Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff, a mail clerk with sickle cell anemia, was employed by the United States Postal Service (USPS) and had a history of attendance issues, some of which were covered by the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). To avoid termination, he entered into a Last Chance Agreement (LCA) that limited unscheduled absences and specified that FMLA-approved absences would not count against him if properly documented. After several disputed absences, some of which the plaintiff claimed were FMLA-protected, USPS terminated his employment for violating the LCA.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment in favor of USPS on most of the plaintiff’s claims, finding that he failed to establish FMLA coverage for all but one disputed date and did not sufficiently notify USPS of a need for accommodations under the Rehabilitation Act. The court also held that the plaintiff’s FMLA medical certification, which estimated two days of intermittent leave per month, created a hard cap on his FMLA leave. The plaintiff’s claims regarding one date were settled, and his motion for reconsideration was denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s decision regarding the December 26, 2018 absence and the Rehabilitation Act claim, finding no evidence of a request for accommodation. However, it reversed the district court’s holding that the FMLA medical certification imposed a strict monthly limit on unforeseeable intermittent leave, clarifying that such certifications provide only estimates, not hard caps. The court remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the plaintiff gave proper notice for FMLA leave on certain dates and vacated the district court’s summary judgment on FMLA interference and retaliation claims related to the LCA, pending resolution of factual disputes. View "Jackson v. Postal Service" on Justia Law

A closely held Kentucky corporation, operated by members of the Tarter family, experienced a transfer of shares from the third generation (David, Donald, and Joy) to their children in December 2012. Despite this transfer, the corporation failed to observe corporate formalities such as holding annual shareholder or board meetings, leaving the composition of the board unclear. This ambiguity became significant when three shareholders sought to sue a family member, Josh Tarter, for alleged misconduct during his tenure as president. The plaintiffs attempted to have the board authorize the corporation to sue, and, alternatively, brought a derivative action on behalf of the corporation.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky initially dismissed the complaint, finding the plaintiffs lacked standing for direct claims and failed to make a demand or show futility for derivative claims. After the plaintiffs attempted to cure these defects by calling a special board meeting and authorizing the suit, the district court first allowed the claims to proceed, then later granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that the board vote was invalid because the third-generation members had resigned by transferring their shares. Upon reconsideration, the court vacillated, at one point accepting a theory that Anna Lou was the sole board member, but ultimately reinstated summary judgment for the defendants, reasoning that the plaintiffs had not properly pleaded this theory.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that under Kentucky law and the corporation’s bylaws, the third-generation board members did not effectively resign by merely transferring their shares, as resignation required written or oral notice. Therefore, the board remained as constituted before the share transfer, and the special meeting authorizing the direct suit was valid. The court vacated the district court’s judgment, allowing the direct suit by the corporation to proceed, but affirmed dismissal of the derivative claims where demand was made and refused. View "C-Ville Fabricating, Inc. v. Tarter" on Justia Law

A woman who entered the United States illegally as a child was later granted Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) status, which rendered her prior removal order unenforceable. She frequently visited a local Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) office to post bond for detainees and was well known to the staff. During one such visit, ICE agents detained her without a warrant or probable cause, despite being aware of her DACA status. She was held for eight days and transferred between multiple locations before being released. While detained, she sought habeas relief, but her petition was denied as moot after her release.She subsequently filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky against the ICE agents, alleging violations of her First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment rights under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. The district court initially dismissed her claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), but the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that DACA status rendered the removal order non-executable and outside the jurisdiction-stripping provision. The Sixth Circuit also dismissed her First Amendment claim based on Supreme Court precedent. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the remaining Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims, finding they constituted new Bivens contexts and that alternative remedies existed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the plaintiff’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims arose in new Bivens contexts—specifically, immigration enforcement by ICE agents outside the home and outside the federal employment context. The court further found that alternative remedies, such as administrative complaint procedures under the Immigration and Nationality Act and habeas corpus, precluded the extension of Bivens. Thus, no implied damages remedy was available. View "Enriquez-Perdomo v. Newman" on Justia Law

