Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2016, Salansky, the Great Smoky Mountains National Park’s Fire Management Officer, discovered a slow-moving fire covering less than an acre. Due to the upcoming Thanksgiving holiday, most of the Park’s staff were away. Eight days later (November 24), Salansky observed that building a fire line would be impossible. Salansky opted to let the fire burn, using the natural terrain for containment. On November 27, Salansky requested additional firefighting resources. A National Guard helicopter dropped water onto the fire. By evening, the fire had spread to 35-40 acres within Park boundaries. Salansky did not monitor the fire overnight. At 4:05 a.m., the National Weather Service issued a high-wind warning. By 7:30 a.m., Salansky estimated that the fire had grown to 250-500 acres. Burning embers created smaller fires a mile away. People in Gatlinburg observed heavy smoke and ash. A 10:58 a.m. call was the first communication between Park staff and any local official about the fire. Around 5:45 p.m., the Gatlinburg Fire Department received reports of fires within the city. Winds gusted to 87 mph and the fire grew to 5,000 acres. Total evacuation of the Gatlinburg area was ordered. Evacuation efforts were hampered by infrastructure damage. Ultimately, 14 people died, 191 were injured, 2,500 structures were damaged or destroyed, and more than 17,000 acres burned.The Sixth Circuit vacated the dismissal of “failure to warn” suits under the Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA). Before filing suit under the FTCA, a claimant must “present” that claim to the agency, 28 U.S.C. 2675(a); the plaintiffs’ forms sufficiently enabled the Department of the Interior to investigate. On remand, to determine whether the claims are barred by the FTCA's discretionary-function exception, the district court should address whether certain publications constitute mandatory directives. View "Abbott v. United States" on Justia Law

Motorcycle gang members Nicholson and Sorrell were charged with conspiracy and aiding and abetting assault under the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering (VICAR) statute. The district court instructed the jury that either of those two offenses could serve as a predicate offense for another count involving the use or carrying of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The jury convicted both men on those three counts and the convictions were affirmed. The jury did not explicitly answer which predicate offense met 924(c)’s crime-of-violence requirementThe Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of their 28 U.S.C. 2255, motions to vacate their section 924(c) convictions. The 924(c) convictions rested on a valid predicate offense. While a VICAR conspiracy is not a crime of violence, a VICAR aiding-and-abetting assault with a dangerous weapon is because an element of the offense requires a finding of the use or threatened use of physical force. The jury was improperly instructed that it could base convictions for the 924(c) count solely on a conviction for VICAR] conspiracy but the error was harmless. View "Sorrell v. United States" on Justia Law

While serving a short sentence for domestic violence, Johnson caused a disturbance in a jail’s intake area. Officers were taking Johnson to his cell when he disobeyed orders to slow down. Another officer, Deputy Sootsman, stopped him. After a brief exchange, Johnson stepped in Sootsman’s general direction. Sootsman testified that he viewed this conduct as a threat. In response, he immediately grabbed Johnson’s neck, pushed him against the wall, and took him to the ground to be handcuffed. This force lasted about seven seconds. Investigators found that Sootsman’s actions violated jail policies. Sootsman pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor battery.Johnson sued Sootsman, citing the Eighth Amendment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of the claim. Johnson failed to meet the demanding standard of proving that Sootsman used force “maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of” inflicting pain. Johnson’s claim fails if Sootsman used force out of a belief—even an unreasonable belief—that the force was necessary to control Johnson. The states may impose stricter limits on officers than the Constitution demands, so Johnson may try to seek relief under state tort law. View "Johnson v. Sootsman" on Justia Law

