Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2020, three individuals opposed the Kentucky Governor’s COVID-19 restrictions on religious gatherings and on interstate travel. They obtained preliminary injunctions against the orders. The case was eventually dismissed as moot. The district court awarded them $272,142.50 in attorney’s fees as prevailing parties, 42 U.S.C. 1988(b). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the fees award.A preliminary injunction may suffice to establish “prevailing party” status if it mainly turns on the likelihood-of-success inquiry and changes the parties’ relationship in a material and enduring way. These injunctions measure up favorably in terms of the nature of the injunctions, the longevity of the relief, and the irrevocability of the relief. The court also rejected challenges to the amount of the award. View "Roberts v. Neace" on Justia Law

Baugh coordinated a 2009 plan to use a gun to steal cocaine from a drug dealer and resell it. He was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence or a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). In accordance with the law at the time, the jury was instructed that either the cocaine conspiracy or the Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy could furnish the predicate offense for the section 924(c) count. The Supreme Court subsequently held that the residual clause pursuant to which Baugh’s Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy conviction qualified as a crime of violence was unconstitutionally vague.The district court denied Baugh's motion to vacate his section 924(c) conviction, as resting on an invalid predicate. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. There is no reason to believe that the jury based Baugh’s section 924(c) conviction on only his Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy conviction and not also on his cocaine conspiracy conviction. Baugh does not explain how it would be possible to possess a firearm in furtherance of a conspiracy to “steal” cocaine without also possessing the firearm in furtherance of a conspiracy to “possess” it. View "Baugh v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2015, Levine, an African-American woman, applied for the position of supervisor of customer services at the main post office in Grand Rapids, Michigan. Levine had then worked for USPS for over 27 years, in a variety of positions. USPS did not select Levine for the position. Instead, it hired a white employee, Peare, whom Levine alleges was significantly less qualified than Levine. USPS disputes Levine’s allegations that the failure to hire her was racially discriminatory under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e.The district court granted USPS summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting various factual disputes. Levine met her burden of producing enough evidence to convince a reasonable jury that USPS’s proffered reasons for not promoting her may have been a mere pretext for racial discrimination, so USPS was not entitled to summary judgment. The parties dispute the position’s requirements. Levine possesses three post-secondary degrees and has had seven different awards from USPS. Peare’s formal academic training ended with high school and she had worked for USPS for nearly eight years. Levine provided abundant evidence that she is arguably more qualified for the position than Peare. USPS’s reliance on Peare’s purportedly superior interview warrants similar scrutiny as does USPS’s contention that Peare had more relevant experience than Levine. View "Levine v. DeJoy" on Justia Law

Gilbert, on parole for a state conviction, was arrested for printing false identifications and credit cards and was returned to the custody of the Michigan Department of Corrections. Federal authorities charged Gilbert with identity theft crimes. Wolf was Gilbert's appointed counsel. Gilbert consented to federal detention pending trial. Gilbert pleaded guilty under 18 U.S.C. 1029(a)(4) and 1028A(a)(1). After reviewing Gilbert’s PSR, Wolf realized that he had mistakenly led Gilbert to believe that the time Gilbert had spent in federal detention would be credited against his federal sentence. Wolf acknowledged the error. The court offered Gilbert the opportunity to withdraw his plea but Gilbert decided to continue with sentencing. The court sentenced Gilbert to 15 months on Count 1, concurrent to the undischarged Michigan term, and 24 months on Count 2, “consecutive to Count 1 and all other terms of imprisonment.”Gilbert filed a habeas motion. Wolf admitted that he gave Gilbert erroneous advice and that because of his incorrect understanding of the law he did not expedite Gilbert’s guilty plea and sentence; did not seek a downward adjustment under USSG 5G1.3; and did not object when the court ruled that the aggravated identity theft sentence had to run consecutive to all other undischarged sentences. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Even if Gilbert could demonstrate that counsel’s performance—initial error followed by correction—was deficient, he failed to present evidence of prejudice. Sentences imposed under the aggravated identity theft statute must run consecutive to all other (including state) sentences and are not subject to USSG 5G1.3 adjustments. View "Gilbert v. United States" on Justia Law

Following a 29% drop in Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) stock prices in 2007, OPERS, a state pension fund, filed a securities fraud case against Freddie Mac. The district court dismissed, concluding that OPERS failed to adequately plead loss causation because the theory OPERS pursued (materialization of the risk) had not been adopted in the circuit. The Sixth Circuit reversed, “join[ing] our fellow circuits in recognizing the viability of alternative theories of loss causation and apply[ing] materialization of the risk.” On remand, the district court denied OPERS’ motion for class certification, granted Freddie Mac’s motion to exclude OPERS’ expert, and denied OPERS’ motion to exclude Freddie Mac’s experts.The Sixth Circuit denied OPERS’s petition for leave to appeal. OPERS asked the district court to enter “sua sponte” summary judgment for Freddie Mac, arguing that the class certification decision prevented OPERS’ case from proceeding, as it doomed OPERS’ ability to prove loss causation. The district court summarily agreed and entered summary judgment for Freddie Mac. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, citing its lack of jurisdiction. The summary judgment decision was manufactured by OPERS in an apparent attempt to circumvent the requirements of Federal Rule 23(f). The decision was not final. View "Ohio Public Employees Retirement System v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp." on Justia Law

