Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Following separate jury trials, Defendants George Oscar Messer (Oscar) and his son Jake Messer (Jake) were each convicted on two counts of kidnapping in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1201(a)(1). They were both sentenced to terms of life imprisonment because of various sentencing enhancements, including one for sexual exploitation. Defendants appealed their convictions, arguing that the federal kidnapping statute is (1) an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause and (2) unconstitutionally vague. Jake also appealed his sentence as procedurally and substantively unreasonable.   The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court correctly denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment, and precedent forecloses Defendants’ Commerce Clause and void-for-vagueness arguments. Further, the court held that Jake’s arguments regarding the alleged procedural and substantive unreasonableness of his sentence are unavailing. Specifically, the court wrote that the district court did not clearly err in treating Jake’s federal drug-conspiracy conviction as part of his criminal history rather than as relevant conduct. Further, the court held that the district court properly applied the dangerous-weapon and sexual-exploitation enhancements. Moreover, the court wrote that if the district court erred in applying the ransom-demand enhancement, that error was harmless. Finally, the court explained that a life sentence is an extraordinary punishment. But the court is not permitted to engage in a de novo reweighing of the Section 3553(a) factors. And in the present case, despite the extremity of the sentence, it can find no abuse of discretion by the district court in imposing the sentence recommended by the Guidelines. View "United States v. Jake Messer" on Justia Law

Appellant obtained a judgment against his employer after the employer made also accusations that Appellant committed embezzlement and forgery. Shortly thereafter, Appellant's employer filed for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy, both individually and on behalf of his business. Appellant appealed the bankruptcy court's ruling, arguing that he received an insufficient amount as an unsecured creditor.The court explained that "the doctrine of equitable mootness has no place in Chapter 7 liquidations." View "Said Taleb v. Wendy Lewis" on Justia Law

Out-of-work residents of Michigan may claim unemployment benefits if they meet certain eligibility criteria. The State’s Unemployment Insurance Agency oversees the benefits system. In 2011, with the help of private contractors, the Agency began to develop software to administer the unemployment system. The Agency sought to equip the software to auto-adjudicate as many parts of the claims process as possible. The Agency programmed software that used logic trees to help process cases and identify fraud. A claimant’s failure to return the fact-finding questionnaire, for example, led to a fraud finding, as did the claimant’s selection of certain multiple-choice responses. In August 2015, problems arose with some features of the system, prompting the Agency to turn off the auto-adjudication feature for fraud claims.Plaintiffs are four individuals who obtained unemployment benefits, which were terminated after the Agency flagged their claims for fraud. Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against three government contractors and nineteen Agency staffers, raising claims under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, 26 U.S.C. Sec. 6402(f), and Michigan tort law. In a previous proceeding, the court held that plaintiffs’ due process rights clearly existed because they had alleged a deprivation of their property interests without adequate notice and without an opportunity for a pre-deprivation hearing.At this stage, because the remaining plaintiffs have failed to show that these procedures violate any clearly established law, the supervisors of the unemployment insurance agency are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court also found that an intervening plaintiff was properly prevented from joining the case, based on her untimely filing. View "Patti Cahoo v. SAS Institute, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant violated the conditions of release that a district court imposed after it found him not guilty of an alleged crime by reason of insanity. Placing the burden on Defendant, the court found that Williams posed “a substantial risk” of harm to the public and committed him to the custody of the Attorney General. At issue is whether Section 4243(g) places the burden of proof on Defendant to show that his continued release would not “create a substantial risk” to the public.   The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court explained just as the individual has the burden at every turn up to that point to show he is not a risk to the public (for the affirmative defense, for initial release, for release after a period of commitment, for modification of conditions of release, and for ultimate release), so the individual also has the burden when the same issue returns after a violation of the conditions of release. Moreover, the court permissibly found that Defendant presented a substantial risk to the community, as his behavior and mental condition show. View "United States v. Richard Austin Williams" on Justia Law

Petitioner, pro se federal prisoner, moves for an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255. He also moved for default judgment against the government for its alleged untimeliness in responding to his motion.
The Sixth Circuit denied both motions. The court explained that the district court did not run afoul of Castro when it construed Petitioner’s original filings as Section 2255 motions. The court’s order provided Petitioner notice of the recharacterization and gave him an opportunity to amend his filing. The court, it is true, did not expressly warn Petitioner of the consequences of recharacterization. The court instead appointed counsel. No longer pro se, Petitioner moved beyond Castro’s ambit. Further, the court found that even if the transcripts from Petitioner’s sentencing qualify as newly discovered evidence, they do not show his innocence or show that no reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty. View "Curt Russell Cannamela" on Justia Law

