Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Stryker develops, manufactures, and sells spinal implants and products, and employed Abbas from 2013-2022. Abbas purports to have worked exclusively within Stryker’s finance department. Stryker claims that Abbas worked in various roles, including in sales. Abbas regularly used significant amounts of Stryker’s confidential information and trade secrets and supported Stryker’s litigation efforts. Abbas entered into confidentiality, noncompetition, and nonsolicitation agreements with Stryker when he commenced his employment, and again in 2022.Alphatec competes with Stryker. Stryker alleges that Alphatec "systematically misappropriate[s] Stryker[’s] confidential information, trade secrets, customer goodwill, and talent” and is litigating against Alphatec and former Stryker employees in several cases. Abbas resigned from Stryker to take a newly-developed position with Alphatec, a sales role, “crafted to protect Stryker’s confidential information.” Stryker sued for breach of contract and misappropriation of trade secrets.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the issuance of a preliminary injunction on behalf of Stryker. The district court crafted the injunction to preserve the status quo, reserving the possibility that other prospective jobs might be consistent with Abbas's employment agreement. It is not an impermissible industry-wide ban. Stryker is likely to succeed on the merits, based on findings that Abbas worked for Stryker in both sales and finance; Abbas had unfettered access to Stryker’s most sensitive sales and financial information, Stryker’s sales representatives, and key customer decision-makers; the Alphatec position involved work similar to the work Abbas performed for Stryker; and Abbas supported Stryker on litigation matters. View "Stryker Employment Co., LLC v. Abbas" on Justia Law

In 1978, Ohio State hired Richard Strauss, M.D., as an assistant professor of medicine. From 1978-1996, Strauss treated students and student-athletes, as the team doctor for multiple sports and as a student health center physician. When Strauss voluntarily, retired in 1998, the university designated him as an Emeritus Professor although he had been “quietly” placed on leave in 1996 following multiple reports of abuse. In 2018, former student-athletes publicly accused the school of covering up Strauss’s abuse. An investigation reported that Strauss had sexually abused at least 177 students. Plaintiffs allege that the school failed to meaningfully investigate numerous complaints, hid or failed to maintain records of abuse complaints, and failed to inform students and some staff of the abuse until 2018. Plaintiffs allege that they could not have known about the school’s knowledge, and cover-up, of their abuse until the 2019 release of the report; 532 plaintiffs brought 37 separate cases. This appeal concerns students who were abused by Strauss from 1978-1998.The district court dismissed the Title IX claims as time-barred by Ohio’s two-year statute of limitations, whether measured by a discovery rule or an occurrence rule; denied motions for recusal based on the judge’s connections and his wife’s connections to Ohio State; and dismissed Title IX retaliation claims that alleged Ohio State employees made public comments, in a retaliatory attempt to “silence” them.The Sixth Circuit vacated in part but affirmed the denial of the recusal motion and the dismissal of the retaliation claims. Just when the plaintiffs should have known that Strauss’s conduct was abuse, and when they should have known about Ohio State’s role in causing their injuries are questions of fact that cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss. View "Garrett v. The Ohio State University" on Justia Law

Jane, a sophomore, reported to Oberlin College’s Title IX office (20 U.S.C. 1681–1688) that she believed her sexual encounters with Doe amounted to sexual misconduct. The office did not inform Doe of the allegations for several weeks and did not investigate. According to Doe, the delay resulted in a failure to preserve exculpatory security-camera footage. Doe alleges that the dearth of information provided to him led him to hire a private investigator. Doe believed that Jane had spoken to other students about the matter and requested that Oberlin protect his privacy. Doe was told that Jane had requested an informal resolution but was later told that Jane had decided to pursue a formal resolution. Doe asserted a retaliation complaint, claiming that the change was prompted by his complaint that Jane was slandering him. Oberlin then provided Doe with the requested reports and complaints.Doe sought a temporary restraining order weeks after learning of Roe’s complaint, before any formal hearing process began, alleging violations of federal due process, Title IX, and state tort laws. Oberlin subsequently officially concluded that Doe had not violated the Sexual Misconduct Policy. The district court dismissed the due process claim with prejudice and dismissed the remaining claims without prejudice. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part. Although the district court did not follow the appropriate process for an on-the-merits, sua sponte dismissal of Doe’s due process claim, Oberlin is not a state actor subject to federal due process requirements. The court remanded in part; the court was correct to dismiss the remaining claims for lack of ripeness, but subsequent factual developments have ripened the claims. View "Doe v. Oberlin College" on Justia Law

