Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Air Force ordered over 500,000 service members to get COVID-19 vaccinations. About 10,000 members requested religious exemptions; about 135 of these requests were granted, only to those planning to leave the service. It has granted thousands of exemptions for medical or administrative reasons. The Plaintiffs allege that the vaccine mandate substantially burdens their religious exercise in violation of the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The district court granted a preliminary injunction that barred the Air Force from disciplining the Plaintiffs for failing to take a vaccine, then certified a class of thousands of similar service members and extended this injunction to the class.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. In opposing class-action certification, the Air Force argued that RFRA adopts an individual-by-individual approach: it must show that it has a compelling interest in requiring a “specific” individual to get vaccinated based on that person’s specific duties. In challenging the injunction, however, the Air Force failed to identify the specific duties or working conditions of any Plaintiff, citing the “general interests” underlying the mandate. The court reasoned that it could uphold the injunction based on RFRA alone but also noted common questions for the class: Does the Air Force have a uniform policy of relying on its generalized interests in the vaccine mandate to deny religious exemptions regardless of individual circumstances? Does it have a discriminatory policy of broadly denying religious exemptions but broadly granting secular ones? View "Doster v. Kendall" on Justia Law

The PROTECT Act of 2003, 117 Stat. 650, required the Sentencing Commission to vary penalties for child-pornography offenses depending on the number of images involved. Addressing a perceived ambiguity in Congress’s command, the Commission added a Sentencing Guidelines commentary application note instructing courts to equate one video to 75 images when calculating the applicable sentencing range, the “75:1 Rule,” U.S.S.G. 2G2.2(b)(7) n.6(B). Recent Supreme Court precedent has clarified when courts can defer to an agency’s interpretation of its regulations (“Auer deference”).Phillips, convicted of possessing child pornography, argued that this recent clarification meant that courts can no longer rely on the 75:1 Rule and that the court erred in relying on it when imposing his sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his 151-month sentence. Applying traditional statutory construction, determining the number of images in a video is the kind of genuinely ambiguous exercise that the Commission was entitled to address in its commentary. The 75:1 Rule fits within the zone of ambiguity because it considers that videos contain multiple images; the purpose of tying offense levels to the number of images; and Congress’s choice to create four tiers of punishment, based on a scale of 10-600 images. The Rule has the character and context of an interpretation entitled to controlling weight. View "United States v. Phillips" on Justia Law

The 1985 “Manning Lease” granted the lessee rights to oil and gas on an approximately 100-acre tract of land in Bowling Green that is adjacent to a quarry. There is a long-expired one-year term, followed by a second term that conditions the maintenance of the leasehold interest on the production of oil or gas by the lessee. Bluegrass now owns the property. Believing that lessees were producing an insufficient quantity of oil to justify maintaining the lease, Bluegrass purported to terminate the lease and sought a declaration that the lease had terminated by its own terms while asserting several other related claims.The district court found that Bluegrass’s termination of the lease was improper and granted the lessees summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. There is a factual dispute regarding whether the lease terminated by its own terms. The trier of fact must determine if the lessee has produced oil in paying quantities after considering all the evidence. There is a material factual dispute about whether the lessee ceased producing oil for a period of time, and, if so, whether that period of time was unreasonable. View "Bluegrass Materials Co., LLC v. Freeman" on Justia Law

Windham was charged with kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. 2. Windham’s attorney told the court that he had gone over the indictment “word by word” with Windham. The court advised Windham that he was “charged with kidnapping and with aiding and abetting kidnapping” in violation of the federal kidnapping statute. In a pro se motion, Windham later wrote that he had “been indicted [on] one count of ‘kidnapping[,]’” confirming that he understood that he had been charged with a single count. Windham’s negotiated plea agreement provided that he pleaded guilty to a single count of kidnapping and listed the elements of 18 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1) and aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C. 2. The agreement also included Windham's admission that he and his accomplices held M.S. at gunpoint for an extended period of time and confirmed that he used a cell phone and a motor vehicle in furtherance of that offense. At his plea hearing, Windham confirmed that he: signed the plea agreement; initialed each page; and read and reviewed each paragraph with his attorney.The court sentenced Windham to 120 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Windham’s arguments that no factual basis supported his guilty plea and that he was unaware of the nature of the charges against him. View "United States v. Windham" on Justia Law

