Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Debtor filed a chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. The chapter 13 trustee moved to convert the Debtor’s case to chapter 7 or to dismiss the case with a bar to refiling. The Debtor requested that the motion be denied. After the Conversion Hearing, while the matter was still pending, the Debtor filed chapter 13 plan amendments, amended schedules, and an amended bankruptcy petition, all seeking relief under chapter 13. The bankruptcy court entered a Conversion Order. The Debtor subsequently unsuccessfully sought reconsideration, dismissal, withdrawal, suspension, abstention, or other relief and did not cooperate with the Trustee as required (11 U.S.C. 521), resulting in civil contempt, sanctions, and default judgments.Two years after conversion, the Debtor filed a “Motion to Withdraw Pursuant to [sic] U.S.C. 1307(b) and Debtor’s Request to Dismiss Prior to Conversion,” claiming for the first time that she had orally moved to dismiss her case during the Conversion Hearing. Instead of filing a brief or other information as requested by the court, the Debtor sought various forms of relief. The bankruptcy court denied the Debtor’s Motion for Injunctive and Other Relief as a “delay tactic.” The Debtor continued to seek various relief. The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed; the Debtor’s assertion that she requested dismissal of the chapter 13 case before conversion is false and 11 U.S.C. 1307 does not grant a debtor an absolute right to dismiss a case post-conversion. View "In re: Skandis" on Justia Law

Rodriguez filed a purported class action, alleging that Hirshberg violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Because a pending Sixth Circuit case (VanderKodde) would likely resolve the issues, the parties jointly requested a stay. The district court, however, administratively closed the case in November 2018, instructing that within 14 days of the VanderKodde decision, either party could move to reopen the case and that the motion would be granted. In February 2020, the Sixth Circuit decided VanderKodde. Neither party moved to reopen until June. Rodriguez then explained that counsel had mistakenly confused the court’s deadline and noted the onset of the pandemic. The district court denied Rodriguez’s motion without issuing a separate judgment.Rodriguez filed a notice of appeal more than 30 days after the order. Hirshberg moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely. The Sixth Circuit denied the motion because the district court did not enter a separate judgment. Rodriguez also filed a new complaint in state court. Hirshberg removed this second case to the federal district court, where it was dismissed on res judicata grounds.Consolidating the issues, the Sixth Circuit reversed. Using an “administrative closure” to suspend and ultimately dismiss the suit arose from judicial fiat, not the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which articulate different procedures for dispensing with a case. In this instance, the district court’s deployment of local practices is irreconcilable with the requirements set forth in the Rules. View "Rodriguez v. Hirshberg Acceptance Corp." on Justia Law

Smucker’s is a federal contractor that supplies food items to the federal government. In 2021, by Executive Order, President Biden directed all federal contractors to “ensure that all [their] employees [were] fully vaccinated for COVID-19,” unless such employees were “legally entitled” to health or religious accommodations. The order made contractors “responsible for considering, and dispositioning, such requests for accommodations.” In September 2021, Smucker’s notified its U.S. employees that it would “ask and expect” them to “be fully vaccinated.” A month later, in the face of “deadlines in the federal order,” Smucker’s announced a formal vaccine mandate with exemptions based on “sincerely held religious beliefs.”The plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought religious exemptions, then sued Smucker's under the First Amendment's free-exercise guarantee. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. When Smucker’s denied the exemption requests, it was not a state actor. Smucker’s does not perform a traditional, exclusive public function; it has not acted jointly with the government or entwined itself with it; and the government did not compel it to deny anyone an exemption. That Smucker’s acted in compliance with federal law and that Smucker’s served as a federal contractor, do not by themselves make the company a government actor. View "Ciraci v. J.M. Smucker Co." on Justia Law

A government informant arranged to buy meth at Kilbourne’s home. When the informant arrived, Kilbourne was not there. The informant purchased meth from Reinberg and asked Reinberg about purchasing a gun. Reinberg stated she would “have [Kilbourne] hit you up on that.” Later, Kilbourne sold the gun to the informant. Kilbourne was arrested. Reinberg pled guilty, without an agreement, to drug offenses. Reinberg’s attorney stopped her from answering questions about the gun because she was not charged with any gun offenses. The government opposed Reinberg’s for safety-valve relief at sentencing. Reinberg later claimed “she was aware of the gun” but was not involved in its sale. The government opposed her safety-valve request again, claiming that a video of the meth sale showed Reinberg knew more.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of safety-valve relief and a 60-month sentence. The safety-valve provision allows a court to impose a sentence shorter than the statutory minimum, 18 U.S.C. 3553(f), if the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that she meets "every criterion,” including telling the government all information she has concerning the offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme. The district court found the conversation with the informant indicated that the gun was present. Reinberg withheld information. That finding was not clearly erroneous. Reinberg identified the gun by name, twice remarked “it’s pretty,” and facilitated its later sale. View "United States v. Reinberg" on Justia Law

