Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Colerain Township prohibited the public from posting “inappropriate” or “offensive” comments on the police department’s Facebook page and prohibited the public from making “disrespectful” comments at its board of trustees meetings. Davis was active in criticizing the board and the department, through oral comments at board meetings and written comments on the Facebook page. Davis sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that the Township had violated the First Amendment. She alleged that the prohibitions discriminated against speech based on the speaker’s viewpoint and that the (alleged) removal of her video from the Facebook page amounted to retaliation. The parties agreed that the comments section of the Facebook page and the public-participation portion of board meetings were “limited public forums.” The district court rejected Davis’s challenges to the Facebook Rule, finding the categorical ban on posting videos viewpoint-neutral and reasonable. It upheld the Meeting Rule, finding that the board had not applied it to Davis in a discriminatory way. It rejected overbreadth and vagueness challenges.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Davis’s claims for lack of jurisdiction. Davis did not raise her free-speech claims in an Article III case or controversy. She failed to show that the Facebook rule has injured her in the past or is likely to do so in the future. The Township has repealed the meeting rule. View "Davis v. Colerain Township, Ohio" on Justia Law

Lightning, a Delaware start-up company that owns intellectual property protecting designs for a pallet used for transporting cold foods, sought $26 million in outside funding to retire debt, cover operational expenses, and purchase equipment to begin production. GrowMI, an entity created by the Michigan Economic Development Corporation, agreed to loan Lightning $5 million and used its relationship with Flagstar Bank to secure an additional $7 million loan. GrowMI and Flagstar conditioned their loans on Lightning’s securing the rest of the $26 million by selling equity and securing lines of credit from Lightning shareholders. Lightning’s creditor LT sent GrowMI a letter indicating that Lightning owed LT $3.3 million, secured by an interest in Lightning’s intellectual properties. GrowMI allowed Lightning to use a portion of GrowMI’s loan to repay LT, ensuring GrowMI’s first secured position on Lightning’s intellectual properties.GrowMI subsequently became aware of wrongdoing at Lightning, which defaulted on its debt to GrowMI. GrowMI sued LT and its principals, Lightning shareholders, Lightning employees, and a consulting company, alleging violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1962, by a pattern of racketeering activity that included bank fraud, transactions involving money derived from that bank fraud, trade secrets misappropriation, and wire fraud. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. GrowMI’s claims rest on its status as Lightning’s creditor, making its injury derivative of the harm incurred by Lightning. GrowMI does not plausibly allege that it was directly injured by reason of the alleged racketeering activities. View "Grow Michigan, LLC v. LT Lender, LLC" on Justia Law

Fannie Mae purchases mortgage loans from commercial banks, which enables the lenders to make additional loans, finances those purchases by packaging the mortgage loans into mortgage-backed securities, then sells those securities to investors. In 1968, Fannie Mae became a publicly-traded, stockholder-owned corporation. Freddie Mac also buys mortgage loans and securities and sells those mortgage-backed securities to investors. In 1989, Freddie Mac became a publicly traded, stockholder-owned corporation. In the 2008 recession, both entities suffered precipitous drops in the value of their mortgage portfolios. The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) was established and authorized to undertake extraordinary measures to resuscitate the companies, 12 U.S.C. 4511(b)(1).Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac shareholders sought to nullify an agreement (the “third amendment”) between FHFA and the Treasury Department that “secured unlimited funding" from Treasury in exchange for "almost all of Fannie’s and Freddie’s future profits.” The third amendment was authorized by FHFA’s Acting Director, who was serving in violation of the Appointments Clause. Shareholders also claimed that they are entitled to retrospective relief because the Supreme Court held in 2021 that FHFA’s enabling statute contained an unconstitutional removal restriction. The district court dismissed the complaint. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the Acting Director was not serving in violation of the Constitution when he signed the third amendment. The court remanded for determination of whether the unconstitutional removal restriction inflicted harm on shareholders. View "Rop v. Federal Housing Finance Agency" on Justia Law

