Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2015, McBride was charged with first-degree murder, assault with intent to commit murder, carrying a concealed weapon, and carrying a firearm during the commission of a felony. After two trials, a jury convicted McBride on all charges. The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected his argument that the court erred in failing to admit his full police interview, that the evidence could not support his convictions, and that his counsel was ineffective. While his appeal was pending, McBride filed unsuccessful motions requesting a “Ginther” hearing to present evidence of his counsel’s ineffectiveness.In a brief to the Michigan Supreme Court, McBride first alleged that his due process rights were violated during his pretrial detention. That court returned this brief because McBride was represented by counsel. In a federal habeas claim, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1), McBride alleged his due process and Miranda rights were violated during his arrest and detention; his trial counsel was ineffective; and the Michigan courts erred in various evidentiary rulings. The district court dismissed claims without prejudice, citing the unexhausted first claim. A year later, McBride moved for reconsideration, arguing for the first time that his exhausted claims should be allowed to proceed under the Supreme Court’s “Rhines” decision which gives courts facing both exhausted and unexhausted claims two options besides dismissal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion, rejecting McBride’s argument that the district court should have sua sponte considered alternatives to dismissal. View "McBride v. Skipper" on Justia Law

Liggins was charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1),846, and aiding and abetting the possession with intent to distribute heroin, sections 841 and 2. At a pretrial hearing, the district judge remarked that Liggins, a Black man, “look[ed] like a criminal to me” and that Liggins was doing “what criminals do.” Liggins unsuccessfully moved for the judge’s recusal based on these remarks, among others, such as "I’m tired of this case. I’m tired of this defendant."The Sixth Circuit vacated Liggins's conviction and 127-month sentence and remanded to another district judge for a new trial. The judge's remarks could be understood to demonstrate clear prejudgment of Liggins’ guilt and could be understood to refer to Liggins's appearance rather than his behavior in insisting on a jury trial and changing attorneys. The judge also denied Liggins's requests to speak. "In this case, the risk of undermining the public’s confidence in the judicial process is significant." View "United States v. Liggins" on Justia Law

United provided Patterson's medical insurance under a plan subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1101. Patterson received a summary plan description, an ERISA-mandated synopsis of important plan terms but was not given a plan document with all of a plan’s governing language. The summary said that if a beneficiary recovered from a third party for an insured incident, the plan had a right to reimbursement. Patterson was injured in a traffic accident. United covered his medical expenses and notified Patterson it would invoke the reimbursement right. Patterson sued the other driver in state court and joined the plan, seeking a declaratory judgment that it had no reimbursement right. United’s lawyers claimed that no plan document existed. Patterson recovered and settled with the plan for $25,000. Months later, Patterson’s wife suffered injuries in another traffic accident. United paid her medical expenses. Patterson’s wife sued the driver in state court. She obtained a declaratory judgment after the plan's lawyers produced a plan document, stating that it took precedence over the summary and not including a reimbursement right.Patterson then filed a purported class action under ERISA, seeking the return of the $25,000. The district court dismissed the complaint. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part. Patterson had standing to sue only on his own behalf but has cognizable claims for breach of fiduciary duty and engagement in prohibited transactions. View "Patterson v. United Healthcare Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The district court preliminarily enjoined Kentucky’s ban on sex-transition care for minors. The court later stayed its injunction in light of a recent Sixth Circuit decision in which the court balanced the likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, the balance of harms, and the public interest and held that those factors favored allowing Tennessee to enforce its law. Kentucky bans the same conduct as in that case; the plaintiffs bring the same Equal Protection and Due Process claims that the Sixth Circuit held were unlikely to succeed. The Sixth Circuit declined to lift the stay. As a sovereign state, Kentucky has an interest in creating and enforcing its own laws. The people of Kentucky enacted the ban through their legislature. View "Doe v. Thornbury" on Justia Law

From 2014-2018, the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate instructed most Americans to purchase health insurance, 26 U.S.C. 5000A(a) Juntoff opted not to buy the minimum health insurance and failed to make his Shared Responsibility Payment of 2.5% of the taxpayer’s income, subject to a floor and a ceiling. After he declared bankruptcy, the IRS tried to collect the Payment from him and filed a proof of claim in bankruptcy court. The agency asked for priority above other debtors under a provision that covers bankruptcy “claims” by “governmental units” for any “tax on or measured by income,” 11 U.S.C. 507(a)(8)(A). The bankruptcy court denied the request, reasoning that the Shared Responsibility Payment was not a “tax on or measured by income” but was a penalty. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reversed.The Sixth Circuit ruled in favor of the government. The Shared Responsibility Payment is a “tax” under section 507(a)(8) and is “measured by income.” View "In re: Juntoff" on Justia Law