In 2001, Akridge was convicted of conspiring to distribute at least 50 grams of crack cocaine; possessing with intent to distribute crack cocaine; possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime; and possessing a firearm as a felon. Akridge had prior convictions for aggravated assault and possession of cocaine. He was sentenced as a career offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1 based on a then-mandatory Guidelines range of 30 years’ to life imprisonment for his drug-trafficking offenses. Akridge also was subject to a mandatory consecutive 25-year sentence for using a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, since he had a prior conviction under 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The court sentenced Akridge to 55 years’ imprisonment: 30 years for his drug and a consecutive 25-year term.The 2010 Fair Sentencing Act reduced the sentencing disparity between crack- and powder-cocaine penalties; the 2018 First Step Act made this change retroactive. Akridge sought a sentence reduction, acknowledging that his career-offender designation and corresponding offense level remained unchanged. Proceeding to the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, the court noted that while Akridge had taken vocational and self-improvement classes, he had also received 11 disciplinary sanctions. Citing Akridge’s post-sentencing misconduct and criminal history, the court declined to reduce his sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court miscalculated his Guidelines’ range and that its “3553(a) analysis was procedurally incomplete … because it was anchored” to the wrong career-offender range. View "United States v. Akridge" on Justia Law

Based on nominations, UC awarded “triumph cords” to graduating students who had overcome adversity. UC did not vet the nominees and unintentionally awarded a cord to a convicted sex offender. Goldblum, UC’s Title IX coordinator, told her supervisor, Marshall, that she would investigate how UC evaluated admissions applications from convicted sex offenders and address the controversy in the student newspaper. Goldblum forwarded a letter to Marshall, who ordered Goldblum not to submit anything until Marshall coordinated with other University officials. The administration had authorized Dean Petren to address the controversy. Marshall told Goldblum that Petren would issue UC’s response. Marshall also identified problems with the letter’s content. Goldblum texted Marshall that she intended to submit the letter and accept “any repercussions.” Marshall texted: “Please do not send.” Goldblum sent the letter, which was never published. Marshall reported Goldblum’s insubordination. During an investigation, UC discovered additional infractions: Goldblum repeatedly ignored Title IX complaints, criticized her colleagues in front of her staff, and missed reporting deadlines. UC allowed Goldblum to resign in lieu of termination.Goldblum sued UC for unlawful termination under Title VII and Title IX. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claims. UC had legitimate nonretaliatory reasons to fire Goldblum, who has not produced “sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably reject” UC’s proffered reasons. Her letter was not “protected activity.” No reasonable juror could conclude that UC’s work-performance rationale was not based in fact. View "Goldblum v. University of Cincinnati" on Justia Law

Before 2017, B. lived in Illinois; he had no formal mental health diagnoses. B.’s school records reflected that he was meeting academic and behavioral expectations with no safety plan, individualized education program (IEP) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) 20 U.S.C. 1415(i)(2), or section 504 plan. The family moved to Tennessee. There were disciplinary referrals during the first several weeks of school. B. was admitted to a medical center. His discharge papers listed: unspecified disruptive, impulse-control, and conduct disorder, and Generalized Anxiety Disorder. His parents and the school discussed the possibility of an IEP or section 504 plan. B. received additional disciplinary referrals and was arrested by a school resource officer for disorderly conduct. B. was suspended pending a hearing. His parents withdrew B. from school before the hearing and enrolled B. in a private school for the 2018–2019 school year.B.’s parents alleged B. had been denied a free appropriate public education (FAPE) by failure to identify and evaluate him for special education services and failing to implement an IEP. The district initiated an evaluation and determined that B. was eligible for services. An ALJ found that the district did not deny B. a FAPE and that the parents were not entitled to reimbursement for B.’s private school education.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the parents’ IDEA suit. B. had no history of receiving special education services and attended the school for a very brief time. It is contested whether the school was aware of B.’s formal diagnoses. Expert witnesses testified that they did not believe a special education referral had been necessary. While the district was not as communicative or responsive as it could have been, it did not overlook “clear signs of disability” and was not negligent in failing to order testing. View "Ja. B. v. Wilson County Board of Education" on Justia Law

