Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries
Hardin v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
Under the Gun Control Act “it shall be unlawful for any person to transfer or possess a machinegun,” 18 U.S.C. 922(o)(1). The Act incorporates the definition from the National Firearms Act: “machinegun” means any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger. The term shall also include the frame or receiver of any such weapon, any part designed and intended solely and exclusively, or combination of parts designed and intended, for use in converting a weapon into a machinegun, and any combination of parts from which a machinegun can be assembled if such parts are in the possession or under the control of a person, 26 U.S.C. 5845(b).The ATF, which administers both statutes, previously maintained that a bump stock, which drastically increases a gun’s rate of fire, is not a machinegun part. In 2018, after a Las Vegas gunman used bump stocks attached to semiautomatic rifles to kill 58 people and injure roughly 500 in approximately 10 minutes, the ATF reversed its position by promulgating the Rule, giving possessors of bump stocks 90 days to destroy or abandon their bump stocks.Hardin challenged the Rule as exceeding the ATF’s statutory authority. The Sixth Circuit reversed a judgment upholding the Rule, noting the rule of lenity in criminal cases and that Congress could resolve the ambiguity. View "Hardin v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives" on Justia Law
United States v. Johns
More than 20 years ago, Johns kidnapped her ex-girlfriend at gunpoint and sexually assaulted her. Following her arrest, Johns absconded. After about 16 years, the law caught up to Johns. She was convicted of three federal offenses, resulting in a 168-month sentence. In 2021, the district court vacated Johns’s 18 U.S.C. 924(c) conviction under 28 U.S.C. 2255 in light of the Supreme Court’s 2019 “Davis” decision. Johns remained convicted of kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1), and failing to appear following her pretrial release, 18 U.S.C. 3146(a)(1), giving her a Guidelines range of 121-151 months. Johns argued that her deteriorating health counseled for a reduced sentence. The court viewed any mitigating circumstances as “more than offset by the aggravating circumstances” and imposed a 151-month sentence.The Sixth Circuit upheld the sentence as reasonable after conducting “plain error” review. Within-Guidelines sentences are presumptively reasonable. The district court’s decision to discuss Johns’s mitigation arguments generally was not an obvious error; Johns raised multiple mitigation arguments all within the general rubric of “history and characteristics,” against a serious federal offense. Johns’s recently-developed health issues would never have been a subject at the resentencing hearing had Johns not absconded from justice. To find otherwise would be contrary to “the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” The district court discussed Johns’s “well-written” sentencing memorandum and referenced the many mitigating circumstances that she raised. View "United States v. Johns" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
United States v. Sykes
The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) forwarded to the Knoxville Police a CyberTip from Facebook reporting that a 43-year-old male appeared to be using Facebook private messages to entice a 15-year-old female (M.D.) to produce and send child-exploitation images and engage in sexual activity. The CyberTip suggested that they had already engaged in sexual activity and included information matching Tywan Sykes.Charged with enticing a minor to engage in sexual activity, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b); enticing a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct, section 2251; committing felony offenses involving a minor while required by Tennessee law to register as a sex offender, section 2260A; and knowingly possessing child pornography section 2252A, Sykes filed unsuccessful motions to suppress evidence retrieved from his Facebook account and cell phone. He argued that NCMEC is a government entity and that Facebook had become NCMEC's agent by searching his account and forwarding messages to NCMEC and that the month-and-a-half delay between the seizure of his phone and the execution of the search warrant was unreasonable. The court also partially denied a motion to exclude evidence of his prior sex offenses.The Sixth Circuit affirmed Sykes’s convictions and 45-year sentence, rejecting arguments that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress and erroneously admitted evidence of a past sex-offense conviction; that there was insufficient evidence to convict on all charges; and that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable. View "United States v. Sykes" on Justia Law
Beaver Street Investments, LLC v. Summit County, Ohio
In 2017, the County initiated an administrative tax foreclosure against BSI. The County Board of Revision (BOR) issued its final adjudication of foreclosure in June 2019. Because the County had opted for the alternative right of redemption, BSI had 28 days to pay the taxes before the County took title to the property. Days later, BSI filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, which automatically stayed the BOR’s final judgment and 28-day redemption period. The bankruptcy court granted the County relief from the stay on January 17, 2020. The BOR determined that the statutory redemption period expired on January 21, 2020. On January 30, rather than sell the property, the County transferred it to its land bank (Ohio Rev. Code 323.78.1). When a county sells foreclosed property at auction, it may not keep proceeds beyond the taxes the former owner owed; if the county transfers the property to the land bank, “the land becomes ‘free and clear of all impositions and any other liens.’”BSI filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that a significant difference between the appraised value of the property and the amount that the County alleged BSI owed meant that the County’s action violated the Takings Clause. The district court dismissed the case under the two-year statute of limitations. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The limitations period began to run when the redemption period ended on January 21, 2020. If BSI paid its delinquent taxes during that period, the County would have been prohibited from taking the property. View "Beaver Street Investments, LLC v. Summit County, Ohio" on Justia Law
Trustees of Sheet Metal Workers Local 7 v. Pro Services, Inc.
