Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Indicted in Florida and Connecticut, Villa cooperated with prosecutors. Meanwhile, Villa was indicted in Kentucky. Villa was unaware of those charges when he pled guilty (represented by Perez) in the other cases. Those courts sentenced him to concurrent terms of 140 and 98 months. The Kentucky prosecutor, Judd, emailed Meier (Villa’s attorney) a proposed plea agreement, which assumed no further cooperation but stated that if Villa were willing to cooperate further, Judd would consider recommending a concurrent sentence. Later, Villa spoke to Meier and Perez in a three-way phone call. Meier allegedly did not mention Judd’s offer. Villa met with Judd, an FBI agent, and an investigator. Judd told Villa that the government wanted him to testify against a co-defendant but did not mention the possibility of a cooperation agreement. Villa pled guilty without an agreement and was sentenced to 77 months, consecutive to his other sentences.Villa moved to set aside his sentence, citing ineffective assistance of counsel. When Meier provided the case file, Villa allegedly discovered that Judd had mentioned a cooperation agreement and a concurrent sentence. Villa moved to amend his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, attaching an affidavit in which he said that Meier never told him about Judd’s offer and that he would have accepted it, plus an affidavit from Perez. The government submitted an affidavit from Meier, asserting that he told Villa about Judd’s offer.The district court denied Villa's motion, reasoning that Judd’s wanting Villa to testify against Rodriguez-Hernandez should have put Villa on notice of a potential agreement. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. The district court expected too much of an uncounseled defendant conversing in his second language with a federal prosecutor. Nothing about Villa’s meeting with Judd resolved the factual dispute presented by the affidavits. View "Villa v. United States" on Justia Law

Wells was charged with conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine. At his request, the magistrate appointed new counsel and granted continuances. The trial was scheduled for May 2021. In April, Wells pleaded guilty, admitted to the factual allegations, and stated that he had no complaints about his lawyer’s performance. The court scheduled sentencing for August 18; on June 23, Wells sought to withdraw his plea and requested new counsel, alleging that he was misled "about the circumstances of the case.” Wells stated he entered into the plea because of his "assumption that [he] was being charged with another charge.” Counsel explained that Wells had allegedly engaged in conduct that constituted material false statements to a federal officer. Wells confirmed that he wanted to avoid additional charges. Wells then argued that he was not guilty of the conspiracy. Wells confirmed he was able to talk to and understand his counsel.The court declined to replace his counsel but moved the sentencing hearing to September so Wells and his counsel could confer. The court applied a four-level enhancement for Wells’s alleged role as an organizer or leader of the conspiracy, resulting in a Guidelines range of 210-262 months with a mandatory minimum of 120 months. The court considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and mitigating factors, and sentenced Wells to 197 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court 1erred in denying the request to substitute counsel, erred in applying the four-level role enhancement, improperly balanced the 3553(a) factors, and imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence. View "United States v. Wells" on Justia Law

KDE, a thoroughbred racehorse training and care operation, has four locations in Texas, New York, and Kentucky. KDE employed 120-150 employees, including hotwalkers, responsible for walking and bathing the horses to cool them down, and grooms, who prep the horses for training. The hotwalkers work every day of the week from 5:00 a.m. to 10:30 a.m. Some hotwalkers work additional hours every other day, typically from 3:00-4:30 p.m. On average, the hotwalkers work 44.25 hours per week. Grooms also work every day of the week, usually, from 5:00-11:00 a.m. and from 3:00 p.m. to approximately 4:30 p.m. Grooms typically work between 48.5-52.5 hours per week. Most of the employees did not submit timesheets for the additional hours worked, while others submitted inaccurate time sheets; it is impossible to determine how many hours each employee worked. The Department of Labor (DOL) sought an injunction and damages for KDE’s alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201, for failing to pay employees the federal minimum wage, for failing to pay employees overtime wages, and for failing to keep adequate and accurate employment records.The Sixth Circuit affirmed a judgment in favor of DOL on the overtime claims. The district court’s grant of summary judgment on the willfulness issue in favor of KDE was inappropriate; genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether KDE willfully failed to pay its employees in compliance with the FLSA. View "Walsh v. KDE Equine, LLC" on Justia Law

