Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Beauchamp had cerebral palsy. Her mother found Beauchamp unresponsive and called 911. Minutes later, four “First Responders” arrived and attempted CPR and ventilation. After about 30 minutes, they discontinued those efforts and declared her dead. They also called a doctor to obtain permission to stop trying resuscitation, although they had stopped resuscitative efforts five minutes earlier. Numerous medical indicators showed that Beauchamp was not dead—her capnography indicated continued respiration, her cardiac monitor showed electrical activity, and her breathing and pulse were perceptible to her family members. Despite inquiries by Beauchamp’s family members, police officers, and a funeral home employee, the First Responders repeated that Beauchamp was dead, explaining the signs of life as reactions to medication. The funeral home employee placed Beauchamp in a body bag and went to the funeral home. An embalmer saw Beauchamp gasping for air with her eyes open and her chest moving and called 911. At the hospital, doctors determined that Beauchamp was alive but had suffered an anoxic brain injury. Beauchamp remained on a ventilator in a vegetative state and died weeks later.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to Beauchamp’s serious medical need. The individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and the city is not liable for any constitutional violation. View "Linden v. City of Southfield, Michigan" on Justia Law

D.B. left a Detroit and believed he was being followed by a silver sedan. At 1:41:01 a.m., a traffic camera captured D.B. driving through an intersection, followed by the silver sedan less than a minute later. Minutes later, about 2-½ miles away, an individual in a silver sedan shot D.B. Surveillance video captured muzzle flashes coming from a silver sedan described as “look[ing] like a Chevy Malibu.” The only silver sedan that could be placed in D.B.’s proximity around the time of the shooting was Smith’s Chevy Malibu. D.B. later picked Smith out of a photographic lineup as someone he had a “beef [with] in the past.”Smith’s car was tagged in Michigan’s Law Enforcement Information Network, with a warning that the car’s occupants were armed. Days later, an officer stopped Smith’s car and frisked Smith for weapons. Smith stated there was a gun in a case in the car. The trooper performed a “protective sweep” of the areas within a driver’s reach and found a handgun with a chambered bullet and a baggie containing fentanyl and heroin. Smith unsuccessfully moved to have the evidence suppressed as fruit of an unreasonable search. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. The police had reasonable suspicion to stop Smith and perform a limited search. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Bazemore, a Papa John’s delivery driver, sued under the Fair Labor Standards Act, alleging that the company had under-reimbursed his vehicle expenses. Papa John’s moved to compel arbitration, attaching a declaration from its “Director of People Services” that Papa John’s requires all new employees to sign an arbitration agreement as a condition of employment. She asserted that Bazemore signed the agreement electronically on October 10, 2019, by signing in using a user ID and password, then scrolling through the entire agreement and checking a box in order to sign. Bazemore swore under penalty of perjury that he “had never seen” the agreement and that he had seen his manager login for Bazemore and other delivery drivers “to complete training materials” for them. The court denied Bazemore’s request for targeted discovery as to whether he had actually signed the agreement and granted the motion to compel arbitration.The Sixth Circuit reversed. Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 4, the party seeking arbitration must prove that such an agreement exists. Kentucky law governs whether Bazemore entered into an agreement and provides that an electronic signature is legally valid only when “made by the action of the person the signature purports to represent”—which is a question of fact. Bazemore’s testimony that he never saw the agreement was enough to create a genuine issue as to whether he signed it. View "Bazemore v. Papa John's U.S.A., Inc." on Justia Law