The Fox and Puchlak filed purported class actions, alleging that Michigan counties seized property to satisfy property-tax delinquencies, sold the properties, and kept the difference between the sales proceeds and the tax debts.. The suits assert that the counties committed takings without just compensation or imposed excessive fines in violation of the Michigan and federal constitutions. Genesee County’s insurance, through Safety, precludes coverage for claims “[a]rising out of . . . [t]ax collection, or the improper administration of taxes or loss that reflects any tax obligation” and claims “[a]rising out of eminent domain, condemnation, inverse condemnation, temporary or permanent taking, adverse possession, or dedication by adverse use.”Safety sought a ruling that it owed no duty to defend or to indemnify. The district court entered summary judgment, finding no Article III case or controversy between Safety and Fox and Puchlak. The court also held that Safety owes Genesee County no duty to defend. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Safety lacks standing to sue Fox and Puchlak over its duty to defend and its claim for the duty to indemnify lacks ripeness. Safety owes no duty to defend; the alleged tax-collection process directly caused the injuries underlying each of Fox’s and Puchlak’s claims. View "Safety Specialty Insurance Co. v. Genesee County Board of Commissioners" on Justia Law

Hewittel was convicted of armed robbery and related offenses based solely on the testimony of the victim. Three witnesses—one of them having little relationship with anyone in the case—were prepared to testify in support of Hewittel’s alibi that he was at home, almost a half-hour from the crime scene when the crime occurred. Hewittel’s attorney failed to call any of those witnesses at trial, not because of any strategic judgment but because Hewittel’s counsel thought the crime occurred between noon and 12:30 p.m. when Hewittel was at home alone. The victim twice testified (in counsel’s presence) that the crime occurred at 1:00 or 1:30 p.m.—by which time all three witnesses were present at Hewittel’s home. Counsel also believed that evidence of Hewittel’s prior convictions would have unavoidably come in at trial. In reality, that evidence almost certainly would have been excluded, if Hewittel’s counsel asked. Throughout the trial, Hewittel’s counsel repeatedly reminded the jury that his client had been convicted of armed robbery five times before.The trial judge twice ordered a new trial. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, based in part on the same mistake regarding the time of the offense. The federal district court granted a Hewittel writ of habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, calling the trial “an extreme malfunction in the criminal justice system.” View "Hewitt-El v. Burgess" on Justia Law

Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies investigated Bravo for drug trafficking. Those investigatory efforts revealed that Bravo sat at the head of an interstate drug trafficking organization: a contact in Mexico connected Bravo to drug suppliers, one of whom was Mercado-Lozano. When Bravo received drugs from those suppliers, he would route them to associates for distribution. Those associates included Bush, Gibson, and Mosley. Bush maintained one of Bravo’s stash houses, tended to marijuana growing on the property, and occasionally distributed drugs on Bravo’s behalf. Gibson was a street-level drug dealer who bought distribution quantities of cocaine from Bravo on five or six occasions. Mercado-Lozano, a 14-year veteran of the Sinaloa Cartel, was one of Bravo’s methamphetamine suppliers. Mosley bought distribution quantities of cocaine, fentanyl, heroin, and marijuana from Bravo and sold them. After a two-year investigation, a federal grand jury indicted Bravo, Bush, Gibson, Mercado-Lozano, and Mosley for violating federal drug laws.In consolidated appeals, the Sixth Circuit affirmed their convictions and sentences. The court agreed with Gibson that his post-conviction letter to the district court asserting a perfunctory denial of guilt was an improper basis to impose a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. 3C1.1, but otherwise rejected arguments concerning the sufficiency of the evidence, sentencing enhancements, and the denial of a motion to suppress. View "United States v. Mercado-Lozano" on Justia Law