Based on a 1983 murder, a three-judge panel convicted Von Clark Davis of aggravated murder and sentenced him to death. On direct appeal, Davis’s sentence was vacated, but on remand, the same three-judge panel again sentenced him to death. The Sixth Circuit subsequently vacated Davis’s death sentence on appeal of his first federal habeas petition. A different three-judge panel again sentenced Davis to death. Davis again petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court denied the petition.The Sixth Circuit reversed in part and granted conditional relief on claims that the state violated Davis’s constitutional rights by enforcing his 1984 jury waiver against him at his third sentencing hearing in 2009 and that Davis’s trial counsel provided ineffective assistance at Davis’s 2009 sentencing hearing by failing to move to recuse a judge for bias and in failing to reasonably prepare and present mitigation evidence. The court rejected claims that Davis’s trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing adequately to advise him of the collateral consequences of a jury waiver and that Davis’s trial attorneys were constitutionally ineffective in failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence about the circumstances of Davis’s prior conviction, which provided the aggravating circumstance that made him eligible for the death penalty View "Davis v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

On January 18, 2019, then-16-year-old Sandmann and his classmates, attending the March for Life, had an interaction with a Native American man, Phillips, by the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, D.C. The boys were wearing “MAGA” hats and were impeding Phillips, who was attempting to exit the situation, which was becoming confrontational. A chaperone dispersed the students. Video of the incident went viral, and national news organizations, including the five defendants, published stories about the day’s events and the ensuing public reaction.Sandmann sued, alleging that the reporting, which included statements from Phillips about the encounter, was defamatory. The district court granted the news organizations’ joint motion for summary judgment, finding that the challenged statements were opinion, not fact, and therefore nonactionable. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The articles at issue did not “embrace” Phillips’s version of events; they describe a contentious encounter, the meaning of which was hotly disputed by participants and witnesses. The online articles embedded a video of the incident. Whether Sandmann “blocked” Phillips, did not “allow” him to retreat, or “decided” that he would not move aside and “positioned himself” so that he “stopped” Phillips are all dependent on perspective and are not “susceptible” of being proven true or false under the circumstances. View "Sandmann v. New York Times Co." on Justia Law

In 1994, Keith and his uncle were charged with cocaine trafficking based on information provided by Chatman, a confidential informant. Weeks later, someone shot six of Chatman’s relatives, killing three of them. A survivor identified Keith as his attacker. An Ohio jury convicted Keith of triple homicide and sentenced him to death.Keith has filed four federal habeas petitions; three have claimed “Brady” violations. This petition was filed after Keith received the personnel file for Yezzo, a forensic expert who testified at Keith’s trial that she could confirm that the perpetrator’s car had left a partial license plate imprint of the numbers “043” in the snow, matching the license plate on an Oldsmobile driven by Keith’s girlfriend (Davison) and that the tire tracks matched the tires Davison’s grandfather had purchased for the Oldsmobile—though they did not match the tires actually installed on it when the car was found. Yezzo’s file showed that Yezzo’s supervisors, colleagues, and union representatives had expressed concerns about the reliability of her work, even stating that Yezzo would “stretch the truth.” Keith submitted a new forensic analysis that concluded that the snow impressions were not consistent with the Oldsmobile. Ohio state courts again denied relief.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Keith cannot show that no reasonable juror today would convict him in light of the “evidence as a whole.” The full record contains significant additional evidence of Keith’s guilt. View "Keith v. Hill" on Justia Law

In 1997-2009, Chappelle managed Terra and withheld federal income, Social Security, and Medicare taxes (trust fund taxes) from Terra’s employees’ wages, 26 U.S.C. 3102, 3402, 7501, but failed to remit them to the IRS in 2007-2009. The IRS imposed “trust fund recovery penalties” on Chappelle. To avoid paying, Chappelle misstated his income and assets. He used business funds to pay personal expenses. He purchased real estate in others’ names rather than his own. Chappelle repeated this cycle in 2009-2016 after he closed Terra and sequentially opened three more companies. Chappelle repeatedly moved assets.In a 2016 IRS interview, Chappelle made false statements about his real estate purchases. Chappelle subsequently falsely claimed that the latest company did not have any employees and was entitled to a tax refund. Chappelle pleaded guilty to willfully attempting to evade the payment of the Trust Fund Recovery Penalties in 2008-2009. Chappelle’s PSR calculated a total tax loss of $1,636,228.28 and recommended increasing Chappelle’s offense level by two levels for his use of sophisticated means, U.S.S.G. 2T1.1(b). The district court overruled Chappelle’s objections, calculated his guideline range as 37-46 months, considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, and sentenced Chappelle to 38 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court miscalculated the tax loss and erroneously found that his offense involved sophisticated means. View "United States v. Chappelle" on Justia Law

