Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Kennedy was charged with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, fentanyl, heroin, and crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841, and distribution of methamphetamine, section 841. He pled guilty to Count 1 and stipulated that he “was involved in a drug trafficking conspiracy that distributed 50 grams or more of actual methamphetamine, as well as heroin, fentanyl, and crack cocaine.” He “frequently used cellular telephones and various social media accounts, including Facebook, to coordinate with his co-conspirators and to set up various drug deals.” He acknowledged sales of “approximately 99 grams of actual methamphetamine” on November 26, 2019, and of “approximately 270 grams of actual methamphetamine” on December 10.Kennedy’s PSR calculated a base offense level of 32 based on 150-500 grams of at least 80% pure methamphetamine, added two levels under USSG 2D1.1(b)(1) for firearm possession, and deducted three levels for acceptance of responsibility. The court rejected a four-level leadership enhancement because the operation was “decentralized in nature.” With a Guideline range of 168-210 months, the court imposed a 210-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the firearm enhancement was improperly applied; the district court failed to honor the read-and-discuss requirement under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i); and the Guidelines’ harsher treatment of pure methamphetamine was unfair. View "United States v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

Robinson pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon and possessing drugs with the intent to distribute them. During his supervised release term, Robinson was stopped, purportedly for a tinted-window infraction. The officer gave Robinson a warning for that violation, then asked for consent to search the car, allegedly stating that refusal to consent might violate the conditions of Robinson's supervised release. Robinson acknowledged having a gun. The officer searched the car and found a loaded handgun, marijuana, and cocaine. Robinson was not indicted.In proceedings to revoke Robinson’s supervised release, Robinson moved to suppress the evidence. The government conceded a Fourth Amendment violation. The court denied the motion. Robinson separately unsuccessfully moved for a jury trial on the supervised release violation. The court revoked Robinson’s supervised release and sentenced him to another 28 months.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The exclusionary rule does not bar illegally obtained evidence from a supervised release hearing. Defendants do not have a right to a jury at supervised-release hearings. While the Supreme Court recently found that the jury-trial guarantee applies to a unique provision—18 U.S.C. 3583(k)—that imposed a minimum 5-year prison term on a defendant who committed specified federal crimes while on supervised release, that decision did not render unconstitutional 18 U.S.C. 3583(g), which requires a court to impose a prison term of unspecified length if a defendant has engaged in certain conduct (such as possessing a gun) while on supervised release. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

A 2008 Michigan initiative decriminalized marijuana for medical purposes; a 2016 law afforded legal status to medical marijuana dispensaries. In Detroit, the Buildings, Safety Engineering, and Environmental Department (BSEED) screened applications for such facilities. The code prohibits locating such a facility in a drug-free zone–an area “within 1,000 radial feet of the zoning lot” containing any one of several "sensitive places," including a school.Genie applied to run a medical marijuana distribution facility on Mack Avenue in Detroit. BSEED denied the application at the screening stage because the proposed site was in a drug-free zone based on a lot (in the neighboring community of Grosse Point Park) on which St. Clare School sits. Genie unsuccessfully challenged the determination through state administrative and judicial channels. Detroit deemed the St. Clare’s “zoning lot” to include land where the parish church sits (the church and school have separate lots of record), all of which is listed under a single tax parcel number.Genie sued in federal court, arguing that Detroit erred in measuring the distance between the proposed Genie site and St. Clare’s while approving other sites in violation of the equal protection and due process guarantees. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Detroit. Genie had no property interest in its proposed facility. Detroit applied the same method of measurement to each comparable applicant. Although Genie cited two applications that were approved, many applications were rejected on that basis. View "Green Genie, Inc. v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

In 2019, Morgan began employment as Disciplinary Counsel for the Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee. During a disciplinary proceeding, Manookian, whose law license had been suspended, moved to disqualify Morgan as the Board’s counsel, claiming that Morgan was “an anti-Muslim bigot.” Manookian’s filing attached tweets posted by Morgan from 2015-2016 that allegedly demonstrated Morgan’s bias toward Muslims. Manookian is not Muslim but claimed that his wife was Muslim and that his children were being raised in a Muslim household. Morgan responded that the tweets were political in nature and related to the 2015–2016 presidential campaign; he disavowed any knowledge of the religious faith and practices of Manookian’s family. The Board moved for Morgan to withdraw as Board counsel in the appeal, which the court allowed. A week later, Garrett, the Board’s Chief Disciplinary Counsel, told Morgan that his employment would be terminated. Several months later, Garrett notified Morgan that the Board had opened a disciplinary file against him. The matter was later dismissed.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Morgan’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against the Board for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity but reversed the dismissal of the claim for damages against Garrett based on absolute quasi-judicial immunity. Extending judicial immunity here would extend its reach to areas previously denied— administrative acts like hiring and firing employees. View "Morgan v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee" on Justia Law

Harris went to the store, argued with a clerk, left the store, and entered the laundromat next door where his friend, Henderson, worked. Harris asserts that while he was between the buildings, the clerk came out, pointed a gun, and taunted him with racial slurs. Following Harris’s 911 call, four officers arrived. As shown on bodycams, they expressed disbelief in Harris’s report. The store clerk denied having a gun. The store had at least three surveillance cameras but the officers watched footage from only the front door, although Harris had reported that the incident occurred near the back door. Harris wanted to move forward with his report, believing the footage would corroborate his account. The officers indicated that the video revealed Harris had lied and arrested Harris. No officer took Henderson’s statement. Detective Busch reviewed the police report and passed it to the prosecutor for charging.Harris spent 18 days in jail before being released on bond. Weeks later, the state dropped Harris’s false felony report charge; the store clerks failed to appear. Harris sued the City of Saginaw, the officers, and Busch. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity summary judgment to the officers, the grant of qualified immunity to Busch, and the dismissal of Harris’s failure-to-train and failure-to-supervise claims against the city. There is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether the officers arrested Harris without probable cause. View "Harris v. City of Saginaw, Michigan" on Justia Law

