Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Churches, private religious schools, affiliated pastors, and the parents of students (on behalf of themselves and their minor children) sued Kentucky Governor Beshear in his individual capacity for alleged violations of their free-exercise rights, their rights to private-school education, and their rights to assemble peacefully and associate freely, based on Beshear’s Executive Order 2020-969, which temporarily barred in-person learning at all private and public elementary and secondary schools in Kentucky in response to a surge in COVID-19 transmission in the winter of 2020.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit on the basis of qualified immunity. Previous orders in cases involving challenges to pandemic-related executive orders did not make “sufficiently clear t[o] a reasonable official” that temporarily mandating remote learning for all elementary and secondary schools— religious and secular alike—ran afoul of the Free Exercise Clause. An “active and vibrant debate on the constitutional question existed at the time.” EO 2020-969 deprived the parent plaintiffs of neither a choice to send their children to private school over public school nor input in their children’s curriculum. The Governor did not violate the plaintiffs’ rights to assemble peacefully or associate freely. View "Pleasant View Baptist Church v. Beshear" on Justia Law

Jaffal was convicted of two counts of possessing controlled substances with the intent to distribute the drugs, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). Count 1 involved 35.69 grams of a mixture containing heroin and carfentanil that was found in Jaffal’s pocket when police responded to a 911 call and found him unresponsive. Count 2 involved 27 pills containing fentanyl and 4-ANPP (a schedule II controlled substance) that were found in Jaffal’s pocket following a traffic stop weeks later. Jaffal was also convicted of using or carrying a firearm in relation to a drug-trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c), and as a felon in possession of a firearm, section 922(g)(1).The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and remanded. The district court did not err in admitting recordings of his phone calls from jail to show Jaffal’s intent. Statements by the other speaker that referenced hiding evidence, financial struggles, and what the police found on Jaffal when he overdosed were properly admitted to provide context to Jaffal’s own statements. A detective did not improperly provide expert testimony about Jaffal’s state of mind; the detective never mentioned Jaffal’s intent but noted only that the evidence was consistent with distribution. However, because the element of intent is sufficiently in dispute, the district court abused its discretion in denying Jaffal’s request for a jury instruction on the lesser-included-offense instruction of simple drug possession. View "United States v. Jaffal" on Justia Law

Wilkes pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 921(a), 924(a). His prior convictions included four Michigan convictions for the delivery/manufacture of cocaine from 1995, 2006, and 2007. The district court accepted Wilkes’s plea and applied the 15-year mandatory minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e).Wilkes challenged the ACCA sentence, arguing that Michigan’s law includes ioflupane and federal law does not and that Michigan includes all the stereoisomers of cocaine, while federal law does not, so his prior convictions are not serious drug offenses. Wilkes also argued that the district court improperly overruled his objection to the inclusion of proffer-protected information in the PSR.The Sixth Circuit affirmed a finding that federal law covers the same isomers of cocaine as Michigan law and the rejection of Wilkes’s objection to the inclusion of proffer-protected information as harmless error. The court retained jurisdiction over Wilkes’s challenge to his ACCA enhancement based on ioflupane, noting the Supreme Court’s 2023 grant of certiorari in “Jackson.” on the issue of “[w]hether the classification of a prior state conviction as a ‘serious drug offense’ under the [ACCA] depends on the federal controlled-substance schedules in effect at the time of the defendant’s prior state crime, the time of the federal offense for which he is being sentenced, or the time of his federal sentencing.” View "United States v. Wilkes" on Justia Law

International sought permission to erect two two-sided billboards in the City of Troy. These billboards were to be 14 by 48 feet in area and 70 feet in height when mounted; they did not conform to height, size, and setback requirements in the Ordinance. After the City denied its permit application and request for a variance, International sued, citing the First Amendment and arguing that the Ordinance’s variance procedure imposed an invalid prior restraint and that its permit exceptions were content-based restrictions on free speech. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment to the City on International’s prior-restraint claim but remanded for the court to consider whether the Ordinance, with the permit exceptions, survived strict scrutiny.The district court held that the permitting requirements, with the content-based exceptions. did not survive strict scrutiny but that the permit exceptions are severable, leaving intact the Ordinance’s height, size, and setback requirements. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. International’s proposed billboards do not satisfy those valid, content-neutral standards, View "International Outdoor, Inc. v. City of Troy" on Justia Law

Burroughs went to the Niles Municipal Court to pay a traffic fine. The electronic docketing system alerted court officials that there was an active warrant for Burroughs’s arrest, relating to a recent domestic violence incident. Zickefoose, a probation officer, followed Burroughs outside, commanded him to stop, and told him to put his hands behind his back. When Zickefoose tried to grab Burroughs’s forearm, he pulled away and ran toward the parking lot. Zickefoose, injured as Burroughs drove away, reported the incident to the police. Four officers responded separately to Burroughs’s apartment complex, where they boxed in Burroughs’s car and yelled for Burroughs to “[s]hut the car off” and “[g]et out of the vehicle.” Officer Mannella fired three rounds into the windshield, which hit Burroughs in the chest, killing him. Officer Reppy fired an additional five shots that penetrated the car but did not hit Burroughs.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court determined that a reasonable jury could find that when Mannella opened fire, Burroughs was moving slowly or was stationary; Burroughs was complying with Mannella’s commands and was standing to the side of the car, not in the vehicle’s path. The court noted testimony and unrebutted forensic analysis. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity to Mannella. View "Raimey v. City of Niles, Ohio" on Justia Law