Wellpath contracted with the jail to provide on-site medical staff and services. Wellpath assigned Dr. Cogswell, to work at the jail. While there, he sexually assaulted three inmates during their visits to the medical clinic. None of the women called out for help or otherwise indicated to the jail staff that anything untoward was occurring. One inmate, Bills recounted seeing an unidentified officer “glance through the little crack of the white curtain [and give] kind of like a head nod,” which Bills interpreted as the officer saying to Cogswell “I got your back.” Wellpath had a policy that if there was a sensitive exam going on, there would be a chaperone. During Cogswell’s tenure, Macomb Officer Horan reported to Wellpath’s nursing director and a Wellpath paramedic that Cogswell was potentially violating this policy by seeing patients unchaperoned, using a privacy screen. At Horan’s request, the nursing director “pop[ped] [her] head in” and saw “nothing out of the ordinary[ or] suspicious.”Days after their assaults, inmates reported the incidents to the jail. Wellpath learned of the reports the same day and immediately informed Cogswell not to report to work. Following an investigation, his employment was terminated. Cogswell was later convicted of second-degree criminal sexual conduct. In the inmates’ suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants, citing the lack of evidence that the defendants knew of Cogswell’s assaults before they were reported. View "Buetenmiller v. Macomb County Jail" on Justia Law

The 2021 American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) set aside $195.3 billion in stimulus funds, to be distributed to states and the District of Columbia. Kentucky and Tennessee challenged ARPA’s requirement that states certify that they would comply with an “Offset Provision” that bars the states from enacting tax cuts and then using ARPA funds to “directly or indirectly offset a reduction" in net tax revenue resulting from such tax cuts. 42 U.S.C. 802(c)(2)(A). Because money is fungible, enacting any tax cut and then spending ARPA funds could be construed, the states argued, as impermissibly using those funds to “indirectly offset” a revenue reduction from the tax cut. A subsequent Treasury regulation (the Rule) offered a narrowing construction; the states asserted that this construction in no way follows clearly from the Offset Provision itself. The states argued they were coerced into relinquishing control over their sovereign taxing authority.The district court entered a permanent injunction. The Sixth Circuit vacated in part. Kentucky’s challenge is non-justiciable. After the promulgation of the Rule, the states offered no evidence of a concrete plan to violate the Rule. Kentucky offered no other theory of injury. Tennessee offered another theory of injury: that Treasury’s Rule burdened the state with compliance costs that it would not incur were enforcement of the Offset Provision enjoined. On the merits of Tennessee’s claim, the court affirmed the injunction; the Offset Provision is impermissibly vague under the Spending Clause. Treasury cannot use its Rule to impose compliance requirements that are not authorized by the Offset Provision itself. View "Kentucky v. Yellen" on Justia Law

The 2021 American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA), 42 U.S.C. 802, appropriated $195.3 billion in aid to the states and the District of Columbia. To get the money, states had to certify that they would comply with several conditions, including ARPA’s “Offset Provision,” which forbids a state from using the funds “to either directly or indirectly offset a reduction in the net tax revenue” that “result[s] from” a tax cut. Claiming that this condition amounted to a prohibition on tax cuts during ARPA’s “covered period,” and that such a condition would violate the Constitution in multiple respects, Ohio filed suit. The district court permanently enjoined enforcement of the Offset Provision on the ground that its terms are “unconstitutionally ambiguous” under the Spending Clause.The Sixth Circuit vacated the injunction, finding the case moot. The district court should not have reached the merits of the case, as Ohio failed to establish a justiciable controversy. Treasury later promulgated a regulation disavowing Ohio’s interpretation of the Offset Provision and explaining that it would not enforce the Provision as if it barred tax cuts per se. There is no reason to believe that Treasury will not abide by its disavowal of Ohio’s interpretation of the Offset Provision as it administers the statute. View "Ohio v. Yellen" on Justia Law