M.Q., a student attending public school in Knox County, Tennessee, was diagnosed with autism. M.Q. is largely nonverbal and has developmental delays in communication skills, social/emotional behavior, and pre-vocational skills. A suit under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794; and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101, alleged that M.Q. was improperly excluded from the general education classroom setting and placed him in a self-contained classroom for students with disabilities for nearly all his kindergarten academic instruction.The district court held that this placement violated the IDEA but rejected claims that also it also violated Section 504 and the ADA. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court correctly found that the district complied with the statutory requirements with respect to including a general education teacher on M.Q.’s individual education plan (IEP) team— albeit under their most literal interpretation. The IEP cannot stand because it placed M.Q. in a more restrictive educational setting than his disability required. View "Knox County, Tennessee v. M.Q." on Justia Law

Following the Flint Water Crisis, thousands of cases were brought for the various harms minors, adults, property owners, and business owners endured as a result of lead-contaminated water. Putative class action lawsuits and individual lawsuits were consolidated in the Eastern District of Michigan, where Co-Lead Class Counsel and Co-Liaison Counsel were appointed to represent the putative class and individual plaintiffs. After years of negotiation, Co-Lead Class Counsel and Co-Liaison Counsel, together with the Settling Defendants, reached a record-breaking settlement. The court approved the settlement and awarded attorneys’ fees and reimbursement for expenses. Three Objector groups appealed that award.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Objectors are not entitled to detailed discovery of billing and cost records; assertions that those records would have shown excessive billing or revealed the inclusion of time not performed for the common benefit are entirely speculative. The Objectors lack standing to appeal the structure of the fee award; they would fare no better with or without the Common Benefit Assessments applicable to their claims. Were they to have standing, they did not demonstrate that the court abused its discretion in awarding Common Benefit Assessments, particularly when those assessments achieve parity among settlement beneficiaries and are reasonable under the circumstance. The court upheld an award of $500 for bone scans. View "Waid v. Snyder" on Justia Law

Cash died when a hammermill shredder exploded at his workplace. The Tennessee Occupational Safety and Health Administration (TOSHA) determined that the explosion was primarily caused by the accumulation of combustible aluminum dust produced by the shredding process. The personal representative of his estate sued REI, the company that assembled and sold the shredder to LR, Cash’s employer, asserting four product-liability claims. The district court granted REI summary judgment, because it “did not design the hammermill system at issue, and instead assisted LR with locating primarily used components that LR requested based on the design of LR’s existing system, REI is not legally responsible for any alleged defect in the system as a whole.”The Sixth Circuit reversed. A key requirement of the contract-specification defense is that the customer provided the manufacturer with detailed plans or specifications directing how the product should be built. The district court erred in holding that no genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether REI followed LR’s design specifications. There was evidence to suggest that REI contemplated incorporating a dust-collection bin in the design, one that had not been requested. View "Cash-Darling v. Recycling Equipment, Inc." on Justia Law

Moss purchased cocaine from a DEA informant and was charged with possession with intent to deliver 1,000 or more grams of cocaine and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Moss’s first attorney moved for an entrapment hearing. Steingold then began representing Moss. At the entrapment hearing, 10 days later, Steingold attested to minimal pre-trial preparation. Moss was the only witness he presented. Steingold requested a continuance to contact witnesses he learned about during Moss’s direct and cross-examination. The court permitted Steingold to contact one witness but denied a continuance. The prosecution presented five witnesses and multiple exhibits. The court denied Moss’s motion to dismiss based on entrapment.At trial, Steingold waived his opening argument, presented no witnesses, and stipulated to the admission of the transcript from the entrapment hearing as substantive evidence. For one of the government’s two witnesses, Steingold did not object during his testimony or conduct any cross-examination. Steingold waived his closing argument. On appeal, Moss unsuccessfully argued that Steingold provided constitutionally ineffective assistance by waiving Moss’s right to a jury trial and stipulating to the admission of the evidence from the entrapment hearing.The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s order of habeas relief. The state court’s denial of Moss’s ineffective assistance claims under Strickland was not contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. View "Moss v. Miniard" on Justia Law

Simmonds ran a drug-trafficking conspiracy. During traffic stops, officers seized large quantities of fentanyl from co-conspirators acting under Simmonds’s instructions. Investigators also searched an apartment and four storage units associated with Simmonds, where they seized cash, cell phones, fentanyl, methamphetamine, cocaine, xylazine, and suspected marijuana, plus shipping and packaging supplies. At one unit, investigators seized a firearm, ammunition, and Simmonds’s passport and birth certificate.Simmonds pled guilty to conspiring to distribute drugs, possessing a controlled substance with intent to distribute, and using a cell phone to facilitate a felony drug offense. In the plea agreement, Simmonds agreed that “sentencing rests within the discretion of the Court,” that the guideline range would be determined by the court after a PSR was prepared, and to a base offense level 32. The government would seek two-level enhancements for possession of a firearm, and for being an organizer or leader of a criminal activity but “no other specific offense characteristics, Guideline adjustments or Guideline departures.” The PSR departed from that recommendation. The district court followed the PSR, set the base offense level at 36, and accepted four recommended enhancements, bringing the offense level to 43. Simmonds’ Guideline range was life imprisonment. The court sentenced Simmonds to 250 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Simmonds cannot show that the prosecution breached the plea agreement nor can he show that the court committed reversible error by failing to notice and rectify a breach of the agreement. View "United States v. Simmonds" on Justia Law