In 1991, Jackson was wrongfully convicted of murder. In 2016, the Innocence Project requested from the Cleveland Police documents relating to the investigation, pursuant to the Ohio Public Records Act. Receiving no response, Innocence Project sent a request to the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office. Assistant Prosecuting Attorney Marburger produced a heavily redacted file. The Act exempts “investigatory work product” and “[t]rial preparation record[s]” from production as public records. Months later, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the investigatory-work-product exception did not extend beyond the conclusion of a trial. Cleveland then produced the unredacted file, which included significant exculpatory evidence. The Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office also produced an unredacted file. A state-court judge vacated Jackson’s conviction. In 2019, he was finally exonerated. Jackson filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Against Marburger, Jackson alleged denial of access to courts.The Sixth Circuit held that Marburger is not entitled to absolute immunity. Responding to a records request after the conclusion of a trial and appeal is not an action that is an inherent part of a prosecutor’s adversarial function. The court reversed the denial of qualified immunity. Jackson plausibly stated a claim that Marburger violated his right of access to the courts when she removed exculpatory information from the file and effectively prevented him from filing for postconviction relief but in 2016 it was not clearly established that redacting exculpatory information from a response to a public-records request effectively covered-up evidence. View "Jackson v. City of Cleveland" on Justia Law

Around midnight, Woolridge walked through an Akron neighborhood where police were searching for a fugitive. Officer Collins approached him and asked for his name. Woolridge turned and ran, tossing several items. Officers caught Woolridge, who immediately said, “I got a warrant” and “I got a parole violation.” Collins moved Woolridge to a containment van while, Woolridge tried to speak with Collins, who brushed him off. Eventually, Collins asked Woolridge about the items he threw during the chase. Woolridge ultimately explained that his brother had been murdered and “I had a firearm.” Officers found the gun only after asking Woolridge to specify where he threw the gun. As Collins began reading the Miranda warnings, Woolridge said “I know my rights.” Collins proceeded to give them. Woolridge again explained that he had carried the gun due to his brother’s murder.Charged as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). Woolridge moved to suppress the statements he made before receiving the Miranda warnings. The district court suppressed the unwarned statements and permitted the admission of the post-Miranda statements. Woolridge pleaded guilty. The court varied upward by 13 months, imposing a 46-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Woolridge knew he had a choice and decided to speak anyway. The court explained its reasons for the sentence: Woolridge’s numerous offenses, his pattern of illegally possessing firearms, and many prison rule infractions. View "United States v. Woolridge" on Justia Law

Acuity operates a website that connects people looking to buy or sell homes with a local real estate agent. Acuity’s services are free to home buyers and sellers but realtors pay a fee for referrals. The real-estate broker that employed Lewis, a real estate agent, signed up to receive Acuity’s referrals. The broker required its agents (including Lewis) to pay Acuity’s fee out of their commissions from home sales. Lewis sued, alleging that Acuity makes false claims to home buyers and sellers on its website and that this false advertising violates the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a)(1)(B).The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The Lanham Act provides a cause of action only for businesses that suffer commercial injuries (such as lost product sales) from the challenged false advertising. The Act does not provide a cause of action for customers who suffer consumer injuries (such as the cost of a defective product) from false advertising. Lewis alleges that type of consumer harm as his injury from Acuity’s allegedly false advertising: He seeks to recover the referral fee (that is, the price) he paid for Acuity’s services. View "Lewis v. Acuity Real Estate Services, LLC" on Justia Law

Two gangsters convicted under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961-68, challenged their convictions and sentences, raising an unprecedented legal theory—that district courts must apply the “categorical approach” to determine whether a state law crime qualifies as a predicate for “racketeering activity” under section 1961(1)(A). They argued that because Michigan’s robbery statute is categorically broader than generic robbery, the jury’s special verdict that found robbery as a predicate racketeering activity did not establish generic robbery.The Sixth Circuit rejected their argument and affirmed. Under RICO, “racketeering activity means any act or threat involving … robbery …, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year.” This encompasses more conduct than defined by Michigan’s statute, not less. The language refers unequivocally to the defendant’s conduct, not the state law or the elements of the state statute. Section 1961(1)(A) does not require a conviction or even require evidence sufficient for a conviction; it requires conduct that is chargeable under state law. View "United States v. Jefferson" on Justia Law

In 1987, a Michigan jury convicted Burton of first-degree murder and a firearm charge. He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. In 2019, Burton was released from prison and his conviction was vacated on the prosecutor’s motion after key witnesses recanted and details of witness manipulation and intimidation were revealed. Detective Sanders’s investigative tactics allegedly included threats and physical violence against witnesses, including minors. In 2020,Burton filed claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988 against Sanders and Detroit for Brady violations, malicious prosecution, and fabrication of evidence. The district court dismissed Burton’s claims as barred by Detroit’s Chapter 9 bankruptcy which occurred after Burton’s claims arose. Burton’s claims against Sanders remain pending. Burton’s sons then filed suit against Sanders and the city, alleging that the wrongful conviction and incarceration of their father throughout their childhood and into adulthood violated their constitutional right to family integrity. The district court dismissed, finding no cognizable due process right for “interference with family integrity” when a party is indirectly harmed by a constitutional tort against a family member. The Sixth Circuit affirmed; the plaintiffs have not alleged that the defendants acted with a culpable state of mind, directed toward them or their family unit. View "Chambers v. Sanders" on Justia Law