McCall, who pleaded guilty to a conspiracy charge involving heroin possession and distribution in 2015 and was sentenced to 235 months’ imprisonment, moved for compassionate release. He cited as“extraordinary and compelling circumstances” the COVID-19 pandemic, his rehabilitation efforts, and the Sixth Circuit’s 2019 decision, “Havis” that “attempted” controlled substance offenses do not qualify as predicate offenses for the purpose of the Sentencing Guidelines’ career-offender enhancement and a subsequent holding applying the decision to convictions for conspiracy to distribute controlled substances. He argued that his prior convictions for drug trafficking and assault no longer qualified as predicate offenses, that he has rehabilitated himself, and that the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors favored granting compassionate release. The government argued that McCall raised “generalized fears of contracting COVID-19, without more,” that post-sentence legal developments are not extraordinary, and that McCall poses a danger to the community.The district court denied McCall’s motion. The Sixth Circuit initially reversed. On rehearing, en banc, the court affirmed. Consistent with the text of the compassionate-release provision of the First Step Act, and the principles, structure, and history of federal sentencing law, non-retroactive changes in sentencing law cannot be “extraordinary and compelling reasons” that warrant relief. Rehabilitative efforts cannot supply “extraordinary and compelling” reasons. With vaccinations widely available to federal prisoners, not can McCall’s COVID-19 claims. View "United States v. McCall" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs distribute pamphlets to and try to engage with, women entering abortion clinics, hoping to persuade the women not to end their pregnancies. Louisville-Jefferson County ordinances provide that no one shall “knowingly obstruct, detain, hinder, impede, or block another person’s entry to or exit from a healthcare facility” and imposes a prophylactic 10-foot “buffer zone” around the entrance of any “healthcare facility,” forbidding any nonexempt individual from “knowingly enter[ing]” or “remaining . . . within” it “during [a] facility’s posted business hours.” The law exempts persons entering or leaving a healthcare facility persons using the public sidewalk or street right-of-way adjacent to a healthcare facility solely for the purpose of reaching a destination other than the facility, municipal agents acting within the scope of their employment, and employees or agents of a healthcare facility acting within the scope of their employment.”The Sixth Circuit enjoined the enforcement of the buffer zone provision as likely violating the First Amendment. The County did not demonstrate that it was “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.” One abortion clinic has reported problems but the ordinance covers every hospital, clinic, and dentist’s office in the area. The court noted that the “obstruction” provision of the ordinance addresses the same concerns. View "Sisters for Life, Inc. v. Louisville-Jefferson County., Kentucky Metropolitan Government" on Justia Law

In 2018, Haynes began dealing drugs as part of a larger drug-trafficking conspiracy near Knoxville, Tennessee. About a year later he was indicted on drug charges. In 2020, Haynes pled guilty to conspiring to possess with intent to distribute 40 grams or more of fentanyl and 100 grams or more of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 846 and 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B). The quantity of drugs to which Haynes pled made him subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of five years, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B). Haynes argued that he was eligible for so-called “safety-valve” relief under 18 U.S.C. 3553(f), which allows a district court to impose a sentence below an otherwise-applicable mandatory minimum if the defendant meets certain requirements.The Sixth Circuit affirmed his 32-month sentence, agreeing that Haynes had not met the requirements of section 3553(f)(1)(B) because he had a prior conviction for which he was assigned three points under the Sentencing Guidelines. Haynes was credited for his “substantial assistance” in prosecuting other members of the conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 3553(e). View "United States v. Haynes" on Justia Law

Gragg worked as a driver for 31 years. For the first 26 years, he was an employee of Overnite; after UPS acquired Overnite, he was an employee of UPS. In 2008, UPS reclassified his position from nonunion to union, so that two different pension plans funded his pension. In 2010, each plan sent him information indicating that, after Gragg turned 65, each plan would reduce his monthly payment by $1754, which was the anticipated amount of his Social Security benefit. Gragg turned 65 in 2018. The following month, each plan reduced the amount of Gragg’s monthly benefit by the entire amount of his Social Security benefit—for a combined monthly reduction of $3508. Gragg’s overall monthly income declined by $1754, rather than remaining stable as promised by the letters. Gragg filed suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B).The district court held Gragg’s suit was barred by a six-year limitations period, having accrued when he received the letters. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The letters did not cause the injury upon which Gragg sued; the underpayments did. Before that injury, his claim had not accrued. An ERISA claim based on the letters alone would have rested upon “contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” View "Gragg v. UPS Pension Plan" on Justia Law

