Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The trustees of three multi-employer benefit funds sued Pro Services under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001, and the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. 141, to recover unpaid benefit contributions allegedly owed by Pro Services, an industrial contractor that supplies skilled trade workers in the construction and manufacturing industries. Under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and fund documents, Pro Services must contribute to the fringe benefit funds for work performed within the CBA’s Trade Jurisdiction. The Funds relied on audits conducted by a third-party firm to allege that nearly $8 million in contributions and damages arose from hours worked by 230 Full-Service Maintenance Technicians (FMTs) employed by Pro Services, from 2013-2019.The district court granted Pro Services summary judgment—it was undisputed that the FMTs worked in manufacturing, and the court concluded that the CBA covered workers in the construction industry based only on a caption in the CBA. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The standard form caption cannot be used to limit the application of the CBA’s substantive terms, without the court first finding those substantive provisions ambiguous; the CBA is unambiguous. View "Trustees of Sheet Metal Workers Local 7 v. Pro Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Consumers alleged that Ford cheated on its fuel economy and emissions testing for certain truck models, including the F-150 and Ranger. The Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. 6201, and its regulations control such testing, the results of which are sent to the EPA. The EPA uses the information to provide fuel economy estimates for labels affixed to new vehicles. The FTC regulates advertising to consumers; Its “Guide Concerning Fuel Economy Advertising for New Vehicles” advises vehicle manufacturers and dealers about disclosing the established fuel economy of a vehicle, as determined by the EPA. The EPA and Department of Justice investigated Ford’s testing and resultsThe Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the purported class action, which included claims of breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, breach of express warranty, fraud, and unjust enrichment under the laws of every state. The claims are preempted by federal law as they inevitably conflict with the EPA’s regime. The EPA accepted Ford’s testing information and published its own estimate based on that information. The EPA has the authority to approve or reject Ford's figures. The tort claims essentially challenge the EPA’s figures. The EPA must balance several objectives in reaching those figures, and these claims would skew this balance. View "Lloyd v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

A False Claims Act qui tam action was filed under seal against SHH and its nursing facilities, alleging that SHH provided unreasonable and unnecessary services to claim the highest possible Medicare reimbursement. Three co-relators also alleged that SHH retaliated against them for internally reporting fraudulent billing practices. SHH received a Department of Justice notification that it was the subject of a fraudulent claims investigation, requesting information about recent terminations of SHH employees, including the relators. It did not explicitly refer to the retaliation allegations.Two years later, SHH obtained liability coverage. Allied's claims-made policy applies only to claims first made during the policy period. SHH's application checked "none" when asked to “provide full details of all inquiries, investigations, administrative charges, claims, and lawsuits filed” within the last three years. SHH checked “no” to whether “[SHH], any Subsidiary, any Executive or other entity proposed for coverage kn[ew] of any act, error or omission which could give rise to a claim, suit or action.” An application exclusion, incorporated into the policy, stated that if such information existed, any inquiry, investigation, administrative charge, claim, or lawsuit arising therefrom or arising from such violation, knowledge, information, or involvement is excluded from coverage.The qui tam action was unsealed. SHH notified Allied and sought coverage for defense costs. Allied denied coverage. SHH sued. SHH later settled the relators' retaliation claim ($2.2 million) and finalized a $10 million settlement for the claims-submissions violations. The district court granted SHH partial summary judgment, awarding $2,336,786.35. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The plain language of SHH’s policy excluded coverage. View "SHH Holdings, LLC v. Allied World Specialty Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Ferguson, a 20-year-old black man, went online, describing his desire to create a militia group and “orchestrate raids for supplies such as weapons and armor.” An FBI informant, “Guiness,” contacted Ferguson on Discord and was added to the group. Guiness pressured Ferguson to meet for “training.” On April 28, Ferguson first described to the group an idea for ambushing a patrol car but stated, “It’s not happening right now.” The two met on May 2, joined by another informant, “Steve.” At Guiness’s request, Ferguson brought his AR-15 rifle. The group engaged in faux military exercises. Ferguson described having a girl fake a domestic violence call at “the end of the month or even June.” On May 5, without any request by Ferguson, Guiness sent a picture of an abandoned house in Cuyahoga Valley National Park, saying, “Perfect location.”On May 8, the three hiked to the abandoned house, unarmed, with Ferguson saying that if multiple cops responded, they’d have to start shooting. Guiness suggested a “dry run” to time police response and called 911. When rangers arrived, the men ran toward their car but were arrested. The FBI executed a search warrant for Ferguson’s residence, seizing an AR15 rifle, ammunition, magazines, tactical gear, and a guerilla warfare manual.Ferguson was convicted of two counts of attempted kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. 1201(a), (d). The Sixth Circuit reversed. No rational juror could have found Ferguson guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Any possible plan was constantly changing. Ferguson had not decided what to do with the officers other than take their gear. Ferguson did not take a substantial step; his actions did not clearly corroborate an intent to commit a kidnapping. View "United States v. Ferguson" on Justia Law

