Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Two brothers were indicted in 2006 and were convicted of possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute; possession of marijuana with intent to distribute; possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime; and felon in possession of a firearm. Additionally, Alejandro was convicted of possession of counterfeit federal reserve notes. William's sentence was 234 months—the high end of his Guidelines range. Based on prior state convictions for armed robbery and attempted drug trafficking, Alejandro, classified as a career offender, with a Guidelines range of 360 months to life plus a mandatory 60-month consecutive term, was sentenced to 420 months.The 2010 Fair Sentencing Act alleviated sentencing disparities between cocaine offenses and crack cocaine offenses; the 2018 First Step Act made its provisions retroactive. Both brothers sought resentencing. The court calculated an amended Guidelines range of 120-150 months for William and of 262-327 months for Alejandro but denied relief. The Sixth Circuit vacated. On remand, Alejandro argued that, if he were sentenced today, he would no longer be designated a career offender and would have a Guidelines range of 140-175 months. William argued that if an amendment eliminating “recency” points applied to him, his Guidelines range would be 110-137 months. The district court again denied relief.In 2022, the Supreme Court held, in “Concepcion,” that courts can consider all relevant information, subject only to constraints by Congress or the Constitution when discharging “their responsibility to sentence the whole person before them.” The Seventh Circuit again vacated and remanded for reassignment and consideration in light of Concepcion. View "United States v. Domenech" on Justia Law

Al-Adily is a citizen of Iraq and a lawful U.S. permanent resident. After returning his rental car to Thrifty 163 days past its due date, Al-Adily pleaded guilty to failing to return rental property worth between $1,000 and $20,000, under Michigan law. The state court ordered him to pay $10,660.56 in restitution, matching Thrify's itemized restitution request, including a daily loss-damage-waiver charge for 170 days, repair costs, an airport concession fee, and state and municipal taxes.In removal proceedings, DHS alleged that Al-Adily’s conviction constituted an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), allowing for deportation under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), as an offense that "involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000.” The IJ noted oddities in Thrifty’s itemization but felt bound by the restitution amount. With the assistance of new counsel seven years later, Al-Adily successfully moved to reopen his removal proceedings. A new IJ concluded that Thrifty’s loss amount was necessarily equal to the amount of court-ordered restitution and denied Al-Adily’s applications for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture. The BIA affirmed.The Sixth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court has warned that restitution orders must be considered with caution, especially where the amount was determined under a lower evidentiary standard. Thrifty’s itemization is internally inconsistent. Several enumerated charges do not stem from “the specific counts covered by the conviction” or are not losses at all. View "Habib Al-Adily v. Garland" on Justia Law

Maryville College leased a building to Ruby Tuesday, which used it for corporate retreats. In financial trouble years later, Ruby Tuesday decided to sell its interest in the lease. BNA, a real estate developer, and Ruby Tuesday signed an agreement. Ruby Tuesday had previously secured a loan from Goldman Sachs that prevented Ruby Tuesday from selling its interest in the lease without Goldman’s consent. The agreement with BNA stated that Ruby Tuesday “must obtain approval from [Goldman] for the transaction.” Goldman refused to approve. Goldman later acquired the lease, after Ruby Tuesday’s bankruptcy.BNA sued Goldman under Tennessee law for intentional interference with business relations (IIBR). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. To establish a viable IIBR claim, BNA had to adequately plead an existing business relationship with Ruby Tuesday, Goldman’s knowledge of that relationship, Goldman’s intent to cause a breach or termination of the relationship, Goldman’s improper motive or improper means, and damages from the tortious interference. BNA’s pleading did not satisfy the tort’s fourth prong: improper motive or means. The court also noted the lack of an existing business relationship between BNA and Ruby Tuesday. View "BNA Associates LLC v. Goldman Sachs Specialty Lending Group, L.P." on Justia Law

