Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Under the Social Security Act’s Title IV-E program, states receive reimbursements for foster care maintenance payments (FCMPs), 42 U.S.C. 670–676. Title IV-E’s conditions include having a state plan approved by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS); the removed child’s placement and care must be the responsibility of the state agency administering that plan. Kentucky's approved plan is administered by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services. Under Kentucky law, a court may remove a child from her home “to the custody of an adult relative, fictive kin,” or other person or facility or can commit the child to the custody of the Cabinet. The Cabinet does not provide FCMPs to children placed by courts into the care of a relative or fictive kin, although that is a preferred outcome for the child.Caregivers brought a class action, accusing the Cabinet of denying FCMPs to eligible children without notice or a fair hearing, in a way that discriminated against relative caregivers. The district court certified a Children’s Class, a Caregivers’ Class, a Cabinet Custody Class, and a Notice and Hearing Class. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit except as to the Cabinet Custody Class. Under Kentucky law, the Cabinet did not have placement and care responsibility over children not in their custody; the Cabinet cannot change a child’s placement without a court order. Only Cabinet Custody Class members were eligible for FCMPs. View "J. B-K. v. Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services" on Justia Law

At the Ohio State University, Dr. Strauss allegedly abused hundreds of young men under the guise of performing medical examinations, between 1978-1998. The University placed Strauss on leave in 1996, while it investigated his conduct, and ultimately declined to renew his appointments with Student Health Services and terminated his employment with the Athletics Department. It did not publicly provide reasons for these decisions. The University conducted a hearing but did not notify students or give them an opportunity to participate. Strauss remained a tenured faculty member. He retired in 1998, with emeritus status. He opened a private clinic near the University to treat “common genital/urinary problems,” advertised in the student newspaper, and continued treating students. An independent investigation commissioned by the University in 2018 and undertaken by a law firm substantiated allegations of abuse.Strauss’s victims brought Title IX suits, alleging that the University was deliberately indifferent to their heightened risk of abuse. The district court found that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Many plaintiffs adequately alleged that they did not know they were abused until 2018; the time of the abuse, they were young and did not know what was medically appropriate. Strauss gave pretextual, false medical explanations for the abuse. The plaintiffs did not have reason to know that others had previously complained about Strauss’s conduct. View "Moxley v. The Ohio State University" on Justia Law

Secretary of Defense Austin directed that all members of the armed forces be vaccinated against COVID-19. Air Force guidelines allow affected service members to seek exemptions on medical, administrative, and religious grounds. As of May 2022, the Department had denied 8,869 requests for religious exemptions, while granting only 85–all to service members who were separately eligible for an administrative exemption (apparently near the end of their service term). Plaintiffs claimed that the Department’s “systematic” denial of requests for religious exemptions violated the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act and the First Amendment and sought certification of a class of some 10,000 affected service members. Air Force chaplains confirmed that the vaccination mandate substantially burdened sincerely-held religious beliefs. Typically the objections concerned the use of aborted fetal cells in the development of the vaccines. The commanding officers for two plaintiffs recommended that their requests for exemptions be granted, on the ground that less-restrictive means (like masking or social distancing) could satisfy the Air Force’s operational interests. The Department denied those requests.The court entered an injunction, barring the Department from “taking any disciplinary or separation measures” against the named plaintiffs during the pendency of their lawsuit and certified a class. The Sixth Circuit denied the Department’s motion for an emergency stay but expedited the appeal. The Department has not made a strong showing that it “is likely to succeed on the merits” of its appeal of the class-wide injunction. View "Doster v. Kendall" on Justia Law