Adams and Mounts mined coal in Kentucky. Both wore respirators to protect their lungs but nevertheless developed pneumoconiosis, a disease caused by inhaled dust particles. They sued 3M and other out-of-state respirator manufacturers and distributors. Adams’ complaint named more than 400 co-plaintiffs. Mounts’ complaint named more than 300 co-plaintiffs. 3M removed the cases to federal court. The district court remanded to state court.On interlocutory appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed the remand order. The 2005 Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) extends federal diversity jurisdiction to certain “mass action[s]” involving “100 or more persons,” 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) and permits removal of any civil action “in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claims involve common questions of law or fact.” These complaints did that. Claims presented in a single complaint proceed through a common trial process absent an order to the contrary; when the plaintiffs each filed complaints with more than 100 co-plaintiffs, they offered to try their co-plaintiffs’ claims jointly. Both complaints sought “a trial by jury” and a singular “judgment,” not multiple trials and judgments. By filing a complaint predicated on a “common” “question of law or fact,” the plaintiffs offered the presence of common questions as a “ground” for pursuing a joint trial, View "Adams v. 3M Co." on Justia Law

Medlin pleaded guilty to kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1). Based on a guidelines range of 210-262 months and a maximum sentence of life, the district court took into account Medlin’s history of drug abuse, his parents’ incarceration during his childhood, his two children, his criminal history, the serious nature and circumstances of the offense, the respective roles of the co-conspirators, and balancing the factors in section 3553(a).The Sixth Circuit affirmed his sentence of 220 months’ imprisonment, upholding the application of a four-level enhancement to Medlin’s offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2A4.1(b)(2)(A), which applies “[i]f the victim sustained permanent or life-threatening bodily injury[.]” The court noted that one victim suffered multiple, serious, distinct injuries and was forced to ingest methamphetamine. He sustained permanent injuries through the loss of teeth that were extracted, permanent scarring on his face from the beating suffered, and permanent scarring on his arm/shoulder from being burned with a blow torch. The defendants threatened the victims with death if they reported the assault to the police; a co-conspirator brandished a firearm “in a threatening manner towards the [v]ictims” on multiple occasions. The court also rejected an argument that there was an unreasonable disparity between his sentence and the sentences of his co-defendants. View "United States v. Medlin" on Justia Law