Coopwood has bipolar disorder and schizophrenia. She was institutionalized several times from 2010-2017. On August 13, 2017, Coopwood (six months pregnant) stopped taking her antipsychotic medications because of concerns about potential effects on the fetus. Coopwood fatally stabbed her mother and was ultimately found “guilty but mentally ill.”In pretrial custody, Coopwood, not taking her antipsychotic medications, was repeatedly screened and denied any history of mental health treatment. Employees, aware of Coopwood’s history of inpatient psychiatric care, did not raise concerns. Coopwood alleges that, in August 2017, Jailer Watts dragged her to her cell and kicked Coopwood in the stomach, after which she suffered cramping with a bloody discharge from her vagina. She was hospitalized several times in August and September. On October 19, she was seen by a psychiatrist, Haddad, who determined that Coopwood had been psychotic for an unknown period and seemed unaware of her circumstances. On October 22, Coopwood, exhibiting bizarre behavior, was forcibly given antipsychotic medications. She was readmitted on November 8, reporting contractions. Labor was induced. Coopwood’s baby was stillborn. Coopwood contends that she attempted to file a grievance but that her verbal requests were ignored.Coopwood’s suit, alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference to her medical needs, was dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Defendants failed to establish the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the Jail’s staff thwarted Coopwood’s attempts to exhaust her administrative remedies. View "Coopwood v. Wayne County, Michigan" on Justia Law

Columbus-based financial advisors developed a financial product seemingly unique to the annuities market: the Transitions Beneficiary Income Rider, which would guarantee that, following a life insurance policyholder’s death, an insurance company would pay death-benefit proceeds to beneficiaries throughout their lifetimes. They founded Novus to launch the product. Novus contracted with Genesis and Annexus, financial product developers, to handle the eventual pitch to Novus’s target customer, Nationwide. Each agreement contained a confidentiality provision. Nationwide would not sign a nondisclosure agreement (NDA) and cautioned Novus not to disclose any confidential information about the Rider. An Annexus executive shared the Rider concept by email with Nationwide VP Morrone. Nationwide chose not to pursue the concept. After Novus’s unsuccessful pitch, Branch, Morrone’s supervisor, left Nationwide to join its competitor, Prudential. Branch convinced Ferris, also in Branch’s chain-of-command, and who had allegedly attended the in-person pitch, to leave Nationwide for Prudential. Prudential subsequently launched Legacy “eerily similar to” Rider.In Novus’s suit, alleging that Prudential engaged in trade secrets misappropriation, in violation of Ohio’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act, the district court granted summary judgment to Prudential. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. There is no reference to a confidential relationship through which Prudential acquired information about the Rider concept. View "Novus Group, LLC v. Prudential Financial, Inc." on Justia Law

Miller, who describes himself as “an active wine consumer,” asserts that he wants to order wine from out-of-state retailers and would like to be able to buy wine in other states and transport that wine back into Ohio for his personal use. House of Glunz is an Illinois wine retailer and alleges that it wishes to ship wine directly to Ohio consumers but cannot. Miller and Glunz challenged the constitutionality of Ohio liquor laws preventing out-of-state wine retailers from shipping wine directly to Ohio consumers and prohibiting individuals from transporting more than 4.5 liters of wine into Ohio during any 30-day period.The district court held that the Direct Ship Restriction is constitutional under binding Sixth Circuit precedent; the Director of the Ohio Department of Public Safety is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from the claims; and the plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the Transportation Limit. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the Director of the Ohio Department of Public Safety’s Eleventh Amendment immunity, reversed with respect to the Direct Ship Restriction and the plaintiffs’ standing to challenge the Transportation Limit. On remand, the district court shall determine whether the challenged statutes “can be justified as a public health or safety measure or on some other legitimate nonprotectionist ground,” and whether their “predominant effect” is “the protection of public health or safety,” rather than “protectionism.” View "Block v. Canepa" on Justia Law

Michigan State University's “COVID directives,” included a requirement that all employees receive a vaccine by August 31, 2021, even those who worked remotely. The policy included religious and medical exemptions. Medical exemptions were limited to “CDC-recognized contraindications and for individuals with disabilities.” It did not provide an exemption based on immunity acquired from a COVID-19 infection. The plaintiffs all tested positive for COVID-10 and claimed that, based on their natural immunity, it was medically unnecessary for them to be vaccinated. They did not comply with the policy; one was terminated, one was placed on unpaid leave, and one received a religious exemption.Their suit claimed violations of their constitutional rights to bodily autonomy and to decline medical treatment, alleging that MSU cannot establish a compelling governmental interest in overriding those constitutional rights; the policy constitutes an unconstitutional condition on continued state employment; and the policy contradicts the Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) statute, 21 U.S.C. 360bbb-3. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. It is sufficient that MSU could rationally believe that requiring the vaccine for naturally immune individuals would further combat COVID-19 on its campus. The plaintiffs did not adequately explain how receiving a vaccine violates a fundamental right, which would invoke a higher level of scrutiny. The EUA is meant to ensure patients’ consent to the pharmaceutical they are receiving and does not mean that MSU cannot require vaccination as a term of employment. View "Norris v. Stanleys" on Justia Law