Child foster care systems in this country are administered by state governments. The federal government reimburses states for “foster care maintenance payments” that the state makes to certified foster caregivers who meet federal-eligibility requirements. In Ohio, there are also foster caregivers (typically relatives) whom the state does not certify as meeting those federal requirements. Ohio withholds payments for those caregivers and provides these non-certified caregivers with less generous payments through a separate state program. The plaintiffs, foster caregivers whom Ohio has considered ineligible to receive the higher foster care maintenance payments, sued. The district court dismissed, finding that the caregivers did not have to meet the same licensing standards as licensed caregivers in Ohio and thus were not “foster family homes” as required by federal law.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Title IV-E of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 671 (a), requires that all foster family homes eligible for payments under federal law meet the same licensing standards; the plaintiffs are subject to different standards than “licensed” caregivers are not “foster family home,” and are not eligible for the higher payments. View "T.M. v. DeWine" on Justia Law

Sittenfeld, a former Cincinnati City Council member, was charged with honest-services wire fraud, bribery, and attempted extortion under color of official right. The jury trial comprised nine days. The court did not sequester the jurors but admonished them repeatedly against discussing the case or considering extraneous information. On the third day of jury deliberations, a court employee informed the judge that “Juror X” had been posting to her private Facebook page, which was visible only to Juror X’s Facebook friends, of whom the court employee was one. The court obtained printouts of Juror X’s private posts and comments and called the parties to chambers to discuss the situation. In the meantime, the jury reached a verdict. The parties and court accepted the verdict with the possibility of a post-verdict “Remmer” hearing on possible extraneous influences on the jury. The jury convicted Sittenfeld on two counts. The court discharged the jury, questioned Jurors X and Y in chambers, denied Sittenfeld’s motion for a forensic examination of Juror X’s electronic devices, and concluded that Sittenfeld was not prejudiced by the Facebook postings.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A court’s inherent or statutory authority in conducting a Remmer hearing does not include an unlimited, inquisitorial power to order jurors to surrender their personal possessions, such as their electronic devices, or to divulge their passwords; the district court had no power to order a forensic examination of the juror’s devices. View "In re: Sittenfeld" on Justia Law

A world-famous boxer and a famous MMA fighter faced one another in a legendary fight, produced by Showtime, which allowed individuals to live-stream the fight from Showtime’s website for $99.99. Showtime granted Mayweather the exclusive right to exhibit and distribute, and authorize the exhibition and distribution of, the fight. Mayweather enlisted JHP to issue commercial licenses. JHP sold commercial licenses to broadcast the event at bars and restaurants and collected fees, ranging from $3,700-$15,700. The fight was not registered as a copyrighted work when it first aired on August 26, 2017. Two months later, Showtime applied to register its copyright, as the sole author and claimant. Showtime later signed the Copyright Agreement, giving JHP the exclusive right to distribute and publicly perform the fight live and the exclusive right to sue anyone who live-streamed the fight without paying the licensing fee. JHP sued several restaurants and bars that aired the fight without paying.In an action for copyright infringement, 17 U.S.C. 106, 501, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment, finding that JHP did not own the copyright to the fight on the day it aired and that the “retroactive transfer" was ineffective. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The Copyright Agreement merely codified earlier transfers in the wake of the post hoc registration, there is no retroactivity issue. JHP owned the exclusive right to distribute and publicly display the fight on the day it aired. View "Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Griffith" on Justia Law