Churches, private religious schools, affiliated pastors, and the parents of students (on behalf of themselves and their minor children) sued Kentucky Governor Beshear in his individual capacity for alleged violations of their free-exercise rights, their rights to private-school education, and their rights to assemble peacefully and associate freely, based on Beshear’s Executive Order 2020-969, which temporarily barred in-person learning at all private and public elementary and secondary schools in Kentucky in response to a surge in COVID-19 transmission in the winter of 2020.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit on the basis of qualified immunity. Previous orders in cases involving challenges to pandemic-related executive orders did not make “sufficiently clear t[o] a reasonable official” that temporarily mandating remote learning for all elementary and secondary schools— religious and secular alike—ran afoul of the Free Exercise Clause. An “active and vibrant debate on the constitutional question existed at the time.” EO 2020-969 deprived the parent plaintiffs of neither a choice to send their children to private school over public school nor input in their children’s curriculum. The Governor did not violate the plaintiffs’ rights to assemble peacefully or associate freely. View "Pleasant View Baptist Church v. Beshear" on Justia Law

Jaffal was convicted of two counts of possessing controlled substances with the intent to distribute the drugs, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). Count 1 involved 35.69 grams of a mixture containing heroin and carfentanil that was found in Jaffal’s pocket when police responded to a 911 call and found him unresponsive. Count 2 involved 27 pills containing fentanyl and 4-ANPP (a schedule II controlled substance) that were found in Jaffal’s pocket following a traffic stop weeks later. Jaffal was also convicted of using or carrying a firearm in relation to a drug-trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c), and as a felon in possession of a firearm, section 922(g)(1).The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and remanded. The district court did not err in admitting recordings of his phone calls from jail to show Jaffal’s intent. Statements by the other speaker that referenced hiding evidence, financial struggles, and what the police found on Jaffal when he overdosed were properly admitted to provide context to Jaffal’s own statements. A detective did not improperly provide expert testimony about Jaffal’s state of mind; the detective never mentioned Jaffal’s intent but noted only that the evidence was consistent with distribution. However, because the element of intent is sufficiently in dispute, the district court abused its discretion in denying Jaffal’s request for a jury instruction on the lesser-included-offense instruction of simple drug possession. View "United States v. Jaffal" on Justia Law

Wilkes pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 921(a), 924(a). His prior convictions included four Michigan convictions for the delivery/manufacture of cocaine from 1995, 2006, and 2007. The district court accepted Wilkes’s plea and applied the 15-year mandatory minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e).Wilkes challenged the ACCA sentence, arguing that Michigan’s law includes ioflupane and federal law does not and that Michigan includes all the stereoisomers of cocaine, while federal law does not, so his prior convictions are not serious drug offenses. Wilkes also argued that the district court improperly overruled his objection to the inclusion of proffer-protected information in the PSR.The Sixth Circuit affirmed a finding that federal law covers the same isomers of cocaine as Michigan law and the rejection of Wilkes’s objection to the inclusion of proffer-protected information as harmless error. The court retained jurisdiction over Wilkes’s challenge to his ACCA enhancement based on ioflupane, noting the Supreme Court’s 2023 grant of certiorari in “Jackson.” on the issue of “[w]hether the classification of a prior state conviction as a ‘serious drug offense’ under the [ACCA] depends on the federal controlled-substance schedules in effect at the time of the defendant’s prior state crime, the time of the federal offense for which he is being sentenced, or the time of his federal sentencing.” View "United States v. Wilkes" on Justia Law