In 2005, FBI wire intercepts, part of an unrelated drug investigation, indicated that Day’s life was in danger from West and his associates. After Day was killed, West was charged with conspiracy to use interstate commerce facilities in committing a murder-for-hire, 18 U.S.C. 1958. The court instructed the jury that a guilty verdict required findings that one or more conspirators had “traveled in interstate commerce”; “with the intent that a murder be committed”; and “intended that the murder be committed as consideration" for the promise to pay. The court defined “murder” under Michigan law, but did not require the jury to make a finding that Day’s death was the result of the conspiracy. The jury returned a guilty verdict. The court sentenced West to life in prison without the possibility of parole.In 2014, West unsuccessfully moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255. He then unsuccessfully petitioned to file a second 2255 motion. In 2022, West moved for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(C)(1)(a), claiming that the jury instructions violated “Apprendi.” Conspiracy alone carries a 10-year maximum sentence. Life imprisonment requires a jury finding that “death result[ed]” from the conspiracy. He also argued that his medical conditions supported his early release. The district court granted compassionate release based on the Apprendi violation and West’s rehabilitation efforts. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court improperly used compassionate release as a vehicle for second or successive 2255 motions. View "United States v. West" on Justia Law

While Smith was hiding in the woods, with an outstanding parole violation, police arrested him with a loaded gun in his possession. Smith was charged with illegally possessing a firearm and ammunition as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Despite advice from his attorney and the judge, Smith declined to stipulate his status as a felon and his knowledge of the same to preclude the government from introducing evidence of his prior felony convictions. At trial, the government introduced evidence of Smith’s 11 prior felony convictions: three convictions for grand larceny, one for forgery, two for robbery, four for escape, and one North Carolina conviction for assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill and infliction of serious injury. A jury convicted him. The district court sentenced him to 235 months in prison under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Smith’s argument about the alleged unfairly prejudicial taint of evidence of his 11 prior felony convictions. Smith’s North Carolina conviction for assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill and inflicting serious injury qualified as a predicate violent felony under ACCA because it requires purposeful or knowing conduct and is categorically a violent felony. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Officer Layne pulled VanPelt over for driving a car with an illegal window tint and called for backup. When Officer Bennett responded, Layne informed him that “the plate doesn’t come back to the car” and the “car smells like weed.” While patting VanPelt down, Layne found several baggies of marijuana and one baggie of crack cocaine. With VanPelt in handcuffs, Layne led him toward the police car. VanPelt took off running. Four seconds later, Layne tackled VanPelt to the ground, then stood and attempted to pull VanPelt to his feet, briefly grabbing VanPelt’s hair. VanPelt replied that he could not stand because his hip was broken. Layne released his grip. VanPelt fell back to the ground.VanPelt sued Layne for using excessive force and Detroit for failing to adequately train and supervise Layne, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants, citing qualified immunity. Layne’s tackle and subsequent attempt to lift VanPelt did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Layne’s use of force throughout the encounter was objectively reasonable under the circumstances, even assuming Layne could have stopped VanPelt using a less severe technique. When Layne attempted to lift VanPelt, a reasonable officer would not have known that VanPelt was injured. The record and video did not establish any indication of excessive force nor evidence that Layne had “evil intentions.” View "VanPelt v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

After drunkenly beating his wife and threatening to shoot her with a handgun, Carter pled guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). Carter had a prior conviction for felony robbery under Ohio law. The district court held that Ohio robbery is a crime of violence and calculated an enhanced Guidelines range of 37–46 months’ imprisonment, U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(4)(A); 4B1.2. Considering the harm Carter caused his wife, the district court suggested the sentence would be the same even without the enhancement. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Carter’s 38-month sentence. The elements of Ohio robbery are “the same as, or narrower than,” the Guidelines’ elements of extortion. The court rejected Carter’s argument that because the crime he was convicted of is called robbery it could only be compared to Guidelines robbery. View "United States v. Carter" on Justia Law

H.K., a high-school student, created a fake Instagram account impersonating one of his teachers. The account was benign at first, but became graphic, harassing, and threatening when two of his friends added their own posts to the account. The posts included statements about sex and violence. News of the account spread. H.K.’s friends tagged teachers in their posts. H.K. eventually decided that the attention was too much and deleted the account. The school traced the account to H.K. and the other two students and imposed an immediate five-day suspension pending further investigation. After concluding the investigation and providing H.K. with an administrative hearing, the school suspended him for 10 days.The district court granted the defendants summary judgment in H.K.’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The defendants had the authority to regulate H.K.’s off-campus speech; the “gross misbehavior” rule the defendants relied on to discipline H.K. was sufficiently definite. The student speech at issue involved serious or severe harassment of three teachers and another student; H.K. bore some responsibility for the speech and the speech substantially disrupted classwork or the defendants reasonably believed the speech would disrupt classwork. View "Kutchinski v. Freeland Community School District" on Justia Law