Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Wolverine transports refined petroleum products in its 700-mile pipeline system. These pipelines run from refineries in the Chicago area to terminals and other pipelines in and around Indiana and Michigan. Because Wolverine transports refined petroleum, a hazardous liquid, the company is subject to safety standards, 49 U.S.C. 60101, and falls into the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) regulatory orbit. A few years ago, PHMSA conducted a routine inspection of Wolverine’s records, procedures, and facilities and identified several issues. PHMSA sent Wolverine a Notice of Probable Violation, which acts as an informal charging document, and described nine potential violations of PHMSA’s regulations, including a dent with metal loss on the topside of a pipe segment, with respect to which Wolverine did not meet an “immediate repair” requirement. Wolverine missed a 180-day repair requirement for other deficiencies.The Sixth Circuit affirmed a $65,800 civil penalty. The court rejected Wolverine’s arguments that PHMSA’s action was arbitrary and violated its due process rights. Wolverine had adequate notice and, to the extent Wolverine believes another approach would better achieve PHMSA’s desired policy outcomes, its argument is one for resolution by PHMSA. View "Wolverine Pipe Line Co. v. United States Department of Transportation, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration" on Justia Law

Dickson alleges that Direct delivered multiple ringless advertising voicemails (RVMs) directly into his voicemail box, without placing a traditional call to his wireless phone. An RVM placed on November 3, 2017, stated that the call was from “Nancy Brown with Direct Energy.” Dickson never consented to receive these communications. Dickson filed a purported class action, alleging violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227, automated calling prohibitions. At his deposition, Dickson testified that he received 11 RVMs from Direct and that he generally listened to every voicemail message in its entirety. Direct retained an expert witness to analyze Dickson’s phone records, who concluded that only the November 3, 2017 voicemail was from Direct.The district court dismissed, holding that Dickson’s receipt of one RVM did not constitute concrete harm sufficient for Article III standing because he could not recall what he was doing when he received it, he was not charged for the RVM, it did not tie up his phone line, and he spent a small amount of time reviewing the RVM. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Regardless of the number of RVMs Dickson received, his asserted injury bears a close relationship to one recognized at common law, intrusion upon seclusion; Direct caused Dickson precisely the type of harm Congress sought to address through the TCPA. View "Dickson v. Direct Energy, LP" on Justia Law

During the public comment period in a Zoom meeting of the Grand Traverse County Commission on January 20, 2021, MacIntosh expressed her concern about the Commission’s March 2020 invitation to and endorsement of the Proud Boys, a group that has been designated an extremist group and a hate group. She requested that the Commissioners make a public statement condemning the group’s violent behavior. In response, Commissioner Clous produced a high-powered rifle and displayed it to MacIntosh and the viewing audience.MacIntosh sued, alleging that Clous unconstitutionally retaliated against her for exercising her First Amendment rights and that the County had an unconstitutional policy or practice of allowing this kind of First Amendment retaliation. The district court denied his motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. MacIntosh plausibly alleged that Clous violated MacIntosh’s free speech rights and Sixth Circuit caselaw put him on clear notice that his actions were unconstitutional. The court rejected Clous’s argument that his display of the rifle was not an “adverse action” that would deter a “person of ordinary firmness” from exercising her First Amendment rights. View "MacIntosh v. Clous" on Justia Law

McReynolds and 17 co-defendants were charged with conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute heroin and cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); 846. The government, using circumstantial evidence, argued that McReynolds was part of the charged conspiracy, and should be held responsible for the drug quantities attributed to the conspiracy. The jury found McReynolds guilty and attributed “less than 100 grams” of heroin and “less than 500 grams” of cocaine to him. His PSR included the drug amounts attributable to the conspiracy–767.66 grams of heroin, 711.56 grams of cocaine, and 263.51 grams of cocaine base. The court adopted the PSR’s drug quantity determinations, calculated McReynolds’ guidelines range at 151-181 months, and imposed a 151-month sentence.The Sixth Circuit vacated his sentence and remanded, stating that the district court should adequately explain its reasoning if it attributes any drug amounts to McReynolds beyond the jury’s verdict. On remand, the district court did not change its guideline range determination but imposed a 145-month sentence to account for McReynolds’ post-sentencing positive conduct. The court concluded that the PSR correctly calculated the drug quantity attributable to McReynolds because that quantity was within the scope of his conspiratorial agreement and foreseeable to him but opined that the jury was “confused” and cited three key witness testimonies.The Sixth Circuit again vacated the sentence. Because the higher drug quantities were not supported by a preponderance of the evidence, McReynolds’ sentence is substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. McReynolds" on Justia Law