Will started attending Farragut High School in 2015. Will’s style and his friendships created “a perception that he was alternatively sexually oriented” and affiliated “with the LGBT movement.” According to his parents, administrators targeted Will for discipline because of his appearance, perceived sexual orientation, and speech. There were several disciplinary actions that contributed to Will’s increasing anxiety and depression. Although a teacher graded an assignment in which Will expressed suicidal thoughts, nobody at the school informed his parents. During his sophomore year, Will died from a self-inflicted gunshot wound.Will's parents brought a state court suit, alleging deprivation of “administrative due process” during Will’s suspension proceedings, violations of the District’s anti-harassment and suicide-prevention policies, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The District removed the suit to federal court, arguing that the “due process” allegations raised federal claims. The district court remanded the suit in 2018, based on the parents’ assertions that they raised only state law claims. Their attorney let the suit languish for years. A new attorney believed that the state law claims would fail and filed an amended complaint adding claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and claims under Title IX, 20 U.S.C. 1681. The District removed the suit to federal court again. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the federal claims as time-barred. The parents forfeited several of their arguments by failing to raise them earlier. View "Bannister v. Knox County Board of Education" on Justia Law

In 2010, a jury convicted Mammone of the aggravated murder of his two children and his former mother-in-law, aggravated burglary, violation of a protective order, and attempted arson. Mammone’s mother, his father, and a psychologist testified on his behalf at sentencing, and Mammone gave a five-hour unsworn statement. The jury recommended and the court imposed three death sentences plus 27 years of consecutive imprisonment for his noncapital offenses. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of his habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The court rejected Mammone’s arguments that pretrial publicity was so prejudicial that he did not receive a fair trial; that the jurors unconstitutionally prayed before penalty-phase deliberations; and that trial counsel and appellate counsel were ineffective. The Ohio Supreme Court held that it could not conclude that pretrial publicity rendered Mammone’s trial a “hollow formality.” That decision was not an objectively unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. Mammone cites no Supreme Court precedent holding that prayer by jurors amounts to the influence of extraneous information. Mammone’s underlying claim that trial counsel should have pursued a defense of not guilty by reason of insanity is not substantial because he cannot overcome the presumption that the decision was strategic. View "Mammone v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

FBI agents were searching for Davison when they approached King, who has a similar description. King attempted to flee. Officers used force to apprehend King. Bystanders called the police and began filming. Officers ordered them to delete their videos because they could reveal undercover FBI agents. King spent the weekend in jail. The district court found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over King’s subsequent Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) claim, and granted the officers summary judgment based on qualified immunity. In 2019, the Sixth Circuit reversed.After the Supreme Court reversed, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court. Because the district court’s order “hinged” on whether King could establish the elements of an FTCA claim, the order was on the merits for purposes of the judgment bar, 28 U.S.C. 2676, which provides that a judgment under the FTCA is a complete bar to any action by the claimant, by reason of the same subject matter, against the employee of the government whose act or omission gave rise to the claim. The analysis did not change based on the fact that the elements of an FTCA claim also establish whether a district court has subject-matter jurisdiction over that claim. The Sixth Circuit held that the FTCA judgment bar applies to other claims brought in the same lawsuit. View "King v. United States" on Justia Law

Under the Social Security Act’s Title IV-E program, states receive reimbursements for foster care maintenance payments (FCMPs), 42 U.S.C. 670–676. Title IV-E’s conditions include having a state plan approved by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS); the removed child’s placement and care must be the responsibility of the state agency administering that plan. Kentucky's approved plan is administered by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services. Under Kentucky law, a court may remove a child from her home “to the custody of an adult relative, fictive kin,” or other person or facility or can commit the child to the custody of the Cabinet. The Cabinet does not provide FCMPs to children placed by courts into the care of a relative or fictive kin, although that is a preferred outcome for the child.Caregivers brought a class action, accusing the Cabinet of denying FCMPs to eligible children without notice or a fair hearing, in a way that discriminated against relative caregivers. The district court certified a Children’s Class, a Caregivers’ Class, a Cabinet Custody Class, and a Notice and Hearing Class. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit except as to the Cabinet Custody Class. Under Kentucky law, the Cabinet did not have placement and care responsibility over children not in their custody; the Cabinet cannot change a child’s placement without a court order. Only Cabinet Custody Class members were eligible for FCMPs. View "J. B-K. v. Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services" on Justia Law