In 2010, Keller and others broke into a Shelby County house occupied by Morrow and Jones and two minor children. Keller threatened the occupants with a gun while demanding money. One assailant repeatedly struck Morrow in the head. All the assailants ransacked the house. One child hid and called 911. After his conviction Keller sought a new trial, raising several challenges to his convictions and sentence; he did not raise a double-jeopardy claim. For the first time, on appeal to the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals, Keller argued his convictions violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, in that his convictions for attempted especially aggravated robbery and aggravated assault of Morrow were for the same offense, and that all of his convictions should have merged into a single conviction for aggravated robbery of Morrow. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeal found that Keller waived his double-jeopardy claim by not raising it in his motion for a new trial as required by Tennessee’s procedural rules. Keller had acknowledged the waiver. Considering Keller’s double-jeopardy claim under plain-error review, the court held that the double-jeopardy claim failed.After unsuccessfully seeking post-conviction relief in state court, Keller filed a federal habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of his federal 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition on the double jeopardy claim. Keller, by his own concession, procedurally defaulted his double-jeopardy claim. View "Keller v. Genovese" on Justia Law

The DEA received a tip from a local pharmacist that Dr. Anderson, an Ohio physician, was seeing patients who had been discharged by other physicians for non-compliance. The pharmacist was one of several who had grown concerned about Anderson’s prescribing practices relating to pain medications. The State Medical Board of Ohio expressed concern that Anderson was not prescribing in the usual course of practice or for a legitimate medical purpose. Separately, one of Anderson’s patients contacted the local sheriff’s office, voicing his concern that he sometimes would not get to see Anderson at his appointments and would occasionally retrieve his prescriptions from the receptionist rather than from Anderson himself. The DEA launched an investigation into Anderson, used a confidential informant, and then executed a search warrant to obtain evidence.Anderson was convicted of one count of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, eight counts of unlawful distribution of controlled substances, and one count of healthcare fraud. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, the district court’s refusal to give a good faith jury instruction, and the admission of the government’s expert testimony. View "United States v. Anderson" on Justia Law

The Lemasters run a Lawrence County, Kentucky towing business, which was on the county’s “rotation list” of companies to call when it needed to order a tow. Both as fire chief and in his towing business, Lemaster sparred with Carter, Lawrence County’s “judge-executive,” the elected head of its executive branch. Lemaster criticized Carter on Facebook. Five days later, the 911 Center sent an email to dispatchers; its subject identified Lemaster Towing and the Cherryville Fire Department. Its body stated in all caps: “Per Judge Carter do not tone them out on any fire calls[;] use nearest department[;] . . . Lemaster Towing is no longer on the rotation list[.]”The Lemasters sued Carter and Lawrence County under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law, alleging that Carter violated the First Amendment by removing Lemaster Towing from the rotation list in retaliation for Lemaster’s criticisms. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed as to the Monell claims against the county; Lemaster did not tie the actions to any county policy. The court reversed as to Carter. Carter conceded that his communications with dispatch employees could constitute an adverse action. The record would allow a rational jury to find that Lemaster’s Facebook post motivated Carter’s decision to remove Lemaster Towing from the rotation list. View "Lemaster v. Lawrence County, Kentucky" on Justia Law

Responding to a “shots fired” call, officers arrived at an apartment, finding blood on the walls, bullet holes in the TV, broken glass, and items scattered everywhere. Crump, who was incoherent and wearing only a towel, was the only person inside. A protective sweep and subsequent search led the police to find two guns, ammunition, drugs (870 grams of marijuana packaged for resale and 27.3 grams of crack cocaine), drug paraphernalia, burner phones with messages about drugs and guns, and several documents bearing Crump’s name. After his arrest, Crump said on recorded phone calls that he had fired a gun and wanted to get back to drug trafficking.Crump was convicted of possessing a firearm and ammunition as a felon (18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924). His PSR calculated Crump’s guidelines range as 262-327, based on the conclusions that Crump qualified as an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. 924(e) and possessed a firearm in connection with a controlled substance offense. The court imposed a 210-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. There were guns in the apartment, and a rational juror could have found that Crump possessed each of them. The district court properly gave instructions on both actual and constructive possession. The court upheld a finding that Crump possessed the guns and ammunition “in connection with” a controlled substance offense and upheld his sentence as reasonable. View "United States v. Crump" on Justia Law