Iris and Jose lived with their two children in Usulután, a part of El Salvador that they believed to be controlled by MS-13. They ran a small retail business. In 2016, gang members began extorting Jose, threatening to kill the family if Jose did not pay. Gang members robbed Jose and a colleague at gunpoint. Jose did not report the crimes to the police. He knew that the police conducted daily raids in his neighborhood to combat gang activity but he believed that the gangs had infiltrated the government. He feared that MS-13 would learn of his complaints and kill him. The mayor was subsequently arrested for helping gang members collect “rent.” Members of MS-13 interrogated Jose about his dealings with the police. Jose left El Salvador but the gang continued to extort and threaten Iris. Eventually, she fled to the United States.The family sought asylum and withholding of removal, submitting country-condition reports about gang activity in El Salvador that corroborated their testimony. An IJ ordered the family’s removal, finding Iris and Jose credible, but concluding that they had not established that the government was unable or unwilling to control MS-13. The BIA affirmed. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review. The BIA did not commit a legal error in interpreting and applying the asylum and withholding-of-removal statutes. Its opinion permits discernment of the grounds on which it relied and its findings have a fair evidentiary basis. View "Rodriguez de Palucho v. Garland" on Justia Law

Class Counsel discovered the Social Security Administration's (SSA’s) systemic failure to perform “Subtraction Recalculations” and recovered over $106 million in past-due disability benefits. After performing the Subtraction Recalculations for all the claimants, the SSA argued that the district court did not have authority under the Social Security Act’s judicial-review provision, 42 U.S.C. 405(g), to order the Subtraction Recalculations and that Class Counsel cannot recover attorney fees under section 406(b) for representation of the claimants.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the award of $15.9 million in attorney fees to Class Counsel. SSA “may not hide behind” the statutory provisions merely because it erred at the end, rather than at the beginning, of the benefits-award process. The district court appropriately exercised judicial review under section 405(g), properly ordered the SSA to perform the Subtraction Recalculations, and properly awarded reasonable attorneys’ fees. The SSA failed to award claimants additional past-due benefits to which they were entitled. Counsel successfully sought judicial assistance to obtain those benefits. Congress did not create a statute that allows attorneys to recover fees when the SSA initially fails to award benefits, only to foreclose fee recovery when the SSA later unlawfully withholds additional benefits. View "Steigerwald v. Commissioner of Social Security" on Justia Law

In 1985, Messing, an attorney, obtained a long-term disability (LTD) insurance policy through Provident. Beginning in 1994, Messing struggled with depression. In 1997, Messing was hospitalized for his depression for more than three weeks. Provident began paying LTD benefits but later initiated a dispute. Messing's subsequent lawsuit settled in 2000 with Provident resuming payments. In 2018, Provident sought proof, beyond Messing’s own certifications, that he was unable to work as an attorney. Messing’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Franseen, submitted a report diagnosing Messing with “Major Depressive Disorder, recurrent, minimal to mild,” and noting that Messing had stopped using medications to treat his depression in 2012 “and ha[d] been stable for the most part since then.” Franseen refused to render an opinion as to whether Messing could return to work. Provident had Dr. Lemmen interview Messing. Lemmen concluded, “[t]here is no objective evidence that [Messing] would not be able to practice as an attorney, should he desire to do so.” Messing appealed the termination of his benefits, providing affidavits from attorneys and a report from a third psychiatrist, Callaghan.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Provident’s claim for reimbursement of benefits it had paid but reversed with respect to the termination of benefits. Messing has proven that he remains unable to return to work as an attorney. Improvements in Messing’s health do not necessarily mean he can return to working as a full-time personal injury attorney. Dr. Callaghan noted Messing’s progress is likely attributable to his abstention from practicing law. View "Messing v. Provident Life & Accident Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Weiser, a Republican donor and chair of the Michigan Republican Party (MRP), and the MRP alleged that an interpretative statement (recall exemption) and a declaratory ruling issued by the Michigan Secretary of State in the 1980s violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments by allowing supporters of Governor Whitmer to make or receive contributions on more favorable terms than Weiser or the MRP with respect to the 2022 gubernatorial election. The Michigan Campaign Finance Act (MCFA) limits donations to candidates. The recall exceptions clarify that the general election contribution limits do not apply to contributions made to an officeholder to defend against a recall effort. During a recall effort, the officeholder’s committee may “accept contributions in excess of section [169.252’s] contribution limitations.” Contributions made during an active recall effort must be so designated and must be deposited into the committee’s account. If a recall election never materializes, the committee must divest itself of these contributions. In 2020 and 2021, apparently in response to measures to combat the spread of COVID-19, 27 recall efforts were launched by Michigan voters. Whitmer’s committee collected and subsequently disgorged leftover recall funds, refunding $250,000 to an individual donor and about $3.5 million to the Democratic Party.The district court dismissed the action for lack of standing. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Weiser and the MRP fail to plausibly demonstrate that the recall exception prevents Weiser or the MRP from equally supporting their preferred gubernatorial candidate. View "Weiser v. Benson" on Justia Law

