Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2011, Whitson participated in two Hobbs Act robberies. Both had victims who were threatened and physically injured; one was shot. Whitson was convicted of eight crimes at trial and sentenced to 1,252 months of incarceration. After several appeals, through which four of his convictions were vacated, he was resentenced in 2022 to 360 months of incarceration. Whitson argued that his sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable because the district court speculated that Whitson’s difficult upbringing made him more likely to re-offend, in spite of evidence to the contrary; failed to make an “individualized assessment” of Whitson’s background; impermissibly required Whitson to admit his guilt in order to consider fully evidence of his rehabilitation while incarcerated; and did not properly weigh the evidence of his rehabilitation.The Sixth Circuit vacated. The district court committed plain error by requiring Whitson to admit his guilt in order to consider fully the evidence of his rehabilitation. “There is a fine line between consideration of a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility as relevant to [section] 3553 and penalizing a defendant for maintaining their right to avoid self-incrimination, and in this case, the district court fell on the wrong side of that line.” View "United States v. Whitson" on Justia Law

Campbell approached construction workers, performing road repairs, and asked who had voted for Trump in the recent presidential election. Following their responses, Campbell brandished a firearm and stated that he “had a bullet for each one.” Campbell then drove away, parking his truck near the construction site. When officers found the vehicle, Campbell was sitting inside with a semi-automatic pistol in his lap.Campbell pled guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), which typically carried a maximum penalty of ten years’ imprisonment. The Armed Career Criminal Act, however, mandates a 15-year minimum sentence for a defendant with “three previous convictions” for “a violent felony or a serious drug offense,” each committed on “occasions different from another” 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). Campbell had Tennessee convictions for a 1985 robbery, a 1987 aggravated assault, a 1992 drug trafficking offense, plus Virginia drug trafficking offenses from 1992 and 1993. Campbell argued that the drug offenses were not committed on different “occasions,” and that the different-occasion issue must be decided by a jury. Campbell also challenged a standard supervised release condition: if Campbell’s probation officer determined Campbell posed a “risk” to another, the officer could require Campbell to notify the person about the risk. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his 180-month sentence, finding that the robbery and drug offenses qualify as ACCA predicates. Campbell admitted that he committed those predicates on four different dates, separated by months or years. View "United States v. Campbell" on Justia Law

Following news coverage of a unionization effort at one of its stores in Memphis, Starbucks fired seven people who worked there. The Union filed an action with the National Labor Relations Board under section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 157. Meanwhile, McKinney, a regional NLRB director, sought temporary injunctive relief pending the completion of the Board’s proceedings.The district court found reasonable cause to believe that Starbucks had violated the Act and that, because of the chilling impact of the terminations on Union support, some of the requested interim relief, including temporary reinstatement of the Memphis Seven, was just and proper. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that Starbucks did not challenge the holding that there is reasonable cause to believe that Starbucks violated the Act in terminating the Memphis Seven. The district court did not err in concluding that the termination of 80% of the organization committee during a unionization campaign could lead to injury to the union movement that subsequent Board intervention would not be able to remedy. View "McKinney v. Starbucks Corp." on Justia Law

In 2012, Kares was convicted of raping a 16-year-old girl. The judge found five “Offense Variables” that increased Kares’ sentencing range. While Kares’ case was on appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court held (Alleyne) that the Constitution requires any fact that increases the mandatory minimum penalty for a crime to be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Kares’ counsel failed to raise an Alleyne claim on appeal. The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed Kares’ conviction and sentence. Kares then began collateral review proceedings in Michigan state court. Seeking leave to appeal the denial of his motion for relief from judgment, Kares first cited Alleyne. Michigan courts rejected his arguments. In 2018, Kares unsuccessfully sought additional DNA testing under MCL 770.16.Kares filed a 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition in December 2018. The Michigan Supreme Court denied Kares’ application for leave to appeal the denial of his motion for biological testing in April 2019. The district court permitted Kares to amend his petition to include claims related to that request; he filed his amended petition in May 2019.The Sixth Circuit reversed an order denying as untimely Kares’s motion to vacate his sentence. Kares’ petition for DNA testing under MCL 770.16 tolls the limitations period; it was properly filed and calls for “postconviction or other collateral review” under 2244(d)(2). The court denied Kares’ motion to expand the certificate of appealability to include his merits “Alleyne” claim, which was procedurally defaulted. View "Kares v. Morrison" on Justia Law

Defendant One operated as a money broker for drug organizations that wanted to move money from the U.S. to Mexico. DEA agents infiltrated the operation. An undercover “coordinating agent” received from Defendant One a list of cities in which drug proceeds needed to be obtained and then coordinated with the DEA for a “receiving agent” to receive illicit funds. The coordinating agent provided a receiving agent’s phone number to Defendant One who shared it with his client. The money drop would be set up and executed, with the receiving agent obtaining illicit funds from a courier and depositing the funds in an undercover DEA bank account. The money was then transferred to Defendant One as cryptocurrency, then sent back to the client as cash.Guerrero was involved as a courier in three separate money drops in Chicago in 2020. Defendant One, Guerrero, and several other couriers were charged with conspiracy to launder money. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Guerrero’s convictions and sentence. Any errors involving venue or evidentiary rulings were not prejudicial. The court also rejected a claim of “variance,” that the evidence failed to demonstrate an overarching conspiracy between Guerrero and each individual named in the indictment, but rather demonstrated only a smaller conspiracy between himself and Defendant One. View "United States v. Rudy Guerrero" on Justia Law

