Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Christian Identity, a religion that is “explicitly racist,” believes that Caucasians are “God’s chosen people.” After the Michigan Department of Corrections refused to recognize Christian Identity as a religion for purposes of its prison system, the plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc (RLUIPA). The district court affirmed the denial. The Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiffs satisfied the first two parts of the three-part RLUIPA test, but remanded for the Department to sustain its “heavy burden” under a strict scrutiny analysis to show that its refusal to recognize Christian Identity as a religion furthered a compelling governmental interest, and that its denial was the least restrictive means of furthering such a compelling interest. On remand, the district court concluded that the Department met its burden.The Sixth Circuit reversed. The Department failed to satisfy its burden of showing that its denial of recognition was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest. Alternatives, other than simply accepting or rejecting recognition, were available and included in the Department’s policies, but were never considered. Christian Identity was not designated as a security threat group and there was testimony that Christian Identity advocated for nonviolence and would permit non-Caucasians to attend its services. The Department presented evidence regarding Christian Identity as a whole, but not concerning the plaintiffs. Without an individualized inquiry, the decision-making process was deficient. View "Fox v. Washington" on Justia Law

Officer Zolnai, responding to a call, passed a parked, running Chevy Malibu. The driver, Morgan, “appeared to be passed out.” After assisting the caller, Zolnai drove back and again noticed the seemingly passed-out occupant in the Malibu. Suspecting an overdose or intoxication, Zolnai parked and turned on his body camera. He did not turn on the squad’s flashing lights. Zolnai noticed a civilian, potentially in the path of the vehicle. In his experience, intoxicated individuals might “hit the gas” if startled. Without first trying to arouse Morgan, Zolnai opened the car door and asked if Morgan was okay. Morgan's response was “groggy.” Zolnai asked Morgan for “ID.” Morgan moved his hand between the seat and the console. Worried that Morgan might be reaching for a firearm, Zolnai asked him to step out. Morgan refused. A struggle followed. Morgan reached for a cardboard box in the passenger seat. Other officers arrived. They eventually handcuffed Morgan. In searching Morgan, they found plastic bags containing fentanyl, methamphetamine, heroin, and cocaine, and a semi-automatic pistol in the cardboard box.The district court denied Morgan’s motion to suppress, citing the community-caretaking doctrine. Morgan conditionally pleaded guilty to possessing controlled substances with intent to distribute, and to possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Zolnai violated the Fourth Amendment when he seized and eventually searched Morgan by unreasonably opening his car door without warning in the absence of any exigency. View "United States v. Morgan" on Justia Law

Goodman dealt with Martinek of Southern Risk to obtain crop insurance and later discovered that portions of his property could not be farmed. Southern denied his claim. Goodman accused Martinek and Southern of failing to obtain proper coverage. Based on a perceived moral obligation, Martinek provided Goodman with checks drawn from Southern’s Commercial Bank account–for $100,000 and $200,000. Southern’s account had insufficient funds to cover the draws. Goodman gave Martinek nothing in consideration for the checks; they never discussed a lawsuit. Goodman twice unsuccessfully attempted to cash the checks. Months later, after exchanging text messages with Martinek, Goodman was heading to Commercial Bank when Martinek sent an “everything stopped” message. Goodman asked for cashier’s checks in exchange for the Southern checks, without mentioning his past attempts to negotiate the checks. The teller did not check the balance in Southern’s account but printed “teller’s checks” payable to Goodman for $100,000 and $200,000. When the teller realized the account lacked sufficient funds, the Bank issued a stop payment order.Goodman sued to enforce the checks. The Bank counterclaimed for restitution. Under Tennessee’s Commercial Code, if Commercial Bank paid the checks by “mistake” and Goodman had taken those checks in “good faith” and “for value,” the Bank was not entitled to restitution. The district court held that Commercial Bank paid the checks by mistake and that Goodman did not give value. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Commercial Bank. View "Goodman v. Commercial Bank & Trust Co." on Justia Law