Waide encountered the Lexington police after a shed fire occurred on the property next to his. Although no one suspected Waide of being involved with the fire and there was no evidence of arson, the fire investigator noticed surveillance cameras attached to Waide’s duplex residence and asked Waide to turn over his DVR. When Waide declined, the investigator obtained a warrant to enter Waide’s apartment and retrieve the DVR. When six officers arrived at Waide’s duplex to execute that warrant, their threatened entry and questions about whether Waide had drugs on the premises caused Waide to admit that his apartment contained a small amount of marijuana. This confession led to the issuance of two subsequent warrants to search both units of Waide’s duplex for narcotics–the other unit was occupied by Waide’s mother. The searches yielded a firearm plus large quantities of drugs and money.After the district court denied Waide’s motions to suppress evidence, he entered into a conditional guilty plea to the offense of possessing cocaine and heroin with the intent to distribute the drugs and to possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The affidavit in support of the DVR warrant lacked reliable evidence to establish probable cause to believe that the shed fire was due to arson or any other criminal activity. The incriminating evidence should be suppressed because it stemmed from the exploitation of the unlawful DVR warrant. View "United States v. Waide" on Justia Law

The Clean Air Act gives the EPA the authority to establish national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for certain pollutants. To achieve, maintain, and enforce those standards, every state develops a State Implementation Plan (SIP), which the EPA reviews and, after public notice and comment, approves or disapproves. Upon approval, a SIP—and all the state regulations it includes—becomes enforceable in federal court. If the EPA determines that its prior approval of a SIP was in error, the EPA can revise the plan using the Clean Air Act’s error-correction provision, 42 U.S.C. 7410(k)(6). For almost 50 years, Ohio’s SIP included an air nuisance rule (ANR) that made unlawful the emission of various substances in a manner or amount that endangered public health, safety, or welfare, or caused unreasonable injury or damage to property. In 2020, the EPA proposed removing the ANR from Ohio’s SIP using the Act’s error-correction provision.After public comment, the EPA finalized the removal of the ANR from Ohio’s SIP on the grounds that the state had not relied on the rule to implement, maintain, or enforce any NAAQS. Objectors argued that the EPA improperly invoked section 7410(k)(6) and acted arbitrarily. The Sixth Circuit remanded without vacatur. The objectors established that vacatur of the EPA’s decision is sufficiently likely to redress injuries to their asserted physical, recreational, and aesthetic interests, and have established standing; they also established standing based on their asserted procedural injury. View "Sierra Club v. United States Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

The Everly Brothers (Phil and Don) are known for many musical hits, including Cathy’s Clown, recorded, released, and copyrighted in 1960. The copyrights listed both brothers as authors; both were credited as co-authors and received royalties. In 1980, Phil signed notarized documents titled “Release and Assignment,” related to Cathy’s Clown and other works: “Phil Everly desires to release, and transfer, to the said Don Everly all of his rights, interests and claim in and to [‘Cathy’s Clown’], including rights to royalties and his claim as co-composer. In 2017, Don sued Phil’s estate for a declaratory judgment that Don was the sole author of Cathy’s Clown. There was contradictory evidence of Phil’s factual authorship, particularly a 1984 television interview.The district court found that Don repudiated Phil’s authorship of Cathy’s Clown, which triggered a three-year window for Phil to make an authorship claim under the Copyright Act. Phil did not do so. The district court rejected Phil’s estate’s argument that the three-year limitations period should not apply to the defense that Phil is a co-author. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Don’s estate may rely on the statute of limitations. The district court did not clearly err in finding that Phil failed to exercise his rights after Don repudiated his authorship. View "Garza v. Everly" on Justia Law

In 1985, two people were shot to death in rural Garrard County. Haight, who had escaped from jail days earlier, was captured in a nearby cornfield. During a chase, police discovered the victims’ possessions and both handguns used to commit the murders in a stolen truck abandoned by Haight. Haight pled guilty in exchange for the prosecutor’s recommendation of a life sentence without parole for 25 years. The court accepted Haight’s plea but sentenced him to death. The Kentucky Supreme Court vacated. Haight unsuccessfully sought specific enforcement of the plea agreement, was allowed to withdraw his plea, and went to trial. Haight admitted to the murders from the witness stand, claiming that he was suffering from “extreme emotional disturbance” and intoxication. The jury found him guilty of two counts each of intentional murder and first-degree robbery, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Haight’s convictions and death sentence were affirmed. Haight was denied postconviction relief without discovery or an evidentiary hearing.In 2002, Haight sought habeas relief. The district court stayed the federal action. The Kentucky Court of Appeals and Kentucky Supreme Court refused to consider his unexhausted issues. Haight successfully moved to have the now-exhausted issues included in his amended 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition, which raised 45 grounds. Haight’s motion and application for the appointment of experts and his motion for discovery and an evidentiary hearing were denied.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief, rejecting claims of ineffective assistance; upholding the refusals to permit the defense to have Haight examined by a neuropsychologist before sentencing and to appoint medical experts; rejecting challenges to jury instructions and to the exclusion of certain potential jurors; and rejecting arguments concerning the refusal to enforce the plea agreement. Kentucky’s death penalty statute is not facially unconstitutional. View "Haight v. Jordan" on Justia Law