The 2020 Horseracing Safety and Integrity Act created a national framework to regulate thoroughbred horseracing, replacing several state regulatory authorities with a private corporation, the Horseracing Authority, the Act’s primary rule-maker. The Authority was not subordinate to the relevant public agency, the Federal Trade Commission, in critical ways. In 2022, the Fifth Circuit declared the Act unconstitutional because it gave “a private entity the last word” on federal law. Congress amended the Act to give the Federal Trade Commission discretion to “abrogate, add to, and modify” any rules that bind the industry, 15 U.S.C. 3053(e).The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a suit filed by Oklahoma, West Virginia, Louisiana, their racing commissions, and other entities that made the same claims as the Fifth Circuit case. While the challenges are not moot, the Authority is now subordinate to the FTC, which has “pervasive” oversight and control of the Authority’s enforcement activities, just as it does in the rulemaking context. The court rejected a “commandeering” challenge to a provision that requires state authorities to “cooperate and share information” with the Authority or federal agencies for lack of standing and rejected claims that the Act was coercive or punitive. View "State of Oklahoma v. United States" on Justia Law

Bouye financed a furniture purchase with Winner through a retail installment contract (RIC). Winner supposedly sold the debt to Mariner. Bouye defaulted. Mariner, through its attorney (Bruce), sued in state court to recover the debt and attorney’s fees “of one-third of the amount" collected; the RIC limited fees to 15% of the unpaid balance. The attached RIC did not establish a transfer to Mariner. The court ordered Mariner to file proof of assignment. Mariner filed an updated RIC that listed Winner’s store manager as assigning the debt to Mariner. The court granted Mariner summary judgment. The Kentucky appellate court found that Mariner had not sufficiently demonstrated a valid transfer. Mariner dismissed the case.Bouye sued Bruce in federal court under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692(e), 380 days after Mariner sued in state court. The district court dismissed the complaint as untimely under FDCPA’s one-year limitations period. Bruce sought attorney’s fees. Meanwhile, Bouye and Mariner entered into a settlement that released Mariner, later clarifying that Bruce was not released.Three months before the court denied motions for reconsideration and attorney’s fees, Bruce learned of the settlement. The Sixth Circuit first held the settlement did not moot the appeal, then reversed, The statute of limitations did not bar an allegation Bruce filed an updated RIC and moved for summary judgment on that basis, affirmatively misrepresenting that the assignment occurred before Mariner filed suit. View "Bouye v. Bruce" on Justia Law

Brothers Marshane and Terry were convicted in 2005 of conspiring to distribute crack and powder cocaine. Each brother had at least two prior convictions for a “felony drug offense.” Their latest convictions required life sentences. The Guidelines ranges for both brothers was 360 months to life, regardless of whether they were deemed career offenders. Both were sentenced to life in prison. The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 raised the amount of crack cocaine required to trigger the statutory penalties. The Sentencing Guidelines changed how multiple prior sentences are counted in calculating an offender’s criminal history and changed the drug-equivalency tables to reflect the Act. Marshane's Guidelines range dropped to 292-365 months. Terry's range fell to 324-405 months. If treated as career offenders, the brothers would still have a Guidelines range of 360 months to life. The 2018 First Step Act made the Fair Sentencing Act retroactive.In 2020, the brothers sought sentence reductions. Conceding that they are career offenders, they asked for a downward variance, emphasizing their rehabilitation and a recent report recommending that offenders convicted only of drug-trafficking crimes should not be deemed career offenders. The government argued that the Act had not modified the penalties for their offense that involved five kilograms or more of powder cocaine and that they remained career offenders. President Obama had already commuted their sentences to the bottom of their Guidelines ranges. The district court granted reduced sentences of 306 months for Marshane and 324 months for Terry. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the district court erred by failing to recognize that, under current law, they were not career offenders. While an error occurred, it was invited by the defendants and was not so plain as to warrant remand. View "United States v. Woods" on Justia Law