A woman identified as E.J. was carjacked by two masked men in a Detroit store parking lot. She observed the men in the store, noting one was light-skinned and the other dark-skinned. After the incident, a store customer who knew the light-skinned man from school provided E.J. with his name and later sent both E.J. and the investigating officer photos and information from his Facebook profile. Before a police-arranged photo lineup, the customer sent E.J. a picture of the suspect, Kyrrah Radaker-Carter, despite police instructions not to do so. E.J. confirmed to the customer that the man in the photo was the carjacker. The next day, E.J. participated in a six-photo lineup and immediately identified Radaker-Carter, who was later arrested while driving the stolen car.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied Radaker-Carter’s motion to suppress E.J.’s identification, finding that due process did not require exclusion because the suggestive circumstances were not arranged by law enforcement and the photo array itself was not unduly suggestive. Radaker-Carter subsequently pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 122 months’ imprisonment, then appealed the suppression ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. The appellate court held that E.J.’s identification was constitutionally admissible because the suggestive circumstances—E.J. seeing Radaker-Carter’s photo before the lineup—were not orchestrated by law enforcement. The court also found that the police-arranged photo lineup was not unduly suggestive, as the differences in the photos were minor and did not improperly single out Radaker-Carter. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress. View "United States v. Radaker-Carter" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of possessing a machinegun conversion device, known as a Glock switch, which both parties agreed qualified as a machinegun under federal law. He had pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement but subsequently moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute criminalizing possession of machineguns, 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), violated his Second Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, holding that his plea agreement did not bar his constitutional challenge and rejecting his Second Amendment argument. The defendant then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, maintaining that the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen had undermined prior circuit precedent upholding § 922(o).The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial de novo, as the case involved the constitutionality of a federal statute. The appellate court held that its prior decision in Hamblen v. United States, which relied on District of Columbia v. Heller, remained binding after Bruen. The court explained that Bruen did not overrule Heller or Hamblen, and that the tradition of prohibiting “dangerous and unusual weapons” such as machineguns was reaffirmed. The court concluded that the Second Amendment does not protect the possession of machineguns covered by § 922(o). Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the defendant’s conviction. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Two men were arrested in Louisville, Kentucky, in 2020 and charged with being felons in possession of firearms. Both had prior convictions for crimes punishable by more than a year in prison. One defendant pleaded guilty, while the other was convicted by a jury. At sentencing, the government sought to apply the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which imposes a mandatory minimum fifteen-year sentence for offenders with at least three prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses, provided those offenses were committed on different occasions.The United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, following then-binding Sixth Circuit precedent, determined that the judge—not a jury—should decide whether the prior offenses occurred on different occasions. The court found that both defendants qualified for the ACCA enhancement and sentenced each to fifteen years in prison. Both defendants appealed, arguing that, in light of the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Erlinger v. United States, the question of whether their offenses occurred on different occasions should have been decided by a jury.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the cases. Applying a harmless error analysis as required by recent precedent, the court found that, for one defendant, the record established beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found his offenses occurred on different occasions, so his sentence was affirmed. For the other defendant, the court concluded that the government had not met its burden to show the error was harmless, given similarities among the offenses and gaps in the record. As a result, the court vacated his sentence and remanded for further proceedings. The main holding is that failure to submit the ACCA “different occasions” question to a jury is subject to harmless error review, and the outcome depends on the specific facts of each case. View "United States v. Barnes" on Justia Law

Between 2017 and 2020, a major energy company and its senior executives allegedly orchestrated a large-scale bribery scheme, funneling approximately $60 million to key Ohio political figures and regulators through a network of shell companies and political action committees. In exchange, the company secured favorable legislation (Ohio House Bill 6), which provided substantial financial benefits, including a $2 billion bailout for its nuclear power plants. The scheme was concealed from shareholders and the public, with the company issuing public statements and regulatory filings that failed to disclose the true nature and risks of its political activities. When the bribery was exposed in 2020, the company’s stock and debt securities plummeted, resulting in significant losses for investors.After the scheme was revealed, investors filed multiple class actions in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, which were consolidated. The plaintiffs alleged violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, specifically section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5, claiming that the company and its executives made material misstatements and omissions that artificially inflated the value of its securities. The district court denied motions to dismiss and later certified a class of investors, holding that the plaintiffs were entitled to a presumption of reliance under Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, and that their damages methodology satisfied the predominance requirement for class certification.On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the class certification order. The court held that the district court erred in applying the Affiliated Ute presumption of reliance because the case was primarily based on misrepresentations, not omissions. The Sixth Circuit established a framework for distinguishing between omission- and misrepresentation-based cases and clarified that the Affiliated Ute presumption applies only if a case is primarily based on omissions. The court also found that the district court failed to conduct the required “rigorous analysis” of the plaintiffs’ damages methodology under Comcast Corp. v. Behrend. The Sixth Circuit vacated the class certification order to the extent it relied on the Affiliated Ute presumption and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Owens v. FirstEnergy Corp." on Justia Law

