted of maintaining drug-involved premises. Hofstetter was also convicted of conspiring to distribute controlled substances, distributing controlled substances, and money laundering. Hofstetter was sentenced to 400 months in prison, Clemons to 42 months, Newman to 40 months, and Womack to 30 months. After the Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions, the Supreme Court decided “Ruan” (2022), clarifying the applicable mens rea for an unlawful distribution charge, and remanded.The Sixth Circuit again affirmed. Under Ruan, it is insufficient for the government to prove that a prescription was “in fact” not authorized; the government must prove the defendant subjectively knew or intended that the prescription was unauthorized. The district court’s instructions were not plainly erroneous regarding the drug-involved-premises and conspiracy-to-distribute-and-dispense charges. Taken as a whole, the jury instructions made clear that the jury had to find that the defendants knowingly opened the clinics for the purpose of illegally distributing Schedule II controlled substances. View "United States v. Hofstetter" on Justia Law

Velasquez was convicted of conspiracy to use interstate commerce to commit murder-for-hire, 18 U.S.C. 1958(a), and conspiracy to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841. The district court increased Velasquez’s offense level by four levels to 37 because “the offense involved the offer or the receipt of anything of pecuniary value for undertaking the murder” U.S.S.G. 2A1.5(b), determined Velasquez to be a career offender, varied downward on criminal history, reached sentencing range of 262–327 months, and ordered Velasquez to serve a 120-month sentence on the murder-for-hire conviction (the statutory maximum) concurrent with a 262-month sentence on the cocaine-distribution conviction. The Sixth Circuit rejected challenges to the convictions and upheld the four-level increase, but agreed that Velasquez should not have been considered a “career offender.”On remand, the district court denied a reduction under U.S.S.G 2X1.1(b)(2), which provides for a three-level decrease “unless the defendant or a co-conspirator completed [or was about to complete] all the acts the conspirators believed necessary on their part for the successful completion of the substantive offense” and sentenced Velasquez to 120 months for Count 1 and 240 months for Count 2, to be served concurrently. The Third Circuit held that denial of the reduction was correct; a crossreference in U.S.S.G. 2X1.1(c) provides that when the “conspiracy is expressly covered by another offense guideline section, apply that guideline section.” The guideline that covers Velasquez’s case is U.S.S.G. 2A1.5, which expressly covers conspiracy to commit murder. View "United States v. Rios-Velasquez" on Justia Law

McElhaney’s daughter, L.M., played high school softball. The school's “Parent–player Information” sheet stated: “Playing time is a non-negotiable for coaches to talk directly with parents about.” L.M.’s playing time decreased. McElhaney texted Coach Williams to express his displeasure. Williams responded, indicating McElhaney should reconsider either his tactics or his participation. McElhaney texted a conciliatory reply but Williams forwarded the messages to Principal Stepp, who banned McElhaney from a week’s worth of softball games. McElhaney unsuccessfully challenged but did not honor the suspension. Stepp spotted McElhaney and asked him to leave. Fearing arrest, McElhaney left. He filed suit (42 U.S.C. 1983), asserting that his communications with Williams constituted First Amendment-protected speech and that the school officials had impermissibly retaliated against him for exercising those speech rights and did not afford him due process before infringing on his property right to his season tickets. The district court held that the right to attend games after criticizing the coach was not clearly established, meaning any purportedly retaliatory acts did not violate McElhaney’s settled constitutional rights and that McElhaney did not experience a due process violation because any alleged injury could be remedied through a breach of contract action.The Sixth Circuit reversed. It is clearly established at a low level of generality that when a school employee interacts with a student, speech by the student’s parent about those interactions enjoys First Amendment protection. On remand, the court must resolve whether retaliation occurred. View "McElhaney v. Williams" on Justia Law