Smith was stopped in a car that contained about 103 grams of crystal methamphetamine. Smith was charged with possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine and conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. The government indicated that it would seek an enhanced mandatory minimum of 180 months (21 U.S.C. 851) because of Smith’s prior drug trafficking conviction. Smith pleaded guilty to the conspiracy charge; the government dropped the possession charge. The PSR calculated a guidelines range of 180-188 months—a combination of his uncontested guidelines range and his 180-month statutory mandatory minimum. The government requested a downward departure of one level under 18 U.S.C. 3553(e) and U.S.S.G. 5K1.1 for Smith’s cooperation, indicating that Smith had lied but had supplied some helpful information. Smith argued that he “earned and deserve[d]” a four-level departure.The district court determined that Smith’s range was 151-188 months and that Smith had a mandatory minimum of 180 months, then decided on a two-level departure, and arrived at a range of 135-168 months. The court explained that the guidelines are advisory, evaluated the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, and imposed a 158-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the sentence as procedurally and substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Around noon, officers responded to nine gunshots in a Cleveland neighborhood and located nine shell casings. A witness stated, and video surveillance confirmed, that he saw Wilson shooting out of a Ford truck as he chased a black Jeep. The victim (Wilson's relative) stated that Wilson got out of his truck and shot at his Jeep. The agents observed the victim’s wounds and images of the damaged Jeep. Wilson pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of the ammunition used in the shooting. His PSR recommended a four-level enhancement, U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), for shooting at an occupied vehicle, a felonious assault under Ohio law. Wilson was not charged in state court. Wilson asserted that he acted in self-defense. The witness apparently saw someone shoot out of the Jeep at Wilson. The judge stated: You do not have the right to shoot back at someone simply because they have shot at you. … you can’t even possess a bullet. If a bullet is here ,,, you are in violation of federal law, … 2K2.1 only requires that you were doing something in violation of some law.Wilson’s Guidelines range was 21-27 months; the court imposed a 46-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit vacated. The district court failed to make the requisite factual findings, rejecting Wilson’s self-defense claim based on its inaccurate belief that Wilson could not invoke self-defense because he did not lawfully possess the ammunition or firearm he used. View "United States v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Michigan State Police (MSP) detectives, assigned to investigate the 2011 Bates killing, learned that on the night of her murder, Bates was in her home with Jones and both of their boyfriends. Reed, Jones’s boyfriend, was charged. Jones said she did not want to testify and that “they” would kill her if she did. An assistant prosecutor saw Brown (Reed’s mother) following Jones as Jones cried, yelling that she “couldn’t go testify and she better not go in there.” Brown was arrested for witness intimidation. Brown was in jail for approximately 96 hours and was not brought before a judge for a probable cause hearing. MSP never requested a warrant for her arrest or took any other action relating to her detention.Brown sued the MSP defendants for violating her Fourth Amendment rights. The district court held that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity but, because of the “complicated factual scenario” did not determine at the summary judgment stage which defendants bore legal responsibility for violating her rights. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part. Under the totality of the circumstances, there was probable cause to arrest Brown. The defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on that claim. It was clearly established at the time of Brown’s arrest that her arresting officers had a duty to take her before a magistrate for a probable cause hearing; they are not entitled to qualified immunity on that claim. View "Brown v. Knapp" on Justia Law

In 1965, the predecessors of the Louisville and Jefferson County Metropolitan Government established the Riverport Authority, which constructed and owns a 300-acre Ohio River port facility. In 2009, the Authority leased the facility to “Port of Louisville.” In 2016, the parties extended the lease, potentially until 2035. According to Port, in 2018, Bouvette, the Authority’s director, started secret negotiations with its competitor, Watco. Port alleges that Bouvette and Watco needed a pretext to terminate the existing agreement and hired outside advisors to inspect the facility. These allegedly biased advisors found the facility “mismanaged, unsafe, and in disrepair.” The Authority asserted that Port had breached the lease and filed suits to remove it from the facility while conducting public bidding and awarding a lease to Watco, contingent on Port’s removal from the site. In one suit, Kentucky courts upheld a decision in favor of Port.In another suit, Port alleged tortious interference with contractual and business relationships, civil conspiracy, and defamation against Watco and Bouvette. The district court rejected Bouvette’s defenses under state-law sovereign immunity, governmental immunity, and Kentucky’s Claims Against Local Governments Act, noting the Authority’s status as a corporation and that it performed a proprietary (not governmental) function. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Under Kentucky law, a “state agency” cannot receive “automatic” immunity but the Authority is under the substantial control of an immune “parent.” The development of “transportation infrastructure” is a government task; the Authority does not act with a “profit” motive and alleviates a statewide concern. View "New Albany Main Street Props. v. Watco Co., LLC" on Justia Law

La Bamba Licensing operates Mexican restaurants in the Midwest under the name “La Bamba.” In 1998, La Bamba registered “LA BAMBA” as a trademark for restaurant services and for various food items. Nearly two decades later, La Bamba Authentic Mexican Cuisine opened a Mexican restaurant under the name “La Bamba Authentic Mexican Cuisine” with one location in Lebanon, Kentucky—about 65 miles from one of La Bamba’s restaurants in Louisville. In May 2016, La Bamba sent Cuisine a cease-and-desist letter, citing La Bamba’s federal trademark registrations. La Bamba subsequently sued, alleging trademark infringement and unfair competition under the Lanham Act and Kentucky common law. In October 2017, Cuisine changed the name of its restaurant to “La Villa Rica Authentic Mexican Cuisine, Inc.”The district court granted La Bamba summary judgment and awarded La Bamba $50,741.76 ($22,907.26 in profits; $27,309.50 for attorneys’ fees; and $525.00 for court costs. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, Under the Lanham Act, a plaintiff who succeeds on an infringement claim “shall be entitled” subject to equitable principles, to recover a defendant’s profits, any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and the costs of the action, 15 U.S.C. 1117(a). The district court did not abuse its discretion in considering the relevant factors and making the awards. View "La Bamba Licensing, LLC v. La Bamba Authentic Mex. Cuisine, Inc." on Justia Law