After the 2020 presidential election, Michigan election officials canvassed the results. Michigan law allows any candidate with a “good-faith belief” that he lost the election due to “fraud or mistake” to request a recount within 48 hours after the canvass. No candidate did so. On November 23, the bipartisan Board unanimously certified results indicating that Biden had won the state by 154,188 votes. On November 25, Plaintiffs sued several “state defendants,” asserting that they had “fraudulently manipulat[ed] the vote” through “a wide-ranging interstate—and international—collaboration” and that unspecified “foreign adversaries” and “hostile foreign governments” had accessed Dominion voting machines; that Detroit election officials had participated in countless violations of state election law, including an “illegal vote dump”; and that expert analysis showed that the election results were fraudulent. The Supreme Court declined to intervene. Michigan’s electors cast their votes for Biden. Detroit served plaintiffs and their attorneys with a “safe harbor” letter, warning that it would seek sanctions under Rule 11 if plaintiffs did not voluntarily dismiss their complaint. Plaintiffs did not respond. The district court held that plaintiffs’ counsel had violated Rule 11 by filing their suit for an improper purpose, failing to conduct an adequate prefiling inquiry into the legal and factual merits of their claims; and ordered plaintiffs’ attorneys to pay the reasonable legal fees of the moving defendants.The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part. The selective-enforcement claim (42 U.S.C. 1983) and a state-law claim were non-sanctionable under Rule 11. Plaintiffs’ other claims were all sanctionable. Counsel are liable for the defendants’ reasonable attorney’s fees after December 14 because they failed to dismiss their case after it had concededly become moot the allegations in the complaint itself refuted allegations about the Dominion system used in Michigan. Allegations of harassment and intimidation, however, were credible. View "King v. Whitmer" on Justia Law

During World War II, the federal government played a significant role in American oil and gasoline production, often telling refineries what to produce and when to produce it. It also rationed crude oil and refining equipment, prioritized certain types of production, and regulated industry wages and prices. This case involves 12 refinery sites, all owned by Valero, that operated during the war, faced wartime regulations, and managed wartime waste. After the war, inspections revealed environmental contamination at each site. Valero started cleaning up the sites. It then sought contribution from the United States, arguing that the government “operated” each site during World War II. It did not contend that government personnel regularly disposed of waste at any of the sites or handled specific equipment there. Nor did it allege that the United States designed any of the refineries or made engineering decisions on their behalf.The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court. The United States was not a refinery “operator” under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. 9601–75. CERCLA liability requires control over activities “specifically related to pollution” rather than control over general pricing and product-related decisions. View "MRP Properties Co., LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

Amaya was convicted of conspiracy to travel in interstate commerce with intent to commit murder, 18 U.S.C. 1958; using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence causing death, sections 924(c), (j); and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846. The district court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment for each count, to be served concurrently, and ordered Amaya to pay a statutorily required “special assessment” of $100 per count of conviction, section 3013(a)(2). The Sixth Circuit affirmed.Years later, Amaya filed a pro se 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate his conviction and sentence on count two, arguing that after the Supreme Court’s 2019 “Davis” holding, his murder conspiracy charge was no longer a valid predicate crime of violence for his 924(c) conviction. The district court invoked the “concurrent sentence doctrine” and denied relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed; 28 U.S.C. 2255 limits its reach to “prisoner[s] in custody ... claiming the right to be released.” Only prisoners who claim a right to be released from custody may challenge their sentences. Even if his motion were successful, Amaya would still be in custody on the two unchallenged life sentences and the $100 special assessment attached to Amaya’s challenged conviction did not warrant section 2255 review. View "Amaya v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2017, Corridore was convicted of sexually abusing his granddaughter. He was sentenced to 19 months to 15 years in prison and became subject to mandatory lifetime electronic monitoring (LEM) via a permanent ankle bracelet and sex offender registration under Michigan’s Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA). By the time he filed a habeas petition in federal district court, he had been released from prison and discharged from parole. The district court dismissed the petition, explaining that Corridore was no longer in custody and therefore could not meet the requirements of 28 U.S.C. 2254.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Corridore’s arguments that he is subject to lifetime sex-offender registration and electronic monitoring—requirements that he says satisfy the custody requirement. The collateral consequences of a conviction are not sufficient to render an individual “in custody” for the purposes of a habeas attack. The issue is whether a petitioner’s movement is limited because of direct government control and therefore amounts to a severe restraint on liberty. The LEM and SORA requirements, even combined, do not qualify. View "Corridore v. Washington" on Justia Law