In 2011, Whitson participated in two Hobbs Act robberies. Both had victims who were threatened and physically injured; one was shot. Whitson was convicted of eight crimes at trial and sentenced to 1,252 months of incarceration. After several appeals, through which four of his convictions were vacated, he was resentenced in 2022 to 360 months of incarceration. Whitson argued that his sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable because the district court speculated that Whitson’s difficult upbringing made him more likely to re-offend, in spite of evidence to the contrary; failed to make an “individualized assessment” of Whitson’s background; impermissibly required Whitson to admit his guilt in order to consider fully evidence of his rehabilitation while incarcerated; and did not properly weigh the evidence of his rehabilitation.The Sixth Circuit vacated. The district court committed plain error by requiring Whitson to admit his guilt in order to consider fully the evidence of his rehabilitation. “There is a fine line between consideration of a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility as relevant to [section] 3553 and penalizing a defendant for maintaining their right to avoid self-incrimination, and in this case, the district court fell on the wrong side of that line.” View "United States v. Whitson" on Justia Law

Campbell approached construction workers, performing road repairs, and asked who had voted for Trump in the recent presidential election. Following their responses, Campbell brandished a firearm and stated that he “had a bullet for each one.” Campbell then drove away, parking his truck near the construction site. When officers found the vehicle, Campbell was sitting inside with a semi-automatic pistol in his lap.Campbell pled guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), which typically carried a maximum penalty of ten years’ imprisonment. The Armed Career Criminal Act, however, mandates a 15-year minimum sentence for a defendant with “three previous convictions” for “a violent felony or a serious drug offense,” each committed on “occasions different from another” 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). Campbell had Tennessee convictions for a 1985 robbery, a 1987 aggravated assault, a 1992 drug trafficking offense, plus Virginia drug trafficking offenses from 1992 and 1993. Campbell argued that the drug offenses were not committed on different “occasions,” and that the different-occasion issue must be decided by a jury. Campbell also challenged a standard supervised release condition: if Campbell’s probation officer determined Campbell posed a “risk” to another, the officer could require Campbell to notify the person about the risk. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his 180-month sentence, finding that the robbery and drug offenses qualify as ACCA predicates. Campbell admitted that he committed those predicates on four different dates, separated by months or years. View "United States v. Campbell" on Justia Law

Following news coverage of a unionization effort at one of its stores in Memphis, Starbucks fired seven people who worked there. The Union filed an action with the National Labor Relations Board under section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 157. Meanwhile, McKinney, a regional NLRB director, sought temporary injunctive relief pending the completion of the Board’s proceedings.The district court found reasonable cause to believe that Starbucks had violated the Act and that, because of the chilling impact of the terminations on Union support, some of the requested interim relief, including temporary reinstatement of the Memphis Seven, was just and proper. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that Starbucks did not challenge the holding that there is reasonable cause to believe that Starbucks violated the Act in terminating the Memphis Seven. The district court did not err in concluding that the termination of 80% of the organization committee during a unionization campaign could lead to injury to the union movement that subsequent Board intervention would not be able to remedy. View "McKinney v. Starbucks Corp." on Justia Law

In 2012, Kares was convicted of raping a 16-year-old girl. The judge found five “Offense Variables” that increased Kares’ sentencing range. While Kares’ case was on appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court held (Alleyne) that the Constitution requires any fact that increases the mandatory minimum penalty for a crime to be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Kares’ counsel failed to raise an Alleyne claim on appeal. The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed Kares’ conviction and sentence. Kares then began collateral review proceedings in Michigan state court. Seeking leave to appeal the denial of his motion for relief from judgment, Kares first cited Alleyne. Michigan courts rejected his arguments. In 2018, Kares unsuccessfully sought additional DNA testing under MCL 770.16.Kares filed a 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition in December 2018. The Michigan Supreme Court denied Kares’ application for leave to appeal the denial of his motion for biological testing in April 2019. The district court permitted Kares to amend his petition to include claims related to that request; he filed his amended petition in May 2019.The Sixth Circuit reversed an order denying as untimely Kares’s motion to vacate his sentence. Kares’ petition for DNA testing under MCL 770.16 tolls the limitations period; it was properly filed and calls for “postconviction or other collateral review” under 2244(d)(2). The court denied Kares’ motion to expand the certificate of appealability to include his merits “Alleyne” claim, which was procedurally defaulted. View "Kares v. Morrison" on Justia Law

Defendant One operated as a money broker for drug organizations that wanted to move money from the U.S. to Mexico. DEA agents infiltrated the operation. An undercover “coordinating agent” received from Defendant One a list of cities in which drug proceeds needed to be obtained and then coordinated with the DEA for a “receiving agent” to receive illicit funds. The coordinating agent provided a receiving agent’s phone number to Defendant One who shared it with his client. The money drop would be set up and executed, with the receiving agent obtaining illicit funds from a courier and depositing the funds in an undercover DEA bank account. The money was then transferred to Defendant One as cryptocurrency, then sent back to the client as cash.Guerrero was involved as a courier in three separate money drops in Chicago in 2020. Defendant One, Guerrero, and several other couriers were charged with conspiracy to launder money. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Guerrero’s convictions and sentence. Any errors involving venue or evidentiary rulings were not prejudicial. The court also rejected a claim of “variance,” that the evidence failed to demonstrate an overarching conspiracy between Guerrero and each individual named in the indictment, but rather demonstrated only a smaller conspiracy between himself and Defendant One. View "United States v. Rudy Guerrero" on Justia Law