Kentucky State Police learned that a woman (Miller) had stolen a truck. State Trooper Couch located and stopped the truck, approached, and told Miller to exit the vehicle. According to Couch, Miller responded, “I’m not going back to fucking jail,” and refused to open the locked door. When Couch opened the door with a key code provided by the truck’s owner, Miller fired a single shot, hitting Couch in the shoulder at “point-blank” range. Couch and another trooper fired nearly 50 rounds at Miller, who was struck multiple times. Miller might have fired again during the exchange. More troopers arrived and forcibly removed Miller from the truck. In the truck, officers found a stolen revolver with three live rounds and two spent cartridges in the cylinder. Miller later claimed that she intended to scare Couch but hit him by mistake and that she had smoked methamphetamine that day. Couch and Miller survived.Miller pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and possession of a stolen firearm, section 922(j). The PSR calculated Miller’s Guidelines range as 324-405 months. Under U.S.S.G. 5G1.1(a), 5G1.2(d), however, her recommended sentence was reduced to 240 months to match the maximum sentence that she could receive for the firearms offenses. The district court applied the cross-reference to attempted murder and sentenced her to the statutory maximum sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the 240-month sentence as procedurally and substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Miller" on Justia Law

You, a U.S. citizen of Chinese origin, worked as a chemist, testing the chemical coatings used in Coca-Cola’s beverage cans. You was one of only a few Coca-Cola employees with access to secret BPA-free formulas. You secretly planned to start a company in China to manufacture the BPA-free chemical and received business grants from the Chinese government, claiming that she had developed the world’s “most advanced” BPA-free coating technology. On her last night as a Coca-Cola employee, You transferred the formula files to her Google Drive account and then to a USB drive. You certified that she had not kept any confidential information. You then joined Eastman, where she copied company files to the same account and USB drive. Eastman fired You and became aware of her actions. Eastman retrieved the USB drive and reported You to the FBI.You was convicted of conspiracy to commit theft of trade secrets, 18 U.S.C. 1832(a)(5), possessing stolen trade secrets, wire fraud, conspiracy to commit economic espionage, and economic espionage. The Sixth Circuit remanded for resentencing after rejecting You’s claims that the district court admitted racist testimony and gave jury instructions that mischaracterized the government’s burden of proof as to You’s knowledge of the trade secrets and their value to China. In calculating the intended loss, the court clearly erred by relying on market estimates that it deemed speculative and by confusing anticipated sales of You’s planned business with its anticipated profits. View "United States v. You" on Justia Law

Stewart obtained his private pilot airman’s certificate in 1978. In 2013, he flew at altitudes and in weather conditions for which he was not authorized. The FAA notified Stewart that it planned to suspend his airman’s certificate. He could: surrender his certificate and begin the 180-day suspension; submit evidence that he had not violated the regulations; discuss the matter informally with an FAA attorney; or request an appeal to the NTSB. Stewart instead sent a letter stating that the agency lacked jurisdiction over private pilots. The FAA suspended Stewart’s certificate and assessed a $5,000 civil penalty for failure to turn in his certificate. Stewart kept flying. When he failed to properly deploy his plane’s landing gear, the FAA flagged his plane for inspection. Stewart did not comply. The FAA suspended the airworthiness certificate for his plane. Stewart kept flying and again landed his plane with the landing gear up. The FAA revoked Stewart’s airman’s certificate and again assessed a civil penalty. Stewart continued flying. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Stewart's convictions for knowingly and willfully serving as an airman without an airman’s certificate authorizing the individual to serve in that capacity, 49 U.S.C. 46306(b)(7), rejecting Stewart’s argument that he was not “without” a certificate because he still had physical possession of his. The statute required Stewart to have FAA permission to fly at the time of the flights in question. View "United States v. Stewart" on Justia Law