The False Claims Act imposes civil liability for “knowingly present[ing], or caus[ing] to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim [to the government] for payment or approval,” 31 U.S.C. 3729(a)(1)(A). Individuals with knowledge of false claims may bring private qui tam lawsuits, on behalf of the government. The Act covers claims resulting from a violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute, 42 U.S.C. 1320a-7b(g), which prohibits medical providers from making referrals “in return for” “remuneration.”Oaklawn Hospital is in Marshall, Michigan, which had two ophthalmologists. Oaklawn extended one of those doctors (Martin) a tentative offer to work at the hospital after hearing that the other doctor (Hathaway) planned to move his surgeries elsewhere. Hathaway told the hospital’s CEO that he wanted to continue working with Oaklawn and that Oaklawn hiring Martin would be the “death knell” of his practice. Oaklawn’s Board ultimately did not hire Martin.Martin filed a qui tam action, alleging an illegal fraudulent scheme under the Anti-Kickback Statute and that claims for Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement resulting from the kickbacks violated the False Claims Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit, which essentially argued that Oaklawn’s rejection of Martin’s employment in return for Hathaway’s commitment to continue sending surgery referrals violated the Anti-Kickback Statute. The Martins have not plausibly alleged causation; the alleged scheme did not change anything. When Oaklawn decided not to establish an internal ophthalmology line, it simply left things where they were. View "Martin v. Hathaway" on Justia Law

A man walked into Walgreens wearing clothes with white stains, placed a pack of gum on the counter, asked for cigarettes, then pulled out an apparent handgun. The man fled with the money and the cigarettes, leaving the gum. Police found Jacobs’s fingerprint on the gum and got an arrest warrant. Jacobs learned of the warrant and voluntarily went to the police station. Jacobs met with Detective Agee, who read him his Miranda rights. Showing Jacobs pictures from the Walgreens robbery and other robberies, Agee noted that the stains on the robber’s clothes resembled stains on Jacobs’s jacket. Jacobs denied involvement in the robberies. Agee highlighted the strength of the fingerprint evidence and said that he would get a warrant to search Jacobs’s dad’s house, where Jacobs was living, and Jacobs’s car. Agee said that Jacobs would likely face a severe sentence but things might be different if Jacobs changed his story. Jacobs then said: “The weapons—them is gone.” Agee gave Jacobs a phone to make calls and offered food and drink. After a break, Jacobs said he “f—ed up bad” because he was “broke” and needed to pay child support. He made statements about the gun and helped police retrieve the clothes from his girlfriend’s house. The interview lasted less than two hours.The district court granted Jacobs’s suppression motion, concluding that Agee used impermissibly coercive tactics. On interlocutory appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed. Jacobs’s statements were voluntary. View "United States v. Jacobs" on Justia Law

Ward twice received medical treatment at Stonecrest after signing agreements, stating that Ward was responsible for charges not covered by insurance and that Stonecrest may “utilize the services of a third party" as an extended business office (EBO) for billing and account servicing, and that while the account is being serviced by the EBO it is not considered delinquent, past due or in default. Stonecrest would “determine the account to be delinquent, past due, and in default” after its return from the EBO and the account could be referred to a collection agency. After Ward did not pay bills from Stonecrest, Ward’s accounts were referred to a third party, NPAS, which mailed Ward statements and left him messages. NPAS identified itself as “a company that is managing your account." Ward contacted a law firm, which erroneously sent a cease-and-desist letter to the wrong company.Ward sued under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), alleging NPAS had not disclosed its identity as a debt collector, 15 U.S.C. 1692d(6); used a name other than its “true name” (NPAS instead of NPAS, Inc.); and called him after he attempted to send a cease-and-desist letter. The court held that NPAS did not qualify as a “debt collector” under the FDCPA. The Third Circuit found that Ward did not have Article III standing but remanded. On remand, Ward amended his complaint and submitted documents to show he had suffered concrete harm. The Third Circuit affirmed that those changes were sufficient to demonstrate Ward’s standing but that NPAS is not a debt collector. View "sWard v. NPAS, Inc." on Justia Law

Kennedy was charged with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, fentanyl, heroin, and crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841, and distribution of methamphetamine, section 841. He pled guilty to Count 1 and stipulated that he “was involved in a drug trafficking conspiracy that distributed 50 grams or more of actual methamphetamine, as well as heroin, fentanyl, and crack cocaine.” He “frequently used cellular telephones and various social media accounts, including Facebook, to coordinate with his co-conspirators and to set up various drug deals.” He acknowledged sales of “approximately 99 grams of actual methamphetamine” on November 26, 2019, and of “approximately 270 grams of actual methamphetamine” on December 10.Kennedy’s PSR calculated a base offense level of 32 based on 150-500 grams of at least 80% pure methamphetamine, added two levels under USSG 2D1.1(b)(1) for firearm possession, and deducted three levels for acceptance of responsibility. The court rejected a four-level leadership enhancement because the operation was “decentralized in nature.” With a Guideline range of 168-210 months, the court imposed a 210-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the firearm enhancement was improperly applied; the district court failed to honor the read-and-discuss requirement under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i); and the Guidelines’ harsher treatment of pure methamphetamine was unfair. View "United States v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