The trustees of three multi-employer benefit funds sued Pro Services under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001, and the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. 141, to recover unpaid benefit contributions allegedly owed by Pro Services, an industrial contractor that supplies skilled trade workers in the construction and manufacturing industries. Under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and fund documents, Pro Services must contribute to the fringe benefit funds for work performed within the CBA’s Trade Jurisdiction. The Funds relied on audits conducted by a third-party firm to allege that nearly $8 million in contributions and damages arose from hours worked by 230 Full-Service Maintenance Technicians (FMTs) employed by Pro Services, from 2013-2019.The district court granted Pro Services summary judgment—it was undisputed that the FMTs worked in manufacturing, and the court concluded that the CBA covered workers in the construction industry based only on a caption in the CBA. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The standard form caption cannot be used to limit the application of the CBA’s substantive terms, without the court first finding those substantive provisions ambiguous; the CBA is unambiguous. View "Trustees of Sheet Metal Workers Local 7 v. Pro Services, Inc." on Justia Law
Posted in:
ERISA, Labor & Employment Law
Lloyd v. Ford Motor Co.
Consumers alleged that Ford cheated on its fuel economy and emissions testing for certain truck models, including the F-150 and Ranger. The Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. 6201, and its regulations control such testing, the results of which are sent to the EPA. The EPA uses the information to provide fuel economy estimates for labels affixed to new vehicles. The FTC regulates advertising to consumers; Its “Guide Concerning Fuel Economy Advertising for New Vehicles” advises vehicle manufacturers and dealers about disclosing the established fuel economy of a vehicle, as determined by the EPA. The EPA and Department of Justice investigated Ford’s testing and resultsThe Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the purported class action, which included claims of breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, breach of express warranty, fraud, and unjust enrichment under the laws of every state. The claims are preempted by federal law as they inevitably conflict with the EPA’s regime. The EPA accepted Ford’s testing information and published its own estimate based on that information. The EPA has the authority to approve or reject Ford's figures. The tort claims essentially challenge the EPA’s figures. The EPA must balance several objectives in reaching those figures, and these claims would skew this balance. View "Lloyd v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law
SHH Holdings, LLC v. Allied World Specialty Ins. Co.