Helphenstine was arrested for drug offenses on April 14 and taken to jail. Around 8:30 p.m. on Sunday, April 16, Helphenstine vomited and was moved to a “detox” cell. A local doctor was contractually obligated to visit the jail once a week. He came on Tuesday nights. Helphenstine’s condition deteriorated. Knowing that the office was closed, deputies faxed the doctor a non-emergency medical request, stating Helphenstine was vomiting and soiling himself, refusing to eat or drink, and had not gotten out of bed for 24 hours. The doctor testified he called the jail and directed that Helphenstine be taken to a hospital but was told that Helphenstine refused. There is no record of these calls. The doctor faxed prescriptions for antiemetics; although it was a Tuesday and although he knew of Helphenstine’s condition, he did not visit the jail. Around midnight, Helphenstine laid on his mat, where he remained. Around 3:30 a.m., Helphenstine was unresponsive; jailers began CPR and called 911. Helphenstine was pronounced dead en route to the hospital.Plaintiff’s experts testified that Helphenstine died either from withdrawal or from severe dehydration caused by withdrawal. Helphenstine’s death certificate lists his cause of death as “acute (fentanyl) and chronic drug abuse,” with the interval between onset and death listed as 6 minutes; fentanyl was present in Helphenstine’s blood. The district court rejected a deliberate indifference claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. A jury could conclude that Helphenstine’s death was the result of deliberate indifference by the county and the doctor; the individual defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. View "Helphenstine v. Lewis County" on Justia Law

Gold was the trustee of Biondo’s Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate. Before the bankruptcy filing, Biondo experienced an automobile accident. Biondo sought exemptions for that claim totaling $35,648.74, to prevent that sum from being distributed to her creditors. The statutory maximum exemption for “payment[s]” received “on account of personal bodily injury, not including pain and suffering or compensation for actual pecuniary loss,” 11 U.S.C. 522(d)(11)(D) was then $23,675. Gold did not object to the exemptions and retained the Ratton law firm, which sued Biondo’s insurer, Progressive, and the other driver, Peterson. Progressive settled its case for $48,500 to cover Biondo’s medical expenses, attorney’s fees, “lost wages,” and all “other forms of economic or non-economic loss.” Peterson's $70,000.settlement covered “pain and suffering.”Gold opposed Biondo's motion to compel Gold to release $23,675. The parties settled. Gold’s law firm sought $2,880 in fees for its work opposing the motion. Biondo objected. The bankruptcy court awarded the fees. The district court dismissed her appeal. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The fees compensated the attorneys for services reasonably likely to benefit Biondo’s bankruptcy estate, 11 U.S.C. 330(a)(1)(A). The Peterson settlement was outside section 522(d)(11)(D)'s exemption as covering pain and suffering; the Progressive settlement was also open to attack because it covered Biondo’s medical bills, her attorney’s fees, and lost wages. Gold did not act unreasonably in asking whether 522(d)(11)(D) covered Biondo’s settlements. View "Biondo v. Gold, Lange, Majoros & Smalarz" on Justia Law

Dream purchased university systems with locations across the country: South University, Argosy University, and the Art Institutes. States had recently brought consumer-protection lawsuits against the seller. Dream had to close 30 campuses. Unpaid creditors filed multiple lawsuits. Students at the Illinois Institute of Art brought a class-action fraud suit.Dream feared that filing bankruptcy would cut off its access to federal student loans. In 2019 Digital sued Dream for $252,737. The court appointed a receiver to manage Dream’s property and stayed pending lawsuits. The Receiver decided that potential claims greatly exceeded potential assets. The federal government had discharged the student-loan debts of many of Dream's students.Existing suits had already depleted the payout available from Dream's insurance policies covering its directors and officers. The policies did not protect Dream itself. The Receiver believed that Dream had legal claims against the directors and officers and eventually brought the proceeds from the policies into Dream’s receivership estate ($8.5 million). The settlement hinged on the entry of an order that would “bar” third parties (including the Art Students) from pursuing claims against Dream, its parent, the directors and officers, and the insurer. The district court approved the settlement and Bar Order. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court lacked authority to issue the bar order. Historical principles of equity do not allow a court to issue an injunction that protects the non-receivership assets of non-receivership parties; that type of non-debtor relief amounts to a remedy “previously unknown to equity jurisprudence.” View "Digital Media Solutions, LLC v. South University of Ohio, LLC" on Justia Law