Robinson pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon and possessing drugs with the intent to distribute them. During his supervised release term, Robinson was stopped, purportedly for a tinted-window infraction. The officer gave Robinson a warning for that violation, then asked for consent to search the car, allegedly stating that refusal to consent might violate the conditions of Robinson's supervised release. Robinson acknowledged having a gun. The officer searched the car and found a loaded handgun, marijuana, and cocaine. Robinson was not indicted.In proceedings to revoke Robinson’s supervised release, Robinson moved to suppress the evidence. The government conceded a Fourth Amendment violation. The court denied the motion. Robinson separately unsuccessfully moved for a jury trial on the supervised release violation. The court revoked Robinson’s supervised release and sentenced him to another 28 months.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The exclusionary rule does not bar illegally obtained evidence from a supervised release hearing. Defendants do not have a right to a jury at supervised-release hearings. While the Supreme Court recently found that the jury-trial guarantee applies to a unique provision—18 U.S.C. 3583(k)—that imposed a minimum 5-year prison term on a defendant who committed specified federal crimes while on supervised release, that decision did not render unconstitutional 18 U.S.C. 3583(g), which requires a court to impose a prison term of unspecified length if a defendant has engaged in certain conduct (such as possessing a gun) while on supervised release. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

A 2008 Michigan initiative decriminalized marijuana for medical purposes; a 2016 law afforded legal status to medical marijuana dispensaries. In Detroit, the Buildings, Safety Engineering, and Environmental Department (BSEED) screened applications for such facilities. The code prohibits locating such a facility in a drug-free zone–an area “within 1,000 radial feet of the zoning lot” containing any one of several "sensitive places," including a school.Genie applied to run a medical marijuana distribution facility on Mack Avenue in Detroit. BSEED denied the application at the screening stage because the proposed site was in a drug-free zone based on a lot (in the neighboring community of Grosse Point Park) on which St. Clare School sits. Genie unsuccessfully challenged the determination through state administrative and judicial channels. Detroit deemed the St. Clare’s “zoning lot” to include land where the parish church sits (the church and school have separate lots of record), all of which is listed under a single tax parcel number.Genie sued in federal court, arguing that Detroit erred in measuring the distance between the proposed Genie site and St. Clare’s while approving other sites in violation of the equal protection and due process guarantees. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Detroit. Genie had no property interest in its proposed facility. Detroit applied the same method of measurement to each comparable applicant. Although Genie cited two applications that were approved, many applications were rejected on that basis. View "Green Genie, Inc. v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

In 2019, Morgan began employment as Disciplinary Counsel for the Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee. During a disciplinary proceeding, Manookian, whose law license had been suspended, moved to disqualify Morgan as the Board’s counsel, claiming that Morgan was “an anti-Muslim bigot.” Manookian’s filing attached tweets posted by Morgan from 2015-2016 that allegedly demonstrated Morgan’s bias toward Muslims. Manookian is not Muslim but claimed that his wife was Muslim and that his children were being raised in a Muslim household. Morgan responded that the tweets were political in nature and related to the 2015–2016 presidential campaign; he disavowed any knowledge of the religious faith and practices of Manookian’s family. The Board moved for Morgan to withdraw as Board counsel in the appeal, which the court allowed. A week later, Garrett, the Board’s Chief Disciplinary Counsel, told Morgan that his employment would be terminated. Several months later, Garrett notified Morgan that the Board had opened a disciplinary file against him. The matter was later dismissed.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Morgan’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against the Board for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity but reversed the dismissal of the claim for damages against Garrett based on absolute quasi-judicial immunity. Extending judicial immunity here would extend its reach to areas previously denied— administrative acts like hiring and firing employees. View "Morgan v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee" on Justia Law