Telecommunications industry groups and associations challenged a rule issued by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) that imposed new data breach reporting requirements on telecommunications carriers and telecommunications relay service (TRS) providers. The rule expanded the definition of a reportable breach to include inadvertent disclosures of customer information and required notification to customers and government entities when breaches involved either customer proprietary network information (CPNI) or personally identifiable information (PII), such as names, Social Security numbers, and biometric data. The petitioners argued that the FCC exceeded its statutory authority and violated the Congressional Review Act (CRA) by issuing a rule they claimed was substantially the same as a prior rule Congress had disapproved.Previously, the FCC had issued a similar privacy rule in 2016, which Congress disapproved under the CRA in 2017, leading the FCC to revert to its earlier, narrower 2007 rules. In 2023, the FCC proposed and, after notice and comment, adopted the new 2024 rule. Multiple industry groups filed petitions for review in several circuit courts, which were consolidated in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.The Sixth Circuit held that the FCC did not have authority under 47 U.S.C. § 222(a) to regulate PII, as that section’s text and structure did not encompass PII. However, the court found that 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) independently authorized the FCC to regulate unjust or unreasonable practices, including data breach notification requirements for PII, as such practices are directly connected to the provision of communication services. The court also held that the FCC had authority under 47 U.S.C. § 225 to apply these requirements to TRS providers. Addressing the CRA, the court concluded that the 2024 rule was not “substantially the same” as the disapproved 2016 rule and thus did not violate the CRA. The court denied the petitions for review, upholding the FCC’s 2024 rule. View "Ohio Telecom Association v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

The defendant was previously convicted of transporting child pornography and, after serving most of his sentence, was released to a halfway house. While there, he engaged in a series of text conversations with his preteen daughter, asking her about his past conviction, her views on sex, and whether she thought there was anything wrong with adults or children engaging in sexual acts, as depicted in pictures or videos. He also instructed her to keep their conversations secret. The defendant’s ex-sister-in-law, who had access to the daughter's phone records, became concerned and forwarded the messages to the FBI. A subsequent investigation of the defendant’s phone, despite his attempts to delete its contents, revealed incriminating text messages, bookmarks to websites with suggestive titles, and 163 images sexualizing children, seven of which were alleged to be child pornography.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied the defendant’s pretrial motions to exclude most of the images and the website bookmarks, finding them relevant to knowledge and intent. The court also denied his motion to dismiss the indictment on First Amendment grounds. At trial, the government presented evidence including the images, text messages, and testimony from the investigating agent and the ex-sister-in-law. The defendant argued that others at the halfway house could have accessed his phone and that he only sought “child erotica,” not child pornography. The jury found him guilty of knowing receipt of child pornography and specifically found the seven images met the statutory definition.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence de novo and held that a rational jury could find the images constituted child pornography. The court also found no error in admitting the website bookmarks or the text messages with the defendant’s daughter, as they were relevant to intent and not unfairly prejudicial. The court rejected both facial and as-applied First Amendment challenges to the statute. The conviction was affirmed. View "United States v. Mercer-Kinser" on Justia Law

An orthopedic surgeon was convicted by a jury in Ohio of two counts of gross sexual imposition and one count of tampering with records, following allegations by two patients of inappropriate conduct during medical examinations. The prosecution’s case included testimony from the alleged victims, peer physicians, and investigators, as well as various exhibits such as interview recordings and medical records. The trial court admitted these exhibits, and the jury found the defendant guilty on all counts, resulting in a sentence of jail time, work release, community control, a fine, and sex offender registration.The defendant appealed to the Ohio Court of Appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions, specifically challenging the proof of sexual gratification and intent to defraud. The appellate court affirmed the convictions, finding that a rational juror could infer the necessary elements from the evidence presented. The Ohio Supreme Court declined to review the case further. The defendant then filed a federal habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, raising several claims and seeking to supplement the record with additional documents, including trial exhibits. The magistrate judge allowed some supplementation but excluded certain trial exhibits. The district court denied both the motion to expand the record and the habeas petition, concluding that the state court record, including the trial transcript, was sufficient for review.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit considered whether the district court erred by adjudicating the habeas petition without including all trial exhibits in the record. The Sixth Circuit held that the district court was not required to review every trial exhibit, as long as it had the relevant portions of the record necessary to evaluate the claims. The court found no error in the district court’s process and affirmed the denial of the motion to expand the record. View "Heiney v. Moore" on Justia Law