A False Claims Act qui tam action was filed under seal against SHH and its nursing facilities, alleging that SHH provided unreasonable and unnecessary services to claim the highest possible Medicare reimbursement. Three co-relators also alleged that SHH retaliated against them for internally reporting fraudulent billing practices. SHH received a Department of Justice notification that it was the subject of a fraudulent claims investigation, requesting information about recent terminations of SHH employees, including the relators. It did not explicitly refer to the retaliation allegations.Two years later, SHH obtained liability coverage. Allied's claims-made policy applies only to claims first made during the policy period. SHH's application checked "none" when asked to “provide full details of all inquiries, investigations, administrative charges, claims, and lawsuits filed” within the last three years. SHH checked “no” to whether “[SHH], any Subsidiary, any Executive or other entity proposed for coverage kn[ew] of any act, error or omission which could give rise to a claim, suit or action.” An application exclusion, incorporated into the policy, stated that if such information existed, any inquiry, investigation, administrative charge, claim, or lawsuit arising therefrom or arising from such violation, knowledge, information, or involvement is excluded from coverage.The qui tam action was unsealed. SHH notified Allied and sought coverage for defense costs. Allied denied coverage. SHH sued. SHH later settled the relators' retaliation claim ($2.2 million) and finalized a $10 million settlement for the claims-submissions violations. The district court granted SHH partial summary judgment, awarding $2,336,786.35. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The plain language of SHH’s policy excluded coverage. View "SHH Holdings, LLC v. Allied World Specialty Ins. Co." on Justia Law
United States v. Ferguson
Ferguson, a 20-year-old black man, went online, describing his desire to create a militia group and “orchestrate raids for supplies such as weapons and armor.” An FBI informant, “Guiness,” contacted Ferguson on Discord and was added to the group. Guiness pressured Ferguson to meet for “training.” On April 28, Ferguson first described to the group an idea for ambushing a patrol car but stated, “It’s not happening right now.” The two met on May 2, joined by another informant, “Steve.” At Guiness’s request, Ferguson brought his AR-15 rifle. The group engaged in faux military exercises. Ferguson described having a girl fake a domestic violence call at “the end of the month or even June.” On May 5, without any request by Ferguson, Guiness sent a picture of an abandoned house in Cuyahoga Valley National Park, saying, “Perfect location.”On May 8, the three hiked to the abandoned house, unarmed, with Ferguson saying that if multiple cops responded, they’d have to start shooting. Guiness suggested a “dry run” to time police response and called 911. When rangers arrived, the men ran toward their car but were arrested. The FBI executed a search warrant for Ferguson’s residence, seizing an AR15 rifle, ammunition, magazines, tactical gear, and a guerilla warfare manual.Ferguson was convicted of two counts of attempted kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. 1201(a), (d). The Sixth Circuit reversed. No rational juror could have found Ferguson guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Any possible plan was constantly changing. Ferguson had not decided what to do with the officers other than take their gear. Ferguson did not take a substantial step; his actions did not clearly corroborate an intent to commit a kidnapping. View "United States v. Ferguson" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
Adams v. 3M Co.
Adams and Mounts mined coal in Kentucky. Both wore respirators to protect their lungs but nevertheless developed pneumoconiosis, a disease caused by inhaled dust particles. They sued 3M and other out-of-state respirator manufacturers and distributors. Adams’ complaint named more than 400 co-plaintiffs. Mounts’ complaint named more than 300 co-plaintiffs. 3M removed the cases to federal court. The district court remanded to state court.On interlocutory appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed the remand order. The 2005 Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) extends federal diversity jurisdiction to certain “mass action[s]” involving “100 or more persons,” 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) and permits removal of any civil action “in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claims involve common questions of law or fact.” These complaints did that. Claims presented in a single complaint proceed through a common trial process absent an order to the contrary; when the plaintiffs each filed complaints with more than 100 co-plaintiffs, they offered to try their co-plaintiffs’ claims jointly. Both complaints sought “a trial by jury” and a singular “judgment,” not multiple trials and judgments. By filing a complaint predicated on a “common” “question of law or fact,” the plaintiffs offered the presence of common questions as a “ground” for pursuing a joint trial, View "Adams v. 3M Co." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Class Action
United States v. Medlin
Medlin pleaded guilty to kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1). Based on a guidelines range of 210-262 months and a maximum sentence of life, the district court took into account Medlin’s history of drug abuse, his parents’ incarceration during his childhood, his two children, his criminal history, the serious nature and circumstances of the offense, the respective roles of the co-conspirators, and balancing the factors in section 3553(a).The Sixth Circuit affirmed his sentence of 220 months’ imprisonment, upholding the application of a four-level enhancement to Medlin’s offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2A4.1(b)(2)(A), which applies “[i]f the victim sustained permanent or life-threatening bodily injury[.]” The court noted that one victim suffered multiple, serious, distinct injuries and was forced to ingest methamphetamine. He sustained permanent injuries through the loss of teeth that were extracted, permanent scarring on his face from the beating suffered, and permanent scarring on his arm/shoulder from being burned with a blow torch. The defendants threatened the victims with death if they reported the assault to the police; a co-conspirator brandished a firearm “in a threatening manner towards the [v]ictims” on multiple occasions. The court also rejected an argument that there was an unreasonable disparity between his sentence and the sentences of his co-defendants. View "United States v. Medlin" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law