Hill and Combs kidnapped 12-year-old Fife, beat Fife, raped him in multiple ways, strangled him, bit his genitals, sodomized him, and burned him. Fife’s father found him in a field. Fife died days later. Several witnesses testified that Hill was around the crime scene. The state introduced Hill’s confession that he had watched Combs beat and rape Fife. There was physical evidence. One witness testified that Hill had raped her in the same wooded area and another testified that Hill had raped her multiple times. Hill was sentenced to death in 1986. Ohio courts rejected Hill’s appeal and state habeas petition.Hill’s 1996 federal habeas petition challenged the denial of expert assistance on bitemark evidence. While an appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided “Atkins.” On remand, the state court determined that Hill was not intellectually disabled; his death sentence stood. Following a remand by the Supreme Court and various Sixth Circuit decisions, Hill sought a new trial based on “newly discovered evidence,” a report from the American Board of Forensic Odontology that suggested using bitemarks to identify a specific individual might not be reliable. Ohio courts held that there was “no probability” that a new trial would lead to a “different outcome” because the state had proffered so much other evidence of guilt.Hill’s second federal habeas petition argued that the state trial court violated his due process rights by not properly conducting a materiality review of the bitemark evidence. The Sixth Circuit characterized Hill’s petition as “second or successive,” so Hill was required to meet the gatekeeping provisions of 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(2). Under Hill's interpretation, "Hmost convictions involving forensic evidence would never be final." View "In re: Hill" on Justia Law

Thomas-Mathews pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute controlled substances, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and to two counts of possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(i). Thomas-Mathews objected to the PSR’s “weight attribution to cocaine base versus cocaine as an unwarranted disparity” and requested the use of a 1:1 ratio. Thomas-Mathews also alleged he experienced a challenging childhood, including food insecurity and physical and sexual abuse by his uncle. His juvenile convictions include criminal sexual conduct, larceny, and drug possession. His adult convictions include drug offenses, domestic violence, and perjury in connection with a murder investigation. While serving his sentences for these crimes, Thomas-Mathews appeared to have turned his life around when he got out of prison in 2017, becoming involved with his children and “getting a barbershop.” The pandemic hurt Thomas-Mathews’ career as a barber and he “got back into [his] old style of living.”The Sixth Circuit vacated his sentence of 60 months for the drug count, and two 60-month consecutive sentences for each of the gun counts as procedurally unreasonable. The court did not acknowledge the scope of its discretion concerning the crack-to-powder ratio and did not address specifically that failing to use the 1:1 ratio would result in an excessive sentence for Thomas-Mathews. The court’s discussion of section 3553(a)'s factors was limited to Thomas-Mathews’ criminal history without addressing Thomas-Mathews’ personal history and characteristics. View "United States v. Thomas-Mathews" on Justia Law

In 2019-2020, Cedrid, Smith, and Hoskins defrauded 20 different banks and their customers by purchasing identification information that hackers stole from financial institutions, then accessing the victim’s bank online. A conspirator would call the victim, “spoofing” the bank's phone number, and pretend to be concerned about suspicious activity, then tell the victim they would send an identification code to verify the victim’s identity. The co-conspirator would then trigger the “forgot my password” function to send a code to the victim. When the victim provided that code to the conspirator, the conspirator could change the password and gain full access to the victim’s account.to withdraw funds. The three were charged with bank fraud conspiracy and aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1349 and 18 U.S.C. 1028A.The PSRs determined an actual loss of $1,171,673.97 and an Intended loss of $2,158,297.80. The district court overruled Smith’s objection to some of the conduct included in her offense level because she was not directly involved with several of the banks. The court sentenced Smith to 36 months for the conspiracy charge and to a consecutive 24 months for aggravated identity theft. Hoskins was sentenced to 48 months for the conspiracy charge. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court erred by attributing to each defendant the conduct of others involved in the conspiracy, by including intended-loss amounts in Hoskins’s offense level, and in ordering Smith to pay all the restitution in full. View "United States v. Hoskins" on Justia Law