Wild Eggs owns and operates restaurants in Indiana, Ohio, and Kentucky. When the COVID-19 pandemic began, those states imposed Stay-at-Home orders for all “non-essential” businesses. Wild Eggs was forced to suspend in-person dining and to restrict restaurant use to curbside pickup and delivery. State Auto has insured Wild Eggs since 2016. Wild Eggs notified State Auto of its claim for business losses under the Restaurant Extension Endorsement, which provides for 30 days of lost business income for the suspension of restaurant operations due to the order of a civil authority that resulted from an actual or alleged exposure of a restaurant to a disease. It also claimed coverage for all lost business income resulting from “direct physical loss of or damage to property” under the “Business Income Coverage” provision. State Auto denied coverage. Wild Eggs filed a breach-of-contract suit.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The Endorsement did not apply because the closures of Wild Eggs’s restaurants did not result from exposure to COVID-19 at the restaurants themselves. The Business Income Coverage provision did not apply because Wild Eggs did not suffer tangible damage to its property. View "Wild Eggs Holdings, Inc. v. State Auto. Property & Casualty Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Mayfield manufactures a football helmet accessory that purportedly reduces the severity of football helmet impact when it is installed on an existing football helmet. Mayfield sued the National Operating Committee on Standards for Athletic Equipment (NOCSAE), a nonprofit organization that develops and promotes safety standards for athletic equipment. It has a safety certification that can be applied to football helmets that meet NOCSAE’s standards. NOCSAE does not permit manufacturers of helmet accessories to seek certification separately from the helmet manufacturers.Mayfield alleged that NOCSAE and helmet manufacturers are restraining trade in the football helmet market, engaging in an overarching conspiracy to limit competition, and subjecting Mayfield to tortious interference of business relationships or expectations. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. In its claims under the Sherman Act section 1, Mayfield cited scenarios, theories, and occurrences and asked the court to make "sweeping conclusions" about the motives and actions of the defendants. An “explicit agreement,” as required for Sherman Act liability, "should not demand this kind of intellectual leap." The defendants have shown that their desire to protect their reputations and sell safe products is a legitimate business interest. View "Hobart-Mayfield, Inc. v. National Operating Committee on Standards for Athletic Equipment" on Justia Law

Clemons worked as a coal miner for 10 years and smoked two packs per day for 30 years. Clemons suffered and died from COPD. His claims for federal black-lung benefits (30 U.S.C. 901) were denied. An ALJ awarded Mrs. Clemons survivor’s benefits after considering three medical opinions. Dr. Sikder diagnosed Clemons with legal pneumoconiosis in the form of COPD that resulted from both cigarette smoking and from coal-mine dust exposure. Doctros Habre and Broudy attributed Clemons’s COPD solely to his cigarette smoking. The ALJ credited Sikder’s opinion as well-documented, well-reasoned, and supported by substantial evidence, irrespective of the length of coal mine employment she considered, so that opinion was accorded “probative weight” while the other opinions did not sufficiently explain why Clemons’s coal-mine dust exposure did not contribute “at least in part” to his COPD. The Benefits Review Board affirmed, concluding that the evidence was sufficient to establish the presence of legal pneumoconiosis.The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review, finding that the ALJ took the coal mine employment discrepancy into account when he weighed Dr. Sikder’s opinion, and acted within his discretion in explaining that the discrepancy was not so great as to detract from the opinion’s probative value. View "Huscoal, Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor" on Justia Law