Michigan’s 1994 Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) (amended in 2006 and 2011) imposed registration requirements, restrictions on living and working in a school zone, and reporting requirements. Michigan retroactively imposed these obligations, including those contained in the amendments, on offenders convicted before 2006 and 2011. In another suit, the Sixth Circuit held, in 2016, that the retroactive application of SORA amendments violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. While an interim order was in effect, in another suit, Michigan passed a fourth version of SORA, effective on March 24, 2021, removing or modifying provisions that had been declared unconstitutional.In 2021, five Michigan sex offenders filed suit, seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983. They alleged that the Michigan State Police enforced unconstitutional provisions of SORA from 2006 onwards, including after the previous cases were decided. They alleged that state officials, whom they purported to sue “in their individual capacities,” knew that the invalidated provisions were unconstitutional, but failed to stop their subordinates from enforcing them, noting the governors’ duty under the Michigan Constitution to ensure the faithful execution of federal and state law. The district court dismissed the complaint on various grounds, including sovereign immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed on different grounds. The plaintiffs fail to state a claim of supervisory liability. They do not plausibly allege that the defendants authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in any unconstitutional conduct. View "Does 1-5 v. Whitmer" on Justia Law

At Weatherford’s fracking operations, Hammons directed Ayres to drive a truck outside of his driving certification; Ayres refused, telling his district manager, Crabb, that employees were being asked to drive in violation of Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations. At a subsequent employee meeting, Crabb said that anyone who complained to HR would be fired. Ayres spoke by phone with a regional HR manager. Subsequently, Ayers was taken off the schedule and eventually fired, due to a “Reduction in Force.” When Ayres applied for unemployment benefits, Weatherford claimed he had been discharged because he “failed to follow instructions.” The district court dismissed Ayres’s suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Ayres did not appeal.Ayres had also filed a Surface Transportation Assistance Act (STAA) complaint. Ayres died; his estate’s administrator was substituted as the complainant. An ALJ found that: Ayres had engaged in STAA-protected activity; Weatherford knew about the protected activity; the protected activity contributed to Ayres’s discharge; and Weatherford failed to present clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same actions absent Ayres’s protected activities. The ALJ awarded Ayres $82,119 in back pay, $10,000 for emotional harm, $25,000 in punitive damages, plus attorneys’ fees and costs. The Board and the Sixth Circuit upheld the decision in part, vacating the award of punitive damages. Penal claims, including the STAA right to punitive damages, abate upon the death of the injured party. View "Weatherford U.S., L.P. v. United States Department of Labor" on Justia Law

In 2011, Gaona fired a gun with the intent to kill a certain individual but accidentally shot and injured a bystander. Gaona pleaded guilty in Michigan state court to assault with intent to murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Gaona was sentenced to two years for the firearm conviction, consecutive to a 17-to-50-year sentence for the assault conviction, based on a PSR which reported three prior misdemeanors, including one stemming from a 2009 incident, for which Gaona was (without the assistance of counsel) convicted of possession of marijuana via plea and sentenced to 30 days’ time served. The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected his argument that state courts may not rely on an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction in enhancing a sentence if that conviction resulted in a sentence of actual imprisonment.The district court denied Gaona’s 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition on the same sentencing argument but stayed his petition so that he could exhaust his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in state court. The state courts rejected those claims. The federal court then rejected his ineffective assistance claims as he had not filed an amended habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. No Supreme Court case clearly establishes that state courts may not, in enhancing a sentence, rely on an uncounseled misdemeanor that resulted in a sentence of time served. View "Gaona v. Brown" on Justia Law