Defendant murdered a rival drug dealer. When he learned that a witness might cooperate with law enforcement, Defendant murdered him too. Federal charges followed. His lawyers negotiated a plea deal under which the government would drop many of the charges, and he would serve 480 to 520 months in prison. Defendant agreed to the plea deal, and the district court imposed a 504-month sentence. Defendant had second thoughts. He moved to vacate his sentence, claiming that his counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance in advising him to accept the plea deal. The district court rejected this contention.   The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendant must show that his attorney performed deficiently and that he suffered prejudice from the inadequate representation. The court reasoned that given the lack of a single favorable decision at the time, the district court may not have accepted it. Even if the court had done so, “it is not clear how the successful exclusion of” one of 18 charges would have materially improved Defendant’s bargaining position. Yet despite this minimal leverage, Defendant’s counsel secured a plea with a 480-to520-month sentence—a lengthy term, granted, but one that (with good time credit) permits Defendant’s release in his mid-to-late 50s, a meaningful improvement over a guaranteed life sentence. Further, the court wrote that Defendant failed to show prejudice. Finally, the court held that by failing to raise the substantive challenge (or his newly asserted grounds for overcoming procedural default), Defendant doubly forfeited review. View "Terrance Kimbrough v. United States" on Justia Law

The district court previously found Defendant guilty of twelve supervised-release violations and sentenced him to a below-Guidelines sentence of 48 months imprisonment. He appealed, and the Sixth Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded the case to the district court for resentencing in light of Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021). On remand, the district court sentenced Defendant to the same sentence of 48 months imprisonment, even though that sentence now exceeds the high end of the advisory Guidelines range by 21 months. Defendant appealed again, arguing that his sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable.   The Sixth Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded to the district court for resentencing. The court explained that district courts may consider the seriousness of the violation conduct when determining the sanction for the breach of trust associated with a supervised-release violation. Thus, it was appropriate for the district court to consider Defendant’s violation conduct. Further, the court found that the district court failed to adequately explain its decision to impose consecutive sentences. Also problematic is the court’s failure to explain its decision to increase Defendant’s sentence on Count One from “time served” to 24 months’ imprisonment post-remand. Although the district court was not constrained by its prior decision, the absence of any explanation leaves us to speculate as to the court’s reasoning. This is a reversible error. Moreover, the court concluded that the district court improperly weighed Section 3553(a) factors by placing considerable weight on a couple of factors and no weight on several other factors. This renders the sentence, in this case, substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Andrew Damarr Morris" on Justia Law

Sterling Hotels sued a state elevator inspector (Defendant), asserting several claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Sterling first argued that Defendant violated its right to due process when he sealed Wyndham’s elevators without giving Sterling notice or an opportunity to object. Further, Sterling argued that Defendant engaged in an unconstitutional regulatory taking when he sealed the elevators. Defendant moved to dismiss, in part on qualified immunity grounds. The district court declined to address Defendant’s entitlement to immunity, and Defendant appealed.   The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court explained that when a deprivation of property “occurs pursuant to an established state procedure”—as Defendant acknowledges it did here—the state must provide adequate notice and an opportunity to respond before the deprivation. Here, Defendant sealed the elevators without providing any advance notice that the elevators should descend to the basement. Thus, Sterling alleged, Defendant failed to provide it with any opportunity to respond to that requirement. That is sufficient to state a due-process claim against Defendant. Further, Defendant’s potential individual liability for a regulatory takings claim was not clearly established when he sealed the elevators. That means Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. View "Sterling Hotels, LLC v. Scott McKay" on Justia Law