In 2015, McBride was charged with first-degree murder, assault with intent to commit murder, carrying a concealed weapon, and carrying a firearm during the commission of a felony. After two trials, a jury convicted McBride on all charges. The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected his argument that the court erred in failing to admit his full police interview, that the evidence could not support his convictions, and that his counsel was ineffective. While his appeal was pending, McBride filed unsuccessful motions requesting a “Ginther” hearing to present evidence of his counsel’s ineffectiveness.In a brief to the Michigan Supreme Court, McBride first alleged that his due process rights were violated during his pretrial detention. That court returned this brief because McBride was represented by counsel. In a federal habeas claim, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1), McBride alleged his due process and Miranda rights were violated during his arrest and detention; his trial counsel was ineffective; and the Michigan courts erred in various evidentiary rulings. The district court dismissed claims without prejudice, citing the unexhausted first claim. A year later, McBride moved for reconsideration, arguing for the first time that his exhausted claims should be allowed to proceed under the Supreme Court’s “Rhines” decision which gives courts facing both exhausted and unexhausted claims two options besides dismissal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion, rejecting McBride’s argument that the district court should have sua sponte considered alternatives to dismissal. View "McBride v. Skipper" on Justia Law

Liggins was charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1),846, and aiding and abetting the possession with intent to distribute heroin, sections 841 and 2. At a pretrial hearing, the district judge remarked that Liggins, a Black man, “look[ed] like a criminal to me” and that Liggins was doing “what criminals do.” Liggins unsuccessfully moved for the judge’s recusal based on these remarks, among others, such as "I’m tired of this case. I’m tired of this defendant."The Sixth Circuit vacated Liggins's conviction and 127-month sentence and remanded to another district judge for a new trial. The judge's remarks could be understood to demonstrate clear prejudgment of Liggins’ guilt and could be understood to refer to Liggins's appearance rather than his behavior in insisting on a jury trial and changing attorneys. The judge also denied Liggins's requests to speak. "In this case, the risk of undermining the public’s confidence in the judicial process is significant." View "United States v. Liggins" on Justia Law

United provided Patterson's medical insurance under a plan subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1101. Patterson received a summary plan description, an ERISA-mandated synopsis of important plan terms but was not given a plan document with all of a plan’s governing language. The summary said that if a beneficiary recovered from a third party for an insured incident, the plan had a right to reimbursement. Patterson was injured in a traffic accident. United covered his medical expenses and notified Patterson it would invoke the reimbursement right. Patterson sued the other driver in state court and joined the plan, seeking a declaratory judgment that it had no reimbursement right. United’s lawyers claimed that no plan document existed. Patterson recovered and settled with the plan for $25,000. Months later, Patterson’s wife suffered injuries in another traffic accident. United paid her medical expenses. Patterson’s wife sued the driver in state court. She obtained a declaratory judgment after the plan's lawyers produced a plan document, stating that it took precedence over the summary and not including a reimbursement right.Patterson then filed a purported class action under ERISA, seeking the return of the $25,000. The district court dismissed the complaint. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part. Patterson had standing to sue only on his own behalf but has cognizable claims for breach of fiduciary duty and engagement in prohibited transactions. View "Patterson v. United Healthcare Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The district court preliminarily enjoined Kentucky’s ban on sex-transition care for minors. The court later stayed its injunction in light of a recent Sixth Circuit decision in which the court balanced the likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, the balance of harms, and the public interest and held that those factors favored allowing Tennessee to enforce its law. Kentucky bans the same conduct as in that case; the plaintiffs bring the same Equal Protection and Due Process claims that the Sixth Circuit held were unlikely to succeed. The Sixth Circuit declined to lift the stay. As a sovereign state, Kentucky has an interest in creating and enforcing its own laws. The people of Kentucky enacted the ban through their legislature. View "Doe v. Thornbury" on Justia Law

From 2014-2018, the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate instructed most Americans to purchase health insurance, 26 U.S.C. 5000A(a) Juntoff opted not to buy the minimum health insurance and failed to make his Shared Responsibility Payment of 2.5% of the taxpayer’s income, subject to a floor and a ceiling. After he declared bankruptcy, the IRS tried to collect the Payment from him and filed a proof of claim in bankruptcy court. The agency asked for priority above other debtors under a provision that covers bankruptcy “claims” by “governmental units” for any “tax on or measured by income,” 11 U.S.C. 507(a)(8)(A). The bankruptcy court denied the request, reasoning that the Shared Responsibility Payment was not a “tax on or measured by income” but was a penalty. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reversed.The Sixth Circuit ruled in favor of the government. The Shared Responsibility Payment is a “tax” under section 507(a)(8) and is “measured by income.” View "In re: Juntoff" on Justia Law