Undercover FBI Agent Hurst made an online post feigning interest in incestuous sexual abuse. An anonymous user, later identified as Sammons, responded. He explained that he babysat his six-year-old niece every two weeks and offered to share videos of future interactions with her. Sammons sent Hurst child pornography and repeatedly requested videos of Hurst abusing his (fictitious) daughter. Hurst continued the correspondence as he tried to uncover the anonymous user’s identity. The FBI apprehended Sammons hours before he was scheduled to babysit his niece, and he confessed to taking and sharing explicit photos of her online. A jury convicted him of several child-pornography charges.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that under 18 U.S.C. 2251(d)(1), the non-public, one-on-one messages did not amount to “mak[ing]” “any notice” “seeking or offering” child pornography. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the proposed testimony by Dr. Bresler was not the product of reliable methods, reliably applied (Rule 702). Dr. Bresler concluded that Sammons possessed a compliant personality and therefore may have falsely confessed but his methodology amounted to little more than vouching for Sammons’ credibility with the weight of a Ph.D. The confession was amply corroborated. View "United States v. Sammons" on Justia Law

Carson was convicted of bank robbery and witness tampering. He was sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment and ordered to “immediately” begin paying $5,590 in restitution in installments of 25% of his gross monthly income through the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program. Carson receives prison wages and cash deposits from his family in his inmate trust account, maintained by the Bureau of Prisons (BOP). After discovering that BOP had control of $4,037.89 belonging to Carson, the government asked the court to order BOP to turn over all but $300 and apply the funds to Carson’s restitution obligation. The government cited 18 U.S.C. 3664(n), which requires a defendant who “receives substantial resources from any source, including inheritance, settlement, or other judgment" to apply the value of such resources to any restitution or fine still owed. The next day, without giving Carson an opportunity to be heard, the district court granted the motion. The order contained no findings and cited no authorities.The Sixth Circuit vacated, noting that the government had moved to recover federal stimulus payments issued during the COVID-19 pandemic to thousands of inmates. The district court failed to make the minimal findings necessary under statutes cited by the government–18 U.S.C. 3664(n), 3664(k), 3613. . It did not determine the source of the funds, whether they are sufficiently “substantial” to warrant garnishment, or whether circumstances justified adjustment to the restitution order View "United States v. Carson" on Justia Law

Blount who is Black, worked for Stanley for 21 years, most recently as a forklift operator. Blount was warned multiple times against using his phone on the plant floor, in violation of safety policies. On January 31, 2018, Taylor reported that Blount was driving a forklift toward her with “neither of his hands on the wheel” because he was manipulating his smartwatch. Blount offered no explanation. Stanley credited Taylor’s account and took steps to terminate Blount. Blount’s union interceded and Blount signed a last-chance agreement, which provided that any additional safety violations within two years would result in Blount’s immediate termination. A few months later Taylor reported seeing Blount using his cell phone in his lap while sitting on an idling forklift. Blount denied the conduct. Stanley, after an investigation, fired him. Blount’s union withdrew a grievance when Blount refused to provide his phone records. As a separate matter, Blount had filed an EEOC complaint in 2015 that was dismissed in 2016.Blount sued under Kentucky Civil Rights Act, alleging that he was fired because of his race and in retaliation for his 2015 EEOC complaint. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment. Stanley offered a legitimate non-discriminatory reason—serious safety violations—for firing Blount, which was not a pretext for intentional discrimination. Blount’s proferred comparators, white employees who were not terminated, were not similarly situated. There was no evidence connecting Blount’s protected conduct and his termination. View "Blount v. Stanley Engineering Fastening" on Justia Law