After extensive litigation, the United States, Michigan, and five federally recognized tribes entered the Great Lakes Consent Decree of 1985, governing the regulation of Great Lakes fisheries. The subsequent Consent Decree of 2000 had a 20-year term. The district court extended that Decree indefinitely “until all objections to a proposed successor decree have been adjudicated” and granted amicus status to the Coalition, which represents numerous private “sport fishing, boating, and conservancy groups” interested in protecting the Great Lakes. The Coalition has represented its own interests during negotiation sessions.As the parties were concluding their negotiations on a new decree the Coalition moved to intervene, stating that Michigan is no longer “willing or able to adequately represent the Coalition’s interests” and intends to abandon key provisions of the 2000 Decree that promote biological conservation and diversity, allocate fishery resources between sovereigns, and establish commercial and recreational fishing zones. The district court denied the Coalition’s most recent motion to intervene. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. In finding the motion untimely, the district court properly considered “all relevant circumstances” including the stage of the proceedings; the purpose for the intervention; the length of time that the movant knew or should have known of its interest in the case; the prejudice to the original parties; and any unusual circumstances militating for or against intervention. View "United States v. State of Michigan" on Justia Law

The named plaintiffs, former home-health aides, sued A&L under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), claiming that A&L had paid them less than the correct overtime rate and under-reimbursed their expenses. Plaintiffs may bring such claims on behalf of other “similarly situated” employees. 29 U.S.C. 216(b). The plaintiffs sought to facilitate notice of their action to three groups of other employees who had worked for A&L. The court adopted a two-step procedure under which it would facilitate such notice following “conditional certification,” which required a “modest factual showing” that the other employees are “similarly situated” to the original plaintiffs. When merits discovery is complete, the court must grant “final certification” for the case to proceed as a collective action. The court applied that “fairly lenient” standard, and “conditionally certified” two groups for receiving notice. The court declined to facilitate notice to employees who had left A&L more than two years before or who had signed a “valid arbitration agreement” with A&L.On interlocutory appeal, the Sixth Circuit rejected the lenient standard, vacated the notice determination, and remanded for redetermination of that issue under the strong-likelihood standard. The court noted that the decision to send notice of an FLSA suit to other employees is often dispositive, in the sense of forcing a settlement. As a practical matter, it is not possible to conclusively make “similarly situated” determinations as to employees who are not present in the case. View "Clark v. A&L Homecare & Training Center, LLC" on Justia Law

The Plan is an employee welfare benefit plan under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). W&S denied Laake’s claim for extended long-term disability (LTD) benefits, indicating that Plan limited LTD benefit to 24 months if the disabling condition is due to any mental, nervous, psychiatric condition or chronic pain.” The Plan refers to “chronic pain syndrome.” No medical doctor had ever diagnosed Laake with “Chronic Pain Syndrome.” Although the Plan fails to define “Chronic Pain Syndrome,” Schedule C—which lists conditions that are excluded from extended LTD benefits—explicitly incorporates the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, which does not specifically include “Chronic Pain Syndrome,” but does detail the symptoms and features of “Pain Disorder.” W&S did not ask Laake’s physicians in its questionnaires about the Mental Illness exclusion or “Chronic Pain Syndrome.” None of her physicians indicated that there was any psychological basis for her pain.The district court determined that Laake was entitled to benefits, imposed penalties against W&S, and awarded Laake attorney’s fees and costs, 29 U.S.C. 1132(g)(1). The Sixth Circuit affirmed. In denying benefits without any explanation or supporting evidence, W&S acted arbitrarily and capriciously. Because W&S provided notice that implied one basis for its denial of benefits, but in its final decision included an entirely new basis, it failed to substantially comply with ERISA’s notice requirements. The court noted a finding that W&S engaged in particularly “egregious conduct throughout the course of this litigation.” View "Laake v. Western & Southern Financial Group Flexible Benefits Plan" on Justia Law